[H.A.S.C. No. 108-15]
Y 4.AR 5/2 A:
2003-2004/15
Operation Iraqi Freedom: Operat
OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM:
OPERATIONS AND RECONSTRUCTION
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
HEARING HELD
APRIL 4, JULY 10, SEPTEMBER 25, OCTOBER 2, 8, 21, AND 29, 2003
SUPERINTENDENT OF DO
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APR 2 8 2005
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[H.A.S.C. No. 108-15]
OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM:
OPERATIONS AND RECONSTRUCTION
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
HEARING HELD
APRIL 4, JULY 10, SEPTEMBER 25, OCTOBER 2, 8, 21, AND 29, 2003
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HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
One Hundred Eighth Congress
DUNCAN HUNTER,
CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania
JOEL HEFLEY, Colorado
JIM SAXTON, New Jersey
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York
TERRY EVERETT, Alabama
ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland
HOWARD P. "BUCK" McKEON. California
MAC THORNBERRY, Texas
JOHN N. HOSTETTLER, Indiana
WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina
JIM RYUN, Kansas
JIM GIBBONS, Nevada
ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina
HEATHER WILSON, New Mexico
KEN CALVERT, California
ROB SIMMONS, Connecticut
JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia
ED SCHROCK, Virginia
W. TODD AKIN, Missouri
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia
JEFF MILLER, Florida
JOE WILSON, South Carolina
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey
TOM COLE, Oklahoma
JEB BRADLEY, New Hampshire
ROB BISHOP, Utah
MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio
JOHN KLINE, Minnesota
CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan
PHIL GINGREY, Georgia
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
TRENT FRANKS, Arizona
California, Chairman
IKE SKELTON, Missouri
JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina
SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas
LANE EVANS, Illinois
GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi
NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii
MARTY MEEHAN, Massachusetts
SILVESTRE REYES, Texas
VIC SNYDER, Arkansas
JIM TURNER, Texas
ADAM SMITH, Washington
LORETTA SANCHEZ, CaUfomia
MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina
GIRO D, RODRIGUEZ, Texas
ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California
ROBERT A. BRADY. Pennsylvania
BARON P. HILL, Indiana
JOHN B. LARSON, Connecticut
SUSAN A. DAVIS, California
JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
STEVE ISRAEL, New York
RICK LARSEN, Washington
JIM COOPER, Tennessee
JIM MARSHALL, Georgia
KENDRICK B. MEEK, Florida
MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam
RODNEY ALEXANDER, Louisiana
TIM RYAN, Ohio
Robert S. Rangel, Staff Director
James M. Lariviere, Professional Staff Member
Justin Bernier, Research Assistant
(H)
CONTENTS
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2003
Page
Page
Hearings:
Friday, April 4, 2003, Iraqi Violations of the Law of Armed Conflict 1
Thursday, July 10, 2003, Operation Iraqi Freedom: The Commander's Per-
spective 49
Thursday, September 25, 2003, United States Policy and Operations in Iraq ... 137
Thursday, October 2, 2003, Operational Lessons Learned from Operation
Iraqi Freedom 283
Wednesday, October 8, 2003, Iraq: Reconstruction and Rehabilitation 357
Tuesday, October 21, 2003, Operation Iraqi Freedom: Outside Perspectives .... 463
Wednesday, October 29, 2003, Iraq Reconstruction and Stability Operations:
The Way Forward 571
Appendixes:
Friday, April 4, 2003 35
Thursday, July 10, 2003 99
Thursday, September 25, 2003 207
Thursday, October 2, 2003 331
Wednesday, October 8, 2003 417
Tuesday, October 21, 2003 517
Wednesday, October 29, 2003 611
FRIDAY, APRIL 4, 2003
IRAQI VIOLATIONS OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Hunter, Hon. Duncan, a Representative from California, Chairman, Commit-
tee on Armed Services 1
Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Ranking Member, Com-
mittee on Armed Services 2
WITNESSES
Parks, W. Hayes, Special Assistant, Law of War Matters, Judge Advocate
General, Department of the Army 3
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Hunter, Hon. Duncan 39
Parks, Gen. W. Hays 46
Skelton, Hon. Ike 43
(HI)
IV
Page
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Questions and Answers Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Questions submitted.]
THURSDAY, JULY 10, 2003
OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM: THE COMIVIANDER'S PERSPECTIVE
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY IVIEIMBERS OF CONGRESS
Hunter, Hon. Duncan, a Representative from Cahfomia, Chairman, Commit-
tee on Armed Services 49
Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Ranking Member, Com-
mittee on Armed Services 50
WITNESSES
Franks, Gen. Tommy R., Former Commander, U.S. Central Command 51
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Franks, Gen. Tommy R 110
Hunter, Hon. Duncan 103
Skelton, Hon. Ike 106
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Questions and Answers Submitted for the Record:
Mr. LoBiondo 135
Mr. Meehan 133
Mr. Miller 134
THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 25, 2003
UNITED STATES POLICY AND OPERATIONS IN IRAQ
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Hunter, Hon. Duncan, a Representative from California, Chairman, Commit-
tee on Armed Services 137
Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Ranking Member, Com-
mittee on Armed Services 140
WITNESSES
Abizaid, Gen. John P., USA, Commander, United States Central Command .... 147
Bremer, Ambassador, L. Paul III, Administrator, Coalition Provisional Au-
thority 144
Wolfowitz, Hon. Paul D., Deputy Secretary of Defense 141
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Abizaid, Gen. John P 251
Bremer, Ambassador L. Paul III 232
Hunter, Hon. Duncan 211
Skelton, Hon. Ike 216
Wolfowitz, Hon. Paul D 221
Documents Submitted for the Record:
Coalition Provisional Authority Request to Rehabilitate and Reconstruct
Iraq, Summary of the Request 263
Letter to the President from Mr. Skelton, dated March 18, 2003 270
Letter to the President from Mr. Skelton, dated September 4, 2002 273
V
Page
Questions and Answers Submitted for the Record:
Mr. LoBiondo 279
Mr. Skelton 279
Mr. Spratt 279
THURSDAY, OCTOBER 2, 2003
OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM: LESSONS LEARNED
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Hunter, Hon. Duncan, a Representative from California, Chairman, Commit-
tee on Armed Services 283
Taylor, Hon. Gene, a Representative from Mississippi 284
WITNESSES
Giambastiani, Adm. Edmund P., Jr., Commander, United States Joint Forces
Command and Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (NATO); accom-
panied by Brig. Gen. Robert Cone 285
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Giambastiani, Adm. Edmund P., Jr 341
Hunter, Hon. Duncan 335
Skelton, Hon. Ike 338
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Questions and Answers Submitted for the Record:
Mr. Cooper 356
Mr. Meek 356
Mr. Taylor 355
WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 8, 2003
IRAQ: RECONSTRUCTION AND REHABILITATION
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Hunter, Hon. Duncan, a Representative from California, Chairman, Commit-
tee on Armed Services 357
Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Ranking Member, Com-
mittee on Armed Services 358
WITNESSES
Rodman, Peter W., Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security
Affairs 358
Hamre, John J., President, Center for Strategic and International Studies,
Iraq Reconstruction Assessment Mission 361
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Hamre, John J 429
Hunter, Hon. Duncan 421
Rodman, Peter W 425
Skelton, Hon. Ike 423
Documents Submitted for the Record:
Coalition Provisional Authority Baghdad, Iraq, Achieving the Vision to
Restore Full Sovereignty to the Iraqi People 435
Iraq's Post-Conflict Reconstruction, A field Review and Recommendations
July 17, 2003 444
VI
Page
Questions and Answers Submitted for the Record:
Mr. Hunter 461
TUESDAY, OCTOBER 21, 2003
OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM: OUTSIDE PERSPECTIVES
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Hunter, Hon. Duncan, a Representative from California, Chairman, Commit-
tee on Armed Services 463
Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative fi-om Missouri, Ranking Member, Com-
mittee on Armed Services 464
WITNESSES
Biddle, Dr. Stephen D., Associate Research Professor of National Security
Studies, U.S. Army War College 475
Krepinevich, Dr. Andrew Jr., Executive Director, Center for Strategic and
Budgetary Assessments 470
Scales, Maj. Gen. Robert Jr., USA, Ret., Former Commandant, U.S. Army
War College 465
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Biddle, Dr. Stephen D 544
Hunter, Hon. Duncan 521
Krepinevich, Dr. Andrew Jr 539
Scales, Maj. Gen. Robert Jr 527
Skelton, Hon. Ike 524
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Questions and Answers Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Questions submitted.]
WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 29, 2003
IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION AND STABILITY OPERATIONS: THE WAY
FORWARD
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Hunter, Hon. Duncan, a Representative from Cadifomia, Chairman, Commit-
tee on Armed Services 571
Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Ranking Member, Com-
mittee on Armed Services 572
WITNESSES
O'Hanlon, Michael, Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution 578
Ottaway, Marina S., Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace 582
Zinsmeister, Karl, J.B. Fuqua Fellow, American Enterprise Institute 573
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Hunter, Hon. Duncan 615
Miller, Hon. Jeff, a Representative from the State of Florida 642
O'Hanlon, Michael 643
Ottaway, Marina S 659
Skelton, Hon. Ike 619
Zinsmeister, Karl 623
VII
Page
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Questions and Answers Submitted for the Record:
Mr. Langevin 669
IRAQI VIOLATIONS OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, Friday, April 4, 2003.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 1:07 p.m., in room 2118,
Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Duncan Hunter (chairman of
the committee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DUNCAN HUNTER, A REP-
RESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE
ON ARMED SERVICES
The Chairman. The hearing will come to order. This afternoon
the committee will review the apparent violations of the law of
armed conflict by the Iraqi military, and it is a pleasure to welcome
our witness this afternoon, a Mr. W. Hayes Parks, Special Assist-
ant to the Judge Advocate General for Law of War Matters, De-
partment of the Army. Sir, we look forward to your testimony.
The Law of Armed Conflict is a body of international law that
governs the initiation and conduct of military operations. It con-
sists of treaties, conventions, protocols and customary practices
whose purpose is to protect noncombatants and facilitate the end
of a conflict.
The United States, more than any other nation in history, con-
ducts its military operations in strict compliance with the Law of
Armed Conflict. Our extensive use of precision-guided munitions to
destroy military targets while minimizing civilian casualties and
the humane treatment of Iraqi prisoners of war and civilians by
U.S. Forces bear witness to our commitment to these principles.
Our adversaries do not necessarily share our commitment. Since
the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom, there had been reports of
Iraqi soldiers faking surrender in order to get close to U.S. forces,
only to open fire once our troops approached.
Last week, Marines took fire from a hospital, and after returning
fire, captured the facility along with approximately 170 Iraqi sol-
diers, some 200 weapons and nearly 3,000 chemical suits.
There have been reports of Iraqis fighting in civilian clothes and
using civilians as human shields, and just this morning, of course
I watched — unconfirmed, but at least watched initial press reports
of a suicide bomber who approached American soldiers on the basis
that they were — that the person in question was pregnant and
needed help and then blew off a device in the vehicle once the
Americans approached. All these are flagrant violations of the law.
But the most outrageous violation occurred during the weekend
of March 22nd to 23rd. A maintenance convoy moving forward to
support the 3rd Infantry Division was ambushed outside of
(1)
Nasariya. But shortly after the ambush, Al-Jazeera, the Arabic lan-
guage television network, broadcast an Iraqi TV video showing the
dead American soldiers, some with a single bullet wound to the
head. These scenes prompted Department of Defense (DOD) offi-
cials to state that they believe some of these soldiers had been exe-
cuted by Iraqi forces.
One PFC. Jessica Lynch was successfully rescued last Tuesday,
and we applaud her courage and fortitude as well as the courage
and skills of the forces who conducted this daring operation.
I and all Americans deplore this flagrant violation of the Laws
of Armed Conflict. While they will, in no way, alter the way we
treat Iraqi prisoners, neither will they deter us from finding those
responsible for this conduct and bringing them to justice once this
conflict is over. And I think that is a consideration that has to be
undertaken by every Iraqi officer at this time.
When they are held accountable for their actions during this war,
will they be found guilty of war crimes? Will they be found guilty
of abusing American prisoners? Will they be found guilty of execut-
ing American prisoners? Will they be found guilty of using weapons
of mass destruction? I think it is incumbent upon every Iraqi offi-
cer who is in operations today to reflect very deeply and very
gravely about their future and about the accountability that will
occur very shortly.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hunter can be found in the Ap-
pendix on page 39.]
The Chairman. So before going to our witness, let me now recog-
nize the committee's ranking Democrat, my partner on this com-
mittee, Mr. Ike Skelton, the gentleman from Missouri, for any re-
marks he may wish to make.
STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM MISSOURI, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON
ARMED SERVICES
Mr. Skelton. First, Mr. Chairman, let me not only thank you,
but compliment you on calling this hearing. It is a very important
issue that we in the Congress, the United States, should under-
take, and I think it is very, very timely as well as important. We
have all heard both the media stories and the classified briefings,
we receive reports of the appalling Iraqi treatment of American
prisoners of war. You have heard, too, about the Iraqi's ambush
tactics on a battlefield where soldiers dressed as civilians have
feigned surrender only to attack American soldiers once they ap-
proach. It is impossible to watch these stories without anger.
The United States military, more than any other in the world,
trains our troops and demands their compliance with the Geneva
conventions as well as all other laws of war. That our current ad-
versary does not is a travesty, with a continuation of a long line
of war crimes committed in its previous conflicts. That when the
war is over, we will have to find a way to bring those who have
perpetrated these actions to justice. No question about that. We
will have to do this in a way that shows our continued commitment
to the rule of law and nobly honoring the principles that some Iraqi
troops have not.
I would like to thank you, Chairman, again, for holding this
hearing now when the issues are fresh in our minds. It is a perfect
time to better understand what the laws of war say and what the
range of options may be for handling those who violate the laws;
but decisions about how to handle those Iraqis accused of a crime
must be made with sober deliberation, mindful of the high stand-
ards of the international law.
First step is doing what we are doing today. Let me also add, we
take a page out of history. This is not the first time our country
has been faced with challenges such as this. We all recall, of
course, the Nuremberg trials that I had a lawyer from my home-
town participating in those. The trials of — as established by Gen-
eral Douglas MacArthur of the Japanese leaders who allowed atroc-
ities to occur, General Homma and General Yamashita as well as
Tojo and the others that were tried by tribunals under General
MacArthur.
And then, of course, it is a little different from what we are talk-
ing about today, but it is still a tribunal, a tribunal of the eight
German saboteurs who were captured in 1942, tried and convicted
of espionage, and all of these historical precedents could very well
play a role in what we in the Congress do today. This is a very se-
rious matter. And I commend you on calling for this all-important
hearing. Thank you.
The Chairman. I thank my colleague, and I want to thank all
the members who came here today, even though we are not in ses-
sion, and lots of folks have a lot of work to do back in their dis-
tricts. It was important to be here, I think, and work on this impor-
tant issue. So I want to thank everyone who stayed here today to
work this important issue for the House Armed Services Commit-
tee.
So once again, our witness is a Mr. W. Hayes Parks, who is Spe-
cial Assistant to the Judge Advocate General for Law of War Mat-
ters, Department of the Army. And Mr. Parks, thank you, sir, for
your service to our country, and thank you for reflecting on this im-
portant issue. The floor is yours.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Skelton can be found in the Ap-
pendix on page 43.]
STATEMENT OF W. HAYES PARKS, SPECIAL ASSISTANT, LAW
OF WAR MATTERS, JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL, DEPART-
MENT OF THE ARMY
Mr. Parks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for invit-
ing me to testify on this very important subject.
I have been asked to comment on the 1949 Geneva Convention
relative to the protection of prisoners of war. Department of De-
fense policies with respect to that Convention, and the current con-
flict with Iraq and Iraqi violations of that Convention and other as-
pects of the Law of War.
The 1949 Geneva Convention relative to the protection of pris-
oners of war, commonly referred to by the acronym GPW, was ne-
gotiated after World War II. Out of 194 nations in the world, 190
are states parties, including the United States and Iraq. More gov-
ernments are states parties to this Convention than member states
of the United Nations, making it one of the most widely accepted
treaties.
The protections of the Convention apply when the members of
the armed forces of one belligerent nation fall into the hands of an
enemy belligerent. This can happen through capture or surrender
to enemy military forces.
The Geneva Convention provides the following fundamental pro-
tections for prisoners of war: Prisoners of war must, at all times,
be humanely treated. Humane treatment is the baseline, but pris-
oner of war protections are much more extensive.
Any act or omission that causes the death or endangers a pris-
oner of war (POW) is prohibited and is a serious breach of the Con-
vention. Prisoners of war must be removed from the battlefield as
soon as circumstances permit, and at all times protected from phys-
ical and mental harm.
Prisoners of war must be provided adequate food, shelter and
medical aid. Prisoners of war must be protected, particularly
against acts of violence or intimidation and against insults and
public curiosity.
If questioned, prisoners of war are required to provide their
name, rank, serial number and date of birth. They may not be re-
quired or forced to provide any other information.
Prisoners of war may not be subjected to physical or mental tor-
ture. Those who refuse to answer questions may not be threatened,
insulted or exposed to any unpleasant or disadvantaged — disad-
vantageous treatment of any kind. Subject to valid security rea-
sons, prisoners of war are entitled to retain their personal property
and protective equipment. These items may not be taken from a
prisoner of war unless properly accounted for and receipted.
Representatives from the International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC) must be permitted access to prisoners of war as soon
as practical. All prisoners of war must be protected against assault,
including sexual assault. Female prisoners of war shall be treated
with a regard due to their gender, and like all POWs, are entitled
respect for their person and their honor.
In addition to the GPW, there are other Geneva Conventions rel-
ative to the current conflict. In particular, the United States and
Iraq are both parties to the 1949 Geneva Convention for the ame-
lioration of the condition of the wounded and sick of armed forces
in the field. The title of this Convention is a bit misleading because
it also provides protection for the dead.
In particular, this Convention first requires parties to the conflict
to protect the dead against pillage and ill treatment; and second,
requires parties to ensure that the dead are honorably interred,
their graves respected and information as to their identity, et
cetera, provided to the International Committee of the Red Cross
to be provided to the government that sent them to the conflict.
With respect to Department of Defense policies in the conflict
with Iraq, the United States and its coalition forces conduct all op-
erations in compliance with the law of war. As the Chairman
noted, no nation devotes more resources to training and compliance
with the laws of war than the United States.
Both the United States and Iraq are parties to the GPW, which
the United States has fully observed in this conflict. U.S. and coali-
tion forces have planned for the protection and proper treatment of
Iraqi POWs under each of the Geneva conventions I have identi-
fied. These plans are integrated into current operations.
Before describing our policies, I should note that in Operation
Desert Storm in 1991, the United States and its coalition partners
detained 86,743 Iraqi prisoners of war. These Iraqi POWs were
given all the protections required by the Geneva conventions.
Our aims and acts are precisely the same in the current conflict.
We are providing and will continue to provide captured Iraqi com-
batants with the protections of the Geneva Conventions and other
pertinent international law.
In addition, arrangements are in place to allow for representa-
tives from the International Committee of the Red Cross to meet
with Iraqi POWs in U.S. and coalition hands.
With respect to Iraqi violations of the Geneva conventions and
related laws of war, unfortunately, the Iraqi regime is not comply-
ing with the Geneva conventions. Before turning to a summary of
the current Iraqi violations, I should note that in the Desert Storm
in 1991, the Iraqis mistreated U.S. and coalition forces in numer-
ous respects, including physical abuse and torture of prisoners of
war, forcing them to make propaganda statements, depriving them
of food and denial of access to the International Committee of the
Red Cross until the day of repatriation, and of course, much, much
more.
The Iraqis similarly mistreated Iranian prisoners of war during
their Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s. The Iraqi regime has thus dis-
played a system of systematic disregard for the laws of war.
Based upon initial reports and including those in the media, it
appears that Iraq has once again committed extensive violation of
the Geneva Conventions and related laws of war. I will note just
three. First, Iraqi government television and Al-Jazeera have aired
a lengthy tape of deceased or U.S. coalition service members. I un-
derstand that some of you have seen the tape. I will not describe
it in detail.
Suffice it to say that this tape, made at the direction of the Iraqi
regime, shows fundamental violations of the Geneva Convention
obligations, to include prohibitions on pillage and ill treatment of
the dead, the duty to respect the personal dignity of all captured
combatants and possibly prohibitions against willful killing, tor-
ture, inhumane treatment or the willful causing of rape, suffering
or serious injury to body or health of a POW.
Second, Iraqi government television and Al-Jazeera have aired a
tape of U.S. soldiers answering questions in humiliating and insult-
ing circumstances, designed to make them objects of public curios-
ity in violation of the Geneva Convention for protection of prisoners
of war.
Third, there are reports that the Iraqi regime has sent forces car-
rying white flags as if to indicate an intention to surrender, repeat-
ing an illegal act used by the Iraqi military in the 1991 coalition
war to liberate Kuwait, or dressed forces as liberated civilians to
draw coalition forces into ambushes. These acts of perfidy are
among the most fundamental violations of war, endangering coali-
tion forces and innocent Iraqi civilians. These are three obvious
Iraqi Law of War violations. Behind the tapes and initial reports
from the field, there are likely to be additional violations.
The position of the United States Government is to do everj^hing
in its power to bring to justice anyone who, by action or inaction,
is responsible for violations of the laws of war.
A war crimes investigation by the Secretary of the Army to
record Iraqi war crimes during the 1990, 1991 Persian Gulf war re-
sulted in a detailed report. Steps have been taken to begin a simi-
lar investigation and information collection effort. Ultimate disposi-
tion will depend upon evidence collected, identified violations and
individuals who come under U.S. control.
I thank you again for the opportunity to be here. I will be happy
to take any questions you may have.
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Parks.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Parks can be found in the Ap-
pendix on page 46.]
The Chairman. Mr. Parks, just a first kind of a threshold ques-
tion here. What are America's options with respect to bringing to
justice and to accountability war criminals, that is, officers or other
military or political personnel who may have directed some of the
acts that you have talked about?
Mr. Parks. If I might preface that just a bit, Mr. Chairman, we
are doing this on a basis of a treaty obligation that every state
party to the Geneva Conventions has. In Article 1, common to all
four Geneva Conventions, it is stated that each government must
respect and ensure respect for the present Convention in all cir-
cumstances. That includes bringing to justice those who have com-
mitted these offenses.
In the United States, ways to discharge this obligation are statu-
tory. First, within our general courts marshall, we are permitted
to try persons for war crimes. Second, there is
The Chairman. When you say within our jurisdiction for courts
marshall, we have the power to try for war crimes. Does that
mean — that means members of the Iraqi Armed Forces as well as
ours?
Mr. Parks. It does, sir.
Second, in 10 U.S. Code, Section 21, there is also the authority
to use military commissions. As the Chairman knows, I am sure,
that has been one historic way that we have tried war crimes in
the past.
And finally, in 18 U.S. Code, Section 2441, there is also jurisdic-
tion in Federal district court. So we have three
The Chairman. Jurisdiction in what?
Mr. Parks. Federal district court. So we have three Statutory op-
tions on the record.
The Chairman. Okay
Mr. Spratt. Mr. Chairman, I was just curious. What was the
second one? I didn't get the citation.
Mr. Parks. Mihtary commissions, 10 U.S. Code Section 21.
The Chairman. And with respect to the Federal district court, is
there a particular part of U.S. Code that addresses war crimes?
Mr. Parks. In fact, this particular provision, 18 U.S. Code, Sec-
tion 2441, provided the jurisdiction to the Federal district court for
trial of war crimes.
The Chairman. And so I presume it has an array of punishments
which are — which one would — which the court would hand out
upon certain findings of fact and convictions?
Mr. Parks. I cannot say for certain.
The Chairman. Or activities.
Mr. Parks. I would be happy to get that answer for you.
The Chairman. I would just like to see that, and maybe our staff
can provide that. But you have laid out a series of what are at
least apparent violations from the information that we have seen
with our own eyes, and I would like to see what those particular
remedies are.
If you give us just a little historic background, give us an exam-
ple of the military commission and how it has operated in the past.
Mr. Parks. Military commissions actually very much parallel our
own court-martial system. It is a matter of using the same system,
usually because the defendants are not
The Chairman. Bring your microphone up a little closer there.
Mr. Parks. Oh, sorry. Because the defendants are persons not
normally covered by the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Many of
the rules and procedures are exactly the same as they would be
within a court-martial. Many — or actually almost all of the individ-
uals who were tried for war crimes after World War II were, in
fact, prosecuted before military commissions.
The Chairman. Those were the so-called MacArthur Commis-
sions?
Mr. Parks. No, sir. General MacArthur convened the court that
tried General Yamashita in the Philippines after World War II.
Most of the other tribunals were three-officer courts convened at
a local level for offenses committed in a particular geographic area,
not only in the Far East, but also in Europe. Military commissions
of this type were used by just about every ally of ours during World
War II and the United States.
The Chairman. So under what framework were the MacArthur
prosecutions undertaken?
Mr. Parks. He was using that historical military commission
precedent. There had been some in the past, and basically were
using — part of the articles of war at that time gave us the same
authority that Congress gave us under the Uniform Code of Mili-
tary Justice and
The Chairman. Okay. Could you now describe to some degree the
apparatus that we set up in the war against terror that has been
given so much publicity here in the recent months?
Mr. Parks. I am not in a position to give a lot of detail on that,
sir. I have not been directly involved in that. I have been involved
in some other issues. I know that we have had a group of individ-
uals, people much smarter than me, who are experts in criminal
law who have worked these procedures.
The Chairman. Okay. Thank you for your opening statement. It
has been very good. Mr. Parks, at this time let me turn to the
ranking member of the committee, the gentleman from Missouri,
for any questions he has.
Mr. Skelton. I may be able to help you, Mr. Chairman, on your
last question.
8
The Chairman. You know, I kind of think you are going to be
able to, and I want to thank the ranking member, incidentally, as
a guy who has a great historic perspective on a lot of these issues
that come before the committee. And I can see that you had done
a lot of work and a lot of background
Mr. Skelton. You will think by the time I am through that
every lawyer of my hometown from Missouri participated in var-
ious tribunals, which is somewhat close to the truth, but I am
somewhat familiar with the 1942 tribunal that was established by
executive order by Franklin Roosevelt. As a matter of fact, I have
a copy of it. I think I sent it to you. Franklin Roosevelt signed an
executive order establishing a tribunal for the eight saboteurs, Ger-
man saboteurs, the forum or capture that came on the Ponte Vedra
Beach just outside Jacksonville Beach in Florida, and the other
four were captured not long after they landed at Long Island.
They were tried. A lawyer from my hometown, a reserve colonel
by the name of Carl Ristine, defended one who in essence turned
state's evidence, and he received life imprisonment. The others
were executed within moments of their conviction before this spe-
cial tribunal.
And think the tribunal that the Attorney General has estab-
lished— I have seen the language on it — regarding the terrorists is
a parallel to that particular tribunal established by Franklin Roo-
sevelt.
Let me go back a bit, Mr. Parks. 1991, a number of our troops
were captured and mistreated, and my recollection is before our
committee, a woman pilot testified about her being tortured, her
arms being broken. Was there any punitive action taken against
those who perpetrated those war crimes against our American
troops in that 1991 war?
Mr. Parks. Mr. Congressman, there were none. As we said, we
captured the 86,000 some-odd. We found that, in fact, most of the
people we captured were very low-ranking Iraqi soldiers. The offi-
cers had all fled back to Baghdad long before that. Those who were
responsible for her abuse, that was then-major, now-Colonel
Rhonda Cornum, were never apprehended. So we did not have
them in our custody. But it was well established that she was
abused, along with the other prisoners of war as the Congressman
has noted.
Mr. Skelton. So according to our testimony, there are three po-
tential remedies. One is a court-martial of the offending party be-
fore a military court of the American military. Is that correct?
Mr. Parks. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Skelton. Second is a military commission which evidently
is established by statute. Is that correct?
Mr. Parks. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Skelton. And then, of course, the third is Federal courts in
response to a question put by the question to you, you are not fa-
miliar with the penalties or if a jury trial is available, et cetera?
You will give those back to us. Am I correct?
Mr. Parks. I will, sir. It is my understanding, and it has been
sometime since I looked at the legislation — I was involved at the
time that went through the Congress — that the idea was we would
be using the same procedures and punishments and what have
you. We were just adding to the Federal district's authority the ju-
risdiction to try these offenses in cases for someone who is not-
Mr. Skelton. Of course, the biggest problem is having physical
custody of the defendants. Am I correct?
Mr. Parks. That is correct, sir, but at this time — around the
same time, actually a few years before that, I am sure the Con-
gressman was directly involved, we extended our long arm statute
authority to start going after people for violations that did not nec-
essarily occur within the United States. This is yet one more step
in that process.
Mr. Skelton. The Nuremberg Tribunal of which we all may well
remember, that tried Goering and Speer and Rosenberg and the
other notable Nazi criminals was an international tribunal of the
four successful powers. Am I correct?
Mr. Parks. That is correct, sir. There were actually multiple
tiers of tribunals after the war. The top one was the International
Military Tribunal of the principal Nazi accused. There was a simi-
lar tribunal in Japan simply known as the Tokyo Tribunal.
Mr. Skelton. I will get to that in just a second. Explain the ones
in Europe, first.
Mr. Parks. All right. The first one was for the principal Nazi ac-
cused for a number of violations, massive war crimes, crimes
against humanity, waging — starting the war and what have you.
The next level were other military tribunals conducted of higher
ranking general officers, but who were not directly part of the Nazi
leadership as such. These are the officers who commanded core di-
visions and what have you in the field, and who actually carried
out many of the illegal orders issued by Hitler and his regime.
The third level was the smaller military tribunals of individual
accused who committed a specific act. I can recall one particular
case — it was actually tried in Italy — where eight U.S. Army Rang-
ers went ashore one evening, were almost immediately caught. The
commanding general, in whose custody they were ordered their
execution under the Commando Order. His staff judge advocate
and others advised him against it, but the orders went out anyway,
and they were executed. He was tried before an American military
tribunal for those offenses. Was convicted, sentenced to death and
executed by firing squad.
Mr. Skelton. Now, let's talk about the Japanese war tribunals.
For instance, the one that tried Tojo and subsequently hanged him,
where did that come from?
Mr. Parks. That was the International Military Tribunal for the
Far East, otherwise known as the Tokyo Tribunal.
Mr. Skelton. That was composed of American justices and who
else?
Mr. Parks. That was Americans, Russians, India
Mr. Skelton. British?
Mr. Parks. Yes, sir. Great Britain; I believe Australia and the
Dutch, if I am not mistaken.
Mr. Skelton. Now, contrast that to the MacArthur tribunals
that tried Yamashita and Homma. They are the butchers
Mr. Parks. Butchers in the Philippines?
Mr. Skelton. Yes.
10
Mr. Parks. Again, it is the option that was considered at the
time. These people had committed
Mr. Skelton. What statutory authority, if any, did MacArthur
have?
Mr. Parks. He had the authority under the statutes — was given
the authority under the statutes to create mihtary commissions
and under the Articles of War, I assume.
The idea was this was a local offense. It was committed by Gen-
eral Yamashita and by his subordinate officers, and MacArthur
had the authority to convene the court and try him at the scene
of the crime, which was
Mr. Skelton. Was that an American court?
Mr. Parks. That was purely an American court.
Mr. Skelton. Were there others tried besides those two?
Mr. Parks. Yes, sir. His chief of staff was tried.
Mr. Skelton. General Yamashita.
Mr. Parks. General Yamashita's chief of staff was tried. Of
course General Yamashita argued that he did not know these
things were going on. And that was disproved, in my opinion, and
general — I am sorry. Admiral Toyoda, T-o-y-o-d-a, who was, in fact,
in charge of the Japanese naval forces — but he was in Japan — was
tried for these same offenses before the Tokyo Tribunal and acquit-
ted, that court saying that Yamashita had full authority. But the
primary individuals tried were Yamashita and his chief of staff. I
do not know if they went to lower levels. They may have in those
lower tribunals of the type that I referred to.
Mr. Skelton. Now, let's talk about today, and I will be through
in just a moment, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. The gentleman may take as much time as he
needs. I think this is extremely important to build the historic base
for what we may do shortly.
Mr. Skelton. The International Red Cross, of course, has visited
the Iraqi prisoners that are in American hands. Is that not correct?
Mr. Parks. That is correct.
Mr. Skelton. Has International Red Cross, to your knowledge,
made a request to visit the American prisoners of war?
Mr. Parks. It is my understanding that they are in Baghdad and
have made that request.
Mr. Skelton. Has it been granted, to your knowledge?
Mr. Parks. To my knowledge, it has not. I would point out that
during the previous conflict, as I believe I said in my prepared
statement, the International Committee of the Red Cross had rep-
resentatives in Baghdad throughout Operations Desert Storm,
Desert Shield, Desert Storm, made requests to the Iraqi govern-
ment, and were not allowed to see the coalition prisoners of war
until the completion of hostilities after the Iraqis signed the agree-
ments, at which time I can say that the ICRC representatives per-
formed superlative duty in getting our forces — our coalition POWs
repatriated as quickly as possible, but not until they had the con-
sent of the Iraqi government, which did not come until the Iraqi
government had been defeated on the battlefield.
Mr. Skelton. Mr. Chairman, I will reserve my other questions.
Thank you.
11
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman for his knowledge of his-
tory and for setting the stage here for what we may have to do at
the conclusion of this conflict.
The gentleman from New Jersey, the Chairman of the Terrorism,
Unconventional Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee, Mr.
Saxton.
Mr. Saxton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Parks, let me ask
a question that kind of picks up where the ranking member left off.
Can you kind of walk us through the process that we might expect
to see? There was another example in this morning's press of an
Iraqi individual who observed the alleged mistreatment of an
American POW and came to the Marine Corps, reported the mis-
treatment, a series of events took place, and they were successful,
of course.
The question here is, now, can you kind of walk us through — use
this case as an example that we have all read about — can you walk
us through what we might expect to see in the days, weeks, months
ahead.
Mr. Parks. I think the first thing we all want to see is winning
the war, and of course, that is where the combatant commander
has his priorities at this time.
We do have army criminal investigation elements in the theater
of operations. I think until they feel that it is safe to actually pro-
ceed into areas where offenses allegedly occurred, they are not
going to those areas because it might require additional security re-
quirements around them to get them there. And I am offering more
of my personal guess based upon experience in these types of —
prosecuting these types of crimes in Vietnam.
Mr. Saxton. May I just ask you
Mr. Parks. Yes, sir.
Mr. Saxton [continuing! . What you are sajdng is that evidence —
the collection of evidence would be an important thing to be ongo-
ing now, and it is difficult to do that because of the current situa-
tion?
Mr. Parks. Because of the current conflict. The combatant com-
mander has his focus on getting into Baghdad and getting the con-
flict over.
And there is, I think, in my opinion, another reason for that, and
that is there may be, in fact, Iraqi citizens who have been wit-
nesses to crimes. They may not be where they live. They may have
fled because of the fighting. Even if they were there, they might
be reluctant to speak until they are sure that their safety can be
ensured. So I think that the first thing is to win the war, and I
know that from our experience in 1991, we collected tons of docu-
ments. And many of those documents we went through for evidence
of Iraqi war crimes while they were occupying Kuwait.
The same will be the case now. Documents have to be reviewed
for any number of things, potentially orders from the Iraqi regime
to do this, that and the other that is illegal, collecting on-the-scene
physical evidence, covering remains, perhaps, and finding wit-
nesses. This is in the hands of professional criminal investigators.
At that time the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force judge ad-
vocates would assist them in reviewing the evidence that deter-
mined, A, who might have done this; what units were where at
12
what time; looking at the order of battle the Iraqis might have had
at the time; finding out if these people are still alive; seeing if we
have them in custody. As I mentioned, in the 1991 Gulf War, we
had 86,000 POWs, mostly enlisted. We didn't have the perpetrators
of the offenses. This might be a different circumstance this time.
So it is a matter of finding out who was where at what time, what
evidence do we have that a crime was committed, who might have
committed it, who were the witnesses, building a case just as we
might do right here in the United States?
During that time, the policymakers, working with lawyers back
here, would be determining the best course with respect to the par-
ticular forum to try these cases.
Mr. Saxton. We thank you.
Mr. Parks. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman, and I am going to go to
the gentleman from Texas in just a second, but let me just ask you,
Mr. Parks; you related in answer to Mr. Skelton's question that an
execution — that there was a prosecution and an execution of the
general who ordered American POWs to be executed in one conflict.
Mr. Parks. That is correct, sir.
The Chairman. Is that regulation or that prescription of execu-
tion, that is, the capital punishment, for the ordering of execution
of POWs still manifest in the regulations?
Mr. Parks. It is certainly manifest in the Uniform Code of Mili-
tary Justice. I am sure it would be manifest in tribunals or before
the Federal district court. It is not off the table.
The Chairman. So an Iraqi officer who orders the execution of
an American POW can expect that if historic precedent is carried
out, he could well be executed for that action?
Mr. Parks. If the court so determines.
The Chairman. Okay. Thank you.
The gentleman from El Paso, the distinguished gentleman, Mr.
Reyes.
Mr. Reyes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you and
the ranking member for holding this very important hearing. As
you know, Mr. Chairman, I am proud to represent Fort Bliss. That
is the home of the 507th maintenance company that suffered, at
least to date, the most in terms of prisoners of war. We have got
five, and then a number that are missing. And as I mentioned to
you yesterday, Mr. Chairman, I was very proud to have visited
three of those members of the 507th at Walter Reed, and am con-
vinced that when their story is told, it will reinforce the courage
and the bravery of America's fighting men and women. So thank
you for holding this very important hearing.
My first question — Mr. Parks, thank you for your testimony. I
thank you for being here — deals with the fact that a nation is sig-
natory to the Geneva Convention, it obligates every subsequent
government of that nation or form of government, does it not?
Mr. Parks. It does, sir.
Mr. Reyes. And if a government were to renounce, reject, in
some term, disassociate it with the signing of that Convention,
would that be — is there a provision that allows that?
Mr. Parks. The basic laws of treaties, a humanitarian instru-
ment of this type, cannot be renounced in a time of armed conflict.
13
Mr. Reyes. To our knowledge, has the Saddam Hussein regime
ever made any statements renouncing the Geneva Convention or
some — in some way or fashion disassociating themselves from that
signatory obligation?
Mr. Parks. It has not, Mr. Congressman.
Mr. Reyes. Thank you. I have done a number of call-in shows,
and one of the questions that has been asked several times deals
with the fact that we are at war, and how can we reasonably ex-
pect nations to follow "rules of war." I have explained it in terms
that I felt were important in terms of making sure that when we
take into custody as prisoners members of armed services or inno-
cents, that we have an inherent moral obligation to follow rules of
war, and if for no other reason, for the sake of morality, members
of humanity and human kind.
If you were asked that question, how would you respond, Mr.
Parks?
Mr. Parks. Mr. Congressman, I get that question every time I
teach a class. I can give you a long answer or a short answer. I
will give you the short answer to begin with. For a dozen years,
I taught a five-day course in the United States Marine Corps on
the Law of War. It was for captains to colonels. On the first day,
everyone sort of sits there asking the very same kind of question
you are thinking about — are asking, that here comes this Marine
Corps colonel in to talk to them about touchy-feely stuff and at the
end of the day, we will all stand around and sing Kumbayah.
By the second day, they begin to get involved with this, and by
the third day, they say this is not only a moral issue, this is what
America is all about, and this is basically good leadership. And ev-
erybody should be getting this. It is consistent with the way the
United States fights. They may not have identified these things as
legal obligations, but they have seen that this is the right way to
fight. What I do in teaching is to challenge people. Tell me what
it is I am going to tell you in this Law of War course that keeps
you from winning and doing your job. And to date, this is about 35
years of this now, I have not had anyone say, yes, but we would
like to be able to do this.
Let me say a little bit about how treaties are negotiated. I have
been on a delegation since 1978 regulating rules related to the use
of certain conventional weapons in combat. The delegation consists
and is headed by a representative from the State Department. It
has representatives from the Department of Defense, representa-
tives of each of the military services. Our guidance is given to us.
It has been coordinated, sent through interagency process and
clearance by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and we go over and negotiate
what we are told to negotiate.
When we come back, we are not there to be salesman for that
treaty. We bring it back and say, here it is, take a look at it and
see if we can live with it. It goes through a very thorough vetting
process within the Pentagon. It is sent out to the combatant com-
manders. They are told, look at this and tell us if there is an3rthing
that is not acceptable. And when we finish that, we make sure that
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Department of Defense, the State De-
partment are all on board. That is then sent to the White House,
which submits it to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratifi-
14
cation. And the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the chair-
man are expected to sit at the table and say this is the way we
fight, this will not restrict our capabilities. And if it does, to say
so, at which time we will take a reservation to it. So this is not
something that has been written by people out of contact with com-
bat. These are people who say, well, sure, this is exactly how we
want to fight.
The rules there are — we try to make them common sense. The
devil is in the details, of course, and convincing that young 18-year-
old soldier, sailor, airman or Marine, this is in your best interest
and the best interest of the Nation, this is what the people of the
United States expect of you, and I have got to say in witnessing
the leadership, that we have got, particularly over the last 20
years, we have gotten our soldiers and sailors to understand that.
Mr. Reyes. Thank you. I have other questions, Mr. Chairman,
but I will wait for the second round.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
The distinguished gentleman who is a former Marine, Mr. Kline.
Mr. Kline. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, Mr.
Parks, for being here. I am proud to say that I have sat through
those classes of yours. You are an excellent instructor, near as I
can remember from 20 years ago. And I remember the kinds of
questions we asked and the understanding that we had, and so my
first — my first question to you is, are you still teaching those class-
es?
Mr. Parks. I am retired from the Marine Corps Reserve, happily
collecting my Marine Corps Reserve retirement check, but I still do
quite a bit of teaching at the staff and war colleges.
Mr. Kline. And so, the point of that question really is that our
officers, our soldiers and sailors and airmen and Marines are get-
ting instructed in the Law of War, and we have every reason to ex-
pect that they will understand it and abide by those laws.
Mr. Parks. That is correct, sir. I would actually say the edu-
cation program in the Law of War today is broader and deeper
than it has ever been in the history of the United States military.
Mr. Kline. Thank you. Moving to the other guys now, there have
been a lot of stories about the Fedayeen Saddam either threatening
to shoot or actually shooting Iraqi civilians to keep them in line.
Where does that fall in as far as a violation of the Law of War, and
whose jurisdiction would that be under to punish those actions?
Mr. Parks. I believe we actually would have authority to try
these folks for this. The 1949 Geneva Convention generally talks
about, as a Congressman knows, military wounded and sick, mili-
tary wounded, sick and shipwrecked, prisoners of war and enemy
civilians in our hands. So the 1949 conventions probably would not
apply. Other aspects of the Law of War would apply.
When you are using your own citizens as human shields or order-
ing them out to commit acts of perfidy, as is the case with the
Fedayeen Saddam, then I think in that case you are issuing illegal
orders, and you can be prosecuted for those offenses.
Mr. Kline. So whether they are shooting their own civilians, an
incomprehensible sort of concept, I think, to us, or mistreating our
coalition POWs, they could be tried by the same system of commis-
15
sions and tribunals and so forth that you have already explained
to us?
Mr. Parks. They could be.
Mr. Kline. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
The gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Ryan.
Mr. Ryan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate you coming
here today, and I would also like to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for
calling this hearing, because we have an enormous amount of inter-
est back at home on these issues.
One question I did want to ask you is that after September 11th,
the Administration decided not to confer POW status on terrorist
suspects. It was argued that they did not meet the standard laid
out in the Laws of War, and similar decision was made with regard
to the Taliban, as well, despite their roles as defenders of the
Afghani state.
In Iraq, there have been both conventional military troops and
troops who have changed into civilian clothes to fight, and then
they also have the paramilitary troops who are there. What factors
should the Administration take into account in determining which
prisoners should be accorded prisoner of war status?
Mr. Parks. There is no question but the Iraqi — members of the
Iraqi military, the regular military, would be entitled to prisoner
of war status. The question comes with regard to those who are not
part of the Iraqi regular military forces, whether they are this
paramilitary force of some sort or individual civilians.
As a fundamental basis for protection as a prisoner of war, pri-
vate citizens are not allowed to engage in combatant acts. If they
do so, they are not entitled to prisoner of war status. If you have
an irregular militia like this, there are criteria set forth within the
Prisoner of War Convention. There must be some formal associa-
tion with the government. They must be commanded by a person
responsible for their acts. They must be carrying their arms openly,
which of course with the Fedayeen Saddam, that is not often hap-
pening. They must be wearing some sort of a distinctive device,
whatever that might be, that shows they are acting as part of the
military forces, which the Fedayeen Saddam is not doing. And they
must carry out their operations in accordance with the Law of War,
which of course they are not doing either.
So that gets into the issue of whether or not they would be enti-
tled to prisoner of war status as such. So the criteria are well laid
out within the Prisoner of War Convention.
Mr. Ryan. And what is the difference between the way a prisoner
of war would be treated and, say, a civilian who took up arms?
Mr. Parks. There are provisions in a fourth convention I have
not talked about, the Geneva Civilians Convention, that lays out
some fundamental protection for enemy civilians in our hands. As
a practical matter, oftentimes we have had people in our hands
who might not technically have been entitled to prisoner of war
status, but we have provided them prisoner of war protection, and
basically we take the Prisoner of War Convention and use it as a
template for how to set up a camp to take care of them.
For example, the Viet Cong that we captured in Vietnam were
not technically entitled to prisoner of war status, but the military
16
knows how to run a prisoner of war camp, and so they simply set
that camp up and ran it much as they would a prisoner of war
camp without technically providing them the status as such. They
know how to provide adequate food, shelter, medical aid and what
have you, and so even though they might not technically have all
the protections of a prisoner of war, they are provided many of the
privileges of them by simply using this same template.
Mr. Ryan. That is good to know. How far back — I know you men-
tioned a little bit about the process of doing the investigation. How
far back can we realistically go in Iraq to investigate these war
crimes and everything that has happened in between that we, I am
sure, will find out about as we continue to have access to more of
their documents?
Mr. Parks. We have a very large body of evidence from the first
Gulf War, very substantial, which is now in the national archives,
both classified and unclassified. And I think we did a fairly good
job of documenting the violations during that conflict.
It will depend on the evidence that we can get. The witnesses,
the victims that we might have that we might be able to find, and
then, of course, finally, the persons we have in our custody who we
have been able to identify.
Mr. Ryan. One last question, Mr. Chairman. We have all learned
about Al-Jazeera and the TV coverage that has been going on in
the Middle East. Are they somehow contributing to some of the in-
humane treatment just by the nature of who they are and what
they are doing as far as covering this? Do they hold any respon-
sibility at all for being called to go in and watch an execution or
film an execution to violating somehow some of these rules and
laws?
Mr. Parks. That is a tough question. Of course you have to al-
ways ask, are they there voluntarily? If they are in Baghdad and
they are credited to Baghdad and the Iraqi government says, you
will come and film this and publicize it, you always get into the
question of coercion. And as I recall from watching the news just
in the last night or so, Al-Jazeera, I believe, has been told they can
no longer broadcast from Baghdad. So I can only speculate why
that happened. But there is no criminal responsibility, no. It is
wonderful evidence, as far as I am concerned, if that were to hap-
pen. However unfortunate the act itself might be.
Mr. Ryan. I am sure it makes it a lot easier, absolutely. Well,
thank you very much for coming. Thanks again, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
The gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Wilson, who has a
number of members in his family in the uniformed services. And
I know there is great interest in this proceeding.
Mr. Wilson of South Carolina. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you. Ranking Member
Mr. Skelton, for your having and providing for this extraordinarily
important hearing today. Ajnd I am so proud of the service of our
troops. I believe that the conduct of our troops over the past couple
of weeks will be a model in the future as to tactics, as to the use
of professionalism and technology. And the same can apply for
those of us who have a judge advocate general (JAG) background,
and I hope that what we have got with the professionalism that
17
you have already previously indicated, with the technology, with
the investigative abilities that we have, that we will use this con-
flict as a model and a model for deterrence now for the next couple
of weeks, or whatever may occur, but also in future conflicts as a
model, particularly a message to persons who engage in violations
of Law of War, that the United States will take proper action. And
I appreciate you bringing to our attention and reminding us all as
to the ability of a courts marshal or a military commission or U.S.
district court.
Mr. Wilson of South Carolina. And with that background you
indicated that there had been an investigation in the prior war. Is
that — you said that it was both classified and unclassified. Is there
a summary available that could be provided to us?
Mr. Parks. We produced a summary, and I know that it was de-
livered to the State Department, and I believe it was delivered to
the Secretary General of the United Nations. It may have been de-
livered to the Congress. I know in the large volume of the report
to Congress on the conduct of the Gulf War there was an entire
chapter in there on the Law of War, and there was a brief sum-
mary in there on violations by the Iraqi military in that conflict.
There is an executive summary that is unclassified, however, and
we will see if we can run that to ground.
Mr. Wilson of South Carolina. That would be excellent. The
executive summary is exactly what I would like to see. I think
other members of the committee would find that of interest, too.
Additionally, it has been reported that there is a special inves-
tigations team to investigate the Iraqi violations of the Geneva
Conventions. What is the status of that team?
Mr. Parks. The Secretary — let me back up just a moment. The
Department of Defense has a directive that has been in effect since
1974 with minor revisions, Department of Defense Directive
5100.77. It establishes that the Secretary of the Army is the execu-
tive agent for investigation of war crimes committed by enemy per-
sonnel against U.S. forces. The Deputy Secretary of Defense on, I
believe, the 25th of March, just last week, reappointed the Sec-
retary of the Army in that role, the same role the Secretary of the
Army discharged during the first Gulf War. That is now the proc-
ess for beginning to establish the overall framework for carrying
out the execution — the investigations.
As I mentioned, there are already Army criminal investigations
in the theater of operations, collecting the information, recovering
whatever data we might have, and establishing a way in which this
information can be collected, evaluated, and put together to iden-
tify the offenses and proceed from there.
The first step, as I mentioned, however, was won last week. I
think the special investigation itself is sort of probably lower case,
s-i-t, rather than capital; that the idea was we are using the proc-
esses we have in place but we are now building the framework to
receive the information and act upon it.
Mr. Wilson of South Carolina. Our investigative teams now
are so professional and they know what they are doing. Again, I
want to restate about the technology we know who is where, when.
It is just extraordinary. Again, the opportunity that we have to
send a message to the world that war crimes are not to be per-
18
mitted. And I would like to point out, too, I am quite familiar that
there are Reserve and National Guard JAG officers who would be
very enthusiastic in serving in the future, to be deployed in the fu-
ture on this particular project. And I yield the balance of my time.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
The other distinguished gentleman from South Carolina, Mr.
Spratt.
Mr. Spratt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you very much for your testimony. Could I go back to the
three options you listed for trying war criminals: the general court
marshal authority for war crimes, I think it was 10 U.S.C., Section
21, Military Commissions, and 18 U.S.C. 2441. Who is the conven-
ing authority for the military commission?
Mr. Parks. It will depend on entirely how those are set up. Since
the decision has not been taken as to whether or not which of those
options will be utilized, that is one of the details I think yet to be
decided upon.
Mr. Spratt. I believe, there is a standing authority in the so-
called Articles of War, Law of War, that is 234 U.S. Code for such
a commission, where Congress has actually created a generic com-
mission that can be used and convened from time to time?
Mr. Parks. That was the section that I cited. Now, the Articles
of War have been supplanted by the Uniform Code of Military Jus-
tice. It gives that dual jurisdiction in Article 18 of the Uniform
Code of Military Justice. It provides that a general court marshal
may try violations of the Uniform Code of Military Justice and vio-
lations of the Law of War. So that is how we get that dual track.
Mr. Spratt. Typically, who makes the prosecutorial decisions as
to which court of tribunal to use?
Mr. Parks. I think it would be made by the executive branch as
to which is the best option under the circumstances for the particu-
lar type of crimes and accused.
Mr. Spratt. The Attorney General or the President himself?
Mr. Parks. I suspect the President himself.
Mr. Spratt. Why did Congress add 18 U.S.C. 2441 to the other
two procedures?
Mr. Parks. I am not be able to tell you, sir. That was in 1851.
I have not looked at the history of that. It could be that the feeling
was that — I know that at the time, some of the concern was what
if we have some discharged U.S. serviceman who has left the serv-
ice but may have committed an offense while on active duty and
we have no way to recall him, he would no longer be subject to the
Uniform Code of Military Justice. So therefore, if he had committed
a war crime — we all hate to think about that — but if he had com-
mitted a war crime, we could bring him back before general court
marshal and try him under Article 18 for a violation of the Law
of War.
As I am sure the Congressman knows, in the mid-1950s there
were a number of Supreme Court cases that limited the jurisdiction
of general courts marshal against persons who were no longer sub-
ject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice, and persons who had
never been subject to it such as the dependents of servicemen. I be-
lieve there was one case in which the wife of a serviceman mur-
dered him in Germany and was brought before a general court
19
marshal, and the case — obviously the Supreme Court decided there
was no jurisdiction. So those jurisdictional questions were raised at
the time as to whether or not we could bring back a discharged
servicemen.
There was an issue raised at the time of the My Lai investiga-
tions in 1970 and 1971. There were a number of members of Char-
lie 1st of the 20th who were involved in the massacre at My Lai
who were no longer in the military. And an option at that time was
to bring them back and try them under Article 18 of the Uniform
Code of Military Justice for violations of the Law of War. The deci-
sion was taken on both a legal and policy basis that that would not
be done.
Mr. Spratt. So if they have the third option, they felt more con-
stitutionally secure in bringing a new civilian into the jurisdiction
of the US district court as opposed to trying to haul them back be-
fore a military court
Mr. Parks. Yes, sir.
Mr. Spratt [continuing]. When their military status was not
clear.
With respect to unlawful combatants, what rights do they have?
Mr. Parks. They are certainly not entitled to be prisoners of war.
But both within the Civilians Convention and our practices, we are
going to provide them certain minimum humanitarian standards.
With respect to the individuals we have down at Guantanamo, for
example, we have taken the Prisoner of War Convention as a tem-
plate and provided them much of the same treatment we would
provide a prisoner of war. They don't get certain things; like in Ar-
ticle 60 of the Prisoner of War Convention it provides that every
prisoner of war shall receive an advance pay of X number of Swiss
francs per month so they can buy things at the post exchange. We
don't provide them that. We provide them free: the soap, towels,
toothpaste, toothbrush, tobacco and what have you. So it is a mat-
ter of finding those basic things that we would provide anyone in
our hands and in our custody and providing them those amenities.
Mr. Spratt. Having engaged in combat but not being in uniform
or in regular service or even in a militia, are they war criminals;
and does it require them to be tried before they can ultimately be
released?
Mr. Parks. They would be tried for those offenses. The basic dif-
ference is if I am a lawful combatant, I am lawfully entitled to kill
an enemy soldier and there is no crime for that. Because this per-
son is an unprivileged belligerent, the fact that a civilian who has
now taken part in the hostilities, he can now be prosecuted for kill-
ing an enemy soldier. That is the basic difference. This is a crimi-
nal offense, to kill an enemy soldier. Whereas, when a regular com-
batant does that, there is no crime.
Mr. Spratt. If they are irregular troops and unlawful combat-
ants, does that mean if they have killed American soldiers that
they are to be tried for murder?
Mr. Parks. They could be tried for murder, sir.
Mr. Spratt. Is that in the works now? Is that planned for the
disposition of these prisoners?
Mr. Parks. As Congressman Skelton said — I am sorry, I believe
it was Congressman Skelton that said we are in step one, and that
20
is where we are with regard to this conflict. As I mentioned, right
now the first thing we want to do is win the war. And then we will
proceed on those next steps.
Mr. Spratt. But their legal situation is sort of in limbo.
Mr. Paeks. I am not sure that we have that many of them in
custody, but certainly if we had members of the Fedayeen Saddam
in our hands, they can be detained as our prisoners of war for the
duration of the hostilities and they can be prosecuted for their
crimes.
Mr. Spratt. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Thank the gentleman for his excellent questions.
The gentleman who is vice chairman of the Total Force Sub-
committee, which oversees all of our active and Reserve and Guard
forces, the gentleman from Oklahoma, Mr. Cole.
Mr. Cole. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Like the other members on
the committee I want to thank you for having this very, very im-
portant hearing. I think all of us take this personally. I know cer-
tainly I do. I have an uncle who did four years in a prison camp
in the Second World War and went through some horrific experi-
ences.
Let me ask you, if I may, Mr. Parks, could you walk through for
me the sequence of conditions and circumstances whereby we
might hold somebody who was not directly responsible for a crime
or an atrocity in question, but, in the chain of command above peo-
ple who actually committed an act. How do you establish the de-
gree of responsibility? How far up can you go?
Mr. Parks. Actually the standard began with the Yamashita case
that we discussed earlier. I think there is some misunderstanding
as to what was the decision in the Yamishita case. But that deci-
sion was then developed more in subsequent cases during World
War II, and it came out with the basic concepts of command re-
sponsibility. And that is, a commander can be criminally respon-
sible for the crimes committed by his subordinates if he orders
them or if he knows of them or he should have known of them and
fails to act. How far up the chain of command will depend on how
far you can trace that order, what the criminal information may be.
During World War II, the evidence was very overwhelming that,
obviously, the orders flowed from top down. And as I mentioned in
that brief summary of the three-tiered process we had, whenever
we found someone within that chain of command and we found evi-
dence that they knew or should have known the crimes being com-
mitted by their subordinates, they were found criminally respon-
sible for those acts.
Mr. Cole. And as you trace that chain of command, can that
reach that civil authorities as well as directly in the military chain
of command?
Mr. Parks. There were some civil authorities in the postwar
trials both in Germany and Japan. Obviously, today, I think it
would be possible in a regime that if you had people directly in-
volved in the civilian side — for instance, I believe one of Saddam
Hussein's sons is responsible for the Fedayeen Saddam. I have no
doubt if I were a prosecutor of that, I would go to court if his son
was still alive and prosecute him for those offenses on the basis of
command responsibility.
21
Mr. Cole. Thank you. Just a few more questions, if I may. Are
there any statutes of Hmitation that apply on crimes against the
Geneva Convention or other types of war crimes?
Mr. Paeks. If it is a violation of the Geneva Conventions, par-
ticularly those categorized as grave breaches, such as willful kill-
ing, willful torture, there is no statute of limitations.
Mr. Cole. Let me ask you this, too. Let's assume we had a situa-
tion where we had — well, let me ask you this first. Can somebody
be convicted in absentia?
Mr. Parks. The United States as a longstanding policy has not
carried out crime — trials in absentia.
Mr. Cole. Let's assume someone had been charged with a war
crime and fled, clearly to escape prosecution, but fled into another
sovereign state, a noncombatant state. Would we have the author-
ity to take that person out either legally through extradition, or if
we didn't get cooperation, to try a special operation to go after
somebody if they fled to avoid prosecution for war crimes?
Mr. Parks. The provision that I cited from, Article 1 to the 419
Geneva Convention, "respect" and "ensure respect" has been inter-
preted as requiring the nation holding that person to either pros-
ecute or extradite. The dilemma you have, of course, is if there is
not an extradition treaty in process, sometimes some governments
hesitate to do that.
However, that has other consequences, because oftentimes they
find it very uncomfortable to have that person within their terri-
tory and encourage them to go elsewhere or perhaps find their way
into U.S. hands.
Mr. Cole. So just to be specific on this point if I may, at the risk
of being a bit redundant, if someone fled, let's say into the — in all
likelihood — the jurisdiction of another country that had signed the
Geneva Convention, would that country have some degree of obli-
gation to be cooperative and turn that person over to an appro-
priate tribunal for trial?
Mr. Parks. That would be — I believe that would be our position;
that under the Geneva Conventions that they would have that obli-
gation to either prosecute or extradite that person.
Mr. Cole. Thank you, Mr. Parks. I yield back my time, Mr.
Chairman.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman. Mr. Meek.
Mr. Meek. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you so very much, Mr. Parks, for being here today to talk
to us. Give us some insight on the Geneva Convention and other
tools that we would have to follow up on war crimes.
Recently, the Minister of Information in Iraq announced that
Iraqi forces will start using unconventional — how would you say —
war efforts against U.S. troops and allied forces. And I know in Ar-
ticle 18 and 19 it talks a little bit about hospitals, it talks about
the do's and don'ts as it relates to the rules of engagement. We all
know that the Iraqi military or Saddam Hussein are using these
hospitals to stockpile arms and possibly chemical weapons.
How is that going to deal with the prosecution? Because we are
going to have to engage those hospitals in some way. And parts of
what I am reading in 18 and 19 is a protection of civilians. Coupled
with — you can elaborate on this — coupled with the fact that we are
22
having a lot of incidents at our checkpoints, we are trying to help
civilians move out of the area, migrate to a safer area, and every
now and then we have suicide bombers. And U.S. troops — obvi-
ously, we had an incident where a bus wouldn't stop and women
and children lost their lives in that case, including the driver. How
difficult is this going to make this sword as we start to head to-
wards prosecution in the future, towards some of these war crimes?
Mr. Parks. I think my first concern, if I were on the battlefield,
would be protecting my own men, protecting the Iraqi civilian pop-
ulation, the innocents, and also, obviously, accomplishing the mis-
sion. And that is exactly what Saddam is trying to keep us from
doing, all three of those.
It is very difficult — this makes the challenge of prosecuting the
war successfully and rapidly more difficult, there is no doubt about
that. The issue I think is one of criminal responsibility for those
actions. Obviously in the case of the homicide bomber, there is no
issue of prosecution because he is no longer with us. Unfortunately,
they have a tendency to take innocent persons with them, as we
seem to be seeing in the cases you cited.
I think this goes back to the question asked by the Congressman
just a few minutes ago as to what criminal liability might we have.
And one of the points that I have made is that I think in a case
like that, we can show that this is what we refer to as treacherous
killing, which is a violation of the 1908 Convention Number four
that has been around for a very long time. The term I used earlier
was the term "perfidy," which is more the modern concept, but it
is basically killing treacherously.
The best example I can give of this is we train our soldiers when
someone waves a white flag — a white flag actually does not mean
surrender. A white flag does mean, however, that I want to nego-
tiate with you, and it causes our soldiers to restrain themselves in
the use of force against the enemy because they feel they have that
obligation at that point in time. There is a trust factor. If the other
side is now using that white flag to gain a military advantage to
kill people that is, in fact, killing treacherously.
It is my opinion that the people who are ordering members of the
Fedayeen Saddam or what have you to carry out those acts could
be prosecuted, would be criminally liable for killing treacherously
under the 1907 Hague provision.
Mr. Meek. If I may, I want to get — as a past law enforcement
officer, the kind of don't shoot/shoot scenarios that you may have,
that is a perfect example; 18 speaks of civilian hospital casualties
or things of that nature, or prevention of — or sajdng those are sites
that are off limits. Obviously, you stated that if the pattern is set
forth that that particular section is being violated constantly, and
in the case of human shields things of that nature, human nature
would tell you after you go through these suicide incidents, you can
very well have individuals that are innocent and trying to do some-
thing and it is a shoot or don't shoot situation.
And I believe when we start to, how would you say, engage in
urban warfare as we start moving into Baghdad, that we are going
to have more and more of these incidents, unfortunately, due to the
fact that we have been trained to negotiate when we see that.
23
There may be a point where we even have to put a halt to that
because of the danger as it relates to it.
How far up in the past, as it relates to convictions of war crimes,
have we gone? I know, usually this comes from the top command;
how many lieutenants, sergeants, or what have you, or field com-
mand officers? Because the President has said those that carry out
orders will be prosecuted by — under either the Geneva Convention
or what have you, under the War Crimes Act of the — how far have
we gone in the past as relates to our prosecutions in the past con-
flicts?
Mr. Parks. The last complete experience we had, of course, was
in the post-World War II trials. Generally, if you looked at a chain
of command, you might — let's assume that you have an enemy sol-
dier who is taken a prisoner of war and he has received an order
to murder that prisoner of war. If he pulls the trigger, he will be
prosecuted for that. Those in the chain of command who gave the
orders would be prosecuted. Those in the chain of command who
might have known or should have known of the orders and did not
stop the act could be prosecuted.
Now, in response directly to your question, as a practical matter
during World War II, unless there was some direct involvement in
that chain of command, the tendency generally was not to pros-
ecute all except those most closely directed with the offense that
has occurred.
Mr. Meek. There are no statutes of limitations on that?
Mr. Parks. There is none.
Mr. Meek. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back the balance
of my time.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman. We will do a second
round of questioning. Mr. Skelton.
Mr. Skelton. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I am certain that at the end of the present conflict there will be
occasion to charge and try some Iraqis for horrible violations of
international law. So, may I review with you if we can get a sense
of the convening authority or authorities for the, as I have listed
them, six tribunals or courts that we have had through history.
First, let's look at the Nuremberg trials, which were multicoun-
try — America, Britain, Russia — that tried various defendants,
which we have discussed previously. What was the convention au-
thority for that tribunal?
Mr. Parks. It was the Moscow Declaration of November 1, 1943
that established not only that the intent of the signatories, which
were President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and Joseph
Stalin, but it also established the basic document for convening an
international military tribunal.
Mr. Skelton. That, of course, was carried out in 1945-46 on; is
that correct?
Mr. Parks. That is correct.
Mr. Skelton. The second tribunal to which we referred was the
multinational tribunal that tried certain Japanese in Japan after
the war, the most notable being the former Prime Minister Tojo.
What was the convening authority for that?
Mr. Parks. There was a similar declaration. I don't have the
date, sir, but it was the same type of thing the parties — the inter-
24
national allies signed and put together to form this international
tribunal.
Mr. Skelton. Would that be available?
Mr. Parks. It should be, sir.
Mr. Skelton. Number three is the — what was the convention au-
thority of General MacArthur's tribunal where he tried the various
Japanese commanders, two of which we have mentioned,
Yamishita and Homma?
Mr. Parks. That came under, I believe, the Articles of War that
had the provision for establishment of military tribunals.
Mr. Skelton. When you say Articles of War
Mr. Parks. That was the predecessor to the Uniform Code of
Military Justice.
Mr. Skelton. American.
Mr. Parks. American Articles of War.
Mr. Skelton. American Articles of War. Would that be statutory
or
Mr. Parks. Statutory.
Mr. Skelton. Okay. Then, of course, we are familiar with the
three that we mentioned. Would you please review those again for
us?
Mr. Parks. The one would be the Uniform Code of Military Jus-
tice, which is Article 18 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice;
and the Code itself, of course, is 10 U.S. Code. Section 818 is actu-
ally the specific provision that says general courts marshal may try
violations of Uniform Code of Military Justice and violations of the
Law of War.
The second is the military commissions provision in U.S. Code
Section 21. And the third is the jurisdiction provided the Federal
district court for violations of the Law of War in 18 U.S. Code Sec-
tion 2441.
Mr. Skelton. Should the Iraqi perpetrators of these war crimes
be captured, they could be tried, in your opinion, at least under the
three statutes to which you refer.
Mr. Parks. Yes, sir.
Mr. Skelton. And to try them under any of the previous t3T3es
of tribunal, that would have to be done by international treaty; is
that not correct?
Mr. Parks. Or some sort of international agreement. As the Con-
gressman knows, the United Nations, of course, established
through the Security Council the international tribunals for Yugo-
slavia and Rwanda and for Sierra Leone. So that is something, that
there may be individuals of other governments who may wish to
propose something like that. There may be Iraqis in our custody
who are responsible for committing the crimes in Kuwait. It may
be that the Kuwaiti Government may ask for them to try them
themselves. These are not the only options; these are the options
the United States has under consideration for individuals.
The Chairman. Would the gentleman yield? I want to thank the
gentleman, and all members of the committee have been really elic-
iting very important information in this area. I am trying to under-
stand here, and I think it is my understanding that what you are
saying is under an international agreement. If you talk about
World War II and the major allies in the operation basically agree-
25
ing among themselves to set up the tribunals, that would lead one
to conclude that the logical path would be that the coalition allies
in Operation Iraqi Freedom would be the primary parties to such
a tribunal in Iraq. Does that make sense?
Mr. Parks. It is an alternative. I would think personally that if
you had — let's suppose you had a situation where American sol-
diers were captured and executed by members of one Iraqi unit.
The only victims involved are American soldiers. In a case like
that, I think — or let's say they were British soldiers. In a case like
that, the government who had the victims would, I think might,
wish to try those persons before their courts on an individual basis
rather than trying them before an international tribunal. There
may be some who were involved in massive crimes; some of the top
leadership, for example, in the 1991 Gulf War and also on the cur-
rent conflict that have more international victims, more inter-
national implications.
I can give you one example. At the start of the 1990 war, on Au-
gust 2, 1990, when Iraqi forces went into Kuwait, they took any
number of foreign nationals out of Kuwait back to Baghdad. And
as the Congressman I am sure recalls, many of them were held as
human shields initially before they were all released in December
of 1990. That is regarded as a grave breach of the 1949 Civilians
Convention.
The Chairman. There are some 800 or so people who were taken
from Kuwait that were never returned.
Mr. Parks. That is correct. So, conceivably, in a case like that,
there may be governments who would seek to have an inter-
national tribunal for those persons. Again, it is going to depend on
what was the crime, what is the evidence, who were the victims,
who has jurisdiction, and who would wish to try them. As we saw
in the post-World War II trials, we had a little bit of each. We had
some international tribunals; we also had some national tribunals.
The Chairman. Thank the gentleman.
Mr. Skelton. So we will not be confused on jurisdiction; the six
situations to which we referred are not to be confused with the
1942 tribunal established by Franklin Roosevelt of the saboteurs or
the tribunal established by the President at the behest of Attorney
General John Ashcroft, is that correct, for terrorists; is that cor-
rect?
Mr. Parks. Certainly. There may be a lot of parallels and over-
laps, but they would appear to be different.
Mr. Skelton. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
The Chairman. Thank the gentleman. Mr. Kline.
Mr. Kline. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Hays, we have been talking about jurisdiction and courts who
would convene them and who would conduct them and so forth.
That means that we are trying crimes, and I am just thinking
about the logistics of the troops that are on the ground now. These
are infantry commanders and maybe maintenance battalion com-
manders and so forth who are taking persons into their custody.
And the people that are taken into custody could be a wide variety:
regular troops. Republican Guard, Fedayeen Saddam, civilians and
so forth.
26
Mr. Wilson asked earlier about the investigative teams. My ques-
tion to you is just one of mechanics of law enforcement, if you will,
of how are we equipped to sort these out and get our detainees
from capture to court? Because at the end of this, there is going
to be a criminal proceeding, a criminal court. So if you could help
us walk through that, how are we equipped to deal with that?
Mr. Parks. There is actually a two-step process or parallel proc-
ess that is operating. Obviously, we have a very detailed procedure
for taking a prisoner of war from the time he is captured from the
collection point up the chain of command to, let's say, the core level
where they go through initial processing. Then ultimately they go
back to a theater prisoner of war camp.
During the 1991 Gulf War, we established two prisoner-of-war
camps called Brooklyn and Bronx, because the 800th M.P. Brigade
comes from that part of the world and they ran these two camps.
They had a capacity of 50,000 prisoners of war each. We filled
them rather rapidly. And they have a U.S. processing system basi-
cally using laptops to record who they have, get as much informa-
tion on them as they can, and that information then is sent back
to the National Prisoner of War Information Center in the Penta-
gon, run by the Army; and then from there it is forwarded to the
International Committee of the Red Cross to record every single
person we have. We insisted upon a detailed accounting of who we
have in our hands, because we also want to insist upon a detailed
accounting of those persons in enemy hands.
Now, in that process, coming back to the question I believe Con-
gressman Ryan asked, how do we tell the regular forces from the
Fedayeen Saddam? In Article Five of the Prisoner of War Conven-
tion, it provides that in case of any doubt as to a person's status,
that person shall be afforded prisoner-of-war protection until his
precise identity or, rather, status has been ascertained by a mili-
tary tribunal. We actually convened what are called Article Five
tribunals both in Vietnam and in the 1991 Gulf War, because we
did have some people come in — we weren't sure if they were Iraqi
military dressed in civilian clothing, trying to hide, or if they were
in fact innocent civilians. They listened to the circumstances of cap-
ture, they listen to other evidence they have, and they make a de-
termination. If they make a factual determination — Article Five
says if there remains any doubt, they are entitled to prisoner-of-
war status, which they will receive. On the other hand, of course,
if they have committed a crime, they are still subject to being pros-
ecuted for that crime.
So there is that additional vetting or screening process using the
Article Five tribunal process. We have used those. I believe the
British may have used them already in the current conflict with re-
gard to some of the people they have captured. So we know how
to run these.
If they are a prisoner of war, that person may remain in our
hands until the cessation of active hostilities and for a period
thereafter going through processing and repatriation. It took until
September of 1991, for example, for us to repatriate all of the
Iraqis that we had in our hands from the first Gulf War. And even
then, they are interviewed twice in private by the International
Committee of the Red Cross to ensure that they want to go back
27
voluntarily. And there were quite a few who did not, and in fact
some were allowed to resettle in the United States.
So the process can be rather lengthy. If they are in fact charged
with a war crime during this time, they may be detained until they
are prosecuted. And if they are sentenced, of course, they are then
going to serve the time.
Mr. Kline. So then they are treated as a criminal in this case,
not as a prisoner of war, and their actions will be investigated by
a criminal investigation or a special team and a case prepared, just
as you would any other criminal in that sense.
Mr. Parks. If a regular Iraqi soldier commits a war crime, he
does not lose his status as a prisoner of war, but he can be pros-
ecuted for his offenses.
Mr. Kline. Okay. Thank you very much. I yield back.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman. Mr. Reyes.
Mr. Reyes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As I was listening to a
couple of the other questions pertaining to jurisdiction and protec-
tion— Mr. Parks, what kind of protection do our soldiers currently
have if they are mistreated in places like the Philippines or Colom-
bia?
Mr. Parks. You are not talking about the Law of War here. It
depends, of course, on whose hands they are in. The guerilla move-
ments that you are talking about, of course, are not what are wide-
ly known as respecters of the Geneva Convention. In fact, these
folks are either criminals or terrorists who would like to use vio-
lence for intimidation and things like that. They are unfortunately
not going to be looking at the Geneva Conventions for protection
if they were to capture U.S. personnel.
Mr. Reyes. So what options would we have? Would we have one
of the six that my ranking member mentioned, or would we be
forced to follow civilian prosecution in the respective country, or
what protections do they have?
Mr. Parks. They have no protections. If you are talking about
the protections that they could be provided, they can be provided
by their captor. They are at the mercy of their captor. The captor
is outside the law.
Mr. Reyes. Getting back, let me switch back, given the issue of
Iraq being a signatory to the Geneva Convention and all of those
things that they are bound by, exactly what measures have we un-
dertaken to make sure that we clarify the Law of War to a popu-
lation of a country that may not be only highly illiterate, but also
uninformed of international law and under the threats of death
themselves if they don't comply with the orders that are given by
the command?
Mr. Parks. I know that in our psychological operations cam-
paigns, we have issued broadcasts to the people of Iraq and we
have also dropped millions of leaflets advising that those who are
involved in crimes will be held accountable for those crimes. I rec-
ognize the Congressman has identified a real dilemma for the indi-
vidual citizens of Iraq. That it is a kill-or-be-killed-type situation
in some cases. It may well be that Saddam is purposely using the
civilian population for those things. Regrettably, what he seems to
be doing rather than ordering his civilians to torture and murder
28
American prisoners of war, he is in fact using his own civilians as
human shields and having them die.
From the fact that we learned of the American female prisoner
of war who we rescued — the fact that we learned of that from an
Iraqi civilian who risked his own life to provide that information
to the United States Marines so that woman could be rescued, I
think, says a lot for the Iraqi people; that they were not — but for
this fear that they face, they have, they are not going to do — they
are going to do the right thing. But, of course, in many indications
they want to make sure that the threat to them is gone.
Mr. Reyes. And finally, given again the various options that
were set up earlier in the hearing, are there different thresholds
of evidence at these different prosecution options for violations of
the rules or laws of war? Are there different thresholds?
Mr. Parks. If you saw my grades in evidence at Baylor Law
School, you wouldn't ask that question. I couldn't tell you without
going through them and breaking them down. I think they are
probably the same. All of our court systems work on roughly the
same type of evidentiary rules.
Mr. Reyes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman. Mr. Wilson.
Mr. Wilson of South Carolina. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And Colonel Parks, again I just appreciate how thorough your
presentation is and it truly is indicative of the professionalism of
the JAG officers. I have had the opportunity to take the Law of
War courses at the U.S. Army JAG School at Charlottesville. I was
impressed by what I learned there, and this has just been a real
refresher course today.
As we again look at what is coming up, the Chairman has cor-
rectly identified that we have a coalition of over 50 countries that
are involved, and you have indicated that in the past there has
been an agreement signed for a multinational tribunal and this
would be in accordance with statutory authority that we already
have; is that correct?
Mr. Parks. Well, the President has a right to engage in negotia-
tions of various international agreements. I think the issue is going
to be whether or not some of our coalition partners would ask us
to consider some sort of an international tribunal for all individ-
uals, particular individuals, or those who have committed offenses
against one or two of the coalition partners. And the President and
the Secretary of State and others would make decisions as to
whether or not they wish to enter into that type of agreement and,
if so, whether it would extend to all that we might have in our
hands, or to certain persons.
Mr. Wilson of South Carolina. I thought it was very insight-
ful, you pointing out that if the victims are of a particular national-
ity— American, British, Australian, Bulgarian, Romanian, Polish,
whoever it may be is the victim — that that would possibly establish
who might proceed. With the circumstance of there also being a ju-
risdiction for offenses against Iraqi civilians — in particular, we
have run into where the Ba'ath party has officials who have super-
vised paramilitary — so could that also be part of the war crimes tri-
bunal?
29
Mr. Parks. I think there is a possibihty that such an offense
could be considered. I would like to have more of the facts to sort
of nail this down on how we could construct a charge. But I believe
that it would be entirely possible that if you had someone who was,
in fact, let's say, working with the Fedayeen Saddam; training
them and sending others forward, ordering them to place civilians
in front of them or shoot civilians if they are trjring to flee the cit-
ies, that all those things would present a basis for looking at some
sort of a war crimes charge.
Mr. Wilson of South Carolina. Thank you very much. I yield.
The Chairman. Mr. Meek.
Mr. Meek. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Hunter, I want
to thank you and Ranking Member Skelton for putting forth this
hearing, because I think that this is really going to shed a lot of
light on what is happening right now and how we are going to bal-
ance the playing field as it relates to following through enforcement
of violations of the different conventions and war crimes.
I guess I want to kind of go back. You said something a little ear-
lier, Mr. Parks, about guerilla warfare and what is happening in
South America. And I have a feeling that some of this is going to
play into the Iraq situation, even though Iraq is seen as a theater
of war and South America is not. The determination between who
is going to be prosecuted under what — if we can at all, because I
believe a lot of intimidation is going to play a role in here.
I think a lot of things are going to happen. Using Iraq's Informa-
tion Minister "unconventional," that could be just as something to
set in the minds of our troops to slow us down or, whatever the
case may be, have us look a little more carefully at what we are
doing. But I think as it relates to coalition forces and keeping those
coalition forces intact, what is going on on the ground as it relates
to briefing the men and women that are out there in the theater
now on how the rules of engagements change? What role does your
office play in that, in informing commanders of how they can — in-
form their troops of what they have been trained prior to engage-
ment and what they should know now? I think something that you
said that was very, I would say, interesting; that was they have
been trained — well, obviously playing by the rules is not nec-
essarily a quality of individuals that we are fighting against even
in Iraq or Afghanistan. How are the troops being informed now?
Mr. Parks. I am happy to say that my office is not involved in
the day-to-day rules of engagement. I, having been an infantry
company commander in Vietnam, would hate to have a lawyer in
Washington, D.C. telling me how to do my job. My job is to train
them initially and give them the basics. I think it is not only my
job, but as Congressman Wilson pointed out, it is the other judge
advocates
Mr. Meek. I am sorry, Mr. Parks. I want you to hold your
thought. Don't misinterpret what I was saying there. The last thing
you want to do is hear from a lawyer from Washington about what
you should do. I am talking about in the minds of the troops as
they are out there, they have been trained on what they can do and
what they want to do and what they should engage in; what is
legal and what may get them in trouble.
30
So I am just saying that, as it relates to the commanders, you
may not know what they are sharing with these troops right now.
I know right now it is win the war. But I wanted to — I mean, you
could stop right there as it relates to your office informing them.
I am just talking about, there has to be some discussion with some
of the folks or there is no discussion at all.
Mr. Parks. Perhaps I was being too long-winded, because I was
going to get to that.
Mr. Meek. I am sorry.
Mr. Parks. No. No. No. You get me wound up on some of these
sometimes and I could go on forever. I think we are saying the
same thing. And I can go back again to my personal experience.
This is where good commanders make all the difference in the
world. The job of the judge advocates in peacetime is to train peo-
ple on the basic principles of the Law of War. You do not inten-
tionally attack civilians if someone is trying to surrender. You as-
sist them in doing that. If someone is a threat, particularly an
enemy soldier, you have a right to engage them.
What it gets down to is that individual soldier — I can sort of give
you the basic criteria that I would provide, were I there, and I be-
lieve this is how our commanders are acting, and it is you have a
right to use deadly force if you have a reasonable belief there is an
imminent threat of serious injury or death by the actions that per-
son is taking.
Now, what we are doing is we are telling the commanders, tell
your folks how to do this. We do not want innocent Iraqi civilians
to die or otherwise be injured. But every commander is also very
concerned about the lives of every single one of his men and
women. And so they are tr3ring to strike that very delicate balance.
Get into Baghdad, win the war, let's not cause undue casualties on
either side.
The strong point here is, in fact, those commanders trying to bal-
ance that, and then is placing judgment in the hands of those indi-
vidual soldiers to make that call. I was being somewhat facetious
about being a lawyer from Washington and here to help you, but
that is exactly what the commanders want, too; they don't want a
soldier looking over his or her shoulder to see if they can now fire
their weapon. It is a very, very difficult balance. And I can tell you
from what I have heard, our commanders are doing a superb job
of that.
Mr. Meek. Mr. Chairman, I want to say that today I received the
first letter in my office of a casualty of a young man from my dis-
trict, 26 years old. I won't mention his name in the committee be-
cause I haven't had an opportunity to speak to his wife or family.
But I just want to say that I know that many of these families that
are losing loved ones, or even loved ones that have been injured in
these conflicts, whether it be Iraq or Afghanistan, definitely want
the wheels of justice to be able to turn in some manner, so some
level of justice for those individuals or justice for the family can be
carried out.
So that was the point of my question because, like I said from
my past background, not in the theater of war but just in tradi-
tional law enforcement, that is something that law enforcement in-
dividuals have to live with every day, what they can do and what
31
they can't do. And as it relates to previous training, Mr. Chairman,
and what we are doing now, I have some comfort in what I am
hearing from Mr. Parks of what our men and women are being
told.
Mr. Parks. Sir, if I can respond to that. In fact, what I just gave
you is the same criteria what I train our law enforcement officers
on, too. We have to trust that individual police officer on the street.
It is the same standard, the United States Supreme Court stand-
ard, a reasonable belief of imminent threat of serious bodily injury
or death. And after that, we have to trust the man with his finger
on the trigger. And I couldn't agree with the Congressman more.
Mr. Meek. Thank you, Mr. Parks.
The Chairman. I want to thank the gentleman for his excellent
line of questions, and also I am reminded by Mr. Reyes that the
gentleman, Mr. Meek, who has contributed so much to his question
has his wife Leslie and Kendrick, Jr. and Lauren in the audience.
And thanks for coming by, kids, and watching your daddy work.
Mr. Meek. I just want to say, if I may, my wife is a lawyer, Mr.
Parks.
The Chairman. Well, you know, we thought — I am a lawyer my-
self. I have to admit, and we thought at one point that maybe one
of our strike tactics would be parachuting in 100 lawyers right into
the Presidential Palace. But thank you very much, Mr. Meek.
And, Mr. Cole, do you have any further questions?
Mr. Cole. Just one or two, if I may, Mr. Chairman, very quickly.
First, Colonel Parks, thank you very much. It has been an extraor-
dinarily instructive testimony, helpful to all of us.
Two quick questions. One, assuming a conviction for violation of
the Geneva Convention, is there any appeal process to that? If so,
how would that work?
Mr. Parks. There would be — and it is going to depend on the
particular court to which the cases are sent. It may vary slightly,
but not that much. There would be an appellate process.
Mr. Cole. Okay. And second, in the course, if we find ourselves,
as I am sure we will, in criminal prosecutions, we will undoubtedly
uncover a great deal of information that is not directly relevant to
a violation of the Geneva Convention — may well be a violation in-
volving Iraqi civilians inside that country, crimes against those
people, not directly crimes related to the Geneva Convention in
terms of the prosecution of a war. What sort of options do we have,
would a court have in a situation like that, or prosecutor have?
Could that crime against a civilian be prosecuted under an existing
military court? Would that be referred to the appropriate civil au-
thorities in Iraq? How would something like that work?
Mr. Parks. I think it is perhaps a little premature to look too
far down the road as to what the next Iraqi Government would
look like. As the Congressman shows from his own interest in Afri-
ca, El Salvador, there have been these truth committees where in-
dividuals have been allowed to come forward and bring testimony
against individuals. And other cases, there have been cases where
people have been prosecuted for human rights violations. Those are
oftentimes brought within the jurisdiction of the domestic courts of
that nation. And in the new Iraq, that might be the most logical
place for violations of human rights against the citizens by the pre-
32
vious regime. It would not fall within the jurisdiction of our mili-
tary courts for war crimes.
Mr. Cole. I ask that question, make that point, only to make the
larger point: while we are concerned, obviously, first and foremost,
with crimes committed against American men and women in uni-
form, we have got a concern also in other places. I hope that is not
lost in these proceedings. We are just as interested that justice be
done across the board, not just where our own combatants are con-
cerned.
With that, I jdeld back the balance of my time.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman and the ranking member,
Mr. Skelton, who really is the driving force behind this hearing,
and who has a great background, giving the hearing a lot of value.
He is raised for a follow-up question.
Mr. Skelton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I have just one question, Mr. Parks. Obviously you are quite fa-
miliar with the statutes, the three particular statutes which you
have discussed: the court marshal, the commission, and the Fed-
eral court. Of the alleged atrocities that you have seen or with
which you are familiar, do you have any recommendations for this
committee in changing or adding to or modifying existing law as it
now exists?
Mr. Parks. I do not see any necessity to change anj^hing in the
law. I think the law in each of those options gives us adequate
remedy against the individuals. And particularly in the case of
Iraq, we are in an international armed conflict. All the Law of War
and all of our statutory bases are built on that traditional inter-
national armed conflict between two or more governments. It gets
more difficult when you are in something less than that type of a
conflict. I think this system we have is tailor-made for the type of
offense that is we are looking at, and I cannot recommend any
changes that would really improve the system.
Mr. Skelton. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman. And, sir, you have done
an extraordinary job of informing the committee and this is obvi-
ously an issue on which there is great bipartisan concern and sup-
port for what I would call a full accounting and full justice.
And I think it is important for Iraqi officers who are now consid-
ering their future, the future beyond the next 20 or 30 days, that
there is a system for accounting, that they will be held accountable,
and that the punishments for war crimes range the gamut from in-
carceration up through and including execution, and that those
executions have been carried out. And, further, that people who
feel that they can put themselves far beyond the reach of the
United States and the allies have in the past found that that is not
true. And I am thinking about the Afghan theater and the surprise
that must have occurred in some of the terrorist units of the al
Qaeda when at 10,000 feet elevation, they saw the soldiers of the
First Mountain Division coming over the rise, killing them in their
rifle pits.
We can reach almost anyone on this planet. And I think that it
is very clear that we will have a certain amount of energy in pursu-
ing those especially who have abused American POWs or abused
American soldiers in any way and committed any war crimes. So
33
I think it would be good judgment on the part of Iraqi officers to
ensure their own future by complying with the Rules of War that
the gentleman has laid out.
Mr. Skelton. Would the gentleman yield?
The Chairman. I would be happy to.
Mr. Skelton. I think, Mr. Chairman, you made history. To my
knowledge, this is the first time a hearing of this nature has ever
been held by this committee. I think it is very, very important that
it have been done. Thank you.
The Chairman. Well, I thank the gentleman.
And, Mr. Parks, thank you for your extraordinary expertise and
your contribution to our country.
Mr. Parks. Thank you, sir.
The Chairman. And before we go, we have got Mr. Steadman,
who is our professional staff member, a new professional staff
member who is brand new here. But I was for a short period of
time in a mediocre capacity with the 173rd Airborne Brigade. My
own company commander, Jim Marrison, who in an extraordinary
capacity served that brigade is in the audience. But Mr. Steadman
was in the brigade for four years, the legendary 173rd. They made
a combat jump in Iraq. And anytime a staff member has his old
unit make a combat jump, he gets to ask a question. So, Ken, you
earned it. Does Mr. Steadman have any questions?
Mr. Steadman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Mem-
ber, but at this particular time I wish to defer to precedent and not
ask any questions.
The Chairman. Okay. Any final remarks you would like to make,
Mr. Parks?
Mr. Parks. Just one follow-up on one comment that the Chair-
man made. That was the threat of sending 500 lawyers into the
Presidential Palace. There are probably more than 500 Army, Ma-
rine Corps, Air Force, and Navy judge advocates in the theater of
operations, and two of them have in fact been wounded in combat,
one Army and one Marine. So we do have a brigade of lawyers, and
I am sure that does terrify Saddam Hussein. Thank you, sir.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman. And the hearing is con-
cluded.
[Whereupon, at 3:05 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
APPENDIX
April 4, 2003
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
April 4, 2003
OPENING REMARKS OF CHAIRMAN DUNCAN HUNTER
Hearing on Iraqi Violations of the Law of Armed Conflict
Friday April 4, 2003
This afternoon, the committee will review the apparent violations
of the Law of Armed Conflict by the Iraqi military.
It is a pleasure to welcome our witness this afternoon:
• Mr. W. Hays Parks, the Special Assistant to the Judge
Advocate General for Law of War Matters, at the Department
of the Army
Sir, we look forward to your testimony.
(39)
40
The Law of Armed Conflict is a body of international law that
governs the initiation and conduct of military operations. It consists of
treaties, conventions, protocols and customary practices whose purpose
is to protect non-combatants from the horrors of war and to facilitate the
end of a conflict. The United States, more than any other nation in
history, conducts its mihtary operations in strict compliance with the
Law of Armed Conflict. Our extensive use of precision guided
munitions to destroy military targets while minimizing civilian
casualties and the humane treatment of Iraqi prisoners of war and
civilian by U.S. forces bear witness to our commitment to this important
aspect of warfare.
Our adversaries do not necessarily share our commitment. Since
the start of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, there have been constant
reports of Iraqi military and paramilitary forces violating the Law of
Armed Conflict. There have been reports of Iraqi soldiers faking
surrender in order to get close to U.S. forces, only to open fire once our
troops approached.
2
41
Last week, Marines took fire from a hospital, and after returning
fire, captured the facility along with approximately 1 70 Iraqi soldiers,
some 200 weapons and nearly 3,000 chemical suits.
There have been reports of Iraqis fighting in civilian clothes and
using civilians as human shields. All these are flagrant violations of the
law. But the most outrageous violation occurred during the weekend of
22-23 March. A maintenance convoy moving forward to support the 3'*^
Infantry Division was ambushed outside of Nasiryah. Seven soldiers
were killed, five were captured and three were listed as missing in
action. One, PFC Jessica Lynch, was successfully rescued last Tuesday
and we applaud the courage and skill of the forces who conducted this
daring operation. But shortly after her capture, Al Jazeerah, the Arab
language television network, broadcast an Iraqi TV video showing the
dead American soldiers, some with a single bullet hole in the head.
These scenes prompted DOD officials to state that they believed that
these soldiers had been executed by Iraqi forces.
42
I, and all Americans, deplore this flagrant violation of the Laws of
Armed Conflict. While they will in no way alter the way we treat Iraqi
prisoners, neither will they deter us from finding those responsible for
this heinous conduct and bringing them to justice once this conflict is
over.
Let me now recognize the committee's ranking Democrat, Mr.
Skelton, for any remarks he may wish to make.
[Following Mr. Skelton's remarks]
The entirety of our witness' prepared statements will be
entered into the record.
Mr. Parks the floor is yours.
43
Opening Statement for The Honorable Ike Skeiton (D-MO), Ranking
Member, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of
Representatives
Hearing on Iraqi Violations of Armed Conflict
4 April 2003
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Parks, thank you for joining us
so late on a Friday.
We have all heard — both in media stories and in the classified
briefings we receive from the Pentagon — the reports of appalling Iraqi
treatment of U.S. prisoners of war. We have heard too about the
Iraqi's ambush tactics on the battlefield w here soldiers have dressed
as civilians and have feigned surrender only to attack U.S. soldiers
once they approach.
It is impossible to watch these stories without anger. The United
States military — more than any other in the world — trains our troops
and demands their compliance with the Geneva Conventions and
44
other laws of war. That our current adversary does not is a travesty,
but the continuation of a long line of war crimes committed in its
previous conflicts.
When the war is over, we will have to find a way to bring those
who have perpetrated such actions to justice. We will have to do this
in a way that shows our continued commitment to the rule of law, and
to nobly honoring the principles that some Iraqi troops have not.
Vd like to thank the Chairman for holding this hearing. Now,
when the issues are fresh in our mind, is the perfect time to better
understand what the laws of war say and what the range of options
may be for handling those who violate these laws. But decisions about
how to handle those Iraqis accused of war crimes must be made with
sober deliberation and mindful of the high standards of international
law this nation has followed. Today's hearing can be the first step in
understanding how the administration should proceed.
45
I am sure Mr. Parks can help us understand these issues more
fully. I look forward to his testimony. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
46
Testimony of W. Hays Parks before HASC
Thank you for inviting me to testify on this very important subject.
You have asked me to comment on the 1 949 Geneva Convention Relative to the
Protection of Prisoners of War, commonly referred to by the acronym "GPW."
Department of Defense policies with respect to that Convention in the current conflict
with Iraq, and Iraqi violations of the Convention.
Geneva Convention Background
The GPW was negotiated after World War II. Out of 1 94 nations in the world, 190
are States parties, including the United States and Iraq. More governments are States
Parties to this convention than Member States of the United Nations, making it one of the
most widely accepted treaties. The protections of the Convention apply when the
members of the armed forces of one belligerent nation "fall into the hands" of an enemy
belligerent. This can happen through capture or surrender to enemy military forces.
The Geneva Convention provides the following fundamental protections for
POWs:
• POWs must at all times be humanely treated. Humane treatment is the baseline, but
POW protections are much more extensive.
• Any act or omission that causes the death or endangers a POW is prohibited and is a
serious breach of the Convention.
• POWs must be removed from the battlefield as soon as circumstances permit and at
all times protected from physical and mental harm.
• POWs must be provided adequate food, shelter and medical aid.
• POWs must be protected, particularly against acts of violence or intimidation and
against insults and public curiosity.
• If questioned, POWs are required to provide their name, rank, serial number, and date
of birth. They may not be required or forced to provide any other information.
• POWs may not be subjected to physical or mental torture. Those who refuse to
answer questions may not be threatened, insulted, or exposed to any unpleasant or
disadvantageous treatment of any kind.
• Subject to valid security reasons, POWs are entitled to retain their personal property
and protective equipment. These items may not be taken from a POW unless
properly accounted for and receipted.
47
• Representatives from the International Committee of the Red Cross must be permitted
access to POWs as soon as practical.
• All POWs must be protected against assault, includmg sexual assault. Female POWs
shall be treated with the regard due to their gender and, like all POWs, are entitled to
respect for their person and their honor.
In addition to the GPW. there are other Geneva Conventions relevant to the current
conflict. In particular, the United States and Iraq are both parties to the 1949 Geneva
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed
Forces in the Field. The title of this Convention is a bit misleading because it also
provides protection for the dead. In particular, this Convention:
• Requires parties to the conflict to protect the dead against pillage and ill-treatment;
and
• Requires parties to ensure that the dead are honorably interred, their graves respected,
and infonnation as to their identity, etc., provided to the International Committee of
the Red Cross.
POD Policies in Conflict with Iraq
The United States and Coalition forces conduct all operations in compliance with the
law of war. No nation devotes more resources to training and compliance with the law of
war than the United States.
Both the United States and Iraq are parties to the GPW, which the United States fully
observes in this conflict. The U.S. and Coalition Forces have planned for the protection
and proper treatment of Iraqi POWs under each of the Geneva Conventions I have
identified. These plans are integrated into current operations. Before describing our
policies, 1 should note that in Operation Desert Storm in 1991, the United States and
Coalition partners detained 86,743 Iraqi POWs. These Iraqi POWS were given all of the
protections required by the Geneva Conventions.
Our aims and acts are precisely the same in the current conflict: We are providing,
and will continue to provide, captured Iraqi combatants with the protections of the
Geneva Conventions and other pertinent international laws. In addition, arrangements
are currently in progress to allow for representatives from the International Committee of
the Red Cross to meet with Iraqi POWs. This will take place as soon as their security can
be assured.
Iraqi Violations of the Geneva Conventions and Related Laws of War
Unfortunately, the Iraqi regime is not complying with the Geneva Conventions.
Before turning to a summary of the Iraqi violations, I should note that in Desert Storm in
1991, the Iraqis mistreated U.S. and Coalition forces in numerous respects, including
48
physical abuse and torture, forced propaganda statements, food deprivation, denial of
ICRC access until the day of repatnation, and much more. The Iraqis similarly
mistreated Iranian POWs during the 8-year Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s. The Iraqi regime
has thus displayed a pattern of systematic disregard for the laws of war.
Based upon briefings and reports in the media, it appears that Iraq has once again
committed violations of the Geneva Conventions and related laws of war. 1 will mention
just three.
• First: Iraqi Television and al-Jazcera have aired a lengthy tape of deceased U.S or
coalition service
members. I understand that some of you have seen the tape; I will not describe it in
any detail. Suffice it to say that this tape, which was apparently made with the
consent or at the direction of the Iraqi regime, shows fundamental violations of the
Geneva Convention obligations, including prohibitions on pillage and ill-treatment of
the dead, the duty to
respect the personal dignity of all captured combatants, and possibly the
prohibition against willful killing, torture, inhumane treatment, or the willful causing
of
great suffering or serious injury to body or health of a POW.
• Second: Iraqi Television and al-Jazeera have aired a tape of U.S. soldiers answering
questions in humiliating and insuhing circumstances designed to make them objects
of public curiosity, in violation of the GPW.
• Third: There are reports that the Iraqi regime has sent forces carrying white flags as
if to indicate an intention to surrender, repeating an illegal act used by Iraqi military
in the 1991 Coalition war to liberate Kuwait, or dressed forces as liberated civilians to
draw coalition forces into ambushes. These acts of "perfidy" are among the most
fundamental violations of the law of war, endangering Coalition forces and innocent
Iraqi civilians.
These are three obvious Iraqi law of war violations. Behind the tapes and initial
reports from the field there are likely to be additional violations.
The position of the United States Government is to do everything in its power to
bring to justice anyone who, by action or inaction, is responsible for fundamental
violations of the law of war.
The Secretary of the Army investigated and recorded Iraqi war crimes during the
1990-1991 Persian Gulf War. Steps have been taken to begin a similar investigation and
information collection effort. Ultimate disposition will depend upon evidence collected,
identified violations, and individuals who come under U.S. control.
OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM: THE COMMANDER'S
PERSPECTIVE
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, Thursday, July 10, 2003.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:06 a.m., in room
2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Duncan Hunter (chair-
man of the committee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DUNCAN HUNTER, A REP-
RESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE
ON ARMED SERVICES
The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
Today, the committee will continue its review of the lessons
learned from Operation Iraqi Freedom; and we are very fortunate
to have as our witness General Tommy Franks, Former Com-
mander, United States Central Command.
General, on behalf of the committee, thank you for the years of
distinguished service to our country and for leading our young men
and women in what can only be judged as a brilliant military cam-
paign.
It has only been a few days since your change-of-command cere-
mony, and I am sure you are busy preparing for your next career,
so we appreciate your ability to make time for us today. We will
need your perspective to help sort through the multiple reports,
studies, and presentations that are going to be prepared on Oper-
ation Iraqi Freedom.
Defense analysts and special interests are already drawing the
battle lines over how to interpret Operation Iraqi Freedom in the
debate on military transformation. Advocates of transformation de-
scribe the war in Iraq as a validation of every transformational
idea that has ever been proposed and view it as a model for all fu-
ture operations. Others note that legacy forces and capabilities
largely won the war and argue that the military isn't broken and
doesn't need fixing.
Ultimately, Operation Iraqi Freedom will reveal many lessons
about warfare that lie somewhere between the two camps. No one
should deny that transformational technologies and capabilities
made Operation Iraqi Freedom more decisive and less costly than
it might have been. Nor should we forget that victory still required
American boots on the ground, armed with the best and most sur-
vivable equipment the American people can provide.
And I might add. General, I think we saw soldiers and Marines
and sailors and airmen who performed with all of the talent and
(49)
50
courage and tenacity of any American soldiers in this century; and
I think that was inspiring to all Americans.
General Franks. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. The question that Michener asked in his book,
the Bridges of Toko-Ri, where does America get these people, I
think can still be answered in that they come from all walks of life,
all parts of our country; and, to the credit of our country and to
our benefit, they are still coming.
So, General, your thoughts are going to be vitally important in
helping us sort through all these competing perspectives on this
war.
At this time, I would like to turn to the distinguished gentleman
from Missouri, Mr. Skelton, who has his own way of helping to put
these things into context and who has spent a lot of time, I might
say, in not only working on the issues that directly affect the
warfighting, but also focusing long before the war on what he
viewed to be a major issue and that was after the war, the post-
war Iraq and how we would manage this hand-off to a country with
benign intentions toward the United States, with a decent economy
and with an enduring freedom.
So, at this point, let me ask Mr. Skelton for any remarks he
might want to make.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hunter can be found in the Ap-
pendix on page 103.]
STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM MISSOURI, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON
ARMED SERVICES
Mr. Skelton. Mr. Chairman, thank you very, very much for this
hearing, for calling it; and a special welcome, Mr. Chairman, to our
friend. General Tommy Franks.
It is an absolute pleasure to have you. This is an opportunity to
thank you for your service. General, you are remarkable, and we
thank you for what you have done for our Army, for our military,
and for our country. It is good of you to be with us today.
You achieved military successes in Afghanistan and in Iraq. You
led the Central Command through a very extraordinary era of chal-
lenge. There is no doubt that success under your leadership is due
in no small measure to the quality of our military leadership. It is
my view that the victory is also a testament to the quality of our
officers and the war colleges that enable them to plan under your
guidance and the excellence of the caliber of young people and their
training that they have had. As a result, they have enabled you to
have success on both fields.
General Franks. Yes, sir.
Mr. Skelton. I must draw attention, as the Chairman men-
tioned, to post-Saddam Hussein Iraq. We are all concerned about
what is going on there. In my opinion, there appears to be a lack
of planning for reconstruction; and it seems to be a day-by-day,
catch-as-you-can situation. I pointed out the early need for a com-
prehensive post-war planning in letters I sent to the President and
others in both September and March, both of which were before the
conflict started.
51
I have a fear that the pattern that we see now — if left unchecked,
we may find ourselves, General, in the throes of guerilla warfare
for years. I hope that doesn't come to pass.
I raise this because members on both sides of the aisle want to
be helpful, and we want to be constructive. We cannot leave Iraq.
This has to be a success. If it is not a success, the credibility of the
United States of America as a leader in this free world will hit rock
bottom. We cannot allow that. That is why we want to provide all
we can to Ambassador Bremer and his team. We understand the
nature of what we face, and no doubt many of those who are at-
tacking us do so because of the previous regime or growing frustra-
tion for not being in control of their own future.
Reconstruction is a lengthy process, but it is one that demands
planning and building, and it has to come to pass successfully. No
question about that. And I think every member of this committee
and every Member of Congress understands and wishes that to be
so. I have urged both Secretary Wolfowitz and Ambassador Bremer
to give us milestones on the ways to stability and a new govern-
ment in Iraq, and I hope that they can provide that to us within
the foreseeable future.
Now, with that, Mr. Chairman, I again thank the General for
being with us, for his success, for being, Mr. Chairman, the role
model for American's uniform. Thank you.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Skelton can be found in the Ap-
pendix on page 106.1
The Chairman. Once again, General Franks, thank you for your
service to the United States. Without objection, your entire written
statement will be taken into the record; and the floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF GEN. TOMMY R. FRANKS, FORMER
COMMANDER, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND
General FRANKS. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Skelton, mem-
bers, in fact, I am honored to be here to appear before the commit-
tee today. I appreciate, Mr. Chairman, that you will enter my re-
marks in the record. I will shorten them and provide verbally some
of my thoughts on the key issues this morning.
Since we last met in this room, a great deal has happened in the
Central Command area of responsibility. A brutal regime, as this
committee knows, has been removed from Iraq; and, actually, the
people in that country have started to build toward their own fu-
ture.
Our forces have continued to help Afghanistan. Afghanistan con-
tinues to make strides toward independence, and the Afghan peo-
ple continue to develop their nation while our forces, as Coalition
lead, continue to seek out and destroy terrorists and their networks
all across the central region.
I look forward to discussing these points as the committee may
wish in the time ahead, but let me at this point bring you a mes-
sage from some 280,000 American men and women who wear the
uniform and serve in the central region, those I have been privi-
leged to command; and that message, Mr. Chairman, is thank you
to this committee, to this body, to the Congress. Throughout both
Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom, our
52
forces in the field have been blessed to serve civilian leadership
who has set very clear military objectives and a leadership which
has provided our men and women the tools they need to win. On
their behalf, I will simply say thank you for what you do for our
troops.
As you know, earlier this week General John Abizaid took the
reins of command down in Tampa. He is a principled leader, a sol-
dier, a man I have known for a long time, tested under fire, and
all of us can be very confident of the future of this very important
command.
I would like to begin, Mr. Chairman, by recognizing Coalition na-
tions whose contributions of forces, equipment, and economic sup-
port have signalled worldwide commitment to eradicate terrorism.
Over the past year, the Coalition has been steadfast. As we speak
today, Mr. Chairman, some 63 nations are represented at Central
Command's headquarters in Tampa.
A force has been built in the central region to help our objectives
in both Iraq and Afghanistan, those objectives including the denial
of freedom of operation to terrorists, to deny terrorists the potential
use of weapons of mass destruction, to bring terrorists to justice,
to dismantle their networks.
In the process of doing that, Mr. Chairman, we have also estab-
lished a joint task force that is today conducting operations and
providing presence, sharing training, expertise and working with
the nations in the Horn of Africa. The purpose is the same: To com-
bat terrorism and promote stability. Work in the region is under
way, but I will discuss in a bit greater detail in a minute the envi-
ronment within the region remains challenging.
Securing our interests and working toward regional stability will
involve risks in the future, as we have accepted risk in the past,
and will also require continuing commitment of our resources.
You remember, Mr. Chairman, that the central region is an area
of about 6.4 million square miles. It runs from Egypt and Jordan
to the Horn of Africa, includes the Arabian Peninsula, Pakistan
down in South Asia, and up to the north through Central Asia as
far north as Kazakhstan, some 25 nations, including the waters of
the Red Sea, the Northern Indian Ocean, the Persian Gulf, and the
key maritime choke points of Suez, Bab el Mandeb and the Strait
of Hormuz.
The area is home to about a half a billion people. They represent
all of the world's major religions and almost 20 major ethnic
groups. National economies in this region vary greatly from annual
per capita incomes as low as a few hundred dollars to tens of thou-
sands of dollars. The area includes dictatorships, absolute monar-
chies, failed states, democracies, and governments in transition to-
ward democracy. Humanitarian crises, resource depletion, overuse,
environmental issues, religious and ethnic conflict, demographic
challenges, and military power imbalances in the region create so-
cial, economic, and military volatility. These factors are particu-
larly significant given the geographical and economic importance of
the region where natural resources provide extraordinary economic
opportunities.
53
However, these same resources also give rise to a range of prob-
lems and rivalry. Some states have compensated by the industry of
their people. Other states have not.
In the past two years, Central Command (CENTCOM) has been
at the leading edge of the Global War On Terrorism. The Command
is engaged with U.S. and Coalition forces in Afghanistan and in
Iraq today, and our commitment remains as strong today as it was
when we started. Our troops are working to bring security to the
region, and they will continue to do so.
Sir, on the ground today in Iraq our troops are conducting ongo-
ing offensive operations, combining civil military work with direct
military action to seek out and bring to justice the leaders of this
fallen regime. Our priorities include forming and training police
forces, security forces, a new Iraqi army; improving the infrastruc-
ture of that country; supporting the establishment of both local and
national government; and providing emergency medical care and
other humanitarian assistance with which the committee would be
familiar.
Much dangerous work remains to be done. The media reminds us
of that fact every day. But, you know, millions of Iraqis have free-
doms today which they only dreamed of a year ago, and the regime
of Saddam Hussein is no longer in power.
As you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, our troops work daily very
closely with Ambassador Jerry Bremer and the entirety of the civil-
ian team and provide direct support and the tools that he needs in
order to be successful. Progress is being made; and our country is
justifiably proud, as Congressman Skelton said, of what has been
done by young men and women in uniform, American and the other
nations of the Coalition.
Let me talk briefly about lessons learned up to this point, and
then I will entertain the questions that the committee may have
and go into detail as you may wish, Mr. Chairman.
Decisive combat operations in Iraq saw a maturing first of joint
force operations. Some capabilities reached new performance levels,
from a joint integration perspective, our experience in Operations
Southern Watch and Northern Watch where, over the course of 10
years, we flew 180,000 missions over Iraq. Our troopers were shot
at over 1,700 times during that 10 years and responded kinetically
on more than 450 occasions. That background provided tools that
enabled us to understand joint operations in this area of respon-
sibility and should be counted as one of the major factors that led
to military success in Operation Iraqi Freedom. These operations
also helped improve our joint interoperability, combined interoper-
ability, working with the Brits to be sure and working with neigh-
bors in the gulf region.
During this time, our command, control, computer communica-
tions and intelligence architectures were dramatically improved;
and the synergy of those operations were taken to new levels of so-
phistication. Our forces were able to achieve their operational ob-
jectives during the military beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom
by integrating ground maneuver, Special Operations forces, preci-
sion lethal fires, and nonprecision fires. We saw for the first time
the integration of forces, rather than the deconfliction of forces, a
very substantial point. In my experience, which spans some 38
54
years in uniform, I have seen the operations of services and nations
deconflicted. This is the first joint and combined operations I have
witnessed during my time in the service.
This integration enabled conventional — that being air, ground,
and sea — forces to use and to leverage Special Operations Forces'
capabilities to deal with asymmetric threats and enable precision
targeting simultaneously on the same battlefield.
Likewise, Special Operations Forces were able to use conven-
tional forces to enhance and enable special missions. Operational
fire provided from the air spearheaded ground maneuver and sup-
ported Special Operations Forces. We saw jointness, we saw preci-
sion fires, command and control technologies, equipment readiness,
the state of training of our troops, and Coalition support as very
clear above-the-line winners in Operation Iraqi Freedom.
That said, we also identified a number of areas which require ad-
ditional work today, tomorrow, and in the budgets ahead. Frat-
ricide prevention is one area where we need work as we suffered
from a lack of standardized combat identification of the systems
and the people between nations and between services on the battle-
field.
Similarly, deplo3nnent planning and deplo5mient execution were
cumbersome, much more closely akin to those required during the
Cold War than being relevant to forces which will be required to
support this nation in the 21st century.
And Coalition information sharing also must be improved at all
levels. Human intelligence and communications bandwith are also
areas which will require continuing focus in the days, months, and
years ahead.
Mr. Chairman, let me talk for just a minute about the current
status of operations in Iraq. Although security continues to im-
prove, portions of Iraq are now and will remain for some time dan-
gerous.
You want to flip that map over for me.
A quick look at this map of Iraq describes what we think we see
today. The brown part of the map in the center represents what we
call the Sunni triangle. It is the place where the Ba'ath party was
the most seriously invested in that country, and it represents
where we see more than 90 percent of the difficulties that we see
reflected every day in our ongoing operations in Iraq.
The lightly shaded areas that appear to be yellow from where I
am sitting represent areas where we see less difficulty but where
we also see difficulty, be it from Fedayeen Saddam residual ele-
ments, be it from Ba'athist residual elements, or from cells of ter-
rorists which came into Iraq during the course of this conflict. But,
Mr. Chairman, this is what we look at today.
I think it is very important for us to all remember and continue
to remind ourselves that the term stability operations, which is
what we are doing right now, does not imply that combat oper-
ations have ended. It does imply that major combat operations
against enemy formations have ended. Military forces are still re-
quired to set conditions that will enable the evolution of Iraq, as
Congressman Skelton just described it.
Factors that will influence our force mix in the days ahead — that
is, how many Americans to be invested in Iraq, for how long — will
55
be subject to conditions that we see on the ground. One of those
conditions will be Coalition force contributions. How much inter-
national interest are we able to generate? What types and how
many of international forces will we be able to invest in this coun-
try? How quickly will we bring along Iraqi police forces and secu-
rity forces to guard key infrastructure in that country? And how
long will it take us to move forward and to establish a new Iraqi
army? All these issues are under way as we speak.
Ambassador Jerry Bremer is working very, very hard to balance
three key points: One is the establishment of governance. That is,
to put an Iraqi face on what we see in Iraq. Another is to move
the economy forward. And the third is to improve security in the
areas that I have indicated on this map graphic.
Sir, integration of Coalition forces is a major near term effort.
The United Kingdom and Poland are already committed to lead the
vision in Southern Iraq; and many partner nations, many of them
from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), have offered
forces to fill those units. Deplojnnent of those forces has already
begun. We continue discussions today with India and Pakistan.
At this moment, 19 Coalition partners are on the ground in sup-
port of military operations in Iraq, 19 additional countries are pre-
paring forces to be deployed to Iraq, and an additional 11 nations
are conducting military-to-military discussions here in Washington
and at my headquarters in Tampa.
At this point, about 35,000 Iraqi police have been raised, and
that is about 55 or so percent of an anticipated Iraqi police require-
ment of about 61,000 nationwide. Throughout the country, many of
these law enforcement officers are currently conducting joint pa-
trols with U.S. military forces, and we will ultimately transition re-
sponsibility for security and stability to the Iraqis.
The Chairman. General Franks.
General Franks. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. About how much longer do you have within your
opening statement?
General FRANKS. Sir, maybe two minutes.
The Chairman. I will tell you what. We have got, I think, about
five minutes left in this vote. I think it is very important that the
committee have an opportunity to hear your entire statement. Be-
lieve me, other witnesses, the committee is eager to leave early, but
in this case I think they want to hear everything you have said.
Let us take a break right now. We will vote; we will be back in a
few minutes, and we will keep on trucking.
General Franks. All right, sir.
[Recess.]
The Chairman. General, we just went over and voted on approv-
ing the Journal; and I insisted that every Member read it before
they vote. So thank you for interrupting your statement, and please
proceed.
General Franks. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Sir, with respect to what we see in Iraq today, I was describing
what I believed to be a building of momentum. The creation of the
new Iraqi army is, in fact, also moving forward. We will begin cre-
ating it in the next few days. The plan envisions placing three divi-
sions initially — one in Mosul, one in Baghdad, and one down in the
56
south in Basrah in order to provide territorial defense and to help
conduct stability operations. During the first year, which is begin-
ning now, we believe that we will field approximately nine battal-
ions of the Iraqi army. The new Iraqi army and these forces will
work initially to help secure infrastructure, to help protect fixed
sites, and on border control. As it develops, the force will also be
working with Coalition forces in order to make the Iraqi contribu-
tion to security of their own country.
Underljang all security functions is the need to continue to con-
duct humanitarian assistance and the conduct of civil-military op-
erations which we have been doing and will continue to do in order
to improve the quality of life of the Iraqi people. It is possible to
say that there will be no growth in the economy and that the Iraqi
people will not improve until their condition, until security im-
proves. It is also possible to say that until the Iraqi people are able
to see some tangible benefit of their liberation that the security will
not improve. So what we recognize is that we must move forward
together in order to put an Iraqi face on the building of governance
in Iraq in order to stimulate and grow the economy so that the av-
erage Iraqi can see the benefit of his or her liberation and continue
to work with Iraqis and within the Coalition in order to improve
security.
Mr. Chairman, let me conclude by saying our part in the global
war on terrorism continues. It is ongoing. The precision, the deter-
mination, the expertise of our young men and women who wear the
uniform and of our Coalition partners has brought about the libera-
tion of Afghanistan. It has brought about the liberation of Iraq,
both in lightening speed in the sweep of history, with minimum
bloodshed. These two nations have taken only their first steps,
however, in moving toward freedom, liberty; and our country and
our Coalition partners must be there to support the whole journey.
As Congressman Skelton said, there is no option. We will be
there to support the journey, and these missions will succeed. We
have accomplished a lot, but the potential for terrorist acts, for set-
backs, for continued difficulty remain very real.
Afghanistan has a new government, a new army, and with Coali-
tion support the nation is making strides toward long-term stabil-
ity.
In Iraq, Saddam Hussein's regime is gone. His supporters are
being rooted out. It will take time. Our forces and Jerry Bremer
will stay after it. Our focus in Iraq has, in fact, changed from one
of military destruction of a regime to one of providing security and
humanitarian assistance to the Iraqi people while helping establish
a representative form of government. Decisive combat operations
have been completed, but much work remains.
I am, and as well as you are, very proud of each and every one
of the men and women who have continued to serve selflessly and
tirelessly in the execution of our mission in the central region, from
Egypt to Kazakhstan, from the Suez Canal to Pakistan, regardless
of the uniform of service these people wear or the nation they rep-
resent. Mr. Chairman, I thank the Congress, this body and this
committee as well as the American people, those who wave the flag
while many in uniform salute the flag, for your tremendous sup-
port, the support you have given and will continue to give.
57
Mr. Chairman I would be pleased to take your questions.
The Chairman. General, thank you and thanks for a very com-
plete statement.
[The prepared statement of General Franks can be found in the
Appendix on page 110.1
The Chairman. Let me start off by asking you for your thoughts
about where your service, the U.S. Army, should go.
We have heard lots of talk about transformation, about being
able to get places quicker with more lethality, and we have seen
the discussion and proposals for new systems, and in many cases
that involves getting rid of old systems. And yet, we saw in the op-
eration where you drove the tip of that armored spear at extreme
speeds, taking a lot of key points, bridges, oil fields, et cetera, be-
fore they could be blown by the enemy — we saw a validation in
some of what I would call some of the old; that is, heavy armor.
We also saw validation with respect to some of the new — preci-
sion munitions that paved the way, that knocked out armor when
you forced it to mass with your ground forces, to oppose the ground
forces. In fact, we saw, I think, an integration of the old; that is,
the armored forces with the new, the new technologies of precision
in a very effective way that produced a lot of lethality.
So amid this hubbub of discussion as to where — how the Army
should transform, what are your thoughts with respect to the major
components of this important warfighting force and where we
should go from here?
General Franks. Mr. Chairman, with respect to just the Army,
I probably won't give you as complete an answer as you want. Let
me, if you will, talk about it from a joint
The Chairman. That is a better question. Thank you.
General Franks. There is no question that America's military of
the future will have certain defining characteristics. The force
needs to be lethal so that our country can remain credible, backed
by credible military force. So, lethality for the future 20 years to
50 years will remain terribly important.
Light will become ever more important. We see a move toward
lightness in the U.S. Army now. The desire is to maintain the abil-
ity in our platforms for ground systems to protect the people inside
and to be very lethal while at the same time being light enough
to be transported much more quickly than we are able to transport
them now. So the mark on the wall for the future will be light,
good force protection, and it will remain lethal.
Sir, we have learned in both Afghanistan and Iraq that precision
munitions will also be a part of the transformed military force in
the years ahead. One can say that more precision is better, and I
believe each of the services is moving in that direction.
I remember some of the early reports that we took out of Afghan-
istan. Whereas during the first Gulf War in 1991 we saw that it
took several aircraft delivering dumb munitions in order to destroy
each target, we saw in Afghanistan and we saw later in Iraq that
we had in fact flipped that and it was taking one air frame to de-
stroy several targets. That appears to all of us as being a very de-
sirable characteristic of future force.
Mobility will also be a need for the future force. The ability to
get the sorts of platforms, combat platforms we want and move
58
them long distances in a hurry, whether it is in the air or whether
it is at sea, will be also something that we are going to want to
see in the future force. Our ability to connect with allies, command,
control, computers, communications, will also be a part of the
transformational mix.
Mr. Chairman, I think — in the future, I think what we do not yet
know is what the force footprint, what the size of the various serv-
ices should be, and I will not tread there. I will leave that to each
of the services. Because when one decides given precision, given
speed, given lethality, how much of the force structure request be
traded off, sir, I am not in a position to be able to offer an opinion.
Now, let me, sir, connect perhaps the present to the future. What
I tried to describe is what I think the future force would want to
look like. But in reality we have today the force we have today. We
have some precision, we have some mobility, we have some force
protection in our armor systems. We have lethality. We do not,
however, match all the desired transformational characteristics
that I described. And so, sir, the work that must be done in the
Department and in each of the services is to figure the bridge from
where we get with the systems we have today to where we want
to be 10 years, 20 years, or 50 years into the future.
Sir, that is the issue, in my view, with legacy systems. We found
that the armor punch that we were able to deliver in Iraq was
very, very powerful. We also found that, even absent armor, the
use of Special Operations Forces in Afghanistan leveraging air
power and precision was also a very, very powerful use of legacy
capability, legacy forces and legacy equipment.
So exactly how much we trade off of which type force in order
to move, sir, from where we are today to the force we desire in the
future is going to be work that I think the Secretary characterizes
as transformation; and it is within that construct of transformation
that the retention of legacy systems is going to have to be ad-
dressed.
I am sorry, sir, for the long answer, but that is the best I can
do.
The Chairman. Thank you. General.
Mr. Skelton.
Mr. Skelton. General, thank you again for your testimony and
for your service.
It appears to me that we find that America is quite good thanks
to the reasons I mentioned earlier, winning on the battlefield, and
that we have a lot to learn to bring stability to a dangerous coun-
try. Am I correct?
General Franks. Yes, sir. You are correct.
Mr. Skelton. A few moments ago — I hope I wrote this cor-
rectly— you said the conditions now remain dangerous in Iraq, is
that right?
General FRANKS. That is correct.
Mr. Skelton. Major General Retired Bob Scales likened the con-
ditions in Iraq today as thuggery as opposed to guerilla warfare;
and, however you term it, there were still nine serious attacks yes-
terday, am I correct?
59
General Franks. Sir, on a given day — I didn't look at yesterday,
but on a given day there will be somewhere between 10 and 25 vio-
lent incidents in the area that I have indicated on this map.
Mr. Skelton. General, were you surprised at the end of our ini-
tial victory — military victory over the forces of Iraq, were you sur-
prised at the continued military opposition that our troops are re-
ceiving?
General Franks. Congressman Skelton, I was not surprised be-
cause I had not developed an expectation that hope could become
a method. I had hoped that we would see the total collapse of all
resistance and that there would be no fractious behavior, but I had
never believed that that hope could be a reality. And, Congressman
Skelton, that is why our troops train so vigorously at 29 Palms out
in California, at the Joint Readiness Training Center in Louisiana,
at the National Training Center at Fort Erwin, California, to be
able to operate in this sort of a stability environment.
Mr. Skelton. Now, we have, as I understand it, around 150,000
American troops in Iraq, is that right?
General Franks. 148, sir. That is correct.
Mr. Skelton. According to the news media and — which quotes
the Department of Defense request for congressional appropriations
and states that the Department of Defense now assumes the
ground naval force in theater today will likely remain at that level
through the end of fiscal 2003 and begin to demobilize in fiscal
2004. Do you anticipate that to come to pass?
General Franks. Sir, I think — anticipate — yes, I do, sir. I do an-
ticipate that that will come to pass. No hedge on my comment, but
I will give the following caveats:
Since the height of our footprint in the region for Operation Iraqi
Freedom, we have already removed 141,000 people. That includes
some 47,000 Marines. The remaining footprint at 148 is what I be-
lieve General John Abizaid and I and probably our subordinate
commanders would say represents the desirable footprint for the
near term.
The caveat is to my answer to your question, sir — so i don't know
if that is through the end of December or whether that is January
or February; and, sir, here is why: We need to not develop an ex-
pectation that all of the difficulties we see identified on this map
will go away within one month or two months or three months, be-
cause there are too many variables.
One of the variables is, how many Coalition forces will we wind
up putting in? And you know, sir, that we intend to have perhaps
30,000 or so Coalition forces in Iraq by the end of summer.
Also, we don't know what our contracting — how good our con-
tracting is going to be for Iraqi security forces to provide security
to infrastructure and fixed sites. We are not exactly sure how long
it will take us to generate and vet and be satisfied with all of the
Iraqi police forces.
And so, sir, with that long answer I will stop; but I do generally
agree with the proposition that we may see next year a reduction
in forces. What we see right now for the foreseeable future is that
the footprint appears to be okay, but there is a lot of uncertainty.
Mr. Skelton. My last question. Do you have a judgment as to
how long American forces will be in Iraq to help stabilize that
60
country before the Iraqis will be able to assume their own leader-
ship?
General Franks. Congressman, I honestly do not. My view is
that we want to be there as long as it takes, an expression the
President has used and an expression that my boss has used. We
want to be there for as long as it takes to have the Iraqis being
able to operate with a form of governance that respects human
rights as well as neighbors, but we don't want to be there a day
longer than that. And so, sir, I anticipate that we will be involved
in Iraq in the future. And, sir, I don't know whether that means
two years or four years. I just don't know.
Mr. Skelton. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank the gentleman.
The gentleman from Colorado, Mr. Hefley.
Mr. Hefley. Thank you for being here. General Franks; and
thank you for the marvelous way that you led our efforts here. We
are very, very proud of you.
From the map you indicate that triangle is kind of the problem
area. My sense is, from what I have been told, is that most of the
country and most of the people are very supportive of us. I would
like for you to speak to that.
Also, I get some reports that much of the attacks on us are being
committed by — they are actually terrorist attacks being committed
by people who may have come in from other countries to keep this
thing going.
Are these two things true?
Second, how long and how much effort do you think is going to
be necessary to put this down? If this is the last gasp of the Ba'ath
party, that is one thing. If it is outside terrorists, it is another; and
we have to deal with it differently.
General Franks. Congressman, two good questions.
The first on the view of the Iraqi people. If one looks across the
population in Iraq, in Baghdad or in Tikrit, Mosul or down in
Basrah today, one can find Iraqis in two groups. One group that
is either very pro-Coalition or is neutral. That means they are
waiting to see, does economic benefit derive from everything that
has happened? The other group is disenfranchised Ba'athists; it is
jihadists which, sir, I include the terrorists you mentioned in this
category. And, sir, I will tell you that, in my view, the population
of the first group is factors larger than the population of the second
group, which stirs up all the violence.
Sir, there is another reason that we see constant violence, as I
mentioned to Congressman Skelton, between 10 and 25 incidents
a day; and part of the reason for that is we go out looking for it.
We are, as I mentioned in my statement, conducting offensive oper-
ations. We have our people every day not sitting in base camps but
rather out looking to find the Ba'athists, looking to find the
jihadies, looking to find these people across the border from Syria
who are hell bent on creating difficulty.
With respect to the overall view of the Iraqi people, it is hard to
put percentages on it, but I captured a fact that I think is rather
interesting last night. Right now, there are about 200 radio broad-
cast outlets in Iraq, about 200, run by Iraqis and broadcasting to
100 percent of the Iraqi population. These people are much more
61
inclined to listen to radio — and they do it 24 hours a day — than
they are to watch television. We talk about some of the Arab media
Al Jazeera and so forth and the impact that they have in the re-
gion, but most Iraqis are, in fact, influenced by what they hear on
the radio more than they are by what they see on a television.
There are about 200 outlets. Out of the 200 outlets, pro-Coalition
and neutral broadcasts comprise 81 percent of what we monitor on
these 200 stations. So what the Iraqi people are hearing is either
neutral or pro-Coalition 81 percent of the time; 19 percent is anti-
Coalition.
Just a second on Jerry Bremer. Ambassador Jerry Bremer, who
has done a wonderful job, in fact does have a plan, in fact is work-
ing very hard on the three points that I mentioned earlier: govern-
ance, economy and security. His work is being favorably received
by the Iraqi people.
And so, sir, my view is that we will continue to see violence until
our operations root out the Ba'athists, the Jihadies, that that root-
ing out will continue; and if we are able to bring the economy and
governance along in parallel fashion, that the outcome will be soon-
er rather than later very positive. If the reverse happens, that we
are not able to bring along governance and economy quickly, it will
take longer, but, sir, the outcome will be the same. Because the
Iraqi people are waiting to see the benefit, and that is why I retain
a very positive attitude about Iraq.
Mr. Hefley. What is your best guess about Saddam? Did we kill
him? Is he still alive? And would that be an enormous help to
quelling the unrest if we actually knew we had gotten him one way
or another?
General Franks. Sir, no doubt about it. I do not know. I have
thought in the quietude of, you know, my own office that he is alive
or he is not alive or whatever. And actually we don't know whether
he and the sons are alive or not, but I can comment to your ques-
tion.
There is no doubt that confirmation of killing or capturing Sad-
dam will have a very positive effect on operations and stability in-
side Iraq. Sir, there is no question of that. And for that reason we
have an organization that is devoted to that task, very sophisti-
cated. It is an interagency group. We call it Task Force 20, and it
is doing very good work. Witness the fact that, out of the top, I
guess 52 or 55, the number now stands at about 35 either captured
or dead. So our forces in fact are doing a good job; and, sir, it is
a matter of time.
The Chairman. Thank the gentleman.
The gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Spratt.
Mr. Spratt. General Franks, congratulations on a masterful per-
formance by yourself as the commander and also by all of the
forces under your command.
Based on the intelligence that you had going into this, what sort
of surprises did you encounter? I recall one of your ground com-
manders, a general officer, said this is not the Iraqi troops that we
were told we would be fighting at a point in time when they were
fighting harder. Did you expect, for example, to find them equipped
in the field with chemical weapons and therefore that you expected
a chemical weapon counterattack?
62
General FRANKS. Congressman Spratt, I did expect to see them
equipped on the battlefield with chemical weapons based on human
intelligence, based on the verbal commitment that we had had over
the course of some ten years by the regime to use or to pursue
weapons of mass destruction and the view that that regime has of
our country and, in fact, of the West. The intelligence indicated to
all of us that we should be prepared for the use of weapons of mass
destruction against our troops. And I don't know that I would char-
acterize it as surprise that it was not used. Perhaps, rather, I
viewed it as a blessing that it was not used. But we were fully pre-
pared and the troops on the ground were fully prepared for — to
have to fight in a weapons of mass destruction (WMD) environ-
ment.
Mr. Spratt. How do you account for the fact that they weren't
used? Is this an intelligence lapse or is this an unexplained ele-
ment of their tactical planning?
General FRANKS. Sir, another good question. I actually — I believe
that of some almost 1,000 sites where we thought, based on intel-
ligence, we might find weapons, we had an expectation that we
would go into all 1,000 of those sites. That work is not completed.
So I believe that we will either find the weapons or we will find
evidence of the weapons of mass destruction; and I believe, sir, that
will vindicate the intelligence that we received. Intelligence was
not perfect. It never will be. But I believe that the intelligence was
worked hard, it was worked honestly, and our troops believed, as
I believed, that we had better be prepared for the use of WMD on
this battlefield.
Mr. Spratt. In terms of an exit strategy, what do you think
needs to be accomplished before you can even start thinking about
demobilizing, withdrawing troops? What are the key criteria for us
before we can pull out?
General Franks. As Congressman Skelton said, sir, absolute suc-
cess. We have to have an Iraqi face on governance in that country
so that we assure ourselves that another safe harbor for terrorism
and for the export of WMD is not created.
Mr. Spratt. Does that mean you would have to have elections
and elect a government like that before we could leave?
General Franks. Sir, that is my view, yes. I believe that the
economy has to be running and there has to be security in the
country, although I believe that much of that security will be pro-
vided by the Iraqis themselves, keeping in mind the media situa-
tion that I mentioned a minute ago, with 200 radio stations and
the way the police are being recruited and the building of an Iraqi
national army. Believe it will be coming along, but that also, sir,
would be the end state before exit.
Mr. Spratt. We spent the morning talking about Iraq for good
reason, but there is another place that is a matter of concern, and
that is Afghanistan. Has it suffered from a lack of attention, a lack
of emphasis during the time we put so much emphasis on Iraq?
General Franks. Sir, actually, it hasn't. The Coalition and U.S.
commitment to Afghanistan have remained constants. I will give
you a very simple reason for that, sir.
When we were doing our plan in the Defense Department for po-
tential operations in Iraq, we believed that Afghanistan would be
63
a strategic flank for our operations in Iraq; and so everyone from
Secretary — from the President to Secretary Rumsfeld right through
me were very sensitive to be sure that our operations moved ahead
in Afghanistan in parallel with what we were doing in Iraq. Just
one single metric that I used to just gauge that is the footprint, the
force level. The structure level in Afghanistan has remained con-
stant, between 9 and 10,000 now for over a year. And so, no, sir,
we did not suffer as a result.
Mr. Spratt. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Weldon.
Mr. Weldon. Thank the chairman.
General, thank you for being here. Thank you for your outstand-
ing service to the country.
General, you are the individual that was on the spot guarantee-
ing the safety of the lives of our military personnel while the arm-
chair quarterbacks back here in our country were taking potshots,
saying the plan wasn't properly thought through, it didn't antici-
pate what we would find. I think in the end you proved everyone
wrong. You did a masterful job, and we are all proud of you. I can
tell you that without a doubt.
General Franks. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Weldon. You had to make the ultimate decision, I guess,
along with the President and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs to
move forward. Do you feel in hindsight now after it is over that
somehow the threat was enhanced or overstated as a justification
for to us take military action in Iraq?
General Franks. Sir, I do not believe that at all. I do not believe
the threat was overstated. I think the threat was accurately stated.
Mr. Weldon. Thank you. General.
General, one of my concerns before the war and after is the eco-
nomic restructuring of the country and the stability that needs to
be provided. There have been several Iraqi reconstruction con-
ferences that I have spoken at, and back in March I challenged the
energy sector worldwide to come up with a broad-based multi-
national council to assist us. I agree with you that I think Ambas-
sador Bremer is doing a good job, but in the three items that you
outlined — governance, economy and security — I think there is an
effort that we can explore, and I want to get your assessment if you
think we are moving in that direction quickly enough to allow the
connection of those three.
Even though many of us were upset that France and Germany
and Russia did not immediately come on board with us and still
harbor some concerns about that lack of support, the fact is that
they were involved prior to the war and some of their companies
have excellent expertise and have an on-site capability to work
with the Iraqi people. Therefore, I think there needs to be an inter-
national role, not just a U.S. role, for the rebuilding of the country.
For instance, I have in the room today — I introduced you to the
leader of the largest energy infrastructure company from Russia,
Mr. Bokanovski, who is a major presence in Iraq. He is sitting over
here. Meeting with me today he said, we are willing to put our own
investment in. We have relationships with the Iraqi people.
64
Do you think it can be helpful that these companies that were
in Iraq and have the ongoing presence, by getting them to come
back in and putting their own private sector investment in creating
new job opportunities, that they can actually assist in both the se-
curity and the governance role that we have to play to get the Iraq
country back on a solid footing again? And if you agree with that,
I would hope that you would continue a role beyond your military
career in a very up front, positive way so that we can benefit from
the experience that you have had not just in the military but in
your experience in bringing us to the point where we are at in re-
building a new Iraq.
General Franks. Sir, I believe — without talking specifically to
the business sector, I believe that it is important to international-
ize what we are seeing in Iraq in terms of reconstruction across all
three of the points that Jerry Bremer talks about in governance;
and I think we are seeing some evidence of that in the rebuilding
of the economy, which would certainly address the point, sir, that
you made as well as the internationalization of the force to provide
security.
Mr. Weldon. Just one final point. General. I don't mean to put
you on the spot, I am not looking to, but there is going to be a
major international energy reconstruction conference in Washing-
ton on July 24th. And you may not be available, but if you would
be, I know they would love to have you as a keynote speaker. There
will be leaders from 35 nations, chief executive officers (CEO) of all
the major energy companies coming to this city to talk about an ad-
visory council and assisting the U.S. in a constructive way. I know
certainly on behalf of that group they would welcome your involve-
ment. I don't expect an answer, but I want to call that to your at-
tention.
Thank you again for your service.
Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for the great role you played
during this entire conflict. You led us, the committee; and I want
to say on behalf of our colleagues on both sides we appreciate the
role that you played in this entire Iraqi effort.
The Chairman. Well, I thank the gentleman; and I am not retir-
ing.
Mr. Weldon. Darn it.
The Chairman. Doggone it. But I thank my old friend.
Mr. Ortiz, the great gentleman from Texas.
Mr. Ortiz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and. General, thank you
so much from one Texan to another. You have done a great job.
General Franks. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Ortiz. Now, the Third Infantry Division — they were the first
division that went into Iraq. Are they still there?
General Franks. Sir, they were the first division that went in;
and, yes, sir, they are still there, most of them still there.
Mr. Ortiz. We seem to be getting a lot of mail from wives, fami-
lies of the Army troops that are there. They tell us the Air Force
has come back, the Marines have come back, the Navy has come
back, but our soldiers have not been rotated. And they see the
graphic scenes on TV of the war that is going on, and they worry
so much that it might be their relatives who might be killed. What
65
measures have been put in place to achieve a better force protec-
tion for our troops now?
I see that map, and I see that it is a big country. When we move
either soldiers from one area or another or we move equipment, are
they protected? What measures have been taken. General?
General Franks. Sir, Congressman, your point is well taken.
Let me first say that I am so proud of the Third Infantry as the
first Army unit and the principal axis of advance unit that moved
in historically unprecedented time to isolate Baghdad and to drop
the regime of Saddam Hussein. That great division, sir, the one of
the brigades — there are three brigades in that division, and one of
them is beginning its redeployment now, Congressman Ortiz. The
second will begin its redeployment next month, and the third and
final brigade of third infantry will be out of Iraq in September.
With respect to force protection, I think, sir, there are two ingre-
dients that we want to be absolutely certain are in place. One is,
wherever we establish our enclaves or our operating bases, we
want to be sure that the force protection in the vicinity of those
bases is very good, is solid security.
The second ingredient is that we want to conduct offensive oper-
ations. We do not want in Iraq to accept a defensive posture where
we sit and wait. I believe that our forces are doing that.
Congressman, I will tell you, however, that we will continue to
have these groups fade; and Saddam, the people, the jihadists who
came in from Syria, some of the Ba'athists — they are going to con-
tinue to seek out the vulnerabilities that we have as we move our
conveys. We will have to continue to be sure that these convoys are
protected and armed; and, sir, we will do that.
Mr. Ortiz. One last question. You know, there is talk about
sending our troops to Liberia now. What kind of impact is this
going to have as far as being able to rotate our troops because of
the many deployments that we have throughout?
General Franks. Congressman, I don't know, because I have not
been part of any of the considerations that have gone into that. My
understanding from talking to Secretaiy Rumsfeld yesterday was
that no decision had been taken to do that. Rather, an assessment
team to develop a view of what is going on in that country would
be dispatched. Then all of the pros and cons would certainly be dis-
cussed and then a decision made by the President, sir. And that
is the best I can do on that one.
Mr. Ortiz. Again, thank you for a great job.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman from Texas.
General, before going to the next question. Mr. Spratt asked you
if you thought you had had bad intelligence, misinterpreted intel-
ligence with respect to weapons of mass destruction. You put out —
a number of alerts were put out to our forces that advanced on
Baghdad that — to the effect that communications had been inter-
cepted indicating from the Iraqi officers themselves that they in-
tended to use special weapon or weapons of mass destruction.
General Franks. Mr. Chairman, that is correct.
The Chairman. Would you describe that or just talk about that
for a second? That was direct evidence that we basically heard with
our electronic capability?
66
General Franks. Sir, that is absolutely correct. Intelligence from
a variety of sources is available on the battlefield. One of the
sources is human intelligence; and, of course, we had — and it has
been well reported — we had some elements on the ground in con-
tact with Iraqis prior to the onset or prior to the 19th of March.
Additionally, we have technical means to be able to take commu-
nications, some of which are encrypted, others not; and the take,
if you will, from communications as well as human sources in a
given 24-hour period of time is enormous. It is enormous. Very
large groups of analysts work this information very hard and then
as — I would say connect the dots. And when the dots were con-
nected on several occasions in a way that indicated to us that we
might be closing in on the use of, specifically, chemical munitions,
in fact, we alerted our forces several times, Mr. Chairman, that
that is correct, based on information that we received from human
intelligence and from radio communications intercept.
The Chairman. So when you told your troops to put their gas
masks on and their gas suits
General Franks. That is correct.
The Chairman [continuing! . That was the right judgment, in
your view.
General FRANKS. Absolutely. I would do the same thing again to-
morrow.
The Chairman. If you looked at the same intelligence today, you
would still do it.
General FRANKS. Without a doubt.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Schrock.
Mr. SCHROCK. Mr.
General Franks. Mr. Chairman, let me add one additional thing
to that. I found it especially interesting — one of the blessings of
technology is video teleconferencing, and beyond anything we have
ever had in our military before was our ability to video teleconfer-
ence at very high levels of classification with all of my commanders
and with my staff, with all of their staffs on a 24-hour-a-day basis.
I think perhaps more than 140 boards, bureaus, and commissions
met between the continental United States, Tampa and our various
headquarters in the region each 24-hour period of time during this.
It was very interesting to me that on a number of occasions one
or more of my subordinate commanders would be conducting video
teleconferencing with me wearing gas masks because they had re-
ceived information that would indicate to them that they should be
at a very high state of alert for the use of chemicals. This was not
uncommon at all. In fact, Mr. Chairman, I believe if you think back
at some of the embedded reporting that went on during the course
of this, there were actually reporters in several of the places where
this happened; and I think it was captured for the world to see.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Schrock.
Mr. Schrock. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and. General, thank
you and your wife for 36 really wonderful years.
General Franks. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Schrock. Kind of a follow-on to what my friend, Mr. Ortiz,
mentioned. Do you think that — I would like to know your opinion
67
on whether you think our troops are overextended? Are we in too
many places in the world? Are we stretched too thin? I know you
wear the uniform of the Army, but if you have an opinion on where
you think we are — because it seems like Liberia today, tomorrow —
I mean, what next? I am just curious what your spin is on that.
General Franks. Sir, it is difficult for me in my joint position or
in my previous position to do a great deal more than speculate. I
believe that we have Army troops, for example, in some 370 dif-
ferent locations around the world right now. On the other hand, I
remember on the 11th of September, 2001, the way I felt and the
way America felt when we realized our own vulnerability in this
country as we watched the strike on the Pentagon, the fields in
Pennsylvania and the World Trade Center come down and recog-
nized the loss of some 3,000 people as a result of our own vulner-
ability. And our President said at that time that a heavy load is
going to reside on the shoulders of America's military. So, sir, none
of us should be surprised in fact that our military forces are out
and about this planet today waging a war on terrorism.
How much could we do, given our current force levels? Congress-
man, I can't give you, sir, a good answer to that. But I do believe
that all of us recognize the obligation and the responsibility to do
whatever our President calls on us to do as part of the Global War
On Terrorism.
I apologize for the answer, but, sir, that is what I believe. I do
believe, because I know Don Rumsfeld very well, and I believe that
on the day that that the Secretary becomes convinced that our
structure is not sufficient to be able to accomplish the task given
him by the Commander in Chief, this committee will know about
it, sir.
Mr. SCHROCK. Okay. Thank you. Let me just say that I just hope
you and your wife have a wonderful rest of your life and success
and happiness because, believe me, the two of you deserve it.
Geijeral Franks. Thank you, sir.
Mr. ScHROCK. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Taylor.
Mr. Taylor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and. General, along with
every other American I want to thank you for the great job you and
those forces who are on the ground with you did.
I want to follow up on what my colleague from Texas had to say.
In the many briefings I had in Bosnia, the point was made very
well to me that, for every troop we had in Bosnia, we were really
t3ring up three. We are training one to go there, we had one there,
then we are retaining the one that just came home from Bosnia to
do his regular military occupational specialty (MOS).
General Franks. Yes, sir.
Mr. Taylor. Given that scenario — and I don't think that rule has
changed much with a 480,000 man and woman Army — if you have
got 150,000 in Bosnia, that would lead me believe to you are train-
ing 150,000, and at some point you are going to be retaining
150,000, which pretty well ties up your entire force.
What units have been notified and are training to go to Iraq?
And at what point — given that at some point our Nation came to
the realization that we were wearing out our Active duty forces and
68
we had to throw the Guard and Reserve into that mix, one of the
things that made that work so well was the 49th and the Mary-
landers and the Mississippians who were given sufficient time to
train for the mission, sufficient time to get their own houses in
order and actually sufficient time, I believe, to man that force with
all volunteers, given that this is going to be an ongoing thing and
every one of our efforts in the past 13 years has taken longer than
we thought, not less time. Given that that is now the rule of
thumb, what steps are in place for that?
And let me follow up. I also notice that the men and women in
the Bosnia mission, their morale shot up dramatically as their
housing got better, as they went from tents to C-huts. My col-
league, Mr. Abercrombie, tells me on his brief trip there we still
had soldiers sleeping in trucks, we had soldiers sleeping in
bombed-out buildings and bombed-out palaces. At what point do
you get the contractors or the Navy construction battalions in there
to build some C-huts to get these guys into some decent housing?
General Franks. Sir, great questions.
The former in Iraq question of 150,000 total, I am not sure today
what the mix of Active Component to Reserve Component is in the
140,000. But your point is correct. It is about three for one for the
reasons that you described: one committed, one regrouping, and
one preparing to go.
Sir, the call for us in the future will be what the Active and Re-
serve Component mix will be as we continue our operations in Iraq
and what the footprint will look like in six months or within a
year.
When I left Central Command — to get to your first question — a
number of brigades were being requested to be placed on what we
call "prepared to deploy" in order to begin the cycling of forces, this
three for one that you talked about; and there was discussion at
CENTCOM headquarters of one additional division to continue the
cycling. I don't know, sir, the bumper numbers of those divisions,
but that is the consideration that is ongoing right now; and I know
for a fact that the Secretary told me yesterday that he is meeting
today or tomorrow with the military leadership, the Joint Staff as
well as Central Command, to make some decisions on what those
bumper numbers will look like and what the rotation will be for
forces that are currently located in Iraq.
So, sir, your point has been taken, and the Department is work-
ing it now.
Mr. Taylor. May I interrupt briefly? What is the designed length
of the rotation?
General Franks. Sir, that is what he is going to decide either
today or tomorrow. And let me — so I don't just force that off on
him, here is the issue: We, because of the way some of our forces
are structured — the differences between Army forces that include
Active and Reserve, naval forces and air forces, I am not sure that
the cycling of forces into Iraq will be exactly the same. In other
words, it may be that you will see part of the force that cycles
every four months, part of the force that cycles every six months.
And that is what the Secretary is working right now with the Joint
Chiefs and his staff.
69
Let me talk for just a second about quality of life. I was — my last
trip in Iraq was, I guess, maybe two weeks ago. And as I stood in
Baghdad and talked to a lot of people, I sort of probed on the qual-
ity-of-life issue to figure out where exactly are we today in terms
of quality of life for the troops that are committed on the ground
in Iraq. We are not where we want to be. That is a fact. It should
not take 14 to 21 days for mail to transit, for example.
General Franks. And so for the past two weeks people have been
working mail, a nontrivial sort of a matter, as well as the estab-
lishment of e-mail links that permit families to maintain better
contact with one another.
Right now, the food cycle for the troops in Iraq is one hot meal
a day and two meals ready to eat (MRE) a day. Within the next
number of weeks, that will change to two hot meals a day and one
meal ready to eat a day. Additionally, some Harvest Falcon force
provider sort of air-conditioned tentage is being taken into Iraq, all
of this in recognition of the valuable point that you made. If we are
going to be invested, then what we want to do is increase both the
force protection as we discussed earlier and the quality of life for
the people on the ground there. And, so, work to be done there, sir.
Mr. Taylor. Do you have a time line?
General Franks. It varies. The mail I suspect will probably take
about two weeks in order to make robust increases. I think e-mail
will probably be much better in a period of two or three weeks.
Mr. Taylor. Is there a time line for getting that force of 150,000
into a C-Hut equivalent accommodation.
General Franks. No, sir, not that I know of C-Hut equivalent?
No, sir. Not that I know of. I suspect that our troops in Iraq will
continue to be in a mixture of unair-conditioned expeditionary liv-
ing conditions, air-conditioned expeditionary living conditions, and
in some cases living in hard sites, and we do that in a great many
places in Iraq right now. But this is going to be something that we
are going to be focusing attention on probably over the next three
to six months.
Mr. Taylor. Thank you.
General Franks. Yes, sir.
Mr. Taylor. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman. Mr. Akin.
Mr. Akin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The task of trying to rebuild, it seems to me there are a couple
of components that maybe you are facing. First of all, you have got
these organized people who are systemically trying to shoot you
when you are in a convoy or whatever. And those are people that
are essentially terrorists or whatever, guerillas, whatever you want
to call them.
General Franks. Right.
Mr. Akin. There is another component of rebuilding a civiliza-
tion, it seems to me, and I am just wondering how significant this
is. And that is, there are a lot of things that we in America just
take for granted. When we go to a food service, we line up in a line.
There is a lot of just sort of basic behavior that we have just inher-
ited as part of our culture. Some of our Third World countries do
not have some of those same kinds of ways of doing things, sani-
tary things and all sorts of things like that. How much is that just
70
going to take a lot of time, and how much is that a factor, and how
much is it more just the terrorist side that we are deaUng with?
General FRANKS. Sir, that is a great question. If you look at Iraq
historically — and by historically I don't mean the last 30 years
under this regime, but just historically — and you consider the
Kurds, you consider the rivalries between Sunni and Shia, you con-
sider the rivalries within the Shia sect, and then you consider the
rivalries between tribal elements and the general overall culture,
you have described it correctly. It is not a standing in line sort of
culture. And that is a part of the issue.
On the other hand, sir, our people who work civil military oper-
ations and civil affairs and so forth will not work to install America
in Iraq. And so, it actually does tie together with the business of
putting an Iraqi face on this, because Iraqi policemen, Iraqis work-
ing in the Ministry of Education will have different tolerances for
these sorts of behavior than Westerners would have. And one of the
things one has to be careful of is while we impose our will as the
Coalition Provisional Authority in that country, we do not want to
alienate the society in such a way that makes it take twice as long
to get rebuilt.
You mentioned cultural differences. There are also, sir, some cul-
tural similarities. Very interesting. Jerry Bremer was telling me
two or three weeks ago about sports pride with the Iraqis, soccer
teams, and a true Olympic committee. And actually, the Iraqis are
working now to put their sports program in shape. And, I mean,
I don't think I have seen anyone report that, nor have I seen any-
one report that after 30 years when orchestras, during which time
orchestras were banned. We recently saw the reformation of an or-
chestra where men had not played their instruments in 30 years,
and instruments had been placed in basements and in back rooms
and had been locked. And we actually had a performance of the
Iraqi National Orchestra recently.
And so there are some dissimilarities and there are some similar-
ities.
Mr. Akin. Thank you.
General Franks. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Reyes.
Mr. Reyes. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
And like my colleagues, thank you very much, General, for your
service. I was doing some calculations. If my math holds up, you
have been in 36 years. So you came in in about 1967?
General Franks. Sir, I actually have been in 38 years, because
I was a private soldier for two years before I became an officer.
Mr. Reyes. Well, thank you so much for your service. And pass
on our best to your lovely wife, as well. We know how difficult
things have been. And the calculation I made is because I wanted
you to comment — being a veteran with service in Vietnam, draw a
comparison for us between what we are seeing today in Iraq and
what you saw initially as an enlisted person for two years and then
as an officer. But before I do that, I wanted to ask you, because
this has been something that was asked of me last week when I
was in my district and it all brought back or jelled in my mind yes-
terday when I saw this picture in the New York Times of the sol-
diers that had just been informed that they were going to — these
71
are soldiers from the Third Infantry Division, and they were going
to be extended in Iraq at least for the foreseeable future.
If I understood you correctly when Congressman Ortiz asked you,
these soldiers, particularly of the Third Infantry Division, will all
have been rotated out by September. Is that correct?
General Franks. By the end of September. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Reyes. And that is great news and I know will be great news
to the parents, some of which talked to me in El Paso and even
a couple in Phoenix, where I was at in the early part of the week.
And one of them made mention that their son had said that the
officers were getting rotated back much quicker than the enlisted
personnel. And then in this week's Army Times, I have got an arti-
cle here that is highlighted where it deals with change of command
ceremonies and changing out the officer personnel. I think it would
be very useful for you to comment on that for the many parents
that are out there thinking that officers are coming back and en-
listed personnel are remaining in theater much longer. Number
one.
And, number two, if you would, kind of compare to us — and the
reason I am asking you to compare is because when I look at that
map. General, and I think of Iraq being 25 percent larger than
Vietnam, and when you factor in the fact that we were only in half
of Vietnam during that era, it is twice as big a country easily as
we had to deal with in Vietnam. And then you have the Sunni Tri-
angle and then the yellow or light green areas there that you point-
ed out where attacks are occurring or conflicts, or however you
want to call it, it brings to my mind the similarity with Vietnam.
And those attacks are going on where our troops are.
And so if you would first cover the enlisted versus officer and
then give us your evaluation of how this compares to Vietnam.
Thank you.
General Franks. Yes, sir. We will not see officers rotated before
enlisted, with the exception of things like you mentioned where we
see a change of command, and I think those will be minimized.
There for sure will be some people on an individual basis who will
rotate rather than being a part of a unit rotation. But Congress-
man, that will be the exception rather than the rule. I think every-
one recognizes the importance of maintaining unit integrity while
we do these things.
The fact is that these young people, to include the officers, have
served us very, very well, and we ought to be about the business
of trying to protect all of their interests as individuals, and I have
a great deal of confidence that our subordinate leaders will be try-
ing to do that. That does not minimize or does not deprecate the
comment by young troops who will be quick to point out that, you
know, someone left, by golly, and I am being forced to stay. And
so the leaders will have that very much in mind as they go for-
ward.
Let me talk for a second to your second notion or your second ob-
servation about rotation policy in general. In World War II, people
got on the ship and they went away for duration. And some of the
same ones who went away for duration were the ones who toward
the end fought the Battle of the Bulge and then they all came home
after three or four years worth of constant combat. In my experi-
72
ence in Vietnam, I went away for a year. We went away for a year
at a time. Sir, we don't yet have anybody who has been in combat
in Iraq for a year.
In terms of responding to a question about the similarities be-
tween Vietnam and what we see right now, actually, sir, I don't see
them. I don't see it at all. This country is larger than Vietnam to
be sure, but in Vietnam one was just as likely to encounter rocket
propelled grenade attack at some point as he was at any other
point in Vietnam. And the green part of that map that I have dis-
played is an area where we don't see much bad news. What we see
is Iraqis working hard, turning over the Baathists to us. It is only
in the yellow splotches and in that brown area where we see most
of the difficulty. And as you can see, that is perhaps 10 percent,
15 percent of this country.
Now, one of the beauties about our current force structure. Con-
gressman Reyes, is that what happens is, when we apply pressure,
military offensive pressure to one part of the country, it sort of
oozes and the problem will move around to a different part. And,
actually, that connects to the Third Infantry Division and why the
Third Infantry Division is where they are.
When we got into an isolated Baghdad and saw the problems out
to the west of Baghdad and al-Fallujah and Ar Ramadi, the Third
Infantry Division wound up being told, wait a minute, we are going
to go out and clear this corridor of al-Fallujah and Ar Ramadi, and
it is going to cost us a month. And so, the Third Infantry Division,
in fact, was retained longer than we thought we probably would
want to retain them. And that can never be good from the perspec-
tive of the trooper. But what I described and what I answered in
response to your question, sir, is true; that is, we have a third of
that outfit getting ready to come home now, another third in Au-
gust, another third in September.
We should feel good about that, but we should also recognize that
those people have been on the line working very, very hard in a
hard environment, now in some cases back to last November, De-
cember. And so we do feel that we have an obligation to do that.
But, sir, I don't see much similarity between what we are doing in
Iraq and what we saw in Vietnam.
Mr. Reyes. Thank you. General.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
The gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Forbes.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, General, you have heard most of the members of this com-
mittee express their appreciation to you.
General Franks. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Forbes. But I would be remiss if I didn't thank you on be-
half of all my constituents who are very appreciative. Of course, we
all know you had a great deal of help and support from all the TV
experts, but we certainly appreciate you staying focused and on
mission.
And, General, a lot of times when we are analyzing a conflict like
this, we talk a lot about the weapons systems in some of the con-
flicts, but I am always impressed with the logical support that is
required for a major military conflict like this. I have a special
73
place in my heart for Fort Lee and their contribution in matters
like this. And my question for you is, were you pleased with the
handling of the water, petroleum, and food distribution? Did you
find any surprises? And did we learn any lessons from this conflict
that we can perhaps adapt and apply to other situations?
General FRANKS. Congressman, surprises, actually, no. Lessons,
yes, sir, we did. We learned some. The degree of being impressed
with our logistics and support and sustainment architecture, my
respect for that, enormous. Absolutely enormous. We have not had
supply lines or lines of communication like this to support in a
long, long time.
I remember as we were planning this, at one point we said, you
know what? If we are going to move food, fuel, water, and
sustainment stocks, we had better preposition a lot of trucks in
Iraq. And so, before this operation ever started, because of the ex-
cellence of people at Fort Lee and a number of other places, we po-
sitioned 27 truck companies in Iraq in order to be able to maintain
this line of communication all the way to Baghdad. Any time that
you have a long line of communication and you have even very
small groups of snipers that operate, enemy snipers which operate
along those routes, very, very difficult.
I have not seen the report on the maintenance company that was
so badly torn up, but I read some news accounts of it, to include
one this morning. And I think, sir, that that talks to the difficulty
that our logisticians have when they are out on the battlefield mov-
ing everything from food, fuel, water, cooks, mechanics along these
lines to be able to maintain contact and support the combat troops.
So I have enormous respect for what they did.
Surprises? Actually, not. Not surprised. But the lessons that
have to do with mobility, we need to take a look at the way we
structure our combat service support to be sure that we have all
of it located in exactly the right place.
The fuel was an enormous success in this operation. Some
months before combat began, fuel lines were laid all the way across
Kuwait, portable fuel lines laid all the way across Kuwait. And
then once the war started, the fuel lines continued to be laid all
the way up to the north of Talil by some incredible petroleum engi-
neers and people in the logistics support side of this. They have a
great deal to be proud of. They were genuine heroes. And the
things that we learned, the ones that I described, mobility, posi-
tioning, structure, we will have to review those in the future, sir.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you. General.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
Dr. Snyder.
Dr. Snyder. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for having
this hearing today with General Franks.
It is good to see you again. General, a lot of us get our informa-
tion from retired high ranking officers, and I hope you will be
available afterwards. And maybe, Mr. Chairman, we can have Gen-
eral Franks come back in his retirement years and give us updates
as the weeks and months go by.
General Franks. I would be delighted.
74
Dr. Snyder. You were talking about surprises. I read parts of the
transcript of yours and Secretary Rumsfeld's testimony before the
Senate, and I was surprised by something that Secretary Rumsfeld
said. At one point he was asked about whether he was aware of
any approaches that had been made to France and Germany about
helping; he said he did not know. There was apparently a vote. He
came back after the break, and this was the exchange. This is Sec-
retary Rumsfeld in this transcript:
The answer to the question as to whether or not we made a spe-
cific request to NATO to assist in Iraq. The answer is we did. Sec-
retary Wolfowitz was sent over there in December of last year; he
did make a specific request. I am sure there were other specific re-
quests that I am not aware of either.
And Senator Levin said: None since the war?
And this is where I was surprised. General Franks. Secretary
Rumsfeld says: I have no idea. I would be happy to run around and
try to find out the answer to that.
Well, I don't — who should know that? I mean, who should know
whether there has been contact made between the United States
Government and NATO about assisting us, or with the French or
with the Germans? I mean, I agree with all the statements that
have been made here about a lot of our troops want to come home,
they feel like they have done their job, and their families want
them to come home. And you talk about all these green areas.
Those look like perfect areas to give the French a sector, to give
NATO a sector and say, here, it is your sector; you are part of the
action now. Whose job is it? Are you aware of any contacts that
have been made since the war to try to get NATO involved in a
major away or to get the French involved in a major way where
they would have a sector?
General Franks. Sir, having been in the hearing with the other
body yesterday, I am familiar with the statement that you read
from. Actually, maybe I can help a little bit.
I actually agree with the comment Secretary Rumsfeld made
when he said, I don't know, but I will run around and try to find
out. And let me try to provide some context around that.
We have in Tampa, as I mentioned, 63 nations. Among those na-
tions actually are Russia, Germany, and France, and they have
been there with us since the very beginning. I deal with them
every day. We talk to them about potential force contributions.
About ten days ago, I was in London and had a session with Prime
Minister Tony Blair, and we talked about the force composition in
the Polish division. I have people who have been to Pakistan and
are in contact with India making arrangements now to see what
force structure we can provide internationally.
And so, when the Secretary says, maybe someone has talked to
them and I will try to find out, what he meant was he has Dr. Paul
Wolfowitz, in fact, who works it; He has his policy shop with Doug
Feith who works it. The State Department, in fact has, Secretary
Powell, who has worked, I think, 70 or 80 nations. He has me
working it from the tactical operational level in contact with these
nations.
And so, I believe he provided an honest answer when he said, I
don't know if someone has done this.
75
Dr. Snyder. Well, General Franks, I am running out of time. I
understand that. It just seems to me that our alliance with NATO
and the French is such a strong one, the French have such peace-
keeping experience that somehow I would have thought that that
would have been a high priority — at least that we would have
known if we had had contacts.
I wanted to ask about Afghanistan. On page ten of your written
statement you say, the average Afghan now enjoys basic freedoms,
a higher quality of life, and prospects for a better future. And I
think everyone would agree with that. But that was a very omi-
nous story in, I guess it was today's Washington Post, about the
opium trade, and that we are at risk of having a country controlled
not just by warlords but by drug money warlords, which to me
sounds if a drug mafia of some kind can thrive so can terrorism
again.
General FRANKS. Congressman, I absolutely agree with you. And
I think the issue that all of us, the international community has
to work with the Afghans, because the poppy production is tremen-
dous and the drug trade is tremendous. But what has to be worked
is, who is going to solve that problem? And obviously all of us, you,
I, the American people would like to have the Afghans solve this
problem for themselves. The issue for us is to judge whether they
have the capacity, given their current governance, to be able to
adequately address it, or whether they are going to require inter-
national help beyond what they are already receiving.
So, sir, no disagreement. It is an issue, it is a problem, and I
think internationally we are going to have to be players as we de-
cide how to handle the problem.
Dr. Snyder. I am out of time. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Wilson.
Mr. Wilson of South Carolina. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, General Franks, I want to particularly thank you and join
with my colleague John Spratt from South Carolina. And this is
truly bipartisan, that we feel like what you have done, what the
troops have done has been a masterful performance.
General Franks. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Wilson. And reflects so well on our country, and is so reas-
suring in the war against terrorism, which is going to be a long-
term conflict. And certainly things have turned around so well in
Afghanistan and also in Iraq. And I particularly am appreciative
of what you have done, the troops have done. Because, as I men-
tioned to you earlier, I am completing 30 years of service myself
in the Army National Guard this month, but I am very proud that
I have got three sons continuing the tradition. My oldest son, Alan,
has just been promoted to captain in the field artillery Army Na-
tional Guard, and my third son, Julian, is Army Reserve Officer
Training Corps (ROTC) at Fort Lewis right now being trained. And
I am even proud of my Navy son, who is an ensign in the Navy,
third year in medical school. But
General Franks. I am proud of him too, sir.
Mr. Wilson of South Carolina. And I have a fourth one that
I am going to get into it some way. But I share the concerns of
Congressman Ortiz and Congressman Reyes, and that is that serv-
76
ice families are under stress now. And they have been so support-
ive and it is just wonderful. And you have addressed a lot of the
concerns today about quality of life, the mail, the food, the pros-
pects of housing.
Additionally, though, about additional security for our troops, the
Washington Post yesterday indicated that the attack level is in-
creasing. And what is the additional security that you see being
provided that could be reassuring to families?
General Franks. Sir, as I mentioned, there are two pieces of it.
One is, we want leadership at every level to ensure that no compla-
cency forms. We want to be sure that where we have enclaves of
our troops that sufficient standoff is built from that, that we are
outside the wire, so to speak. We want to be sure that our people
are properly armed. And actually, even though in a combat zone,
we want to be sure that we maintain training of people because of
alert levels, avoid complacency, achieve standoff, and awareness.
And statement, sir, when we do that what we want to do beyond
that is we want to continue offensive operations so that in every
occasion where we have a contact, a contact with the enemy — and
these are small groups; one, two, three people — that we maintain
contact until that small group is killed or captured. Our people, sir,
are doing a very good job of that because it is a metric that we
watch. Ajnd so we must never get complacent.
There will be no silver bullet that will solve the security issue
for us. We have to remember that we are at war, and we have to
continue to be offensive in spirit.
Mr. Wilson of South Carolina. And on the level of violence,
this morning Congressman John Kline arranged for many of us to
hear General Mike Hagee, the Commandant of the Marine Corps.
And he gave an extraordinary report of the comparison of violence
in comparable American cities to the level of violence in terms of
population of cities in Iraq. And it was very revealing that there
is a level of violence.
General Franks. Yes, sir.
Mr. Wilson of South Carolina. But, actually, in the American
cities it may even be higher. And that is not necessarily totally re-
assuring, but this message needs to get out that our people are in
harm's way but that they could be in harm's way in other places,
too.
General Franks. Sir, that is true.
Mr. Wilson of South Carolina. And so I hope the positive side
comes out as you have stated. And in particular, I think the way
the oil fields have been preserved is just amazing. And, so, any
comment on the level of violence?
General Franks. Yes, sir. You know, the regime of Saddam Hus-
sein actually used looting as a tool for years in order to punish cer-
tain segments of the Iraqi society. And so, one of the difficulties
that we see as part of the lawlessness that we see is a continuation
of a pattern that has been in existence in Iraq for more than 30
years. They simply punish people by looting things.
There are so many miles of oil infrastructure in Iraq, just to use
one example. The same with power lines, the same with water
aqueducting. But there are so many miles of this that those who
would punish either coalition forces or punish the Iraqi people will
77
seek to shoot holes in infrastructure and create problems. And so,
once again, the way we avoid or the way we have to handle that
problem is we have to go after the people who do it at the same
time that we secure — for example, in the case of oil infrastructure,
there are 20 to 25 key sites and we have to provide security for
those sites.
Now, what we want to do is we want to put an Iraqi face on this
site security as quickly as we can for two reasons. One is because
we would like to get our forces relieved of some of that responsibil-
ity. But, second, we would like to take some of this large number
of Iraqi — previous Iraqi military who were not Baathists — they
may have been private soldiers or sergeants or whatever — and
bring them on board to put an Iraqi face and get them hired off
of the street to be able to provide for some of their own security.
And Jerry Bremer is working that very hard now, as well.
Sorry for the long answer, sir.
Mr. Wilson of South Carolina. No, no. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman. Ms. Sanchez.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you. General Franks, for being before us. I, too, would
like to say what a great job our troops have been doing, and we
are really glad to have you there leading them.
I want to talk a little bit about — I have a lot of questions. I will
submit them for the record. I have two I hope to get to.
The first one has to do with guerilla warfare. And I think, you
know, terms are important. They are very important because it
shapes the understanding of the facts on the gi'ound and they
shape the understanding of — for soldiers who are under fire, for
commanders, for staffs, all the way from the Pentagon to Baghdad,
for Congress people, for presidents, for citizens, and for Iraqis. All
of these people will find it harder to understand what is happening
on the ground if the terms are being manipulated by the Secretary
of Defense. If our understanding is cued, our policy response will
be less effective.
And, second, term manipulation erodes trust. This administra-
tion is already suspected of manipulating intelligence to trump up
a case for war. And now the long-term success and the popularity
of this war is at risk, and so they are busy manipulating public
perception of the situation in Iraq in order to sustain public com-
mitment. But the public senses a vague dissidence between the
spin and the daily reality of deaths on the ground. So I want to
ask you after reading about Lieutenant General Sanchez — who by
the way is no relation, but if you want to give him a fourth star
I would be very happy about that — Commander of the Ground
Forces in Iraq.
General FRANKS. He may well deserve one. He is quite a guy.
Ms. Sanchez. He is — who recently noted that there have been an
average of 13 attacks per day on U.S. forces in Iraq since 1 May,
totaling more than 600 attacks and that these have resulted in 32
combat deaths and numerous wounded soldiers just as of yester-
day. General Sanchez also observed that these enemy operations
are increasing in frequency, in sophistication, and in coordination
and that these attacks appear to be carried out by trained soldiers
78
using the unconventional and covert methods typical of guerilla
warfare as defined by the U.S. and NATO in the Joint Operational
Terms and Graphics Manual, which I am sure you are well aware
of.
Sounds like guerilla warfare to me, and yet Mr. Rumsfeld and
General Myers and others continue to stay away from that word.
I am thinking of, for example, the accurate mortar attack that we
saw this past week. That would fall under trained sophistication,
Army, et cetera.
Now, the Army has a long history of good men who tell us the
truth. I am thinking of General Shinseki, for example, who I think
history will treat very well when we get through all of this.
General Franks. He is a good friend. He is a good man.
Ms. Sanchez. You are well known and rightly praised as being
a plain spoken soldier's general. Would you call this a guerilla war?
And, if so, why are we playing word games when our troops are
facing a determined and trained enemy every day on the ground
in Iraq? And shouldn't we be more forthright with the American
people about the nature and the scope of the threats to our troops
who are fighting on our behalf? That would be the first question.
General Franks. Thank you, ma'am. I think — actually I think
General Rick Sanchez described very clearly what we see and what
he as the ground commander sees. And, actually, I think people
should call it whatever they want to call it, and I suspect Secretary
Rumsfeld would probably say the same thing. I mean, if people
want to refer to what we see as guerilla effort, then that is okay.
I personally would not refer to it that way for one very simple rea-
son. It has two parts.
One, guerilla and insurgency operations are supported by the
people, and I have demonstrated to my own satisfaction that the
people of Iraq do not support the violence that we are seeing right
now. So that is one reason I wouldn't do it. But it is okay for some-
one else to do it.
The second reason is that while we see increasing sophistication
and we see the use of mortars and so forth, what I have not yet
seen is the networking of these capabilities in a way where these
assets are commanded and controlled, if you will. That does not
mean that it does not bother me if someone refers to this as gue-
rilla or insurgency or whatever. We have seen such things all over
the world. I mean, it doesn't fit my own personal definition, if that
helps.
Ms. Sanchez. Well, I would just say to you. General, that we see
guerilla warfare in Colombia, and I am sure that if you ask the
general population of Colombia, they would not say that they are
backing that type of guerilla warfare.
And to your second statement, we also have historical precedence
as to guerilla warfare happening that isn't necessarily nationally
networked. So, you know, we can go back and look at Nicaragua
and other places in Central America where we have used that
term. I am just referring to the fact that the Secretary of Defense
has somehow alluded to the fact that these might be — that these
are criminals who were let out by Saddam the day before the war
started. And I think we need to start getting serious, we need to
get serious in this committee and serious in this Congress and seri-
79
ous in this country and understand what we are facing. And as
these attacks are more coordinated and more sophisticated, and
shooting and accurate mortar is not something that a criminal who
has been seven years sentenced by Saddam and let out of prison
a day before would be able to do.
So, you know, I am not questioning what you said, I am just say-
ing that we have certainly many instances of guerilla warfare. And
it is about time this country called this, what is happening in Iraq,
what is happening correctly. It is guerilla warfare, in my opinion,
and we need to address it because you use different resources and
different methods to handle that type of
General Franks. Ma'am, if I could offer, if I could offer. I would
say if there is utility in terms of either force protection or offensive
operations in defining this as guerilla, then it is worth discussing.
If there are other motivations, then perhaps it isn't worth discuss-
ing. And in my personal view, we will find a combination of crimi-
nals, a combination of Jihadists, a combination of Baath remnants.
And none of us yet see any sense of coordinated activity between
those groups that Rick Sanchez is facing on the battlefield every
day.
Ms. Sanchez. Well, I think we do need to have that discussion.
I would love to be in that discussion group, because, as I said, I
think you — we have a whole different set of problems on our hands
than publicly we are acknowledging. And I see that my time is up,
unfortunately. I had another good question though, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you. General.
General Franks. Sure.
The Chairman. Okay. If the gentlelady has a follow-up on that
question, go ahead, if you didn't get all your questions in.
Ms. Sanchez. You will allow me that?
The Chairman. Sure. If you make a quick one.
Ms. Sanchez. God. You love me today. I love it. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Okay. My second one. General, has to do with I did not vote to
go to war because I believe that this whole issue with Iraq would
really give us two things, a short-term operational success which
you have proven me correct on that. But the second problem I had
was the long-term strategic disaster of doing what we did in Iraq.
And, unfortunately, I am seeing my worst fears beginning to hap-
pen.
You know, the policy questions for a Congressperson, I believe,
with respect to this whole issue of Iraq should always have been
and continues to be, did this war materially enhance our security,
the United States' security, at an acceptable cost? As a combatant
commander and a frontline leader in the Global War On Terror,
you have been in a select group of strategic leaders in our response
to the events of 9/11. Let me ask you to offer your thoughts on one
of the broader questions of the national priorities in the future war
on terror and on our strategic goal of securing America from terror-
ist attack. I ask this because I sit not only on this committee but
also on Homeland Security.
Yesterday Mr. Rumsfeld testified that the cost of the military op-
eration in Iraq is currently $3.9 billion a month, and the cost for
Afghanistan is nearly $1 billion monthly. My concern is that the
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war on Iraq has cost us and is costing us a disproportionate share
of resources as we continue to fight the Global War On Terror and
we seek to protect our homeland.
The Chairman. Does the gentlelady have a question?
Ms. Sanchez. Yes. It is coming.
The Chairman. Okay.
For example, the current federal budget allocation for first re-
sponders provides only $5.5 billion annually, or less than half a bil-
lion dollars a month. The ratio, I believe, from $5 billion a month
for Iraq and Afghanistan versus half a billion here on the home-
land is out of whack. A recent Council of Foreign Relations study,
Warren Rudman, General Vesey, Admiral Cole, all these others,
concluded that our responders here are drastically underfunded
and dangerously unprepared.
What could you tell us about bringing down the cost of what is
going on in Iraq and Afghanistan? Is there any way, and can you
talk to specifically if we can get in international troops to help us
with that? Because I don't believe that we can sustain for a long
time our needs on homeland, which are not adequately — which are
just underfunded, and the amount of monies that we are seeing
being spent overseas on defense.
The Chairman. Did you get that question, General?
General Franks. I did, sir.
The Chairman. Okay.
General FRANKS. Sir, and ma'am, I would say, with 19 nations
currently committed, 19 more prepared to be committed by the end
of summer, and ongoing negotiations with 11 more, we are moving
in the direction of internationalizing the force. Whether that gives
us a fiscal — a bit of fiscal relief or not I am not sure, because in
some cases where we deploy international forces we also provide
some support, financial support to those forces. And so the specific
dollar issue is difficult for me, ma'am, to talk to you about in terms
of the overall cost of 3.9 per month in Iraq. And I think it was 900
million per month in Afghanistan. But I will offer a personal view
just because you have given me license to do it. And that is that
in the case of the Global War on Terrorism, my personal view is
that offense is the best defense. I believe that fortress America will
not be in and of itself sufficient to protect the American people.
The Chairman. I thank the gentlelady.
And Mr. Hayes.
Mr. Hayes. General Franks, let me add my thanks to those of
others here. And my question is going to be to you about if and
when you think the United Nations (U.N.) will enter into this pic-
ture. The U.N. chose to take themselves out of the picture early on,
which was regrettable.
To frame the question, I had a humanitarian observer who was
in Iraq from the very beginning and just left a week ago. And I
think the public and the record should show that this non-govern-
ment organization (NGO) person said that what the military did in
terms of avoiding civilian targets, avoiding civilian casualties was
incredible. This person was extremely complimentary of the preci-
sion with which the military carried this out, and people need to
know that.
81
Having said that, a point that this person made was that a major
U.N. presence in terms of manpower would be a very stabihzing
factor. Can that happen? Will that happen? Is there anything we
as Members of Congress can do to help that happen?
General Franks. Sir, on the U.N., I actually don't know because
I don't know what the status of discussions between Colin Powell's
people, the State Department's people in New York with the
United Nations and what the level of interest in work in Afghani-
stan in New York, in the U.N. is right now. I know that it is going
to remain terribly important for United Nations and the persons,
men and women such as the one you alluded to, to be in Iraq and
continuing to work.
In terms of force contribution and so forth, sir, thatis — I would
pass that one off as one that is so far above my pay grade that I
actually don't have a view.
I do believe, sir, that it is important to internationalize the work
that we are trying to do in Iraq. I think that that is terribly impor-
tant, because ultimately the Iraqi people themselves have to be in
charge of this. The road between here and there needs to be more
internationalized with more interest and more activity by the inter-
national community. I think we appreciate veiy much the nations
involved now, the nations that will be involved. But, sir, I can't
talk about the United Nations. I just don't know.
Mr. Hayes. To comment on your pay grade, I can't imagine any-
body's pay grade higher than yours when it comes to experience in
Iraq. So don't sell yourself short.
You made the point that this person was making: A different
face. America is there as liberators. There is no question about
that. But there is still a cultural clash that exists and says there
is some question about this. The point she was making is that if
you internationalize more — and we appreciate the allies — this is
something that can help avoid and to eliminate some of the prob-
lems again.
General Franks. Sir, if you are correct and if you look at several
things that are important to us. One is having the regime family
at the top, having certain knowledge, killed or captured, that is
very important. And getting an international face more involved in
the country is also very important. Neither of those are as impor-
tant as getting an Iraqi face involved on what the Iraqi people are
doing in the country. But, sir, I think you would agree that every
day progress is being made on those fronts. Internationalization is
going up. More Iraqis with the Baghdad Council that I think start-
ed working hard last week. I think that Ambassador Bremer will
be moving in the direction of a constitutional convention here in
the very near term. And so I think there is positive momentum in
each case.
Mr. Hayes. I totally agree. And there is progress being made,
and I appreciate the service that you and the men and women that
are there making that progress today and beyond are doing. Thank
you, sir.
General Franks. Thank you, sir.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman. I thank him for all the
time that he spends working with his constituents in the United
States Army and the rest of the services.
82
The gentlelady from California, Ms. Tauscher.
Ms. Tauscher. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Franks, to you and your family, thank you for nearly
four decades of exemplary service and sacrifice.
General Franks. Thank you.
Ms. Tauscher. And I really appreciate all you have done. I no-
tice that you and I are an age where we wear glasses because our
arms have gotten too short to be able to read. Mine, however, are
not as rose colored as it appears that some people's are. I really am
deeply disturbed by the kind of happy face that we are trjdng to
put on this situation and the kind of terminology that we are using
these days, things that what you said about an hour ago about vin-
dicating intelligence. I don't think that there is enough time in the
day or enough energy that we could spend vindicating some of the
intelligence.
You yourself said just about an hour ago that there are a thou-
sand sites that we were about to look into to find weapons of mass
destruction. Are these sites that the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) had visited in the weeks prior to our attack on
March 19th?
General Franks. A very few of them. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Tauscher. So are these sites that we knew about that we
didn't know divulged to the international community or the U.N.
inspectors?
General Franks. I think the information that was given to the
U.N. inspectors was in accordance with what they requested be-
cause of the priorities in which they intended to visit sites. And
they simply did not have the time, the manpower, and the energy
to get to all the sites.
Ms. Tauscher. Well, of course not, because we decided that di-
plomacy had ended and we decided we were going to use force. But
the truth of the matter is, is what you are telling us now. General
Franks, is that we held back information from the international
community.
General Franks. Oh, not at all, ma'am. No, ma'am. That is not
at all what I am telling you.
Ms. Tauscher. But you are sajring that we knew of sites that we
didn't tell them.
General Franks. No, ma'am. I am not saying that at all. I am
saying that of the sites that they put on their list to look at, there
were a great many of this group of 1,000 in international intel-
ligence that they did not get around to and now we must get
around to them.
Ms. Tauscher. So the sites that you are talking about were well
known to the international community?
General Franks. Oh, yes, ma'am.
Ms. Tauscher. But had they been visited prior to the 1998 ces-
sation of inspections?
General Franks. Ma'am, I am sure that some of them have. But
you will recall that there were four years between 1998 and 2002
when there were no United Nations inspectors visiting this regime.
Ms. Tauscher. Yes. That is why I thought it was important for
us to go back and get a new U.N. resolution to begin inspections
again.
83
I am interested in your comments about the fact that the termi-
nology of guerilla war is or is not appropriate for this. What I find
fascinating is the map that you brought that shows the Sunni Tri-
angle, and these little spots that have all the problems represent
70 percent of the Iraqi population.
General FRANKS. Yes, ma'am. There are 18 governances in the
country and 27 high population centers. Yes, ma'am, that is cor-
rect.
Ms. Tauscher. So the places that you are showing us that are
the places where we have the most danger for our fighting men
and women representing over 70 percent of the population are the
places in fact where we are having all of these attacks, anywhere
from 10 to 25 a day?
General FRANKS. Yes, ma'am. That is correct.
Ms. Tauscher. Now, what would lead me to believe that the
Iraqi people are not supporting these attacks, since 70 percent of
the population lives in those places and that is where those attacks
are happening?
General Franks. Yes, ma'am. Because
Ms. Tauscher. Do you see Iraqis coming after the people?
General Franks. I am sorry?
Ms. Tauscher. The people that are attacking us, are Iraqis actu-
ally going after them like we are going after them?
General Franks. Yes, ma'am. As a matter of fact, they are. For
each one of the number you cited, there will be some number be-
tween 10 and 50 sites that are turned over to the Americans by the
Iraqis which we simply go and site exploit, remove large weapons
caches, pick up hundreds of grenades, rocket propelled grenade
launchers, AK-47s and weapons. In fact, the Iraqi people are help-
ing a great deal. But I know you know that this regime oppressed
its people, 25 million of them, for a period of time that made them
as we see them in much reporting, terrified, terrified of the regime,
wanting to get on with the rest of their lives, not being a part of
these attacks against Americans, and that is what I think we see
in these population centers.
Ms. Tauscher. Well, General, I would like to know what we
would actually call what we are doing right now. If we can't call
it a guerilla war, and the President said on May 1st that the war,
is over
General Franks. No, ma'am. The President did not say on May
1st that the war was over. And you know it as well as I do. I be-
lieve the President said major combat operations were over.
Ms. Tauscher. Well, I will tell you what the American people be-
lieve. The American people that I represent believe that we are in
a war still.
General FRANKS. Yes, ma'am. We are in a war, without a doubt.
It is not a major war against tanks, airplanes, Scud missiles, and
so forth.
Ms. Tauscher. Well, then what I think we are about to do and
need to do is to have a conversation with the American people as
to exactly what their expectations need to be.
General FRANKS. Yes, ma'am. I think that is a great value of
having testimony such as this today, so we can communicate with
the American people.
84
Ms. Tauscher. Well, I agree, and that is why I wish Secretary
Rumsfeld had been here today, because I have many questions for
him, as I think many people do, as to exactly what we are going
to do, how long it is going to take, and how much it is going to cost.
Thank you. General.
General Franks. Yes, ma'am. Thank you.
The Chairman. I thank the gentlelady.
Dr. Gingrey.
Dr. GiNGREY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Franks, thank you. I won't belabor that. But one of my
colleagues on this front row suggested that you not only have the
courage of a great soldier, but also the patience of a saint, particu-
larly with some of the line of questioning that you have handled
here just before me.
I have a good friend. General, that is an OB/GYN physician who
actually is from Iraq, and I talked to him just in the last couple
of days, and he asked me to ask somebody this question. His father
and most of his immediate family are still living in Iraq in the area
around Baghdad. But his question that he received from his dad —
and he asked his dad, you know, what really was the situation and
how were things going. And his dad felt that we are not being
tough enough on some of these Baathists that are responsible. And
of course I was going to ask you that question about, you know,
who are these folks. And I think you have already answered that;
it is a combination of local thugs and Baathists and et cetera, out-
side forces.
But his question was, why are we not tough enough, tougher, on
these as we proceed with Sidewinder and Scorpion and these other
operations? And why are we not pulling more of the Iraqis who are
loyal and want us to succeed? Why are we not utilizing them
quicker?
Now, that is one question. And then I had a couple of quickies.
This question of weapons of mass destruction continues to occur,
and I think it will continue to occur. Why do you think Saddam
Hussein didn't use weapons of mass destruction?
I wanted to ask you also, the use of indigenous forces in Afghani-
stan compared to the Kurdish people in the north and the utiliza-
tion of them.
So if you can answer those quick three questions for me. Thank
you.
General Franks. Yes, sir. I think to people, to Iraqis on the
ground, the good ones — and there are so many of them. A great
many of them would say, well, why don't you treat them rough? I
mean, why aren't you rougher on the problems, the Baathists and
the Jihadists and the criminals and so forth. I think we are treat-
ing them pretty rough, but certainly not to the level that people
who would just like to get on with the rest of their lives would like
to see.
A fact that is not published quite as well in our media in this
country as the wounding of Coalition soldiers or the death of Coali-
tion soldiers are the woundings, the deaths, and the detentions of
Jihadists or the Baathists. Those numbers actually, sir, are enor-
mous. I think right now — my numbers may not be exactly correct,
but I believe being retained right now, somewhere around 3,500
85
Iraqis who come in these categories of terrorists, Jihadists, Baath
residuals, troublemakers, and criminals just as a result of these op-
erations that you mentioned, Sidewinder and so forth.
I think that what we have to do is we have to continue offensive
operations, but at the same time I think we want to balance that
with the needed support from the Iraqi people, and I think our
troops will continue to do that.
I think the second of your question is about why not use more
Iraqis. I think that is a very good question, and we are doing that
now. I mean, we are and have been for — you will recall when we
started recruiting Iraqi police and so forth. We actually can gain
and train control of numbers of Iraqi policemen. One of the issues
that the whole international community is working with right now
is getting them transportation, cars, radios, and so forth to be able
to get themselves constituted as law enforcement officers and able
to investigate criminal conduct and so forth. And, sir, actually that
is just going to take time. That is moving correctly, but it is just
going to take time for us to be able to do that.
Which one of your questions did I miss?
Dr. GiNGREY. The question of, assuming that Saddam did have
weapons of mass destruction and why he chose not to use them.
General Franks. Sir, I think any operator would like to tell you
his weapons were not used because our operations achieved both
tactical and operational surprise. You know, an operator would like
to say that. I don't know. And the reason I don't know why he
didn't use them is because we have, I think it has been reported,
found munitions that were capable of being filled with chemicals
and so forth, but we have not found the chemicals that would go
in such munitions and so it is very difficult to say why he didn't
use them. He had a number of years in order to be able to hide
the capability, in some cases probably destroy the capability.
But, sir, there is something to be said for why do you find WMD
documents buried under rose bushes? Why does one find potential
stocks of seed assets hidden in people's homes? And so how much
of this capability was weaponized? We don't know yet. And we sure
don't know why he didn't put it together and use it, unless it was
because the degree of surprise our forces achieved took the option
away from him.
Dr. GiNGREY. Thank you.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman from Georgia.
And the ranking member had a question he wanted to ask before
we go to Ms. Davis.
Mr. Skelton. To follow on that, can you explain the traffic that
you heard early in the conflict relating to weapons of mass destruc-
tion?
General Franks. Sir, we really can't.
Mr. Skelton. Which you did not find?
General Franks. Congressman Skelton, we really can't yet ex-
plain it. I remember one specific occasion where I was visiting a
unit. And I got a call from my intelligence officer who said, we have
just received information that sounds like an execute order that
said: Blood, blood. That was one of the events described by the
chairman which caused us to alert the whole, alert the forces, be-
cause we thought that this might be talking about the use of blood
86
agents. Well, we did not see the use of blood agents, but the force,
once again, was prepared for that use. And in the days, weeks and
months ahead, Congressman Skelton, I believe that the pieces of
this will be put together in a way that describes much more fully
why we didn't see it used, and what had been done, what were the
characteristics of the WMD program at the time that the attack
was undertaken.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
And against that backdrop, we have the pictures of the dead
Kurdish mothers holding their babies in northern Iraq where they
were gassed to death by Saddam Hussein with poison.
General Franks. Thousands of them, sir.
The Chairman. Thousands of them. And so we have seen him
use the poison gas on his people, and you probably took that into
consideration when you intercepted these messages.
General Franks. As well as against Iranians.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman for his question. My col-
league from San Diego, Ms. Davis.
Ms. Davis of California. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chair-
man, and thank you, General Franks, as well. I want to thank you
for your extraordinary service and your leadership.
I think we all appreciate the difficult questions and the difficult
issues that you had to face, the difficult decisions that needed to
be made. And having perhaps some distance from them as well will
be very helpful to us in the months and the years ahead.
I wonder if you could perhaps give us a little bit more back-
ground into the issue of burden sharing and the fact that we
haven't internationalized the forces in Iraq to the extent that the
American public feels that this is not wholly our burden any
longer. Could you give us a little more sense? Do you think it
would have been more desirable, or were there obstacles in fact?
Are there reasons, challenges why that would not have been a good
idea in just the preceding weeks?
General Franks. Ma'am, I do it in rather prospective rather than
retrospective. I think we are, what, 70 days since the 1st of May?
And I believe with 19 nations committed on the ground and 19
more to be committed within the next couple of months that that
is a substantial contribution by the international community. And
I can't judge whether that is ample. You know, I think all of us
want more. I mean, we want more internationalization.
The Coalition is a very powerful coalition. Some funding, some
troops, and so forth. And I predict in the days ahead that it will
be even more powerful. And that probably is the best that I can
give you right now.
Ms. Davis of California. I might suggest that perhaps that is
a story that hasn't been told very well then, because I think the
perception is that we could have used their help earlier.
The other issue that I hear from San Diego and my base and the
people who have spouses and loved ones serving is a frustration
that they have not been trained well for this effort. Very well
trained for the war, but not so much trained for the peace. Have
we been able to transform the forces there now in more of a peace-
keeping way? What can we learn from that? Should we have been
more prepared in terms of our National Guard? What is it that in
87
a way, had you had more sense of that earUer we would have done
differently?
General FRANKS. Ma'am, I actually think our forces are very well
trained for peacekeeping and peacemaking, having gone to so many
training sites, and many members of this committee have done the
same thing, and have visited where we train peacekeeping and
peacemaking sorts of forces.
The issue that I think we will have for a long time will be that
it is really hard. Peacemaking and peacekeeping in an uncertain
environment and in a lethal environment such as the one we see
in Iraq or in Afghanistan is just really, really hard. And I think
all of us will ask ourselves every day, are we doing enough? Is the
training good enough? And I am sure that from Afghanistan and
from lessons that we take from Iraq there will be enhancements.
We will in the future probably train better and more completely for
these kinds of operations. But that does not mean in my view that
our people are not competent and trained and capable and well-
equipped, because I believe they are.
Ms. Davis of California. I actually had an opportunity to go to
an urban warfare training site, and so I think in terms of the mo-
bility of troops, in terms of the ability to be ready for an unex-
pected event, I could see that. I think the issue perhaps of the cul-
tural training is one that we might fmd that we could do better.
General Franks. Yes, ma'am. That may well be a lesson.
Ms. Davis of California. And I guess the other issue is, if you
could perhaps just pinpoint for us in terms of our role and trying
to look into the future and what the needs of the military may be,
was there an area in which you saw actually a lack, perhaps? I
think linguistically. You know, is that something that we must put
far greater efforts into, the ability not just of our using reserves
perhaps or indigenous forces in terms of language but even in
terms of our own forces? Are there other areas? Or how could you
respond?
General FRANKS. Yes, ma'am. For sure — and I think we will be
pretty transparent with lessons we have learned. I won't say posi-
tive and negative, but in terms of things we think worked really
well and in terms of things where we think we are going to be look-
ing at adjustments. I think there is some study ongoing right now
to try to decide, are we balanced inside the Army — a service I know
best. Are we balanced inside the Army in terms of the skills that
are in the Active Component compared to the skills that are in the
Reserve Component? Do we have the right skills in the active force,
or do we have to call up the reserves too early? I believe that that
will be part of a transformational study, and I think it is ongoing
now and I think it is needed.
Another thing that I think will be studied will be, do we have
the right language skills in the right places in our services? I think
that that will be studied. It deserves to be studied.
Another that we will need to study is, do we have the right — are
people in uniform performing functions that could better be per-
formed by civilians? In other words, could manpower be saved and
put to the task of military police or some other function that is a
high-demand function for peacemaking, peacekeeping, and stability
operations? Can we save that force structure by civilianization in
some other areas?
And so, yes, ma'am, I think there will be several. I think that
we are, again, 70 days since the 1st of May. I think we are a bit
too close right now to know what the enduring lessons are that we
want to take. And so, in each case I think that we are going to
have to do some study to be sure that we don't knee-jerk the tax-
payer, and that the changes we make in fact have high payoff.
Ms. Davis of California. Thank you.
The Chairman. I thank the gentlelady.
Mr. Franks.
Mr. Franks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Franks, I have to echo the gestures of honor to you
today, to the words of appreciation, just the way that you have in
such a humble and unpretentious way shown us all what it really
means to be a faithful soldier.
General Franks. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Franks. And, of course, with a name like yours, I would
have personally expected excellence. But you have transcended all
of that. And I would say to you, too, in light of some of the voices
of dissent, that ultimately there are a lot of us that contend that
the counsels of history will deem your life and your efforts a very
noble contribution to humanity's best interest.
General Franks. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Franks. Having said that, one of the members of this body
has put forth kind of the comparative illustration of Eric Rudolph
when it comes to trying to find a certain individual. You know, one
of the greatest investigative bodies in the world took five years to
find a man that was in a five-by-six mile area without a lot of re-
sources afforded to him. And when one juxtaposes that toward try-
ing to find a man who has the attending resources of being the na-
tion's former leader in a country the size of California, with all of
the support mechanisms there, I think it does illustrate the chal-
lenge that the forces of our side in Iraq have faced.
General Franks. Sir, I agree.
Mr. Franks. And having said that, the second attempt on the
rocket attack which was hoped to take out Hussein and his sons,
I know that there has probably been some retroactive study of the
information there. And is your reaction one of neutrality? Is it one
of those things where you just simply have no indication one way
or the other? Or is there some indication that that was not success-
ful?
General Franks. Sir, I do not yet have an indication that it was
not successful. And here is what I mean when I say that. During
the case in Afghanistan as well as Iraq, I have known for a certain
fact that people have been killed in strikes, and subsequently re-
ceived reports from others who claimed to have seen them subse-
quent to the strikes where I know they were killed. And so what
I have learned is not to be too quick to either react to someone who
says, I saw him and he was killed, or someone who says no, no,
I saw him two days later.
So, no, sir. I do not have anj^hing that convinces — we do not
have anything that convinces us right now tangibly that these lead-
ers are alive or dead. For that reason, I believe we are best served
89
by believing that they are ahve, and recognizing that it will serve
us well when we can conclude that they are captured or dead. And
so, as I said earlier, sir, considerable resources are put to that task.
Mr. Franks. Thank you. General, given your placement and just
your years of service, if you had to put one thing before this com-
mittee or this body that by way of policy or something that we
might do on behalf of the Armed Services of this country to make
it a more capable or a better or more well-served service, what
would that be? I know that is kind of an open-ended etherial ques-
tion, but if you have something that you could throw at us here.
General Franks. Sir, it would not be something that I would put
to you and the chairman and Representative Skelton. It would be
something that I would put to the Armed Forces of our country,
and that would be the efficacy, the utility, the power of joint oper-
ations. As we move forward in the future, the things which cause
our Armed Forces, Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, Active Compo-
nent, Reserve Component, Special Operations Forces, to be to-
gether more, to work as combined and joint task forces more, to
train more in that mode, sir, that is the challenge that I think we
have before us. And as we work this business of jointness, which
perhaps was the most powerful aspect of this operation in Iraq, we
need to become more and more attuned to a future where we will
likely never do anything alone.
Mr. Franks. Yes, sir.
General Franks. We will likely work with other nations, and our
ability to share information and work together also needs to be
honed, worked, schooled, drilled, and resourced.
Mr. Franks. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. General, I just
wish the world had more leaders Uke you, and thank you for spend-
ing your life for the cause of freedom.
General Franks. Thank you, sir. It has been an honor and a
pleasure to do it.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman. Mr. Hill.
Mr. Hill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, General, I join my col-
leagues in wishing you well as you enter retirement.
General Franks. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Hill. I have a series of questions. I hope I can get them all
in, and I hope that you can answer them as briefly as possible.
The first question is, what percentage of the country has elec-
tricity?
General Franks. 70 percent.
Mr. Hill. Is there adequate food and water for the Iraqi people?
General Franks. Yes, sir. 100 percent food, 100 percent water.
Mr. Hill. A typical Iraqi person, when they wake up in the
morning they go to their jobs, I am assuming. What jobs are there?
General Franks. Sir, I can't answer the sort of writ large. I can
tell you that the sense that I get from Senator Levin and Chairman
Warner, based on a recent delegation trip to several places, north,
center, and south Iraq, that the markets are up, the people who
farm are farming, and the people who are operating businesses in
the population centers are up and running.
Mr. Hill. When I read the Washington Post, I get the impression
that chaos exists in Iraq and that the morale of the Iraqi people
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is pretty low. They are scared, they think Saddam Hussein is still
alive, he is going to be coming back. Do you think that is accurate?
General Franks. Sir, I think the people in Iraq are scared, and
that is why I say it will serve us well when we can confirm the
death or capture of Saddam Hussein. I do not believe that Iraq is
in chaos.
Mr. Hill. Okay. Do we have enough troops?
General Franks. Sir, I believe today we have enough troops. I
believe it would be possible to talk to — in one of these yellow areas
on any given day, I believe you could talk to one of our tactical
commanders who could very easily say I could use a few more. And
the reason that I do not overreact to that is because on that same
day there may well be in other places in Iraq an over structure,
where we have more troops than we need. So, sir, what I am say-
ing is, I believe that as we move forward I am satisfied today with
the number of people that we have in Iraq. I think that the loca-
tions of those people over time, next week, next month, perhaps
three weeks from now, may well change. But I am satisfied with
the structure we see there now.
Mr. Hill. Is that the reason why we have not engaged the NATO
or the U.N. In helping us to keep the peace?
General Franks. Sir, I don't think so, because we all recognize
that there can potentially be a fiscal saving and there can certainly
be a personnel tempo (PERSTEMPO) or an operations tempo
(OPTEMPO) saving by internationalizing the force, and I think we
all agree that that is good and we want to do that.
Mr. Hill. Thank you for that answer.
You spoke of the two key components as governance and rebuild-
ing the economy and rebuilding the country of Iraq. I don't know
about the other members of this committee; maybe they know
about a plan, a written plan to do that. But I don't know of any
written plan in order to accomplish this. It seems to me like this
is a huge undertaking.
General Franks. Sir, it is huge.
Mr. Hill. Is there a written plan in place to do this?
General FRANKS. Sir, there is. I believe that the Coalition Provi-
sional Authority that Jerry Bremer has in the first case is a very
clear and very deliberate charter for what he is to do. And I forget
the number of points on that charter. I believe the Department of
Defense could probably provide it to you and probably would. And
I believe that Ambassador Bremer has likely worked each of the
points in that charter and has put together a plan along with mile-
stones. Yes, sir, I do believe so.
Mr. Hill. Mr. Chairman, have you seen this plan?
The Chairman. Which plan is the gentleman referring to?
Mr. Hill. Well, I asked the question of the General that he
thought the two key components of rebuilding Iraq was governance
and rebuilding the economy.
General Franks. Actually, three, sir. Security would be the third.
Mr. Hill. And security. And I asked the General if there was an
actually written plan to do this.
The Chairman. Well, here is what Ambassador Bremer gave us
when we took our delegation to Iraq. We went to Baghdad and re-
ceived a very thorough briefing from the Ambassador, that Mr.
91
Abercrombie commented on as being very thorough, and he re-
viewed the progress at that point — this was about three weeks
ago — of the hooking up of the megawattage that would bring the
country up, first, to the level that existed during Saddam Hussein's
reign, and second, to the level that they actually need, which is
considerably more than that. And then he reviewed the program to
bring up the water supply, potable water up and the contractors
that were doing that and the position that they were in at that
point.
Now, we have inquired here a couple of days ago — in fact I have
got a summary sheet back I will give the gentleman that shows the
progress that has been made to date on that plan to bring it up.
And as I recall, it manifested some, I think, 2,000 projects, some
very small, that have expended upwards of $1 billion to basically
start the wheels turning. So I will be happy to share that with the
gentleman. That is what I have in terms of an update.
Mr. Hill. I see my time has run out.
General Franks. And, sir, if I could provide just a bit more.
The Chairman. Go right ahead, General. Take as much time as
you need.
General Franks. This, Mr. Chairman, is just companion to the
comments you just made. I think Ambassador Bremer also works
in the establishment of local governance and what his time line
looks like for that, what the Iraqi currency will be, and how many
bills of what type will be minted on a time line, and how those will
be distributed. And so, as I said, I actually believe that there is a
plan, and the ministries which work for Ambassador Bremer, in
fact, work and track each of those, as the chairman described is the
case in the examples that he used.
The Chairman. And Mr. Hill, let me just amplify, because I re-
call a few more facts from the information we received this morn-
ing, is that in excess of 90 percent of the schools are now up and
running, and, as I recall, 24 of the 28 major hospitals are now up
and running. That was as of this morning.
Mr. Hill. Okay. Well, I appreciate that information. My time has
run out. But I think this is critically important that members of
this committee, who are probably in the future going to be appro-
priating more money for this effort in Iraq, know that there is some
kind of road map in place to democratize this country and how they
are going to do it. I think it is critically important that we have
that information, and it also is to be shared with the American peo-
ple.
General Franks. Yes, sir. Thank you.
Mr. Hill. Thank you.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
And the gentleman from Oklahoma, with whom I stood at Fort
Sill and watched a lot of his people stage here a couple of months
ago to move out to Iraq, Mr. Cole.
Mr. Cole. I will begin by reminding all these Texans where you
really are from. General.
General Franks. It is all true. Congressman.
Mr. Cole. And we are all proud of it.
If I may, I have got a series of questions with a couple of com-
ments first. First, again, I would be remiss not to thank you and
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the wonderful men and women you led with just such tremendous
distinction for the enormous service you rendered our country, and
am very deeply grateful for that.
General Franks. Thank you.
Mr. Cole. And, frankly, I thank you for the candor and the clar-
ity that you communicate with and, frankly, for your enormous pa-
tience, not just at this committee, but really throughout the period
that you have been in the public eye, so to speak. I think it is so
extraordinarily important that the American people understand the
stakes, the nature, the conflict, that they have confidence in the
people that are communicating with them. And I think they have
a high degree of confidence in you. And, frankly, it is important for
our friends and our adversaries, I think, to understand who we are
and what our values are and how we intend to conduct ourselves
in the struggle that we face. And, again, you communicate that ex-
traordinarily well, too. So thank you again for that.
General Franks. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Cole. Believe me, my honor.
It seems to me, so much of this conflict that we are in is a ques-
tion of — it is both a question of will and calculation by the various
people that are participating. And, you know, I would argue that
the people that were behind September the 11th didn't really un-
derstand the American people and what the response would be,
and I would argue Saddam Hussein didn't really understand the
American people.
General Franks. I agree with that, too, sir.
Mr. Cole. And what the response would be. So given that fact,
what kind of progress do you think we have made in giving the
Iraqi people the confidence that we have the stajdng power and the
good intent to achieve our objectives there and to communicate that
very same set of circumstances to our opponents?
General Franks. Sir, I think in the case of the Iraqi people we
have more work to do, and I would say that candidly. There is a
bank of fear in the Iraqi population that things can go back to nor-
mal. I believe, sir, that they are beginning to believe that we are
going to stay because we are saying we are going to stay and we
have provided no evidence that we intend to do an5^hing else.
One can see, though, in the international press attempts to cre-
ate fissures in that staying power, and I think that especially the
Iraqi elite see that, and they read it, and it causes them to wonder.
I believe that we are in fact committed to stay the course in both
Iraq and Afghanistan, and I think the more often and the louder
that we profess that commitment, the better off the Iraqi people
will be.
Mr. Cole. General, do you have any indication that — obviously,
as you say, we are in a war, we are meeting very serious resistance
of a sort.
General Franks. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cole. Do you have any indication that we have a lot of gov-
ernments helping us, but we have some governments that certainly
aren't favorable to our objectives in this region; any indication that
any foreign states are participating by either sending people, send-
ing material, encouragement, what have you, to the forces that are
against us right now?
93
General FRANKS. Sir, we see the states in the region all aware
of what is going on in Iraq. We see some of those states taking a
hand in actively trying to influence what happens in Iraq. The ex-
ample that I use is Iran. We see Iranian-backed clerics participat-
ing in political dialogue in the Shiite communities in the south all
the way to An Najaf We see unarmed Badra Corps forces operat-
ing in the south, as well, in support of this Iranian influence. We
see Iranian intelligence services operating in the south and so
forth.
And so, yes, sir, we do. We see states trying to influence activi-
ties inside Iraq. But we do not see, up to this point, evidence of the
support of anti-Coalition armed efforts against our people.
Mr. Cole. We have, of course, a great many friends in the Arab
world as well as adversaries.
General Franks. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cole. And would you tell us a little bit to what degree, if
any, some of our friends are being helpful, because obviously they
have a special credibility, given the cultural and religious relation-
ship that we are not going to have?
General Franks. Sir, well, in support of a policy that says we
will let each state describe its own specific contribution. If you
would let me do it from a macro point.
Mr. Cole. Absolutely. I understand you.
General Franks. Sir, every state in that region has supported us
during Operation Iraqi Freedom in a way for which I am grateful,
and in a way that I think evidences continued support for the war,
the Global War On Terrorism. And it is possible to pick out a coun-
try and say, well, isn't it true, for example, that if we had had ac-
cess through Turkey for a large, for a larger conventional force, it
could have made a difference in terms of securing infrastructure or
the termination of hostilities more quickly?
Sir, it is possible to speculate about such things. But I would also
say that the government of Turkey provided appropriate overflight
and support for our operations. And, sir, you can take each country
that is a neighbor of Iraq, and in every case I can find very, very
important support that was given us in this operation. I am posi-
tive in terms of the support from the region.
Mr. Cole. Let me ask you, I have a million questions, I know,
and limited time. And the Chairman has been gracious and you
have been extraordinarily gracious to stay this long. Let me ask
you this just in conclusion. Clearly, the task of rebuilding and rees-
tablishing civil society in Iraq and Afghanistan are enormous. And,
focusing on Iraq for a moment, we have many, many countries who
made very substantial loans to the regime of Saddam Hussein, and
there is obviously a decision point I would hope for a lot of those
countries as to whether or not those loans would be forgiven. Do
you have any opinion as to how much that would make an enor-
mous difference in being able to reput the country back together,
so to speak, to remove that burden from what will be, we hope and
expect, the next generation of Iraqi leadership?
General Franks. Mr. Cole, I actually don't. I am aware of the
debt outstanding to a number of countries. I am also aware of the
political dialogue associated with each of those countries and what
each may choose to do in that respect. But I am not aware of inter-
94
nal U.S. Government policy discussion on what our way ahead
should be. So I can't give you a good answer.
Mr. Cole. Well, again, thank you very much for what you have
done for your country throughout your life. It is quite amazing.
General Franks. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Cole. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Larson.
Mr. Larson of Connecticut. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr.
Chairman, let me start by thanking you and the ranking member
for holding this hearing, and this committee has always dem-
onstrated a certain focus and a certain mission, and I really truly
appreciate General Franks, an American hero, being here this
morning. I would join with some of my colleagues in expressing
concern. We would have liked to have heard from Secretary Rums-
feld, and a lot of the questions that I have for the General I feel
probably would be better answered by Secretary Rumsfeld.
But I also. General, would like to add along with others the great
contribution you have made to your country and the debt of grati-
tude owed to you and your family and all the fighting men and
women of our Armed Services.
General Franks. Thank you very much, sir.
Mr. Larson of Connecticut. And indeed I want to compliment
you and echo the words and sentiment of Mr. Spratt in saying the
job that you have done on the military bases have been masterful.
My question has to deal with focus, and it has been great to
glean from the questions and your testimony areas that you point
out, and especially in mission. And I couldn't concur more with you
in terms of lightness and lethality and a number of the issues that
you enumerated here today, and yet you have kind of come up
through the ranks, starting in Vietnam, and I believe, as Rep-
resentative Sanchez says, have garnered both the reputation, well-
deserved, as being a soldier's general and straightforward and
frank — no pun intended — in your delivery, though for most of your
career you operated from the standpoint of a philosophy on the
part of the United States of one of containment, deterrence, and di-
plomacy.
With September the 11th and the introduction of the doctrine of
preemption and unilateralism, things have changed. What I am
concerned about, and I am hopeful that you might be able to shed
some light on this: What does that mean in terms of the ongoing
transformation of the role of our services? Does a policy that ema-
nates therefore drive the way in which ultimately the military has
to operate, as well? And I was struck by what you had to say in
your comment about the need for coordination. It just seems to me,
and I believe many others here, with respect to policy, the need to
coordinate between the Department of Defense and the State De-
partment. And it seems rather unfair to so many of our young men
and women. I think a lot of the concerns that are raised here today
about reservists and our men in the field is that the very mission
that they were trained for is transforming, as we speak. Notwith-
standing the fine training that they receive — and I am not ques-
tioning that, but I am saying, if we are going to continue down
these roads of where policies by those who wave the flag force those
95
who have to salute the flag to take on a different role, how do we
deal with that in the future?
General Franks. Congressman, I think that, to be sure, national
security policy and national strategy will affect our Armed Forces
to be sure, because there is a difference: An armed force that is re-
quired for the sake of an isolationist government will not match a
force structure that advocates prevention, if you will. And so, I
think all of us, all of us recognize that. And I think transformation
is the way you would describe it, it is what is to change. And I be-
lieve, sir, that the changes we see will certainly be influenced by
our security strategy and our security policy.
And in terms of relationships within the executive branch, sir, I
couldn't talk to that.
Mr. Larson of Connecticut. Will that require in the future
that, as part of the retraining and recycling, and not necessarily of
the one-third, one-third, one-third that Mr. Taylor alluded to ear-
lier, but in terms of the role of nation building, the commitment
that you have indicated that we are here in both Afghanistan and
in Iraq by its very nature — and hopefully we are able to have the
United Nations join in with us. Hopefully, we are able to have
other allies. But if we are not, those roles will fall squarely on the
shoulders of American soldiers. And, is part of the new role that
we are assuming under these policies that of nation builders?
General Franks. Actually, Congressman, I don't think so, be-
cause I believe that a nation that finds itself at the hands of a re-
gime like Saddam Hussein or at the hands of the Taliban and finds
itself in a position where it has to build a government must build
its own government. And so, in my terms, in my view, the nation
building in Afghanistan will be done by Afghans and in Iraq nation
building will be done by the Iraqi people.
The support that we provide from our country is actually in the
category of chapter five and chapter six peacekeeping and peace-
making and stability operations to create an environment within
which a nation can build itself. And so, it may be a fine point, but
I think, sir, what we need to do is we need to be sure that our peo-
ple are prepared, as I said to the gentlewoman a minute ago, as
best we can prepare them for the environments that we are likely
to see in the future for peacekeeping, peacemaking, and stability
operations.
Mr. Larson of Connecticut. Well, it raises an interesting pol-
icy question for this committee in terms of the overlapping respon-
sibilities between the State Department and the Department of De-
fense. And I think you said it so eloquently for those that wave the
flag, and I place all elected officials.
General Franks. Absolutely.
Mr. Larson of Connecticut. As opposed to those who salute
and have to carry out those specific orders.
Well, while we are all pleased to see Saddam Hussein go, there
is no question about that. My concern — and there is no way that
you can know this, but I would be interested just from your per-
spective. And having been through Vietnam — and I think perhaps
that this might have been what Mr. Reyes was driving at in a final
analysis. You have said that it will be the Iraqi people who will de-
cide, and I think all of us believe that to be true. In the final analy-
96
sis, is it conceivable that they will not choose a democratic regime,
that those people will embrace something far different than we
have conceived or would like to see?
General Franks. Sir, I think it is a fair question. And my sense,
my belief, informed as it has been from Vietnam through Haiti and
elsewhere, is that at the end of the day they will settle on a rep-
resentative form of government.
Mr. Larson of Connecticut. Thank you. General, and thank
you for your service.
General Franks. Yes, sir.
Mr. Larson of Connecticut. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman. And the ranking member
has a few other things he would like to say.
Mr. Skelton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for indulging me for a
moment.
I am reading a rather interesting book entitled 19 Weeks: The
Latter Part of 1939 and the Early Part of 1940, which history tells
us was a very crucial time actually for the Western world. Looking
at what we have today in Iraq and also in Afghanistan, and looking
at the whole region and how infectious it can be for positive or for
widespread trouble in the world, I think we may be going through
a series of weeks and months that are crucial to the future history
of freedom and stability. The determination of the British people,
the Royal Airforce (RAF) and the Battle of Britain and Dunkirk
success, if it was a success, probably saved not just Britain, but the
Western world at that time. I am convinced that there is going to
have to be a determination by the American people, military, par-
ticularly American military, quality and quantity, not just presence
but capability, and a confidence in the Iraqi people that they can
have a stable and representative government.
How do we ensure these elements? Because we cannot fail in this
effort. How do we ensure that for the days ahead?
General Franks. Sir, it is interesting. In 1943, in one period of
less than 48 hours we shot down more than 60 of our own aircraft
over Sicily and killed 378 of our own people, in one period of less
than 48 hours. We possessed the moral fiber to stay after the end
of the second war in the face of that disaster, more than 60 of our
airplanes, a bit more than a day. And in the course of our oper-
ations over these months in Afghanistan and Iraq, we have yet to
see that casualty number, yet we are having this discussion.
I am answering as a taxpayer. My personal belief is that it takes
will; it takes, Mr. Skelton, what you provide, and that is a biparti-
san-focused contribution to the support of our people who have to
stay with this mission. As a matter of extreme importance to our
country as well as some 50 million people in Afghanistan and Iraq,
I think it is important for men and women who wear the uniform
and those who represent all of us, such as yourself, to continue to
make the statements, to continue to provide every evidence of sup-
port, because we, all of us, believe that the Global War On Terror-
ism marks a change in America. I believe, sir, that our country has
changed since 9/11/01. I think our expectations have changed. I am
hopeful that our values haven't.
97
And so, sir, I can't give you a simplistic answer to your question.
We have to stay with this. It is important. And, sir, I beUeve your
Armed Forces will do that.
Mr. Skelton. Thank you.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman. And, General Franks,
thanks for your endurance.
General Franks. Sir, thank you very much.
The Chairman. And we appreciate your being with us. Let me
just thank you again for your great career, and ask you just before
we break here, if there are any: In this career that you have had
that has spanned a very important time in American history, what
particular part of this thing did you like the best?
General Franks. Sir, I learned in dealing with the Congress that
sometimes you can get away with answering a different question
than the one that was asked, and I will try to do that right now.
The thing that I have enjoyed most about this has been perhaps
almost even a little bit maudlin. This is truly a great country. This
is a country where people can come out of trailer houses and, as
they say in the Army, be all that they can be. I think it is so re-
markable that this great experiment in democracy has an armed
force that operates ever under civilian control, that we have in our
Armed Forces today no one drafted. Everybody in our Armed
Forces is a volunteer, myself included. And so it is certainly an
honor for people to describe my service of 38 years as something
that is important. But I wasn't drafted. And I have enjoyed every
day of my service because I have been able to work with sons and
daughters of America, not unlike those mentioned by the gen-
tleman on my left and mentioned by Mr. Skelton.
We are blessed in this country. Those of us who wear the uni-
form know it, and it has been an honor to serve.
Someone said to me the other day, well, it must be a bittersweet
thing to move on from 38 years in uniform. Actually, it isn't. It has
been an absolutely wonderful 38 years, and I truly wouldn't trade
a day of it. But it is an equally exciting future, and so my wife and
I are looking forward to the future and looking forward to long as-
sociations with this committee and you, Mr. Chairman, and the
members of this committee. So thanks a lot, and thanks for the
kindness that you have shown me here.
The Chairman. Thank you very much. We appreciate it.
[Whereupon, at 1:37 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
APPENDIX
July 10, 2003
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
July 10, 2003
OPENING REMARKS OF CHAIRMAN DUNCAN HUNTER
Hearing on Operation Iraqi Freedom: The Combatant
Commander's Perspective
Thursday, July 10,2003
Today, the committee will continue its review of the lessons
learned from Operation Iraqi Freedom.
We are fortunate to have as our witness:
• General Tommy Franks
Former Commander
U.S. Central Command
General, on behalf of the Committee, thank you for the
years of distinguished service to our country and for leading our
young men and women in what can only be judged as a brilliant
military campaign.
It has only been a few days since your change-of-command
ceremony and I'm sure you're busy preparing for your next career,
so we appreciate your ability to make time for us today. We'll
need your perspective to help sort through the multiple reports,
(103)
104
studies, and presentations that are going to be prepared on
Operation Iraqi Freedom.
Defense analysts and special interests are already drawing the
battle lines over how to interpret Operation Iraqi Freedom in the
debate on military transformation. Advocates of transformation
describe the war in Iraq as a validation of every transformational
idea that's ever been proposed and view it as a model for all future
operations. Others note that legacy forces and capabilities largely
won the war and argue that the military isn't broken and doesn't
need fixing.
Ultimately, Operation Iraqi Freedom will reveal many
lessons about warfare that lie somewhere between the two camps.
No one should deny that transformational technologies and
capabilities made Operation Iraqi Freedom more decisive and less
costly than it might have been. Nor should we forget that victory
105
still required American boots on the ground, armed with the best
and most survivable equipment the American people can provide.
General, your thoughts will be vitally important in helping us
sort through those two somewhat competing perspectives.
I'd like to turn now to the distinguished Gentleman from
Missouri, who has his own way of helping us put these things into
context, for any comments he would like to make.
(Following Remarks by Mr. Skelton)
General, with unanimous consent, your full statement will be
entered into the record.
Hearing no objection, so ordered.
The floor is yours.
106
Opening Statement for The Honorable Ike Skelton
Full Committee Hearing on Operation Iraqi Freedom: The
Commander^s Perspective
July 10, 2003
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I join you in welcoming General
Franks and in thanking him for his exemplary service. General, you
have provided truly distinguished service to this nation through
your remarkable leadership and success in achieving our military
victories in Afghanistan and Iraq. You have led Central Command
through a period of extraordinary challenge, and we are deeply
grateful.
There is no doubt that our success in Iraq is due in no small
measure to the quality of our military leadership. My own view is
that this victory is also a testament to the quality and innovation of
our war colleges and to the excellence of our military training.
These assets of the American military make the planning and
execution of daring war plans like the one we used in Iraq possible.
And yet, General Franks, I must draw attention to the
apparent lack of sufficient planning for the reconstruction period in
107
Iraq. I pointed to the need for early and comprehensive post-war
planning in letters to the President both last September and in
March. The continuing daily reports of American casualties are
deeply disturbing to me, and I know they must be to you too. We
have already lost more Americans in Iraq since May than we have
in a full year in an Afghanistan, which is itself far from secure. My
fear is that if this pattern is left unchecked, we may find ourselves in
a guerilla conflict for years to come.
General, I raise this issue because my colleagues here on both
sides of the aisle want to be helpful and constructive. We want to
provide our troops and Ambassador Bremer's team in Iraq with
what they need to be successful. But to do that responsibly, we need
some clarification.
We need to understand the nature of the threat we still face in
Iraq. No doubt many of those who are attacking us do so because of
ties with the previous regime, but some are showing frustration with
their sense that Iraqis are not controlling their own future. I believe
the best chance for security will lie with reassurance for the Iraqis
108
that reconstruction is proceeding and that they will be given a
strong voice in their self-government.
Reconstruction is a lengthy process, but it is one that demands
planning and the building of small successes over time. We in
Congress, the American people, and the Iraqi people must all be
able to see and measure progress there. I have asked Secretary
Wolfowitz and Ambassador Bremer to lay out the measurable
benchmarks that will move us toward security for the Iraqi people
and for American troops. I ask you to do the same. Knowing the
milestones on the way to stability and a new government in Iraq will
allow Congress to provide better support to the military and will
help Americans understand what we are trying to achieve.
I also hope you will address the role that our allies can play in
the securing and rebuilding of Iraq. My great regret is that we did
not enter this conflict with far broader international support. But
that support and involvement is still greatly needed now.
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General, I would again like to thank you for your service and
to wish you the very best on your retirement. I look forward to your
testimony. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
UNTIL RELEASED BY
THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
STATEMENT OF
GENERAL TOMMY R. FRANKS
FORMER COMMANDER
US CENTRAL COMMAND
BEFORE THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
10 JULY 2003
Ill
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
UNTIL RELEASED BY
THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, I am honored to appear
before you today. Since we last met here together, much has taken
place in the Central Command area of responsibility. We have removed a
brutal regime in Iraq and have begun to help Iraq build its new future.
Our forces have continued to help Afghanistan make strides towards
independence, and have continued to help the Afghan people develop
their nation while continuing to seek and destroy terrorists and their
networks all across the Central region. I look forward to discussing
these important subjects with you and to your questions.
Let me begin by bringing you a message from the more than 281,000
US eind Coalition troops that I have been privileged to command. That
message is thank you. Throughout both Operation Iraqi Freedom and
Operation Enduring Freedom, our forces in the field have been blessed
to serve civilian leaders who set clear military objectives and then
provide our men and women in uniform the tools they need to win. On
their behalf, let me thank you for all that you continue to do for the
troops .
As you know, earlier this week General John Abizaid took the
reins of command at CENTCOM. He is a principled leader and soldier who
has been tested under fire, amd I am confident about the future of
CENTCOM under his leadership.
I would like to begin today by recognizing the Coalition nations
whose contributions of forces, equipment, and economic support have
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signaled a worldwide commitment to eradicate terrorism. Over the past
twelve months, the Coalition has been steadfast. Today there are 63
nations represented at Central Command's Tampa headquarters.
We have built a force in the CENTCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR)
to help achieve our objectives in Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation
Enduring Freedom--to deny terrorists the use of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) , and to bring terrorists to justice and dismantle
their terrorist networks. We have also established a more visible and
viable presence in the Horn of Africa (HOA) in order to combat
terrorism and promote stability. Work in the Central Region is
underway, but as I will discuss in the sections ahead, the environment
within the region remains challenging. Securing US interests and
ensuring regional stability will involve risks and will require
continuing commitment of resources.
USCENTCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR)
Our AOR encompasses 6.4 million square miles, from Egypt and
Jordan to the Horn of Africa, the Arabian Peninsula, Pakistan in South
Asia, and the Central Asian states as far north as Kazakhstan. It
includes the waters of the Red Sea, the Northern Indicui Ocean, the
Persian Gulf, and the key maritime choke points of the Suez Canal, the
Bab el Mandeb, and the Strait of Hormuz. The area is home to more than
500 million people, representatives of all the world's major religions
eind at least 18 major ethnic groups. National economies produce annual
per capita incomes varying from a few hundred dollars to tens of
thousands of dollars. CENTCOM' s AOR includes dictatorships, absolute
monarchies, failed states, democracies and governments in transition
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toward democracy. Humanitarian crises, resource depletion and overuse,
religious and ethnic conflicts, demographic challenges and military
power imbalances that generate social, economic, and military
volatility characterize this area. These factors are particularly
significant given the geographical and economic importance of the
region where natural resources provide extraordinary economic
opportunities. However, they also give rise to a range of
socioeconomic problems and rivalries. Some states have compensated for
their lack of mineral wealth through the industry of their people.
However, other nations have not generated the will, resources or
organization to move ahead. These factors will not be easily or
quickly overcome and signal additional challenges in the future.
In the past two years, USCENTCOM has been at the leading edge of
the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) . The Command is engaged with U.S.
and coalition forces both in Afghanistan and Iraq. Our commitment
remains strong as our leaders and troopers work to bring security
throughout the region.
On the ground in Iraq today, our troops are conducting ongoing
operations, combining Civil Military Operations with direct military
action to seek out and bring to justice leaders of the fallen regime.
Our priorities include forming and training police, security forces,
and the New Iraqi Army; improving the infrastructure; supporting the
establishment of local government and providing emergency medical care
and other humanitarian assistance. Much dangerous work remains to be
done, but millions of Iraqis have freedoms today which four months ago
were only a dream.
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Our troops are working closely with Ambassador Jerry Bremer aind
his civilian team to provide the tools he needs to be successful.
Progress is being made, and our country is justifiably proud of all
that has been accomplished.
OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM - LESSONS LEARNED
Decisive combat in Iraq saw a maturing of joint force operations
in many ways. Some capabilities reached new performance levels. From
a Joint Integration perspective, our experience in OPERATIONS Southern
and Northern Watch, and Enduring Freedom helped to develop a joint
culture in our headquarters aind in our components. These operations
helped to improve joint interoperability and improve our joint C4I
networks as joint force synergy was taken to new levels of
sophistication. Our forces were able to achieve their operational
objectives by integrating ground maneuver, special operations,
precision lethal fires and non-lethal effects. We saw for the first
time integration of forces rather than deconfliction of forces. This
integration enabled conventional (air, ground, and sea) forces to
leverage SOF capabilities to deal effectively with asymmetric threats
and enable precision targeting simultaneously in the same battle space.
Likewise, Special Operators were able to use conventional forces to
enhance euad enable special missions. Operational fires spearheaded our
ground maneuver, as our forces sustained the momentum of the offense
while defeating enemy formations in open, complex, and urban terrain.
We saw jointness, precision munitions, C2, equipment readiness,
state of training of the troops, and Coalition support as clear
"winners" during OIF.
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That said, we also identified a number of areas which require
additional work. Fratricide prevention suffered from a lack of
standardized combat identification. Units in theater arrived with
seven different cotnbat ID systems, and our commanders were forced to
overcome these shortcomings "on the fly" . Deployment planning and
execution were cumbersome, and need to be improved to meet the
operational demands of the 21st Century. And, Coalition information
sharing must be improved at all levels. Finally, human intelligence
emd communications bandwidth are also areas which will require
continuing focus.
OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM - LESSONS LEARNED
In Afghanistan, Coalition forces continue to deny ant i- coal it ion
elements sanctuary while disrupting their ability to plcin, target,
rehearse and execute operations. This is accomplished through active
combat patrolling from secure fire bases and forward operating bases
(FOB) in order to promote stability, enhance the legitimacy of the
Interim Transitional Government of Afghanistan (ITGA) , and prevent the
re-emergence of terrorism.
During OEF, we saw a number of functional areas and capeibilities
that reached new levels of performance. In some areas, improvements
were made prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom. For example the DoD/CIA
synergy which worked well during OEF was built upon the integration of
liaison officers in each of our headquarters which facilitated teamwork
and paid great dividends in Iraq.
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Also, we continued to leverage coalition strengths as new
Coalition members were added. "The mission determines the Coalition;
the Coalition does not deteirmine the mission."
Advanced technologies employed during OEF were also critical.
The conunand and control of air, grotind, naval, and SOF from 7,000 miles
away was a unique experience in warfare as our forces achieved
unprecedented real time situational awareness and C2 connectivity. We
learned that precision-guided munitions represent a force multiplier.
Low collateral damage during both OEF and OIF was a fxindamental factor
in achieving our objectives. Early in OEF we saw the need for an
unmanned sensor-to-shooter capability to support time -sensitive
targeting (TST) . The armed Predator demonstrates great potential and
will be a high payoff system in the future . Blue Force Tracking and
enheuiced C4I systems increase lethality and decrease response time, and
also represent transformational technologies. We will continue with
development of Global Hawk as an unmanned, high-altitude, long loiter
time, beyond line-of -sight multi-sensor UAV, and will work to
incorporate laser designation and delivery of precision weaponry from
that platform.
The integrated common operating picture (COP) was a very powerful
tool. Tracking systems were previously Service unique. Workarounds
were developed for OIF, but there is a need to develop one integrated,
user- friendly, C4I architecture that captures blue and red air, ground
and maritime forces.
Strategic lift and tanker aircraft availability were stretched
during OEF and OIF. These forces are critical to rapid future force
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projection and we must enhance this vital capability in the years
ahead .
Combined and joint training of our forces was also a key factor
during OEF and was carried over into OIF. Our military forces are the
best-prepared forces in the world and I thajik the members of Congress
for providing assets and funding to train these wonderful fighting men
euid women to give them every possible advantage.
Finally, our ability to take action in OEF was predicated on
"Strategic Anchors," one of which was "Cooperative Security"
relationships, which paid high dividends in basing, staging and over
flight rights during recent crisis.
Regional Concerns
Iraq
Although security continues to improve, portions of Iraq
are now, and will remain for some time, dangerous. The term "stability
operations* does not infer that combat actions have ended. Military
forces are still required to set conditions that en=ible progress. As
we move forward, the composition and size of our forces will change to
match emerging requirements. Factors that influence our force mix will
include Coalition force contributions, threat, emd success in fielding
Iraqi police forces, security, and the New Iraqi Army.
Integration of Coalition forces is a major near-term effort. The
Ttoited Kingdom and Polauid are committed to leading Divisions in
Southern Iraq, and many partner nations have offered forces to fill
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those units. Deployment of those forces has already begun. We continue
discussions with India and Pakistan. At this moment, 19 Coalition
partners are on the ground in support of military operations in Iraq,
with deployment pending for 19 additional countries. An additional 11
nations are conducting military to military discussions with respect to
possibly deploying forces to Iraq in support of stability and security
operations.
At this point some 35,000 police have been hired. This fills
about half of the requirement nationwide. Throughout the country, many
of these law enforcement officers are conducting joint patrols with
U.S. military forces, and we will ultimately transition responsibility
for security and stability to the Iraqis. In the near-term, we must
build upon the momentum we have generated in this area.
Creation of the New Iraqi Army is moving forward. The plan
envisions three divisions located near Mosul, Baghdad, and Basrah to
provide territorial defense and conduct stability operations. In the
first year, the goal is to field approximately nine battalions.
Initially, Iraqi forces will focus on performing security fxonctions at
fixed sites, convoy secxirity, and border control. As it develops, this
force will work with Coalition forces to contribute to stability and
security throughout Iraq.
Ttaderlying all security functions is the need to continue
humanitarian assistauice emd the conduct of civil-military operations to
in^rove the quality of life for the Iraqi people. In this regard, our
regional allies have been invaluable. Neighboring nations have
provided hospitals, medical supplies, water, food, and expertise in
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beginning the rebuilding process. The fact that there has been no
human itaricin disaster in Iraq; no widespread outbreak of disease,
hunger, refugees or displaced persons; or any of the other predicted
consequences of war is due, in large part, to the generosity of our
allies. The CPA and Coalition forces will continue to work in concert
with international and non- governmental agencies to reverse the result
of years of neglect by a brutal regime .
Afghanistan
Our efforts in Afghanistan have given the Afghan people a chance
to break the chain of violence, civil war, and poverty that mauiy have
endured their entire lives. Our Coalition has made considerable
progress over the last 18 months, but much remains to be done. The
average Afghan now enjoys basic freedoms, a higher quality of life, and
prospects for a better future. A Loya Jirga to ratify a new
Constitution will be held this fall and national elections are
scheduled for next summer. President Karzai's transitional government
continues to develop as he works to expand its authority beyond Kabul.
Security and stability are the keys to President Karzai's success.
Since 1 May, our primary focus has shifted to steibility operations. A
steQ>le and secure environment enables reconstruction. U.S. Civil-
Military Operations forces have completed more than 150 projects and
nearly 300 more are underway. To date, these projects have improved
drinking water, medical care, transportation, communications,
irrigation, and agriculture throughout the country. To further our
reconstruction efforts and to help foster stability. Provincial
Reconstruction Teams (PRT) are working in Bamian, Konduz, and Gardez.
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A fourth U.K. led team will soon deploy to Mazar-e-Sharif , and other
PRTs are being planned for future deployments to additional provinces.
A critical step toward stability in Afghanistan is building the
Afghanistan National Army (ANA) . The U.S. is leading this effort,
supported by five Coalition partners. To date, three brigades of
professional Afghan soldiers have been fielded; we project ANA strength
of approximately 8,500 soldiers by Dec 03.
Horn of Africa
Several countries in the Horn of Africa responded positively to
President Bush's call for support against worldwide terrorism.
However, these states are challenged to conduct successful anti-
terrorism campaigns. Over 21 million people remain at risk of
starvation in the region. Long-term conflicts have intensified the
debilitating effects of natural disasters, especially drought. This
forces the dislocation of affected populations seeking food, medical
care, and safety. Existing governments find difficulty meeting the
needs of their populations, creating an environment hospitcible to
terrorist cells and trans -national threats.
USCENTCOM has addressed these issues by standing up a Combined
Joint Task Force in Djibouti. This Task Force provides a forward
presence; trains counter-terrorism forces; and supervises a number of
humanitarian assistance efforts to enhance security, improve public
health and combat famine. These initiatives are key elements of our
Security Cooperation strategy. Close cooperation with interagency and
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international aid organizations facilitates a regional approach to the
humanitarian effort and maximizes the effects of our efforts.
The Horn will require a long-term commitment of resources to
achieve stability, thereby setting conditions that will make it less
hospitable to terrorists.
Iran
Iran has long pursued a goal of regional hegemony through
modernization of a regionally capable military force, the development
of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) , and the use cind promotion of
terrorism as an instrument of foreign policy.
Tehran perceives itself encircled by the U.S. The enmity and
abiding mistrust of the U.S. government is implacable among Iran's
ruling hard-liners furthering security concerns. Iran's principal
security objectives remain unaltered with the fall of Baghdad, njunely
the survival of the Islamic state and the preservation of Iranian
independence, with the secondary goal of expeinding Iranian influence in
the Persian Gulf, Central Asia, euid the broader Islamic world. Iran's
national security policies appear focused on maintaining political
stability and internal security, expanding diplomatic and economic
relations, establishing WMD and long-range missile forces backed up by
vmconventional warfare capabilities and maintaining a robust terrorism
apparatus .
Shifts in regional security relationships are expected as a
result of the formation of a stable and productive post-war Iraq. Of
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course, those realignments and perturbations extend beyond Iraq's
borders and will be of concern to Iran. Following the ouster of the
Saddam regime in Iraq, Iran has mounted an increasingly sophisticated
and multi-faceted influence campaign that will prove persistent in its
focus to create an anti-Coalition, predominantly anti- U.S., sentiment
among Iraqis .
Just as complex is deciphering Irem's dual-track foreign policy
and often contradictory public statements. Iran's efforts to promote
itself as a responsible member nation of the international community
are in direct contrast with its long-standing covert and public support
to radical resistance groups and terrorists as well as its failure to
meet its Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) obligations.
The Iranian regime's proclivity for violence through terrorism,
in concert with its past support of terrorism and an established
pattern of developing nuclear and other WMD and missile programs, will
continue to be of concern.
Gulf states
Trcmsnational terrorists remain throughout the Gulf region.
Violent, anti-Western ideology appeals to some segments of the
populace, due in part to the increasing failure of regional governments
to meet the basic needs of the people. As populations increase,
regional governments struggle to provide adequate education, housing,
infrastructure, suid jobs. Closed political systems are only just
beginning to reform. Regional politics and long-standing, hard-line
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stances concerning the Palestinian- Israeli situation exacerbate
regional instaibility.
However, there are also hopeful signs. Many of the Gulf
countries are moving toward a more representational government. Bahrain
eind Qatar have begun municipal elections; Oman continues working toward
opening its economy and political system; and Saudi Arabia has begun
efforts to change the educational system, privatize state industries,
and open a domestic dialogue on other needed social reforms.
Sxibstantive improvements will require a long-term, determined effort.
The Gulf States have stepped up their antiterrorism efforts in
response to 9/11 and the May attacks in Saudi Arabia. On-going efforts
include increasing law enforcement, stemming the flow of illegal
finauicial support, tracking personnel movements, cind monitoring
terrorist activities. While their cooperation is extensive, these
governments continue to prefer working behind the scenes.
Militarily, the Gulf States continue to perceive a long-term
threat from Iran. In a show of support for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM
(OIF) , the Gulf States, for the first time, deployed the Peninsula
Shield force in defense of Kuwait. Outstanding OIF basing and access
support from the Gulf States demonstrates tangible results of our
active security cooperation programs. They understand that our
"footprint" in the region is likely to change, emd each state continues
to advocate security cooperation with the U.S.
While most citizens are relieved that the Iraqi regime has
been removed, opinions differ on Coalition activities and what type of
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Iraqi society will eventually emerge. Regional governments are looking
to the CPA to ensure Iraq does not become segmented. Gulf leaders look
forward to lucrative trade and economic relations with a rebuilt Iraq.
South and Central Asia
Pakistan's support has been fundamental to our success in
Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. President Musharraf has committed
substantial national resources against terrorism to include arresting a
number of Al Qaida leaders, freezing the financial accounts of known
terrorists and banning fundraising to support Kashmiri militancy. He
has pursued these actions despite ongoing tensions with India and
significant domestic pressure, and he continues on a path toward
democracy and sustained economic development . The US has expressed
gratitude and solidified his political position by lifting sanctions
and granting economic assistance. CENTCOM will continue to support
our mil-to-mil relationship and build closer security cooperation with
PcOcistan.
The Central Asian States remain dedicated partners in the Global
War on Terrorism. Each country declared its support for the US
inanediately after the attacks of 9/11. All offered to host U.S.
personnel and equipment. Bases established in the Central Asieui States
have been critical to the success of our operations in Afghanistein.
The defeat of the Taliban and the removal of Al Qaida from Afghanistan
have enabled the Central Asian States to refocus their attention on
internal development. We will continue working with our Central Asian
partners to prevent the resurgence of terrorism, and the Department of
State and the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection will continue to
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in5)rove their capacity to secure their borders against the flow of
illegal narcotics.
WMD Proliferation
The proliferation of technologies related to weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) and long-range delivery systems continues to be a
significant concern in the Central Region. As some nations ajid
international extremist groups pursue chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear capabilities, some regional allies will seek
to offset such threats by pursuing strategic weapons of their own, thus
perpetuating the proliferation cycle. Security cooperation is our best
hedge against this possibility.
Iran continues to pursue WMD. Its nuclear programs are under the
continuing scrutiny of the International Atomic Energy Agency, emd its
chemical weapons stockpile and probcUsle biological weapons program are
of concern.
In South Asia, the missile and nuclear race between Pakistan smd
India is also troubling. Both states continue to develop advanced
missiles and the risk of miscalculation leading to escalation remains
of concern.
We face a severe threat in the potential for chemical,
biological, radiological or, less likely, nuclear attacks by
terrorists. Docximents found (during the exploitation of suspect WMD
sites in Afghanistan) indicated the al-Qaida terrorist network had
explored methods for producing toxins and was seeking to establish a
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biological warfare capability. Terrorists will continue to seek WMD
capabilities as their need for more sensational attacks intensifies.
The extensive press coverage of the October 2001 anthrax mail attacks
highlighted U.S. vulnerabilities and exacerbated an already dangerous
situation in the Central Region, where many extremists are based and
exploring such capabilities.
Terrorism and Coxinter terrorism
Over the past year, the Global war on Terrorism has been marked
by major achievements. Multiple terrorist operations sponsored by al-
Qaida and affiliated extremists have been disrupted; and many
terrorists, including high-ranking operational planners, have been
captured. Al-Qaida has proven unable to reestablish the extensive
training infrastructure it had earlier instituted in Afghanistan. The
dispersal of its leaders and cadre from Afghanistan continues to impede
al-Qaida's ability to accomplish timely and secure communications
exchanges .
Nevertheless, al-Qaida has responded to our counter-terrorism
initiatives; in this context, several lesser-known personalities have
emerged and this has translated into strikes such as the May 2003
bombings of multiple housing complexes in Riyadh. So far, these
attacks have focused on "soft" targets; however, al-Qaida retains an
interest in striking larger, more spectacular targets.
Counterterrorism operations against al-Qaida, U.S. victories in
Iraq and Afghanistan, and the persistent conflict between Israel amd
the Palestinians have generated pressure throughout the USCENTCOM AOR.
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Jihadist groups and disgruntled individuals constitute another
important source of potential terrorist threats. Given this setting,
we are constantly working to identify vulnerabilities and refine our
force protection measures.
Security Cooperation Overview
Our success in gaining basing, staging and over-flight rights for
ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM and o\ir influence in the region are
directly related to an active security cooperation program.
USCENTCOM's program builds relationships that promote U.S. interests,
build allied and friendly nations' military capabilities, and provide
U.S. forces with access and en route infrastructure. Prosecution of
the GWOT requires continued fiscal and political investment in these
vital programs. I would like to highlight a few dividends of our
approach .
The FY03 supplemental appropriation of $908M in FMP is currently
enabling the training of a professional Afghan National Army eind
allowing Pakistan to restore its military forces. Additionally, long-
standing partners such as Jordan are increasing their interoperability
through FMF-funded purchases. Continued investment in security
assistance allows USCENTCOM to improve the capabilities of friendly
nations by enabling them to provide for their own security.
International Military Education and Training (IMET) remains a
low- cost, high-pay off investment that helps shape the security
environment. Courses offered under IMET provide military members of
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regional states an opportunity to attend courses in U.S. military
institutions such as Command and Staff Colleges and Senior Service
Schools. IMET participation by students from the Central Region
supports Congressionally-mandated initiatives: providing exposure to
the U.S. concepts of military professionalism, respect for human
rights, and subordination to civilian authority. The Counter Terrorism
Fellowship, a new DoD appropriation, enables us to provide flexible
course offerings to several nations who are key partners in the GWOT.
Conclusion
The Global War on Terrorism is underway. The precision,
determination, and expertise of our military forces and our Coalition
partners brought about the liberation of Afghanistan and Iraq in
lightning speed with minimum bloodshed. However, these two nations
have only taken only the first steps toward freedom, and United States
cind our Coalition partners must be there to support the whole journey.
While we have accomplished much, the potential for terrorist acts
and other setbacks remains very real . Af ghsmistan has a new
government, a new army, and with Coalition support the nation is making
great strides towards long term stability. In Iraq, Saddam Hussein's
regime was destroyed and regime supporters are being rooted out . Our
focus has changed from military destruction of a regime to providing
security and humanitarian assistance to the Iraqi people, while helping
to establish a representative form of Government. Decisive combat
operations have been completed, but much work remains.
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I am very proud of each and every one of the men and women who
continue to serve selflessly and tirelessly in the execution of our
mission from Egypt to Kazakhstan, from the Suez to Pakistan, regardless
of the uniform of service they wear or the nation from which they come .
I thank the Congress and the American people for the tremendous support
you have given them.
I would be pleased to take your questions.
20
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE
RECORD
July 10, 2003
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MEEHAN
Mr. Meehan. Ever since my trip to Afghanistan last year, I have taken a strong
interest in mine detection. Given the fact that Iraq also represents a major land-
mine obstacle course of US troops and civilians, my interest has grown more in-
tense. What lessons have you learned about the Army's mine detection capabilities?
General Franks. The Armed Services have had the opportunity to develop and
significantly refine mine detecting tactics, techniques and procedures in recent years
starting with operations in the Balkan region. In Operations Enduring Freedom and
Iraqi Freedom we learned that our hand-held detection equipment works and that
our soldiers are well trained to use the equipment. Also, we're beginning to develop
mine detection dogs, a powerful capability many of our allies possess. We're fielding
AN/PSS-14 HSTAMIDS and replacing the AN/PSS-12, fielded in the early 1990s,
which improves our capabilities to effectively detect mines with fewer false readings.
In the years ahead, the Services should continue to work to develop ever better tech-
nologies for mine clearing.
Mr. Meehan. Is the Vietnam-era technology — the AN/PSS-12 — capable of detect-
ing metallic and non-metallic mines with high accuracy?
General Franks. The Armed Forces fielded the AN/PSS-12 in the early 1990s to
replace the AN/PSS-11. The AN/PSS-12 was designed to detect land mines with
very small metal content (normally only a metallic firing pin) in otherwise non-me-
tallic mines. The AN/PSS-12 can detect non-metallic mines when equipped with a
ground penetration radar sensor. It can detect mines buried up to 20 inches and
under water. The AN/PSS-12 was a state of the art piece of equipment when first
fielded, but has a high false-alarm rate due to its sensitivity.
Mr. Meehan. I understand that some units have received the next generation
mine detector, the AN/PSS-14 HSTAMIDS. I am curious whether this was a result
of a request from the field, or whether it came down from headquarters?
General Franks. Through concept and procurement, since 1992, the fielding of
HSTAMIDS was accelerated under the direction of the Army's Requirements Over-
sight Committee. Units deploying in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom and Oper-
ation Enduring Freedom received pre-production models and training from the
newly formed Countermine/Counter Booby Trap Center at the US Army Engineer
School at Fort Leonard Wood.
Mr. Meehan. How are its results? Does HSTAMIDS have improved accuracy in
detecting mines and permit personnel to clear minefields more expeditiously than
older detectors in the inventory? Would combat engineer units welcome accelerated
procurement of HSTAMIDS?
General Franks. HSTAMIDS is a handheld mine detector capable of detecting all
metallic and non-metallic anti-tank and anti-personnel mines and unexploded ord-
nance. HSTAMIDS combines the maturing technology of groundpenetrating radar
and improved metal detection that is a significant improvement over the AN/PSS-
12. HSTAMIDS enables our soldiers to clear minefields more quickly because of its
ability to tune out metallic clutter. And of equal importance it provides soldiers
greater confidence in their equipment. Soldiers in Afghanistan routinely detect
100% of mines in certification lanes and have found it to be very effective during
mine clearing operations.
Mr. Meehan. On June 8, 2003, there is a New York Times article on barrels that
were looted at a nuclear site in Iraq. The local villagers were exposed to high doses
of radiation and need medical are.
It seems that there is a hospital located near Tuwaitha, but without sufficient ex-
pertise in radiation poisoning to address the needs of those in the community who
have been exposed to the radioactive materials and wastes.
I believe a program sanctioned by the US-led interim administration that would
offer the local medical staff collaborative consultations and advice, or even training,
from the US-based specialists. Such a program would prevent the need for patients
to travel to Baghdad seeking assessment and treatment, and would allow them ac-
cess to highly trained specialists in the field of radiation exposure. What is being
done to treat the patients?
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General Franks. There are over a thousand radioactive sources in Iraq; however,
only a few of these could present a serious threat. The greatest concentration of
these sources is believed to be at the Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Facility.
The US Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine responded
to Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) request for an occupa-
tional and environmental radiological health assessment of the Al Tuwaitha
Nuclear Research Facility (TNRC) sites A, B and C.
The USAC HPPM team arrived on site on 18 June 2003 to conduct a two-phased
assessment to verify there are no acute radiological threats, and to survey the air,
water, and soil on the site. Results of the samples taken are pending.
Mr. Meehan. What additional resources are being used to help the people of Iraq
that are exposed to radiation?
General Franks. On 5 July 2003, LTC Melanson, Health Physicist, USACHPPM,
attended an in-theater meeting convened to discuss strategy for assessment and
mitigation of risks to the public from hazards that may exist as the result of looting
at the Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Facility (TNRC). Present at the meeting were
LTC Melanson, USACHPPM, and representatives from the Civilian Provisional Au-
thority, the Iraqi Ministry of Health, the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission, and the
World Health Organization.
As a result of the meeting, LTC Melanson provided consultation for the proposed
follow-up of personnel within the Iraqi population, who may have received radiation
exposures as a result of looting at TNRF.
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MILLER
Mr. Miller. I understand that the Active duty units (3rd ID) have either started
or have dates when they will rotate home, what is the plan for Reserve and Na-
tional Guard units? They have been there same as them and have fought the good
fight but they are not being advised as to the rotation plan.
General Franks. Reserve component forces did provide a valuable contribution to
Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. The sacrifices borne by these fine Americans and
their families is commendable. The redeployment plan for all forces in Iraq has been
conditions based. As such, it has been extremely difficult to predict actual dates of
rotations or redeployments. National Guard and Reserve units rotate and redeploy
with their parent units as they rotate out of theater. CENTCOM and its components
work closely with the services to ensure National Guard and Reserve units rotate
or redeploy in a timely manner to meet required demobilization dates. National
Guard and Reserve units go through the same process as active component units
in the rotations and redeplojTnent process.
The Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff recently developed a long range rotation plan
for ground forces in Iraq which has been approved by the Secretary of Defense. Na-
tional Guard and Reserve units are included in this plan and have a fair and equi-
table contribution to long range national efforts. Individual units will be advised of
their rotation dates as soon as they are available.
Mr. Miller. National Guard units went to Iraq with older equipment that has
caused logistical problems for CONUS units. At least in Florida, none of their 2 1/
2 ton trucks are operational, due to lack of repair parts in the Army system. . .
Would you agree that National Guard troops should be equipped with the same
weapon and support systems (i.e. radios, rifles) as the active forces? If so, how is
this being rectified?
General Franks. This is a Service Headquarters issue involving the inherent re-
sponsibility of each the Military Services to establish, train and equip forces for
worldwide operations. In the Army, new equipment fielding actions are executed
and managed based on the Department of the Army Master Priority List (DAMPL).
The list prioritizes new equipment fielding sequence for all Army units Active and
Reserve Component. Units designated to receive new systems turn-in their equip-
ment to be replaced based on the timeline contained in the New Equipment Fielding
Plan. That equipment is in most cases, refurbished to "Fully Mission Capable"
standard and re-issued to Army units, Active and Reserve Component, for training
and operational use until they are designated to receive modern equipment based
on the DAMPL. In the case of the specific system cited in the question, there are
repair parts for the 2V2 ton truck in the Army Supply system.
Mr. Miller. I have received reports from my constituents in the field about a tent
company called DRASH. Apparently this constituent's unit bought some Environ-
mental Control Units (ECU) to go along with the tents. One of the ECUs is cur-
rently broken. The company, which is based in New York, has been unresponsive.
The government has spent several millions of dollars with this company. It is my
135
understanding that one system alone cost almost $500,000. The ECU cost was 94K.
The bottom line is I have soldiers that are sleeping in tents during the day with
the temperature inside the tent is 120+. These troops have alleviated the situation
by bujang air conditioners on the economy, but it hasn't solved their problem. It
would be helpful if someone could address the issue with either this equipment or
the company.
General Franks. Coordination with the item manager at Defense Supply
CenterPhiladelphia revealed that the manufacturer has factory support teams in
Iraq to provide support to the ECU. There is a two person team in Baghdad provid-
ing support to CJTF-7A^ Corps. Another factory representative is working mainte-
nance issues in the northern area. The company is attempting to increase its pres-
ence in the theater with additional assistance teams.
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LOBIONDO
Mr. LoBlONDO. We did not face a serious Air-to-Air threat during Operation Iraqi
Freedom or the War in Afghanistan. In your view, how should this shape our future
planes for aircraft procurement for the Air Force?
General Franks. In the last two conflicts we faced specific regional threats, not
necessarily indicative of the most likely threats to the U.S. in the world today and
certainly not indicative of our most dangerous threats. Although the Iraqis never
flew a sortie against our forces, the threat was present. In fact, we needed over two
squadrons of air-to-air configured aircraft to protect our assets during Operation
Iraqi Freedom, especially considering the requirement to protect the relatively small
force used to liberate Iraq. Other potential threats in our AOR or around the world
have not had the experience of facing our forces and may challenge our air superi-
ority, even if in vain.
A dual-role, high endurance aircraft is the way of the future. With limited basing
rights and the need to establish air superiority quickly, future aircraft will need the
ability to fly air-to-air and air-to-ground missions. This will alleviate the need to re-
place aircraft once air superiority is established and allow the flexibility to re-role
them back to air-to-air if need be for follow-on missions.
Mr. LoBlONDO. Along with the other members of this committee and my constitu-
ents, I remain very concerned about ongoing attacks against our soldiers in Iraq.
In your view, what is the dominant force behind these attacks?
General Franks. The anti-Coalition attacks are being carried out by loyalists of
the former Iraqi regime who are fighting to regain the status they enjoyed as bene-
ficiaries of Saddam, and to a lesser extent, foreign and indigenous radical Islamists,
primarily Sunni, who naturally resist any form of what they perceive as Western
occupation of their lands. [The remainder of the answer is classified.!
Mr. LoBlONDO. General Franks, how long do you estimate U.S. forces will ulti-
mately be needed in Iraq to stabilize the country?
General Franks. The number of US forces required to stabilize Iraq is derived
from an analysis of four variables: the security situation throughout the country, the
number of coalition nations contributing forces for stability operations, the progress
in forming a new Iraqi army, police force and border/customs officials and the politi-
cal and economic progress within Iraq.
The plan for the reconstruction of Iraq is based on specific objectives associated
with clearly defined milestones. As we achieve success and responsibility for these
milestones transitions from predominantly military forces to civilian agencies, the
requirement for military forces is expected to decrease. Additionally, as the civilian
agencies transition responsibility for these activities to the Iraqis, the associated re-
quirement for security forces should decrease as these agencies depart and military
support requirements are eliminated.
Because the length of the military commitment in Iraq will ultimately be decided
by the Iraqis themselves as they transform Iraq into a viable, representative nation,
it is not possible to determine specific dates or timelines. During past operations in
the Balkans, military commanders initially attempted to maintain and follow a
strict timeline. However, as timelines proved to be an unrealistic method for deter-
mining progress, commanders shifted to a conditions-based approach. We are using
a similar approach to ongoing stability operations in Iraq and making troop reduc-
tion decisions based upon the internal security situation, coalition contributions, the
establishment of Iraqi security forces, the success of establishing Iraqi-led political
institutions and a viable economic program instead of time.
Mr. LoBlONDO. General Franks, which do you believe was a bigger contributing
factor to victory in Operation Iraqi Freedom-firepower or intelligence and recon-
naissance?
136
General Franks. Firepower, intelligence and reconnaissance are interrelated enti-
ties; each relies on the other to insure a successful outcome. We were very success-
ful in our use of all of these functions during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Our ability
to determine and identify targets and to destroy those targets with air and ground
based firepower was unprecedented. To identify one as a Taigger contributing factor'
would negate the importance of the inter-dependability of the functions. We depend
on all battlefield operating systems to fight effectively.
Mr. LoBlONDO. General, what do you regard as the most "critical moment" in the
war — the moment when American troops were most vulnerable?
General Franks. There truly was never a "critical moment" in the war. There
were some moments that required some more attention than others, but that is the
nature of modem warfare. We were always on plan. The built-in flexibility of our
plan enabled us to take some risk and get to Baghdad more quickly than most
thought we could (including the IZ regime). We controlled the tempo of the fight and
we were always in position to recover from any risk we assumed.
I will say that the troops were most vulnerable when they were postured in their
Tactical Assembly Areas (TAAs) in Northern Kuwait prior to crossing the line of de-
parture. Although we had sufficient Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (TBMD) as-
sets in place to protect our force, we still had a substantial number of personnel
and amount of resources in a confined area prior to us crossing the line of depar-
ture.
UNITED STATES POLICY AND OPERATIONS IN IRAQ
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, Thursday, September 25, 2003.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 1:32 p.m., in room 2118,
Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Duncan Hunter (chairman of
the committee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DUNCAN HUNTER, A REP-
RESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE
ON ARMED SERVICES
The Chairman. The committee will come to order. And I would
like to welcome Secretary Wolfowitz, General Abizaid, Ambassador
Bremer and General Keane to the committee today.
Given your frequent appearances before the committee in closed
session over the last couple of months, I don't think formal intro-
ductions are necessary.
Can folks hear?
Most of the members of the committee like it a little better when
my mike is turned off here, but let me introduce our witnesses once
again: Honorable Paul D. Wolfowitz, who is Deputy Secretary of
Defense; Ambassador L. Paul Bremer HI, Administrator of the Coa-
lition Provisional Authority (CPA); General John Abizaid, the
United States Army commander of CENTCOM, United States Cen-
tral Command; and, of course, also General John Keane, Vice Chief
of Staff of the Army.
And General Keane is going to welcome us — or is going to help
us with any issues that might come up, although he doesn't have
an opening statement, as I understand.
It has been six months since the coalition forces crossed the Iraqi
border and began combat operations to depose Saddam Hussein,
and it took three weeks for our military to reach Baghdad and top-
ple the regime and then a few more days to conclude major combat
operations, but that didn't end the war.
And that shouldn't surprise us. After all, Hussein and his people
ruled through terror. They have got nothing to gain, everjdhing to
lose, from a peaceful, stable and democratic Iraq.
So regime die-hards, criminals and foreign fighters attack coali-
tion forces in the forlorn hope that they can drive us out, that they
can retrieve power through terror against our military, against the
United Nations and against defenseless Iraqi civilians.
Instead of a strategy, they have terror. It is not going to beat us
on the battlefield, which they can't do. Instead, our enemies are
using terror to create the perception that Iraq is chaotic and ungov-
(137)
138
ernable in the hope that we will lose heart and cut our commit-
ment before the job is done.
And you know, I was just reflecting on perhaps the instruction
that has been given to terrorists over the years, that is that the
killing of the Marines in Lebanon did not invite a strong response
from the United States during the Reagan administration. The
Khobar Towers, similarly, and the strikes on our embassies in Afri-
ca, at the most produced a response that consisted of several cruise
missiles aimed in general directions. But there was no strong re-
sponse, as we have had since 9/11.
So we have — I think we have a strategy on the part of those who
wish us ill to proceed on the basis that Americans don't have pa-
tience and that we don't have perseverance.
And if the combination of their die-hards and criminals and
jihadists succeed, we are going to leave prematurely and Iraqi de-
mocracy will die before the people of Iraq are ready and able to de-
fend it.
And that is what is at stake today, whether our staying power
is stronger than that of the terrorists, that is the question. And for
the sake of American security, I think it must be.
Now, our military is up to the task, and that has been strongly
demonstrated. We have taken losses. They are particularly painful
because these soldiers are the best America has to offer. But every-
one over there, civilian or military, is now serving on the front
lines in the battle between terror and civilization, and that is as
noble a responsibility as the fights against fascism and communism
were in the last century.
There are some who would pass that responsibility off onto the
United Nations or who criticize the coalition mission in Iraq be-
cause it hasn't unfolded as neatly as a Hollywood screenplay.
But I might just say, having watched "Patton" the other night
and watching the drive of the 3rd Army through Europe, it was d
pretty strong similarity, when you watch those American Marines,
101st Airborne and our other uniformed people, driving to Baghdad
with that advance. It was so rapid, that we seized many of the
bridges and strong points before they could be blown and seized oil
fields before they could be taken out of action.
And if people want to look for all the things that we look for and
what I think are the good Hollywood reflections of war, that is
bravery, enormous talent, integrity and sacrifice for country, we
saw it in that drive to Baghdad.
But Iraq isn't like the peacekeeping or stability operations of the
1990s. There, the United States sought to keep warring parties
apart. We tried to be fair and impartial. In theory, if not practice,
other states in the United Nations (U.N.) could also play that role.
In Iraq, the stakes are much, much higher. Regime holdouts and
foreign jihadists aren't flocking to Iraq to defend its people. They
are flocking to Iraq to kill Americans and restore a terrorist re-
gime.
The forces of terror are genuine enemies to the United States
and all that we value and that makes this a war in which we are
active participants, not a peacekeeping exercise in which American
resources are interchangeable with those of the United Nations.
139
Because our security depends on victory, we cannot entrust ei-
ther to the dictates of others. We can, should and do welcome allies
in the fight against terror. Indeed, some 32 nations committed mili-
tary resources to building a secure, stable and viable democracy in
Iraq. The contributions are important and more allies will be wel-
come. Nevertheless, our security demands that we prevail with or
without them.
We are at war with terror. It is a war that terrorists started, but
it is a war that we must finish on our terms. As the president
noted before the United Nations just two days ago, peace comes
from freedom and we secure that freedom with courage.
We have years of hard work before us in Iraq. We need to dem-
onstrate the courage to do it.
Gentlemen, we all look forward to your testimony and appreciate
your appearance before the committee this afternoon.
And just one other thing, before I recognize my partner on this
committee, the gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Skelton. I was re-
flecting on something that Rob Simmons, one of our great Vietnam
veterans, a member of the committee, made the other day when he
talked about a term that was used in Vietnam, and that is the
term "wasted." Some people use that to describe how if a G.I. was
killed, he was wasted. And the theme that was often put out in this
country was that somehow the Americans who fought in Vietnam
weren't fighting for something of value.
Any time you look at what this regime did, you understand,
whether you are looking at the Kurdish mothers killed by poison
gas, where they ran, literally in place, holding their babies to their
breasts, how they were killed, by the thousands, incidentally; you
look at the mass graves; you look at the executions on television
with the graphic descriptions of the Iraqi officer of Saddam Hus-
sein's people putting a bullet through each person's head who hap-
pen to have a little movement left in them after they faced the fir-
ing squad; we realize that what we did in deposing that regime was
something of value.
And I think it is important to remember, as we talk about re-
building Iraq, that every time we turn on electricity, we turn on
a water supply, we stand up a school, we stand up a hospital, we
are only able to do that because of what people in uniform did.
That is the product of our service people. And the two are not unre-
lated; they are very much related.
And so, Mr. Secretary and Ambassador Bremer, General Abizaid,
as you tell us about the state of play in Iraq, I hope that you will
mention the status in these important areas of standing this coun-
try up again, both in terms of government and in getting the
wheels of commerce moving, because that is the product that Amer-
ican soldiers bought with this enormous effort to take Iraq.
So, once again, thank you for being with us.
And at this time, let me recognize my colleague, the gentleman
from Missouri, Mr. Skelton.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hunter can be found in the Ap-
pendix on page 211.1
140
STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM MISSOURI, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON
ARMED SERVICES
Mr. Skelton. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. I join you in
welcoming Secretary Wolfowitz, Ambassador Bremer, General
Abizaid, and thank them for testifying today.
It is also good to see General Jack Keane with us again.
Just a few days ago, seven of us from this committee returned
from a most enlightening trip to Iraq. This nation's mission in Iraq
is one of the most important international efforts we have ever un-
dertaken.
If our mission is successful there, we will bring self-govern-
ment— a responsible self-government to a fractured nation, encour-
age stability throughout the region and prevent terrorists from tak-
ing advantage of the current instability.
Our American forces, along with a few allies, especially British,
were magnificent on the battlefield, demonstrating the joint vision
that those of us who worked on the Goldwater-Nichols legislation
knew was possible.
Our forces in combat reflected the superiority of the education
and training they received from basic training to the war colleges.
But it is the conflict's aftermath that has given us a challenge
of monumental proportion. On September the 4th, 2002, and March
18th of this year, I wrote the president and various secretaries in-
volved in national security issues warning of the dangers in plan-
ning for the aftermath.
I ask unanimous consent, Mr. Chairman, that both the letters be
placed in the record at this time.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix begin-
ning on page 270.]
The Chairman. Without objection.
Mr. Skelton. To quote Sun Tzu: "To win victory is easy, to pre-
serve its fruits difficult." In order to preserve our victory I pointed
out the importance of managing Iraq's transition to a post-Saddam
regime. My advice went unheeded. Little attention was paid to the
post-war Iraq.
To say that the assumption, made by many in the administra-
tion, that the Iraqis would welcome us with open arms was incor-
rect is an understatement. It was a downright blunder. Worse yet,
it is a blunder that could have been avoided by taking into consid-
eration the ethnic and tribal strains that existed, particularly the
Baathist Party's persistence.
It breaks my heart to see troops wounded and killed due to the
lack of foresight in the post- victory planning.
I need not recount the short tour of duty of retired General —
Lieutenant General Jay Garner; all the problems that resulted
under Ambassador Paul Bremer. But I can tell you this: America
needs to win this effort. Failure is not an option.
That is why I support the administration's request for funds for
Iraq, as well as for Afghanistan. Congress must hold the adminis-
tration accountable for every penny, but we must provide it. Just
like the idea that second place doesn't count on the battlefield,
there is no other choice but to finish the job and to finish it fully.
141
On September the 14th, 2003, our delegation flew from Baghdad
back to Kuwait. We had the honor of escorting a body of an Amer-
ican soldier. This fine soldier who was killed in a guerrilla attack
in the valley of death in Baghdad was performing his daily duty
with honor and integrity, ingenuity and dedication of which we can
all be proud.
That American soldier and all his brothers in arms in this con-
flict put me in mind of Alfred Lord Tennyson's poem, "The Charge
of the Light Brigade." His second stanza is as follows:
"Forward the Light Brigade.
Was there a man dismayed?
Not though the soldier knew,
Someone had blundered.
Not theirs to make reply.
Theirs not to reason why.
Theirs but to do and die.
Into the valley of death rode the 600."
This poem says more eloquently than I that the cost of poor plan-
ning isn't just in dollars, it is the lives of our best men and women.
It is because of these soldiers that we must win the peace in Iraq.
We have no other choice. There are other reasons, too: for the
good of the Iraqi people; for the safety of the American people; and
for the credibility and leadership of this nation. It is also as simple
as saying that we owe it to these soldiers who have chosen to do
and die.
So, Mr. Chairman, we have no choice. We are there. We are in
Iraq. We can't unring that bell. We must be successful and, in my
opinion, this effort can be won, but it can be lost. It is like a teeter-
totter; it can go either way. To lose this historic mission would be
to let down those amazing American troops who serve, and those
who have died in this cause.
So let us go forward with commitment and with accountability,
with better planning to honor our soldiers, bring this mission to its
victorious conclusion.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Skelton can be found in the Ap-
pendix on page 216.1
The Chairman. I thank the very distinguished gentleman from
Missouri.
Secretary Wolfowitz, thank you for being with us, sir. The floor
is yours.
STATEMENT OF HON. PAUL D. WOLFOWITZ, DEPUTY
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate
the opportunity to appear before this committee, and on such an
important subject.
I have with me some pretty remarkable Americans, two real he-
roes on my right. Ambassador L. Paul Bremer and General John
Abizaid, who can give you the word direct from Baghdad, and I
know that is what you want to hear, and you want to ask your
questions, so I would like to keep my comments relatively brief
here. I have a longer statement I would like to submit for the
record.
142
And General Jack Keane, who-
The Chairman. Without objection. In fact, all statement will be
taken into the record without objection.
Secretary WOLFOWITZ. General Jack Keane is another American
hero who, unfortunately, is nearing the end of an incredible career
in the U.S. Army and is here to help answer what I know are going
to be questions from this committee about the demands being
placed on both our Active Duty and Reserve Component and Na-
tional Guard forces.
I would just like to make two specific comments and one general
one as we open this. First of all, on a piece of bad news, I would
like to express my own personal sorrow at the death of Aquila
Hashimi, the member of the Iraqi Governing Council who was —
who died of wounds suffered a few days ago in an assassination at-
tempt.
I had the privilege of meeting her back in July. It was a remark-
able experience to talk to this woman who has spent years in no
less a position than deputy to Tariq Aziz, who expressed with enor-
mous sincerity and conviction her belief in the future of a free and
democratic Iraq.
It is a cause for which she has now given her life, and it is a
noble cause.
On a piece of happier news, I would like to just share with you,
as an example of the kind of thing that we see frequently, almost
every day, a dispatch that came in from one of Ambassador
Bremer's representatives in the province of Salahuddin, reporting
on the elections of the new governing council for that province.
That name may not mean much even to people in this room, but
if I point out that the capital of Salahuddin is Tikrit, then I think
you will understand why this dispatch was titled "A Ray of Democ-
racy in Iraq's Heart of Darkness," in Saddam Hussein's own home-
town.
"The process for selecting Salahuddin's interim governing council
has ended, by and large successfully," this report says. The provin-
cial judge, accompanied by an American officer, instructed the dele-
gates in the voting process, which was by secret, individual ballot.
While far short of Athenian democracy, the selection process in
Salahuddin is a firm but small step on the path to participatory
government, something inconceivable in Saddam's hometown just a
few months ago.
"While it remains to be seen," this report goes on, "how effective
this diverse group can be in tackling the daiuiting challenges facing
Salahuddin, for the moment the predominant feeling among the
members is one of confident optimism and appreciation for what
the coalition has made possible."
Mr. Chairman and members of this committee, including, I know,
a great many of you who have taken the trouble to travel to Iraq,
along with the bad news, there is a great deal of good news, and
this is one example.
If you would permit me just to make a general point, it seems
clear to me that some people just don't get it. They just don't un-
derstand the lessons of September 11th.
September 11th should have changed the whole way we look at
the world, and in particular the way we look at terrorism in the
143
world. September 11th was a wake-up call. It wasn't just a wake-
up call that Al Qaida was after us. The war on terrorism is more
than just the war on Al Qaida, although that is obviously a very
important part of that war.
But we shouldn't kid ourselves that if we could only catch Osama
bin Laden and the top leadership of Al Qaida, that we could go
back to sleep the way we have for the last 20 years, treating terror-
ism as an evil, but a manageable evil, and continuing to live with
a status quo in the Middle East that has been breeding terrorists
by the thousands.
That is why the president has said over and over and over again
that the war on terrorism will be a long and difficult one. It re-
quires eliminating global terrorist networks and getting govern-
ments out of the business of sponsoring terrorism.
But it also involves what the president referred to in his State
of the Union message last year as building a just and peaceful
world beyond the war on terror, particularly by supporting mod-
erate forces in the Muslim world.
September 11th should have brought a recognition that the old
way of dealing with terrorism, that you deal with terrorism after
the fact by catching the perpetrators, proving their guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt, and if they are individuals, putting them in jail,
and if they are countries, bombing them, as we did occasionally
after the attack on the American discotheque in Berlin or the at-
tack on our embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam — in other
words, that terrorism is an evil, but a manageable evil, one that
we can deal with by the weak deterrence of legal punishment and
occasional retaliation. But we cannot.
September 11th demonstrated, first of all, that we are dealing
with people that can't be deterred. But also, it should have been
a lesson that we are not dealing with just one individual group of
terrorists, that these terrorists work together, that they get support
from states. That state sponsorship of terrorism is simply no longer
tolerable. We have got to eradicate those international terrorist
networks and end state sponsorship of terrorism.
Afghanistan was a very important place to start and Iraq was an
important place to continue.
But the other thing we need to recognize is that dealing with ter-
rorism is more than just killing and capturing terrorists. It also
means winning the battle of ideas, demonstrating to the Muslim
world, and particularly to the Arab world, that progress along the
lines that has been so successful in this country and in Europe and
increasingly in East Asia can also bring success for them.
And the terrorists understand that. That is why they write, as
they did recently on an Al Qaida Web site, that defeating democ-
racy in Iraq is for them the most important battlefield in their
campaign to impose their twisted way of thinking on the world and
on other Muslims.
Why? Because, they write, if democracy succeeds in Iraq, it could
teach Arabs that a good life is possible on this Earth. And they
could come to love life too much and fear death and be unwilling
to become martyrs.
What twisted logic. What sick minds. That tells you the kind of
people we are dealing with, but it also tells you that success in the
144
battle for democracy in Iraq will be a major victory in the war on
terrorism.
The brave young Americans who liberated Iraq from the clutches
of one of the bloodiest and most sadistic tyrants in modern history
have brought us to the possibility of a major victory in the war on
terrorism.
Completing that victory requires not just winning the war in
Iraq, but winning the peace, as well. That is the best way we can
honor the memory of the heroes who have sacrificed to bring us
and the Iraqi people to this point.
We are here today, Mr. Chairman, members of this committee,
to ask the Congress, as you have done so often before, to give us
the tools so we can finish the job.
Thank you.
I would like to ask Ambassador Bremer to
[The prepared statement of Secretary Wolfowitz can be found in
the Appendix on page 221.1
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
Ambassador, welcome.
STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR L. PAUL BREMER, III,
ADMINISTRATOR, COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY
Ambassador BREMER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you
for your visit to Iraq and the visit of so many of your colleagues.
I look forward to welcoming any and all of you, because I think it
is a wonderful experience for people to see what is really going on
on the ground.
I welcome this opportunity to appear in support of the president's
budget. I want to, before I begin, pay tribute to the magnificent
men and women of our armed forces who had the superb victory
in Operation Iraqi Freedom.
And if I may take a personal note here, Mr. Chairman, it is a
particular pleasure for me to welcome my nephew. Captain Max
Bremer, here, who served in both the Afghan and Iraqi campaigns.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
[Applause.]
Ambassador Bremer. Mr. Chairman
The Chairman. Take the next 15 minutes off and then back to
work. [Laughter.]
Ambassador Bremer. No, I don't give him permission, Mr. Chair-
man. He is going to have to sit through this.
I know how awful it is for all of you to wake up and hear another
American serviceman has been killed overnight in Iraq. I learn
about those deaths before you do, just because of the time change,
and I can tell you nobody regrets them more than I do.
But these are not the senseless deaths that sometimes they are
described as in the American press. They are part of the price we
pay for the fight for civilization, the fight against terrorism, the
fight against genocide and weapons of mass destruction.
These people who ambush the coalition forces and who assas-
sinated Aquila Hashimi last week are trying to thwart constitu-
tional and democratic government, as the quote that Secretary
Wolfowitz just read from Al Qaida makes clear.
145
Mr. Chairman, they may win some battles, but they are fighting
a losing fight against history. History is not on their side.
President Bush has a vision that provides for an Iraq made se-
cure by the efforts of Iraq, an Iraqi economy based on sound eco-
nomic principles, bolstered by a substantial infrastructure and, fi-
nally, a plan that provides for a democratic and sovereign Iraq at
the earliest possible time.
If we fail to recreate Iraq as a sovereign democracy sustained by
a solid economy, we will have handed the terrorists a precious gift.
We must deny terrorists the gift of state sponsorship, which they
enjoyed under Saddam, and must deny them the chaos, such as
they survived on and thrived on in Lebanon in the 1980s.
That is why the president's request has to be seen as an impor-
tant element in the Global War On Terrorism.
Our national experience, Mr. Chairman, teaches us how to con-
solidate a military victory. We had to learn the lesson the hard
way. After the First World War, many here had opposed that war
and wanted to solve the problems at home. We won the war and
we did not consolidate the peace.
We all know what happened: Extremism, bred in a swamp of de-
spair, bankruptcy and unpayable debts, gave the world fascism in
Italy and Nazism in Germany, and another world war.
After that conflict, America showed that it had learned that mili-
tary victory must be followed by a program to secure the peace. In
1948, America's greatest generation, having won the war, re-
sponded with the boldest, most generous and most productive act
of statesmanship of the past century: the Marshall Plan.
The Marshall Plan was enacted with overwhelming bipartisan
support in both houses here. It set war-torn Europe on the path to
freedom and prosperity, which the Europeans enjoy today.
After 1,000 years as the cockpit of war, Europe became the cra-
dle of peace in two short generations. The president has a similar
vision for the role of securing the peace in Iraq.
Let me make a few points about the supplemental.
First, we have a definite plan, and we have milestones and dates
which we are executing and which you, Mr. Chairman and other
members of the committee, have been briefed on in detail during
your visits to Baghdad.
Second, no one part of this supplemental is more important than
another part. It is an integrated request for $87 billion.
Third, this is urgent. It is obvious how the urgency affects mili-
tary operations, but it is also equally obvious to me that it is ur-
gent for the non-military part.
Most Iraqis welcomed us as liberators. A Gallup poll, which you
may have read about in the paper yesterday, shows that almost
two-thirds of Iraqis continue to believe that getting rid of Saddam
Hussein was worth the war and the hardships that have come after
that.
But just the same, the reality of having foreign troops on the
streets is beginning to chafe. And the population's view of us is di-
rectly linked to their cooperation in hunting down those who attack
us. Early progress on reconstructing Iraq will give us an edge
against the terrorists and save American lives.
146
Finally, this money will be spent with prudent transparency.
Every contract of the $20 billion will be subject to open competitive
bidding.
The president's priority in this supplemental — first priority is se-
curity: first, to create a police force that can police the country; sec-
ond, to create a national defense system based on a new Iraqi army
and a civil defense corps; and third, to put behind that an effective
justice system, which is fair, objective, by building courts and pris-
ons.
This security assistance helps America in four specific ways.
First, Iraqis will be more effective than we are at gathering intel-
ligence about the enemy. No matter how talented and courageous
the coalition forces are, they can never replace an Iraqi policeman
who knows his beat, knows his people, the language, the customs
and the rhythms of the people. Iraqis want Iraqis to provide their
security and so do we. That is why almost five billion dollars is in
this supplemental for that goal.
Second, as these Iraqi security forces assume their duties, they
replace coalition troops in the roles that often generate frustration,
friction and resentment: conducting searches; manning checkpoints;
and guarding installations.
Third, Mr. Chairman, this frees up coalition forces for the more
mobile, sophisticated operations which they are so well-equipped to
undertake.
And finally, of course, these new Iraqi forces will reduce the over-
all security demands on the coalition, and thereby speed up the day
when we can bring our men and women in the armed forces home.
Of course, security is not enough, and the second thrust of this
supplemental is the economy. A good security system cannot per-
sist on the knife edge of economic collapse.
Saddam, when he scurried away in April, left behind an economy
ruined not by our attacks, but by decades of neglect, theft and mis-
management. In the entire time he was in office, Mr. Chairman,
35 years, he never prepared a national budget.
The Iraqis must now refashion their economy from the Soviet-
style command economy Saddam left them. That poor model was
further hobbled by cronyism, theft and pharaonic self-indulgence by
Saddam and his intimates.
In this reform of the economy, important changes have begun.
You may have read that the Iraqi minister of finance in Dubai this
weekend announced a sweeping foreign direct investment law, the
independence of the central bank and a very simple one-fee tariff
policy.
The Iraqi government has thereby put in place the legal infra-
structure for a vibrant private economy, but those policies will
come to nothing if they don't rest on a sound infrastructure. That
is why the remaining $15 billion of this supplemental is focused on
putting back into place the necessary infrastructure.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, there has been good news on the front of
moving towards a democracy. We have laid out a clear seven-step
process. Three of the seven steps have been taken.
As Secretary Wolfowitz implied, over 85 percent of the towns in
Iraq now have town councils or city councils — 85 percent. Democ-
147
racy is on the march in Iraq, and it is on the march from the bot-
tom up, and it is on the march from the top.
The only path to full Iraqi sovereignty at the end of the seven
steps we have laid out is through a written constitution, ratified by
the Iraqi people, followed by elections. At that point, the Coalition
Provisional Authority will hand sovereignty back to the Iraqi peo-
ple.
Mr. Chairman, you can see, if you examine this supplemental,
that it fits together with those priorities.
And make no mistake: These requested funds represent an in-
vestment in America's national security. Iraq may seem far away
today, but it only seems far away today. Iraq is a focal point in our
Global War On Terrorism, and failure there would strengthen the
terrorists morally and materially.
As Congressman Skelton said, failure is not an option.
This supplemental and the policies to carry it out will require the
combined support of the American people and of both parties here
in Congress.
Mr. Chairman, I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Bremer can be found in
the Appendix on page 232.]
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador,
General Abizaid.
STATEMENT OF GEN. JOHN P. ABIZAID, USA COMMANDER,
UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND
General Abizaid. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, Congressman Skelton, members of the committee,
it is an honor to be here, and thank you for the opportunity to tes-
tify.
First of all, as you know, the Central Command is really at the
heart of the Global War On Terrorism. We have over 200,000
troops that are deployed throughout our area of operations. They
serve in the east as far as Kyrgyzstan and in the west as far as
the Horn of Africa. Foremost among our jobs is prosecuting the
Global War On Terror. We do that in numerous ways and numer-
ous countries, and we are having good effect. But there is a lot left
to do.
Included in our operations is a requirement to bring stability to
Afghanistan and also to Iraq. And, of course, Iraq is the reason
that we are here today primarily to talk about. And the mission
there is tough and the mission there is essential to the success on
the Global War On Terror.
Our troops are tough, they are dedicated, they are confident and
they very much appreciate your support in every way. A lot of peo-
ple have talked about the greatest generation, that generation
being that of my father, that fought World War II. And I do, in
fact, believe that that is the greatest generation.
But as we look at our young soldiers, sailors, airmen and Ma-
rines serving in these tough places in Afghanistan, in Yemen, in
places like Iraq and Baghdad, in the north and south, I would say
they are our next greatest generation. They deserve our confidence.
They deserve our support. They know they are winning and they
148
know that they are making a great deal of good happen in Iraq and
they are giving Iraq a chance for a better future.
Mr. Chairman, this supplemental is about giving our troops, the
great people in the Coalition Provisional Authority and Iraqis the
opportunity for success, and we appreciate your support.
I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Abizaid can be found in the
Appendix on page 251.]
The Chairman. I thank you, General.
And I understand. General Keane, that you are available to an-
swer any questions that we might have in your area.
General Keane. I am.
The Chairman. Mr. Langevin, in the last couple of hearings, you
have been close to getting a question in, but we ran out of time,
so let me start off by yielding my time to Mr. Langevin.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank you for being here, gentlemen. Like many of my
colleagues, we are following this situation in Iraq very closely and
we are all very concerned as to what we are seeing. I have heard
your testimony.
But let me just say that I am proud of the many troops that are
serving in Iraq and Afghanistan from my own district, and recog-
nize that most members of the Reserve Component are proud to
serve when called upon, despite the sacrifices that they and their
families certainly make.
A significant number of my constituents have been calling, send-
ing letters with reference to the frequency of Reserve action. Now,
if the U.S. can't persuade the international community to send ad-
ditional forces, what effects is that going to have on our troop rota-
tion schedule and especially with regard to the Guard and Reserve?
General Keane. Congressman, I can answer that question.
The fact of the matter is, it would have some impact on the Re-
serve Components. We have options currently that we are looking
at right now and that we will recommend to the Secretary of De-
fense for his consideration. If the multinational division support
that we are expecting to get, want to get, does not materialize,
what that would mean is that we will deploy more Reserve Compo-
nent brigades to that theater and also, we will deploy Active Com-
ponent forces with them, as well.
Mr. Langevin. Okay, thank you.
Right now, we are also seeing an escalation in attacks against
not only U.S. forces, but also now U.N. components and the latest,
today, was the attack on a news network headquarters.
Do you feel that this is a coordinated effort by former Saddam
loyalists, or is this a broader attack on anything or anyone that is
supporting the United States or Western entities in Iraq?
General Abizaid. Thank you, Congressman. There is no doubt
that there is a level of organization at the regional level, in particu-
lar in the region of Tikrit/Baghdad/Ar Ramadi, that has been to
some extent coordinated by former regime loyalists, former Saddam
intelligence officers, special security officers, soldiers from the Re-
publican Guard, officers from the Special Republican Guard, et
cetera.
149
There is also a clear indication that terrorist groups, such as
Ansar al-Islam, have moved down into the Baghdad area and are
operating in other places throughout Iraq. And we have foreign
fighters that infiltrate in from primarily the Syrian border area
that add to an extremist, anti-American group or series of groups
that have taken up arms against the coalition. And again, this area
is primarily in the Ar Ramadi/Fallujah area.
All that having been said, I would not characterize the level of
attacks as escalating. As a matter of fact, as I look over how things
have gone, where they have gone well, where they continue to show
a lot of resistance, we are seeing a geographic clarity develop,
where certain areas are more difficult for us than others.
This is good news, because it means in much of the country we
are gaining the upper hand. And as you know, in the south and
in the north in particular, things are stable.
So we should not underestimate the fact that we are facing re-
sistance. We should not discount the fact that it is to a certain ex-
tent organized. And we must continue to conduct operations that
defeat the resistance where we find it.
But as you also know, Congressman, there is no strictly military
solution to the problem in Iraq or to the resistance in Iraq. It re-
quires movement not only on the military arena, but also with re-
gard to governance, economics, diplomacy and politics.
Mr. Langevin. Can you tell me, with respect to these attacks,
what additional steps you are taking to improve the security situa-
tion, particularly in regard to the U.S. military personnel conduct-
ing security operations?
The Chairman. And I remind my colleague that our time is al-
most expired here. We have got a lot of folks that need questions.
So if we can abbreviate the answer, gentlemen, we would appre-
ciate it. And I thank the gentleman.
General Abizajd. Most recently, we have moved out the 3rd In-
fantry Division from their area of operation and moved in the 82nd
Airborne Division. We have conducted a new series of offensives in
areas that we are having difficulty, Ar Ramadi, Fallujah, and it is
beginning to show some effect even at this early stage. And we
have moved more troops out to the border area.
But most importantly, we have increased the capacity of Iraqis
to serve in the police, in the civil defense corps, in other arms of
Iraqi security capacity.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, General.
Thank you gentlemen.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Skelton?
Mr. Skelton. Mr. Chairman, I have, in light of the time con-
straints that we have, only one question.
Mr. Secretary, when we were visiting with Ambassador Bremer
in Iraq a few days ago, he thought our mission could be completed
in four to five years.
In talking with one of the generals there, he thought our mission
could be completed in two years. And I understand there was a re-
cent meeting within the administration that a decision is being
made to withdraw our forces in late spring of next year.
Which of the three is correct, sir?
150
Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Congressman Skelton, I think we ought to
be cautious about making any such predictions. I recall when we
went into Bosnia — and it is something I supported, I would point
out — some people said we would be out in a year. We are hoping
there might be a chance eight years later of being close to being
out.
I think the important message — and it is fundamental — the Iraqi
people need to understand that we will be there until the job is
done. There is an extraordinary suspicion that borders on paranoia,
burned into their minds by, in many cases, the experiences of 1991,
that we will somehow leave before the job is finished and Saddam
and his henchmen will come back. And that very fear inhibits our
operations today. People who want to come forward with informa-
tion are sometimes afraid to do so. Indeed they are sometimes mur-
dered for doing so.
So I think predictions in this area are extremely hazardous. I
think the important point — the message has to get out that we are
there to finish the job. The sooner the Baathists and the terrorists
understand we are there to finish the job, the sooner the Iraqi peo-
ple understand that we will finish the job, the sooner the job can
get done.
Mr. Skelton. So we are committed to staying there until the
mission is complete, is that correct?
Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Yes, we are.
And I would point out that a very important part of that is put-
ting Iraqis in a position to be on the front lines. Unfortunately, as
we saw with Aquila Hashimi, being on the front lines can mean
being killed. And some 58 or so Iraqis have been killed on our
side — fighting on our side in the police and other security forces,
just since June 1st.
I would like to just make a comment about this lack of planning,
because I think it is an extremely serious issue. And I think people
should be extremely careful about suggesting that somehow young
Americans are d3dng because of a failure of planning.
There has been an enormous amount of planning. Some of it,
frankly, has bordered on the brilliant, and I am not claiming any
personal credit; it is done by other people. We have avoided any
number of catastrophes that were predicted that would happen in
this war, including massive street fighting in the city streets of
Baghdad and elsewhere; including environmental disasters that
would have not only poisoned the environment, but poisoned our
troops; including ethnic conflict between Turks and Arabs that was
predicted in the north or fighting among Shi'a in the south.
There has been a lot that has been avoided. A lot of it has been
avoided by careful planning and it includes planning for the so-
called postwar environment. I say "so-called" because we are not
postwar; we are stilling fighting a low-level war and that is what
is most painful here.
But to have gone from zero Iraqis on our side when Baghdad fell,
to 60,000 in the field today— 40,000 or so in the police and 20,000
in the civil defense corps and border forces and facilities protection
services — is not something that happened just magically. It hap-
pened as a result of planning.
151
And planning includes, I think, the very careful thought that
went into the structure that is represented by the two extraor-
dinary leaders next to me, so that we have, I believe, for the first
time an operation of this kind, the civilian side and the military
side, knitted together tightly and coordinated and able to move in
response to inevitably changing conditions on the ground.
So I would rather not have to say the planning was wonderful,
but I think when I hear people say so glibly that it was wrong, I
think it is wrong.
I know Congressman Skelton, you made some extremely helpful
suggestions before the war and we have tried to follow up on many
of them. And I certainly agree on the importance of winning the
peace. That is what we are about. But a lot of thought and plan-
ning has gone into it.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Weldon?
Mr. Weldon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you all for coming in today and, most importantly, for
your service to the country.
I was heartened today by the results of the recent poll that came
out by Gallup which basically showed that in perhaps the most in-
tense private interviews ever conducted in Iraq, 62 percent of the
residents believe the ousting of Saddam justified any hardships
that might have been personally incurred by them. And 67 percent
believe their country will be far improved in five years. That is
good news, and news that we can all take to heart.
In terms of the cost, I think it is also important for us on this
committee to reflect upon where we are. And I want to start out
by giving the administration credit for being candid. They haven't
hedged their bets. They have come out with what they think they
need in terms of dollars.
I would just remind my colleagues on this committee who sat
through the 1990s what happened time and time again, as we were
asked to respond financially to 38 separate deployments of our
troops — and that is how many there were, 38. None of them, I
might add, were paid for in advance, except for Desert Storm when
the president got a commitment from our allies to reimburse us
$52 billion.
How do we pay, then, for these deplo3rments in Bosnia, in
Kosovo, in Somalia, in East Timor, in Macedonia, in Colombia? I
will tell you how we paid. We paid for it by forcing the Pentagon
to eat into their decreasing budget to shore up the costs that were
necessary.
I chaired the Research and Development (R&D) Committee for
six years. And each year, I had to incur a 25 percent across-the-
board reduction in R&D spending to tax those R&D accounts to pay
for the costs of deployments.
Now, if we had been honest with the American people, we would
have told them how much these deployments were going to cost.
But instead of doing that, the administration simply passed on
those costs to the Pentagon and said, "Eat them. Find a way to pay
for them."
152
What did we do? We postponed modernization of our equipment.
We postponed R&D investment. We postponed the investment that
today we are trying to pick up the costs for.
So when our colleagues look at the cost — yes, $87 billion is a lot
of money — and I want to ask the tough questions, as well. In fact,
I have a couple of tough comments I am going to make in a mo-
ment.
But let's be realistic. In the 1990s, starting with former Presi-
dent Bush and continuing through 2000, we largely ate the cost of
the 38 deployments by forcing the Pentagon to eat into their budg-
ets, push aside programs of the future and use that money to pay
for all the deplo5rments, including reimbursing countries for putting
their troops in theaters where they would not come in and pay for
the costs on their own. And that is all verifiable in the record.
Now the one area where I do have some concern — and Secretary
Wolfowitz, I want to address this to you — is back in March, I felt
we were not doing enough to lay the groundwork for the private
energy sector worldwide to come in, using our own resources to
build Iraq's energy industry.
And, in fact, in March of this year, the former Secretary of Com-
merce and I addressed the World Oil and Gas Forum in Houston,
and we challenged the chief executive officers (CEO) of 30 of the
largest energy corporations in the world to put together an inter-
national advisory forum to be ready to assist us in the rebuilding
of Iraq after the war was over.
That group has, in fact, made suggestions. In July of this year,
in fact, on July 24th, we had an all-day conference on the Hill. The
vice president assisted us in getting some speakers. Chalabi came
over from Iraq. We had John Hamre speak; he had just returned
as Secretary of Defense's representative to meet with Ambassador
Bremer.
He spoke; the head of the Army Corps of Engineers spoke; and
the 30 or so CEOs of companies like Kuwaiti Oil, Aramco, Tata In-
dustries from India, the Singapore energy industry, the Russian oil
company LukOil, the Russian pipeline company, they were all
there.
And their common theme was, "We are ready to invest our own
money. We have been in Iraq before the war. We know the people
there."
And, in fact, I introduced General Franks that day to both Dun-
can Hunter and to the CEO of Russian pipeline company, who said,
"We are willing to spend our own money. We don't want U.S.
money. And we will follow the guidelines that the U.S. lays out for
us. We know the pipeline industry in Iraq. We helped build it. We
will come in with our own money and help you rebuild it, as long
as we can have a stake in the outcome of whatever develops there."
The CEO of LUKoil, Alekperov, said the same thing — Chairman
Alekperov.
My concern is that we haven't done enough to enlist the private
sector energy leaders worldwide to come in to use their own money,
especially when they have been involved in Iraq in the past, under
our guidance, under the leadership of Ambassador Bremer, to help
us rebuild the energy infrastructure of Iraq.
153
And that is the area where I think we should be focusing our ef-
fort. These CEOs are ready to respond. In fact, they have formed
an international energy advisory council. They are not looking for
any money in providing consulting. They are willing to do it on a
gratis basis.
And so, my only suggestion as we approach the support of these
financial dollars which you have requested — which I, in fact, will
support — is to quickly supplement the effort you have put forward,
and to hopefully allow you, Ambassador Bremer and Secretary
Wolfowitz, to create a more aggressive relationship between these
energy leaders that are willing to spend their own money and have
been, in fact, involved in the past in helping to rebuild as quickly
as possible, specifically the energy infrastructure in Iraq.
Thank you.
Ambassador Bremer. Thank you, Congressman, for that.
I would only make two points. I welcome it, and I would suggest
that they plan to attend the private sector conference which we are
going to hold parallel to the donors' conference in Madrid at the
end of October, where we are going to try to encourage private sec-
tor engagement across the board in the major areas of Iraqi econ-
omy.
The one proviso is, of course, at least for now there is no foreign
investment allowed in the Iraqi oil sector. That may change; I am
encouraging the Iraqi government to change that policy, but there
still will be ways in which people can participate, and the con-
ference in Madrid would be a very good place to start.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
The gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Spratt?
Mr. Spratt. General Abizaid, General Keane, to a person our
congressional delegation (CODED came back last week saying, I
believe in unison, "Thank God for our troops," and in particular for
the Army.
They had to fill a gap, they had to fill a vacuum in the aftermath
of the war. They had to react ad hoc to tasks that they are not
trained to handle, they had to improvise, and they rose to the chal-
lenge in a splendid way.
And it is to your credit and to their credit that that performance
is there, and the situation could be a lot, lot worse were it not for
their performance.
Mr. Wolfowitz, we have discussed before the cost of these endeav-
ors. And I am not a bean counter, I am not here to do that with
you. I am the ranking Democrat on the Budget Committee, and the
numbers we are talking about, $83 billion, $87 billion, are con-
sequential. They have consequences, they have trade-offs entailed
by them. And they raise the question, should we try to offset this
package in the broader budget somehow so that it doesn't have the
impact on the bottom line? Because this request couldn't come at
a worse time with regard to the budget, which is bordering on $500
billion in deficit next year already.
I am not sajdng that is a consideration here. We have got to do
whatever it takes to complete this mission successfully and to sup-
port our troops, but in a broader sense we have to be conscious of
these budgetary implications.
154
I have written Mr. Bolton at the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB)— Mr. Skelton and I did, at the end of July— and
asked for an accounting of the $80 billion that was appropriated in
the April supplemental. We would like to get an accounting of that,
a justification on the major cost element basis of this request. And
we would like to have a fair estimate of the cost to complete.
I don't think that is asking too much. We would like very much
the opportunity to sit down with Mr. Zakheim in the near future,
soon, so we can get our hands around these essential elements.
Let me show you one thing that concerns us. I am going to give
you this pack with this information in it.
In the absence of getting the information from you, we did our
own study, three different scenarios, best case, mid-case, worst
case, of what it might cost, run out over ten years because that is
how far we extend the budget, adding interest because we are as-
suming it will be charged up to the deficit, go to the national debt,
it won't be paid for now, offset, although I think it should be.
And the numbers are pretty astounding when you do that with
modest assumptions.
For example, case A, we are assuming that we will be out in
2006. Our forces will gradually decline to two division equivalents
and we will get out. We will spend about $5 billion more than the
$23 billion we have spent, $20 billion plus $3 billion in the last
package for economic assistance.
In the next package, the next scenario, we assume that we won't
get out completely until 2008 and we will spend a bit more, $20
billion, assuming if we are there that long, there are problems, we
would probably have to spend more to get the economy up on its
feet and running.
This may be wide of the mark in your estimation, but we would
very much appreciate your response to what we have done as to
whether or not it is accurate, and, if you will, your take: three
cases, best case, worst case, mid case, and what the cost is likely
to be and what the impact on the budget is likely to be. Can we
have that commitment?
Secretary WOLFOWITZ. We will certainly work with you and an-
swer your first question to show you where the money has gone
from the supplementals that have been passed already.
When it comes to making projections, I mean, I look at how you
made yours. Frankly we find it hard to foresee the future much be-
yond 6 months to 12 months. We do think that we know what we
need for this coming fiscal year. Even there, it is based on assump-
tions. And when you start to go out to 2008, the range of assump-
tions, as you know, is very, very broad.
But we are happy to work with you to try to get better numbers.
Mr. Spratt. Can I offer one thing here to show that we are try-
ing to be scrupulously fair, and it might help you, too, in the pres-
entation of your own argument?
Although $87 billion is the number commonly used, when you
back out what goes to Afghanistan, which we would be spending
in all cases and wouldn't even be debating with this kind of delib-
eration, and when you also adjust for savings due to the fact that
we won't have Operation Northern Watch and Southern Watch and
we back out Pakistan aid, it is really about $71 billion for Iraq.
155
It is still enough for sticker shock for the average American and
for all of us, but nevertheless is not quite as big as $87 billion, and
some of the money would be spent anyway.
Can I ask one last question? Given what I just said about the
troops, what is in this package for the troops? This $87 billion, are
we going to be able to do something for rest and recuperation
(R&R), for mid-tour leave, separation pay, family separation pay,
imminent danger pay, something to help the Reservists?
Because they are all writing us, their families are, their employ-
ers are, and they have got an unexpected burden imposed upon
them. And I am afraid the Army may be paying something for-
ward, in terms of recruitment and retention down the road. What
are we going to do for the troops in this package, in terms of qual-
ity of life?
Secretary WOLFOWITZ. There is a lot in this package that ad-
dresses those issues specifically, imminent danger pay, family sepa-
ration allowances. Also, and I think you and Congressman Skelton
gave us a lot of homework to do in the letter you sent with 22 ques-
tions. We will work on them.
I appreciate the conversation we had the other day. I think we
need to look systematically at what we can do to make conditions
for the troops in the theater better. There is money to cover R&R.
That is a clearly recognized need.
General Abizaid might want to comment further. But I agree
with both of you that that is an important issue. We are asking an
enormous amount of these young men and women, to go over there
and serve for a year in conditions of danger. We should make the
conditions as tolerable as we can.
Mr. Spratt. General Abizaid, General Sanchez told us last week
that R&R was absolutely necessary.
General Abizaid. I agree with General Sanchez. And we have
conveyed that to the department. It is necessary.
We also have a Fighter Management Program, we call it. That
is a local program that allows troops to get out to places like Qatar
and other regional locations where they can relax and be away
from the tough conditions in Iraq. And as you know, I believe you
were up seeing northern Iraq. You have seen some of the work that
the general there has done on his own to make life better for his
troops up there.
So we favor the Fighter Management Program and we also favor
the R&R. It is very important for all of our troops.
Mr. Spratt. Is that in this package or is it provided for?
General Keane. I can comment on that, Mr. Congressman.
Yes, it is. It is $300 million in the package devoted to the R&R
program.
By the way, the first flight left Iraq today with 270 soldiers.
About 85 are heading toward Germany and the remainder are
heading toward Baltimore, Maryland. And we continue to increase
that throughput, up to about 600-plus per day.
To be frank about it, we will not be able to get the soldiers cur-
rently serving in Iraq — all of them to have an R&R program prior
to their departure. Most of whom will leave in the February-March
time frame. But we are striving to accomplish that goal for the
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next rotation that begins about that time frame, somewhere in
their year's experience to get them to an R&R site.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
So you are sending how many again, General?
General Keane. Right now, on the airplane, that is 270, and we
are going to increase that to about 600 is what our goal is. And we
will do that over the next 30 days or so.
The Chairman. Okay.
The gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Saxton?
Mr. Saxton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And first, let me express my personal appreciation for the great
leadership that you gentlemen are each showing in carrying out
the daily activities that you carry out.
There has been a lot said this morning about daily reminders
that we have that the war on terrorism is so serious. One set of
reminders come from very qualified people who write books for us.
And I just would like to frame a question for you, using some of
these writings.
One book that I recently received, entitled "A National Security
Strategy in an Age of Terrorists, Tjn^ants and Weapons of Mass De-
struction," written by a guy by the name of Larry Korb, points out,
in some detail, why we need a strategy in the war against terror-
ism.
Another book by a person who is really a household word here
with the committee, Ken Alibek, entitled "Biohazard," describes in
great detail the offensive biological weapons capability developed
by the Soviet Union during the Cold War, where they actually were
able to weaponize dozens of types of diseases, including plague, tu-
laremia, Marburg, smallpox, anthrax and others.
And the final thought in this book is that these weapons are no
longer just in the countries where they were developed. They have
been dispersed to various parts of the world.
And Kurt Weldon just showed me another book, which I haven't
had an opportunity to read yet, entitled "Black Ice," a description
of the potential threat in the area of cyberterrorism, which I look
forward to reading, Kurt.
And of course, all this is funded somehow. A book by Rachel
Ehrenfeld, entitled "Funding Evil," describes in some detail — actu-
ally in collaboration I guess with James Woolsey, who wrote the
foreword to this book — how terrorism is funded.
And finally, a book that I am just completing, "Terrorist Hunter,"
written by an anonymous Jewish woman who was born and spent
the first four or five years growing up in Iraq. And following the
1967 war, when the Iraqis became embarrassed because they didn't
do better in that war, they began to look for somebody to blame,
and they found some Jews living in Iraq, arrested her father, tor-
tured he and her mother, until her father just gave up and erro-
neously admitted that he was, even though he wasn't, a spy. And
then, of course, they hanged him.
And I guess I point out all of this because each of these writings
goes to demonstrate the seriousness of the situation in which we
now find ourselves involved.
And so my question, I guess, is posed by Larry Korb early in his
book. He says in his foreword, "The tragic events of September
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11th, the increase in terrorism and the possible threats from coun-
tries that are capable of developing weapons of mass destruction,
make it imperative to develop a new security strategy to safeguard
the citizens of the United States."
I guess my question is to give you an opportunity to talk about
our strategy and how Iraq fits into it in the war on terrorism. That
is really my question: What is our strategy, and how does the cur-
rent set of activities ongoing in Iraq fit into our new national strat-
egy?
Ambassador Bremer. I could go on at length, but I think it
might be better to hear from General Abizaid who is, in addition
to his many other credentials, by the way, a real Middle East ex-
pert. I met him when he was a colonel commanding an Airborne
battalion in Northern Iraq in 1991. And he was speaking Arabic
back then.
General Abizaid. Yes, sir.
Sir, as far as a strategic construct for getting at the broader ter-
rorist menace, it is absolutely essential that we further develop
international and interagency opportunities to get at the problem.
The points that you bring up about financing, about various sup-
port networks that are developing here and there, about the bor-
derless nature of the problem, clearly show that we have to have
not just a regional strategy but a global strategy to deal with it.
In the CENTCOM area of responsibility, we have three task
forces that are designed to deal with the problem in various loca-
tions.
Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF)-180 in Afghanistan operates
along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. And, as you know, that is
one of these ungoverned spaces to which the terrorists have mi-
grated and through which we have to continue to fight.
In Iraq, we know that we have had terrorists move into Iraq.
They were there before we got there. They are there now. And they
are absolutely dangerous to the mission, and we confront them
there with General Sanchez and CJTF-7.
In the Horn of Africa, we have another task force that is less
well known, but it is the Combined Joint Task Force for the Horn
of Africa. And they conduct operations; not so much direct oper-
ations, but operations to enhance the capacity of the local nations
to deal with what they perceive as a growing menace.
It is a tough issue. The strategy has got to be actually broader
than the Central Command area. And it requires our full attention
and constant reassessment.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Ortiz.
Mr. Ortiz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank the witnesses for being with us today.
And I have a question for General Abizaid. I understand that we
have several ammunition dumps or depots throughout Iraq so that
our troops can use the ammunition or weapons. Have we had any
reports of anybody breaking in and stealing ammunition or weap-
ons from those sites?
General Abizaid. Congressman, there is our ammunition, which
we have secure, and then there is about 650,000 tons of ammuni-
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tion, which is an astronomical amount of ammunition, that exists
throughout Iraq, all of which is not secure.
Mr. Ortiz. You say it is not secured?
General Abizaid. I would say certainly not all of it is secure, be-
cause some of it is in the hands of our enemies.
Mr. Ortiz. But if they are not secured, you don't think that they
will break in, you know, because we see all the time that they are
using rocket-propelled grenades and ammunition and different
kinds of weapon to harm our troops. You are not afraid that they
might break into these sites and steal these weapons or ammuni-
tion?
General Abizaid. Congressman, there is more ammunition in
Iraq that is available for people that would do us harm than we
can secure. We are doing our best to find every cache that we can.
In the 4th Infantry Division area alone. General Odierno has iden-
tified 3,000 caches. We blow it up. We move it. We get it under our
control, to the best of our ability.
But there is also a lot of ammunition that is out there that we
don't know its location, that people are using against us. And there
are probably places where we have put Iraqi guards that may be
vulnerable also to people that would come in, bribe the guards or
whatever.
So I would not want to mislead this committee to think that the
ammunition situation in Iraq is under control. There is more am-
munition per human being in Iraq than any nation on Earth. And
we will work very, very hard to get it under control, but it won't
come any time soon.
Mr. Ortiz. My second question is this now: As members of this
committee, we get, at least from my people back in the National
Guard and Reserves, about activation. Are you hearing anything
from your local leaders at the National Guard and Reserves about
the many activations of the National Guard and Reserves?
General Abizaid. Let me take the first part of it, and I am sure
General Keane would want to comment on it.
Certainly as I go around the theater and I talk to our National
Guardsmen and Reservists, they all understand that we can't get
the job done in Iraq without them. They are extremely dedicated
and they are just absolutely essential to the success of the mission.
One thing we must do, and we will work with the Army to do
this, is to ensure that they all know their go-home date. Our active
forces know their go-home date, but we have to work harder to
make sure that our Reservists clearly understand how long they
will serve, when they will come home, et cetera.
And I think you all know that where we find capacity that is
unneeded, we move very quickly to redeploy it. Unfortunately the
nature of the threat is such that we haven't been able to redeploy
much.
General Keane. Mr. Congressman, we have asked much of our
Reserve Components. Not only in the last 2 years, but in the last
12 years, we have had seven call-ups of our Reserve Components
in various operations, from Desert Storm to Haiti to Bosnia. You
are familiar with the list. And here we are facing another major
call-up.
159
But I think the morale of our Reserve Components could not be
higher, in my judgment. I have seen them at the ports where they
are leaving at airports, as well as in Iraq. And they understand
what this is really all about, as do all of our soldiers, sailors, air-
men and Marines. And the simple fact of the matter is, it is about
America.
In my lifetime, wearing this uniform for 37 years, we have never
ever deployed our soldiers directly for the American people except
post-9/11. That was the first time that I have been wearing a uni-
form we have ever done that. In the past it was always to help an-
other beleaguered nation.
This is all about our people. This is all about protecting our way
of life and what we stand for in this country. And our Reserve
Component, the great citizen soldiers that they are, truly under-
stand this. And they are committed to doing this.
And what we are trying to do is be as fair to them as we possibly
can by giving them predictability in terms of the length of their ro-
tation. And a year is a long time in Iraq, to be sure. But it is worth
it. It is worth it, given what we are up against and what our oppo-
nents are after.
They want to destroy the moral and political will of the American
people and force us to leave. Our soldiers know that and they are
putting their shoulder into this.
And I know you know that. And I just want you to know how
strongly we feel about their level of commitment and what they are
doing to support our national policies here. They are doing just a
remarkable job under very tough, demanding conditions.
Mr. Ortiz. My time is up. We thank all of you for your services
and your commitment.
And, General Keane, I know that you are going to be retiring
soon. We want to thank you for your services to this great country.
General Keane. Thank you. Congressman.
Mr. Ortiz. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman. And I thank him for all
of his time that he has spent with the troops. Probably nobody else
on this committee spent as much time as Mr. Ortiz, from all of the
Middle East operations to the Contra base camps in Central Amer-
ica. When the 82nd Airborne jumped in, you were down there with
them.
Solomon, I appreciated that. You didn't jump, but you were there
when they got there.
Another gentleman from Texas, Mr. Thornberry?
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ambassador Bremer, my district certainly has supported the
military efforts so far, but they are more skeptical about recon-
struction. Partly, they are skeptical about all foreign aid and how
helpful it really is. But first, I guess I would like for you to tell me
if you think my response, when this comes up — and it has come up
a lot — is on track.
Part of what I argue is that the reconstruction of Iraq is a criti-
cal battle in the war on terrorism just like the military actions
were important battles.
160
Some of the reasons you have already given, but in addition, the
whole world is watching how this goes. And if we can be successful
in creating a country where there is some form of representative
government, people have a say on their future, as well as some
form of market economy where they have some investment in the
country — and it is even better if they can own property and actu-
ally pass along what they work for to their kids — if you are in-
vested that way, then you have some hope and you are not that
likely to go blow yourself or your neighbors up.
If, on the other hand, you don't have that sort of hope of a better
future, then there is no amount of money that we can ever spend
for homeland security that is going to keep all the terrorists out of
our country.
Hope for the average 20-year-old male in this region is a lot of
what this boils down to, in my view. Is that right?
Ambassador Bremer. Thank you, Congressman.
Yes, that is right. And it is a good point that brings out an im-
portant element of this supplemental, that I mentioned, which is
that $5 billion of the $20 billion is quite clearly and understand-
ably linked directly to security, because it involves the new Iraqi
army and the police force.
The other $15 billion really addresses the point you are making.
And it is the point that, I think, the Marshall Plan addressed in
the case of Europe.
To win the war is not enough. To win the peace means putting
in place the important elements you touched on.
The element of a vibrant private sector, so that the government
is no longer the only employer in the country. This is one way to
break down the temptation to tyranny.
Putting in place a constitution, which is the essential political
framework for a vibrant political life, leading to an elected demo-
cratic government.
You can't expect these things to happen in the kind of situation
that exists in Iraq today. Progress is being made, but in order to
win this war, these $15 billion are an essential part of security.
They are directly related not only to the war on terrorism in the
broadest sense, but they are related to achieving victory in Iraq
and making Iraq a safer place for Iraqis in the long run and for
our servicemen in the short run.
Mr. Thornberry. Let me ask you this: Do you have the author-
ity you need to spend this money effectively?
Because many of us believe that if you have to go through all of
the government rigamarole that we normally go through when we
are trying to help another country, that you are not going to spend
this money we are about to approve for who knows how long, and
when you do spend it it is going to be so tied up with red tape it
is not going to be effective.
Ambassador Bremer. Well, Congressman, I hope that doesn't
happen.
We have some experience in spending the $2.45 billion that Con-
gress appropriated to us back in April. We had some bumps along
the lines that you referred to, some red tape and stuff. I think we
have pretty much cleared the field of that.
161
And I am satisfied I have a very clear mandate from the presi-
dent that I have authority over all U.S. government resources in
Iraq and all civilians and those military who do not serve under
a theater commander. I have very substantial authority. I think I
have complete agreement in the executive branch and hopefully
with Congress on how we can move quickly to obligate and spend
this money.
Mr. Thornberry. Well, I would just invite you that if you run
into a roadblock that we can deal with, that you can immediately
come and tell us. Because I think it would be a tragedy to let some
bureaucratic snafu prevent this money from being used as effec-
tively and as quickly as it possibly can.
Ambassador Bremer. Thank you, Congressman.
Mr. Thornberry. Let me ask one other question, briefly.
Secretary Wolfowitz and perhaps General Keane. Mr. Secretary,
you mentioned in your remarks the national security personnel sys-
tem, having more flexibility with the civil service so you can free
up military people, and deal with some of the concerns, frankly,
that we have been hearing with operating tempo (OPTEMPO), and
so forth. If either of you would like to briefly address that, I would
appreciate it.
Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Let me just say briefly, we are looking at
every possible way that we can relieve the stress on the force, be-
cause the stress is real.
We are at war. You can expect stress when you are at war, but
we need to look at what things we can do to relieve that stress. We
are looking at our worldwide deployments, places that we have sort
of assumed forces have to be deployed. Well, maybe they don't
when you are in a wartime situation.
One of the things we have looked at is that there are a lot of uni-
formed men and women serving in jobs that could be quite well
performed by civilians, and that that could free up some flexibility
to let us have those people doing the jobs that only military can
perform.
And the House — and we are very appreciative — gave us the au-
thority we think we need to make those conversions more rapidly.
We appreciate that. Of course, it is now in conference with the Sen-
ate. We wish you all the success in that endeavor.
General Keane, do you want to comment further?
General Keane. Yes, sir.
We know we have some challenges, Mr. Congressman. You know,
for example, our Active Component/Reserve Component balance we
know is not right. And what that has done is put a disproportion-
ate stress on some of our Reserve Component forces, and we have
to correct that imbalance.
You know, for example, in the Active Component, we don't have
enough infantry in the Army, we don't have enough civil affairs, we
don't have enough military police. We have to fix that. And we are
putting those plans together to fix some of that.
So those are major issues that we are facing that will help us
with long-range OPTEMPO. It is not going to help us in the short
term; that is the reality of it.
And from the Army perspective, the other services are also com-
ing to our assistance, in terms of our deployment to Iraq, where
162
they can help us with certain functions that heretofore the Army
has been doing, but they may be able to do some of those functions
for us, like Seabees can do engineer work and the Air Force also
has people that can help us with various operations to reduce the
stress that we currently have. Thank you.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
The gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Taylor?
Mr. Taylor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank all four of our guests here today for what you
do for our country.
Three things I would like you to touch on and, General Abizaid,
you touched on it once. But I was with the group that was there
about a week ago, and was somewhat amazed by the comments of
David Kay, who is there heading up our nation's efforts to find the
weapons of mass destruction, when he talked about specifically 55
unguarded caches of weapons that he felt like the Iraqis were
sneaking into at night, stealing weapons and using them against
Americans.
His observation was, it was a lack of manpower on the part of
the American forces that you didn't have the troops to guard those
sites, and therefore it became a vulnerability.
And I would like to hear specifically your thoughts on that, be-
cause it flew in the face of what the commanders we had the oppor-
tunity to visit said. They said we have plenty of troops, and this
was 180 degrees from that.
Second thing that I have noticed with great dismay, and that is
the very efficient use by the enemy of improvised explosive devices
(lED), things as simple as a cell phone being used to detonate a
shell. I am told sometimes a garage door opener, remote control ga-
rage door opener, even things as simple as a remote control door-
bell.
I have been told that the technology exists, and it has actually
been fielded in some instances, to jam many of those signals — not
all the signals, but many of those signals, and therefore save some
American lives.
This is the committee that decides what we buy, and how many
we buy of them. If it is a funding problem, I would hope you would
tell us. If it is an industrial base problem, I still think even that
can be solved with funds. If you spend enough money, someone will
run the second and third shift to make enough of those devices so
that we can put one on every Humvee and every vehicle young
Americans are riding. And, again, I want to hear your thoughts on
that.
Third thing, I think would simply fall into the snafu category,
but I would hope we could solve it with this supplemental.
Our colleague, the chairman of the Appropriations Committee,
wrote every member a letter expressing his dismay that the young
soldiers who are in the hospitals as a result of wounds incurred in
Afghanistan or Iraq are actually charged for their meals. And to
charge a young American who has lost an arm or leg, their vision
even $8 a day for their meals while they are in the hospital, I find
appalling. I would hope that it would be the DOD's request, as a
part of the supplemental, that we fix that.
163
And the other unintended consequence — and again, this is some-
thing I beheve your people did trying to help folks that had unin-
tended consequences — I am told that in many instances people
were listed as medically retired prior to their death in an effort to
see to it that the surviving members of their family could get better
benefits.
Fortunately, some of these people lived, but were then thrown
into some sort of a quagmire of red tape where they no longer were
eligible for the benefits they had earned for serving in our military.
Again, done with the best of intentions and the worst of outcomes.
Are these things being addressed in this supplemental, because
they are real problems that need to be solved? And I would wel-
come your thoughts on this.
General Abizaid. Well, thank you. Congressman.
I can address many of these things, and I would ask General
Keane to help me out on a few others.
First of all, I believe I answered the question to the best of my
ability with regard to the amount of explosives that are available
out there. There are certainly not enough forces anywhere to guard
all the ammunition that is in Iraq. So it is not a matter of more
forces, it is a matter of prioritization of what the forces do.
There is plenty of ammunition that is in the hands of the enemy,
and unfortunately what we need to do in that regard is find them,
kill them, seize the ammunition that is in their hands and then de-
stroy it.
So, again, I would not want to mislead the committee to think
that we can control all the ammunition that is available in Iraq,
because we cannot.
And I would also say that Dr. Kay probably has seen some evi-
dence of people tampering with areas that he has looked into. And
I am sure that that has happened on occasion and that security pe-
rimeters have been breached, et cetera.
That is also a matter of making sure that the Iraqi security
forces that we field do the job that we pay them to do. And we
can't, obviously, do everything in Iraq with Americans only. Other-
wise, we will stay there forever.
With regard to the lEDs, there are technologies available, al-
though we need to be realistic about the lEDs and the way that
they are being triggered. There are some that are on certain fre-
quencies. I believe that it is best not to talk about the details of
how it works in this hearing.
But I would also tell you that, in my experience in Afghanistan,
my experience around the Middle East and certainly in Iraq, that
while we have these devices deployed and we can use more of the
devices, I think that they are only able to get a small percentage
of the type of lEDs that we are operating against. So again, there
is no silver bullet.
What we need to do is continue, to the extent possible, to in-
crease our research and development, to understand how we can
defeat these devices because they are certainly deadly to us. The
number one way we defeat lEDs in Iraq is by Iraqis coming up to
us and telling us where they are. And that probably happens in 40
or 50 percent of the cases.
164
With regard to the quagmire of red tape, I think there is always
a quagmire of red tape somewhere out there in this great armed
forces of ours. We will certainly look into those problems and deal
with them. And I appreciate your bringing it to my attention.
Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Congressman Taylor, if I could add that
we are taking a hard look back here at new technologies that can
be applied to the lED problem. The Joint Chiefs of Staff is leading
an effort and some $130 million that is intended in the supple-
mental could help to fund that kind of activity.
I would add to your comment, I, at Walter Reed, met a sergeant
who had been medically retired because they thought he was about
to die — it was for his benefit. And there he was alive and healthy,
beautiful wife and one-month-old baby. It was pretty remarkable.
And all he could think about was, "How do I get back on active
duty?"
I will say this for the Army: I know he felt at the moment there
was red tape and when I came back a couple of weeks later he said
they had been out there, they had explained all his options to him,
they didn't want him making a rash decision to go back in until
he had thought it all through. And I think they ended up with a
very good solution for him. They will bring him back on active duty
at a better time for his own choosing.
But I would say, generally speaking, that my impression is the
Army has paid an awful lot of attention to those wounded soldiers
and their families. They certainly deserve it.
General Keane might want to add to that.
General Keane. Yes, sir, thank you.
You accurately pointed out that we do have a number of soldiers
that are significantly maimed as a result of this war. And many
of them are missing limbs and some of them will not be able to
carry on and perform their services as Army soldiers or as Marines
in the future.
And what we have done is, we feel a tremendous sense of obliga-
tion to them, as you do. We do not want them just to walk back
into what was previously their civilian life. What we want to do is
help them with a transition to that life, help them to go to school
and provide them a mentor who can see them through the psycho-
logical and emotional challenges that they have.
We are starting with a youngster by the name of Sammy Ross.
He is blind and he has lost a leg. He was a young engineer serving
with the 82nd Airborne Division when all this happened to him.
And Sammy Ross, we are very proud to tell you, came from a very
small town. He is the only person in his family that graduated
from high school. And he did it with honors. And he joined the
United States Army and became an engineer, and he is so proud
of that.
But given the catastrophic nature of his injuries, he is going to
have to go back to civilian life. But we are going to get Sammy
Ross to college. And we are going to make sure he has a mentor
when he goes through that, and he is receiving the psychological
assistance that he needs.
We just have to do these things. These are wonderful people and
they have made tremendous sacrifices. And we are going to take
care of them.
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In terms of the $8.10, you are absolutely right: A soldier who is
in the hospital, in Walter Reed, who is injured, is pajdng a daily
rate of $8.10 essentially for food. And that is by statute, by law,
that he or she receives a subsistence allowance monthly. And that
is deducted from their pay when they are in a medical facility as
such.
Your committee is looking at revising that law and we are in
complete support of that effort.
The Chairman. And I might say to my colleague, the appropria-
tions bill fixed that for a year. We are going to try to permanentize
that, the reform on that.
General, in light of Mr. Taylor's comments, and the comments of
David Kay, I think one thing that would be good for the situation
is if you could have one of your senior officers have a personal dis-
cussion with Mr. Kay, engage with him on these 55 sites and let
us know what the status quo is on those sites.
Could you do that?
General Abizaid. We will, sir.
The Chairman. If you could have your folks report back to the
committee so we know that, we would appreciate that.
I thank the gentleman.
The gentlelady from New Mexico, Ms. Wilson.
Mrs. Wilson of New Mexico. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Keane, I appreciate your passion for our soldiers and
particularly I think you are right on as regards our Reserve and
Guard units. But like you, I am very concerned that we need to
look at our Reserve/Active mix. I worry about how folks feel after
they have come through the airport and the adrenaline rush has
gone away and the banner is down off the garage.
And they know, as you all know and everyone in this room
knows, that this is not a crisis for which we can surge and then
go back to life as normal; that the likelihood of their being called
up again next year is quite high. And they are going to be making
decisions with their families about whether to stay in the Reserve
and the Guard or not.
And I say that — I am married to one. I know these things. I
know a lot of the guys who serve in New Mexico. And I worry
about that.
You talked a little about it. You said it is long-range, but I would
like to know, are you looking at changing the mix of Reserve/
Guard, increasing the end-strength of the active duty force, or
doing both?
General Keane. Yes, well, we are looking at all of that.
We know the mix is wrong. And when we go to war we are far
too dependent on the Reserve Component to provide our logistical
support and some of the combat support and we have got to fix
that. That is number one.
And then, as I indicated before, we know we do not have enough
military police in the active as well as in the reserve, and we in-
tend to fix both of those and increase the infantry in the active.
And also, civil affairs is another problem for us. We have to in-
crease the civil affairs in the active force.
Before we come in and make a recommendation for any end-
strength increase, which I know has been a concern for the commit-
166
tee in the past, we have to take a look at that balance and see
what that does for us.
We are also looking at what military conversions we can make.
And by that I mean is, we have a number of military people serv-
ing in jobs that probably we think can be done by a civilian, a De-
partment of the Army civilian.
And we are looking at that in three categories: 6,000, 18,000 and
24,000. And right now we know 6,000 makes compelling sense to
us. We have gone through all of that. And the 18,000 and the
24,000, we are working on, and that is still under analysis.
So those savings are there for us. But it is not free to the tax-
payers, certainly, because an increase in civilian end-strength is an
increase in the federal budget and it is an increase in the Army
budget and Department of Defense budget, as well.
But those things make sense to us. And then, after that analysis
is complete, then we will see where we are in terms of Army end-
strength.
I have been in the Pentagon now four years. And we have looked
at this every year. And we have had all sort of thoughts in the
Army about our end-strength, just being frank with you.
And we have never walked over here — we have never walked
down the hallway to the Department of Defense and told them,
"We want an increase in Army end-strength" in those four years.
That is the truth of it.
Some of us felt we probably needed to do that, but when we
looked at it, in terms of other Army priorities, we simply could not
afford it, because we knew it was going to come out of our top line
and changing the Army for the future, for example, had a higher
priority. And the senior leaders of the Army submitted to that
higher priority, and we did not increase the strength of the Army
at the time.
And we are right there, right now, going through that analysis
again in the face of what we are dealing with. And after we make
those judgments, the leadership of the Army will talk to Secretary
Rumsfeld about what our conclusions are. And I am sure then, you
will hear from us about it.
Mrs. Wilson of New Mexico. General, I am concerned that
maybe we can't afford not to.
General Keane. I understand.
Mrs. Wilson of New Mexico. I have, kind of, come to this posi-
tion reluctantly, because I am one of those that believes that you
get $1.10 of value out of every dollar you spend, and you try to look
at what things you can not do, and where you can shift people
around and shed missions.
But there comes a point when you look at these numbers. The
United States military will be 28,000 people over authorized end-
strength at the end of this year. You are already over authorized
end-strength. Yesterday, General Pace was talking about calling up
more Guard and Reserves. You have 170,000 Guard and Reserves
on active duty today. We have had over 50,000 on active duty since
September 11th.
I worry that if we don't make this decision, we are going to end
up with the kind of hollowed-out Army at the senior non-commis-
sioned officer (NCO) and junior officer level that destroyed the
167
Army in the wake of the Vietnam War. And if we have to make
that decision, and we have to bump up that top Hne, we need you
to tell us that, too.
General Keane. Sure. And we will, Madam Congresswoman, we
will do exactly that.
Many of us sitting up at this table here lived through that expe-
rience, you know, the post-Vietnam era when we hollowed out our
Army, when we fought that war on the backs of our career force
and many of them were killed and wounded and many of them left
the Army after that because they just could not put up with the
stress any longer. We understand that. And we are looking at this
very hard.
And you are right. In the Army, we have been operating since
9/11, three weeks after that, when we started to mobilize, with
about 30,000 more people to help us do our job every day, having
nothing to do with Iraq. And that would tell you, at a glance, that
probably the Army could be larger, based on that number. And that
is self-evident to us, self-evident to me.
But what we need to do is, before we come in here and say, "That
is what we want," we need to fix our knitting a little bit. We need
to fix ourselves inside.
And that is what I am asking you, to let us do that. We are going
to finish this in the next few weeks, and then we will come forward
with a recommendation.
Mrs. Wilson of New Mexico. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank the gentlelady for her excellent line of
questions.
And the gentleman who hobbled around Iraq with a bad back in
the first CODEL that we took over, the gentleman from Hawaii,
Mr. Abercrombie?
Mr. Abercrombie. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am
sure I was the most fortunate of people to be able to do that of ev-
eryone serving there for sure.
Mr. Chairman, before my time begins, however, I need to ask you
a question for the record. And I am asking this in the context of
everything that has gone on. The supplemental, which is what we
are hearing today, witnesses are here principally for this supple-
mental budget.
In fact, when the announcement was made to me. Memorandum
for the Armed Services Committee members, "The hearing will ad-
dress the status of U.S. military and reconstruction activities in
Iraq in the context of the administration's request for the supple-
mental."
This hearing today is for purposes of dialogue and exchange and
perspective. It is not an authorization hearing. Is that correct in
the sense that I understand our responsibility to be?
The Chairman. That is correct. We are not marking up the sup-
plemental today.
Mr. Abercrombie. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your response to
the request of the members to have a hearing on this and I appre-
ciate the witnesses for being here in this context. But I must pro-
test that this is not an authorization hearing.
My understanding of what a supplemental is all about is that it
has to do with emergency spending. This is not emergency spend-
168
ing. Virtually every word coming from the witnesses, the context of
the questions as such, means that this is not an emergency.
It is an ongoing spending situation and an ongoing spending con-
text that requires authorization. If we do it this way, we are under-
mining the authority and obligation and responsibility of this com-
mittee.
I don't hold you responsible for this personally. Quite the oppo-
site; I have an idea that you may, in fact, agree with me.
But I want to be on record as this member protesting that this
is not taken up in a regular order with authorization of the proper
committees, because this is going to be an ongoing series of re-
quests and decisions that have to be made. And to take it up sim-
ply by going to the Appropriations Committee as if all the policy
has been decided, all of the decisions made with what to buy and
how to do it, is not only unfair to this committee, but it is unfair
to the people that are serving that have been mentioned over and
over again today.
The Chairman. I just say to the gentleman that this is a big
piece of cash. It is not a $5 billion or $6 billion supplemental, it
is a big supplemental. And for practical purposes, it is a mini-au-
thorization bill. And I agree with the gentleman that this commit-
tee should have a thorough oversight participation here.
Let me say to my friend, though, that right now we are turning
and burning trying to get the authorization bill out. And the gen-
tleman knows we have got major, major issues in this bill. We are
trjdng to bring that thing to a closure here before we and the other
body move out of here.
So I agree with the gentleman's point. I think it is a good strong
point.
Mr. Abercrombie. I think it has to be taken to the leadership
of the House that we cannot do this.
And I will move then to my questions for the witnesses. Thank
you for making that clear. I think it has to be on the record, be-
cause I don't believe that necessarily the rest of the Congress nor
certainly the witnessing public understands what is taking place
today. We are not authorizing as we should.
Now, if I take the witnesses at their word, and I will, I say that
for purposes of establishing a foundation.
Mr. Wolfowitz, Mr. Secretary. I appreciate your being here today.
I took your answer to Mr. Skelton to be that those rumors or myths
or propositions that were put forward for whatever reasons from
the Pentagon or other sources that came to Mr. Skelton, that there
would be some cynical manipulation of removal of troops before the
election next year is just that, and that the likelihood of that tak-
ing place is nil; that there will be no substitution of 3 Iraqi divi-
sions, some 27 battalions if I read this supplemental request cor-
rectly— and I am trying to get through every single page and every
single line that has been given to us, believe me — that that would
provide — I won't say a pretext, but that would provide a context for
the removal of 1, 2 or more divisions of American troops before the
election.
That is what we are being told, and that is the question we are
going to have to answer.
169
This thing isn't going to be over, even if you find the opportunity
to remove several battahons or divisions before the election next
year; is that correct?
Secretary WOLFOWITZ. There seem to be two separate premises
to your question. One is, are these decisions going to be made on
political grounds in light of the election, and certainly none that I
will make, nor none that Secretary Rumsfeld will make, nor I think
none the president will make. These are national security deci-
sions. They have to be made on that basis.
Does that mean we are not trying to, in fact, get more Iraqis on
the front lines, get them dying for their country so fewer Ameri-
cans have to? No, we are trying to do exactly that.
We are trying to reduce the stress on our force and bring it down
prudently as we can. We are looking for international coalition
forces so that we can bring our troop levels down.
But certainly no one I know believes that we are not going to be
in Iraq with significant forces right through the end of next year.
Mr. Abercrombie. Thank you.
With that in mind then, this goes. General Keane, to the ques-
tion of Guard and Reserves. Now what I quote to you is words to
the effect — I cannot say that I know they were exactly from Sec-
retary Rumsfeld yesterday — that it is not likely that we will get
more from foreign troops, or words to that effect. I tried to remem-
ber it, and I made some notes to myself.
So that the multi-national divisions from two to four, if that
doesn't take place, and if I understood your commentary correctly,
we are talking about the increase in the number of Guard and Re-
serves. We are talking about the possible stop-loss changes again,
in terms of when people might or might not have their leave dates
changed. Is that correct?
General Keane. Yes, by and large, that is correct. Congressman.
If the planned substitution of a multi-national division, which our
government is attempting to arrange, to replace a United States
Army division which is currently in Iraq, does not materialize, then
we will have to go back and draw on U.S. military forces, both Ac-
tive and Reserve, to accommodate that.
Mr. Abercrombie. Okay.
General Keane. And what I am not prepared to tell you right
now is who are those units and what that composition is because
we
Mr. Abercrombie. I am not asking that.
General Keane [continuing! . Have not made those decisions.
Mr. Abercrombie. Thank you. I appreciate that.
What in effect is happening is we are having a draft by default.
And it was very disturbing to me, and I want to say that again —
we are having a draft. The draft has returned to this country, ex-
cept it is by default. And a whole lot of people that are waving the
flag out there and talking about our responsibilities in the war on
terror are getting to watch it on television, because we are drafting
by default through Guard and Reserves.
It is very disturbing to me, Mr. Chairman, very disturbing that
General Keane feels, despite communications coming on a biparti-
san basis from this committee — and I want to emphasize that, bi-
partisan basis from this committee — if I understood him correctly.
170
he felt and the Army felt that they would have to take an increase
in end-strength out of their top line.
That was not the position of members of this committee in public
hearings and elsewhere, that if that was taken up, that you would
be required to do that.
Now it may have been the policy of the administration; I don't
know. It might have been the policy of previous administrations; I
don't know. But not this committee.
That issue has to be taken up. And, Mr. Chairman, it is another
reason why we should be authorizing this money. This should not
be taken up on an emergency basis as if it was something that fell
out of the sky, out of the blue, something like Hurricane Isabel.
This is not a hurricane. This is something of our own creation, in
terms of what our response is or is not. We are not mute and
standing bereft of an understanding of what we should do.
Now, General, under those circumstances, if you knew that this
committee was prepared to deal with the question of funding an in-
crease in end-strength, is it your opinion — or perhaps I should ask
the Secretary; it may be unfair to ask you.
Is it your view, Mr. Secretary, that the question of increase in
the end-strength for the Army and Reserves should be on the
table?
General Keane. Well, let me answer it first, because I don't want
to dodge you.
Mr. Abercrombie. I never thought for a moment you would
dodge anything. General.
General Keane. I will pass it to the secretary.
First of all, I think the leaders of the Army have always known
for years that this committee — there was a possibility in this com-
mittee you would increase the end-strength of the Army and would
be willing to fund it above the top line. Certainly I understood that.
And I don't want to presume that for my other colleagues, but I
certainly understood that.
The issue for us was always within the Department of Defense
itself, and it concerned the previous administration that actually
wanted to reduce the size of the Army, much less increase it. That
is what we were dealing with, and I am just being frank with you.
And the current administration that we have been dealing with,
the Army has not come forward with any increase in end-strength.
We are facing that reality today. And we are taking a hard look
at doing just that.
And we also understand that there has been support for this
issue on this committee for a number of years. That has been clear-
ly understood.
Mr. Abercrombie. Mr. Secretary?
Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Ever3^hing is on the table. Congressman.
Mr. Abercrombie. Thank you very much. I appreciate it.
Now one last thing.
Time is up?
The Chairman. Time is up.
Mr. Abercrombie. Okay, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. For the gentleman who hobbled around Iraq with
a bad back, we are going to give him another 30 seconds.
Mr. Abercrombie. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
171
You have mentioned, Mr. Secretary, the Horn of Africa in cita-
tion of where our troops are extended now.
Or perhaps, General, you mentioned it. I beg your pardon.
My understanding is there are now circumstances perhaps com-
ing into flower in Eritrea and Ethiopia which might cause conflict
there to be breaking out or extending itself. And so we could find
ourselves operating in another front there.
My question is, Mr. Secretary, when we deal with this $87 bil-
lion— and I have been going through it. I see very little in this $87
billion or anything at all that takes into account the question of un-
anticipated circumstances in which further deployment of troops or
extension of requirements of military activity is taken into account.
I see very little evidence of that. This all seems to be very, very
site-and area-and circumstance-specific with no allowance for any-
thing else.
If such a thing took place in Eritrea and Ethiopia, does this
budget cover that? Or is it strictly for operations within Iraq on the
assumption that everything we hope for will work that way?
Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Congressman, it would depend entirely on
what was involved and what we might want to do.
When we came up with last year's budget and suggested that
there was a requirement for Afghanistan that was not precisely
predictable, we said we were just asking for a slush fund. I mean,
by definition, if it is unanticipated, we can't define it.
But with our incredible military, we have extraordinary capabil-
ity to respond to a crisis in Korea, to respond to a crisis in Liberia,
to respond to crisis in this hemisphere. And I can't imagine exactly
what we might do in Eritrea and Ethiopia. So we have a lot of ca-
pability.
Mr. Abercrombie. So the answer then that that might be an
emergency, it might be a supplemental, but what this is doing is
Iraq-specific, this $87 billion.
Secretary WOLFOWITZ. No, not all of it.
Mr. Abercrombie. Afghanistan and Iraq specific?
Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Yes, sir.
Mr. Abercrombie. For all intents and purposes.
Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I appreciate the straightforwardness
and honesty of that answer.
Mr. Chairman, I rest my case on the fact that we should be in-
volved in an authorizing process.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman for his last 30-second
question. [Laughter.]
But I am going to go to another gentleman who's led a CODEL
to Iraq, Mr. Forbes. But first, the ranking member had an observa-
tion.
Mr. Skelton. Yes, I think the record should show that, since
1995, I have been urging an additional 40,000 Army troops based
upon testimony from this very committee. And I am pleased to
know that there are a number of members of this committee on
both sides of the aisle that agree we need additional troops. And
hopefully that can come to pass, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Okay, I thank the gentleman.
And I want to put myself down, as we have over the years, as
very much in favor of two additional Army divisions.
172
The gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Forbes.
Secretary WoLFOWTTZ. Mr. Chairman, could I just point out that
when we did the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) in the sum-
mer of 2001, a lot of people thought we should cut end-strength,
especially Army end-strength, and when we concluded that we
should not, we were accused of a lack of imagination.
And I remember going to Secretary Rumsfeld on September 12th
and saying, "Thank heavens we didn't. Think of where we would
be if we had."
So we are not completely out of sympathy with your concerns.
But adding end-strength takes time to take effect. And it adds a
permanent burden on your top line, and at the end of the day re-
sources transfer.
So we are trying right now to get the immediate benefits that we
can out of some of the changes General Keane mentioned. But as
I said to several of you, all options are on the table.
We are in a serious situation. We have got to address it seri-
ously.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
And Mr. Forbes, thank you for taking that CODEL to Iraq. And
please proceed.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And Mr. Ambassador and Mr. Secretary and Generals, you know,
sometimes I wonder why you do what you do, not why you make
the decisions that you make, but why you literally don't just throw
your hands up and do something that is easier and more lucrative
to do.
And, Mr. Ambassador, I know that until somebody has traveled
to Iraq, it is easy for us to forget that every day you are personally
in Iraq, your life is at risk, too.
And you know, all four of you do what you do because you love
this country and because you love freedom.
Mr. Ambassador, I saw with my own eyes, the admiration and
trust that the Iraqis leaders had for you personally. We saw in Iraq
children waving at our troops as they flew over with helicopters.
We saw oil refineries that were going back on-line, water wells
opening up where people hadn't had them before, universities be-
ginning to teach religious tolerance. And we didn't see that on TV,
we saw that with our own eyes there.
Every single soldier we spoke to, even the Reservists, who may
want to come home, without exception told us the same thing:
"This was the right mission and we had to win this mission."
7?^d I want to thank all four of you for what you are doing and
for the successes that we are having in Iraq.
The distinguished ranking member, who I have enormous respect
for, said earlier that we had no choice. Well, I disagree. I only wish
that we could have given you more choices.
Mr. Ambassador, I wish that we could have given you an Iraq
that wasn't full of criminals that had been released by Saddam
Hussein in all of the communities there. I wish we could give an
Iraq to work in that you didn't have terrorists flooding in, trying
to thwart everything that were doing.
I wish we could have given you an Iraq that didn't have an infra-
structure that had been laid waste by Saddam Hussein for years.
173
And I wish we could give you a political environment that would
recognize the accomplishments we have had and realize that no
amount of planning that we could have done could have changed
a single one of the things that I just mentioned.
Prior to this conflict, we had two choices: We could have first
waited for the terrorists to strike, and then we could have paid for
their devastation like we did on September 11th, studied the prob-
lem, and then wait for them to hit us again and pay for that and
study it again and pay for that and study it again and study it
again; or we could have gone after the terrorists and broken the
cycle. We made the right choice.
I think now we have two choices: We can cut and run, and we
can leave the terrorists to have a playground and a training ground
with an almost limitless source of funding to attack us for the rest
of our lives and our children's lives; or we can roll up our sleeves
and do what we need to do to finish this job.
And my question today, Mr. Ambassador, Mr. Secretary, for you,
is what is the cost if we don't fund the ongoing operations in Iraq?
What type of future should we envision in that region if we should
fail to reach our goal of freedom and democracy for the Iraqi peo-
ple?
In other words, what is the cost for not funding the requests that
have been laid on the table to this Congress?
Ambassador Bremer. Thank you. Congressman, and thank you
for your kind words about my staff.
Congressman, I think there is a model, maybe two, if we don't
do this: Beirut, Lebanon, during the 1980s and Afghanistan under
the Taliban from 1995 forward.
We simply cannot afford to have an area of the world, particu-
larly an area as rich as Iraq, turned over to a group of terrorists
again. Saddam was a terrorist. We have terrorists there now. If we
don't, as one of the soldiers that was quoted earlier said, "We have
to fight and defeat these terrorists somewhere."
It is for those of us who live in Baghdad an uncomfortable reality
that we are now on the front line of terrorism. It puts the lives of
the thousands of men and women who work for me at risk every
day.
But I will tell you, like the soldiers you spoke of, and they are
wonderful, the civilians too, to a man and a woman, will under-
stand the importance of what they are doing in Iraq for American
security here; that that is what is at stake. It is a war we simply
have to finish, and we have to finish it in Iraq or we will fight it
here.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman. And once again, I want
to thank him for leading his CODEL to Iraq.
Gentlemen, I have to leave for a bit. And General Keane, Sec-
retary Wolfowitz, General Abizaid and Ambassador Bremer, thank
you for your service to the country. I will try to come back a little
later here in the hearing.
Right now, we have Mr. Meehan.
And, Mr. Meehan, thank you for your hard work on the bill this
year. And you are recognized.
Mr. Meehan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
174
And thanks to the members of the committee.
Mr. Secretary, you had indicated in response to Mr. Abercrombie
that there were those who said we shouldn't add end-strength.
Anyone on this committee — I don't know who that would be.
Secretary Wolfowitz. Many pundits in the press and editorial-
ists. And I don't remember anyone on this committee, no, sir.
Mr. Meehan. And when you originally gave your opening testi-
mony, I read your statement, but you indicated there were some
people that just don't get it. Is that members of the Congress? I
didn't really quite get that part. People that just don't get that we
are engaged in a war on terrorism?
Secretary WOLFOWITZ. No, I explained it. I could repeat exactly
what I said. I am not trying to identify individuals.
I think, as I said, there is a view that, while terrorism is terrible
and September 11th demonstrated it is terrible, that it hasn't basi-
cally altered either the way we deal with it as a kind of law en-
forcement catching the criminals after the fact matter, or change
the way in which we deal with the breeding ground of terrorism
in the Middle East and elsewhere in the Muslim world. I think it
requires a fundamentally different change of approach.
And when people say, "We don't know whether or not Saddam
had anything to with 9/11," that misses the point. The point is that
Saddam was a sponsor of terrorism. His influence on the Middle
East was enormously destabilizing. And getting rid of that regime
will get rid of a threat to us and allow us to begin building a better
Middle East.
Mr. Meehan. And I certainly supported the resolution. I have
traveled to Iraq, and all you have to do is go to Iraq, to those places
where 300,000 Iraqi people were put into pits and mass grave sites.
But surely you think that a country like the United States
should analyze their intelligence by which we decide to go to war
and to make sure that the decisions are made at least based on
what we tell the American people or what we tell the Congress.
Secretary Wolfowitz. Of course.
Mr. Meehan. In dealing with this $87 billion package — and I
think we already appropriated about $75 billion. And I think all of
the members of this committee who traveled to Iraq, and even
those who haven't, agree that we need to provide the support for
our troops while they are there and they are engaged in very im-
portant work.
And this is not an easy thing to do. I don't think anyone nec-
essarily knows all in terms of day in and day out processes of what
we are trying to accomplish there.
But many members of the Congress would like to get a better
perspective about that end game. And this is our opportunity to do
that. The administration has been great in terms of briefing us, but
we now have an opportunity where the Congress has an $87 billion
package, where we can ask questions relative to what is the end
game.
Mr. Skelton specifically mentioned one idea that we will be out
by late spring, another idea that it will be two years, another idea
that it will be four to five years. The difference could mean whether
we spend $200 billion in this operation or $400 billion in this oper-
ation.
175
Is there any way to get some kind of a context of an end game
from the administration prior to a vote on this? And I understand
in Kosovo, in Bosnia, it was very difficult to give specific dates. But
I would point out that this is a much more critical, expensive prop-
osition. In Bosnia and Kosovo, I think we represented about 17 or
18 percent of the operation and here about 90 percent of the oper-
ation.
So many of us here would just like to get a more specific general
idea of a plan, an exit strategy. And, I understand, get more Iraqis
up front, try to get international support from other countries.
Is there anything more that you can say other than, "We just
don't know," relative to an exit strategy in some kind of a time
line?
Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I think there is a lot that can be said
about the end game, except predicting dates when things will hap-
pen. Nobody has a crystal ball.
You are right that this is a more expensive proposition than Bos-
nia or Kosovo. It is also true that it is a lot more complicated. We
didn't have Saddam's bitter-enders trying to defeat us in either of
those places. The war ended when we came in.
And on the other hand, the stakes are far, far greater. The
stakes are enormous here.
Essentially the end game is to have Iraqis taking care of their
own security, running their own country, getting basic services
running so they can, and having a political process that leads to
basically a free and democratic system.
Ambassador Bremer is really the person who should speak to
that in more detail. But there is an end game.
Mr. Meehan. To that end, are we getting more Iraqi military
into reconstituted police or military forces? I assume we are mak-
ing progress vis-a-vis that?
General Abizaid. Sir, we are certainly making progress in that
arena. We have quite a few police that are on duty now, somewhat
over 40,000, although all of them are not equipped, trained and
provided for the way that we would like them to be. But every day
they get better.
I would also like to assure you that the CENTCOM staff is work-
ing very hard with Ambassador Bremer's staff to synchronize both
the military effort and the civil effort to ensure that we have condi-
tions-based understanding of how we can draw down forces.
But the draw-down of the forces isn't the key thing. It is achiev-
ing success on all of our various azimuths, whether it is govern-
ance, security, infrastructure, et cetera. And I believe that this ef-
fort is probably more synchronized from a military and a political
perspective than any one I have seen before.
Mr. Meehan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Weldon [presidingl. The time of the gentleman has expired.
I would remind our colleagues, perhaps they are not aware of
this, but Ambassador Bremer has to leave here by 4 p.m. So if we
could try to get our questions out for him, the other panelists could
perhaps stay a little longer. But he has an appointment that he
has to make.
Dr. Snyder is recognized for five minutes.
Dr. Snyder. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
176
Thank you, gentlemen, for being here. We really appreciate your
service.
I attended a funeral this weekend of a special forces master ser-
geant who died in combat in Iraq. And his family was very appre-
ciative and very proud of the work that he did and that he served
under you all.
Ambassador Bremer, I want to ask you, the Hamre commission
had recommended, I think it was the establishment of 18 provincial
Coalition Provisional Authority offices and they recommended a
staff of 20 to 30 people.
Did you agree with that? What is the current count?
Ambassador BREMER. Yes, I did. And we have now what they call
government support teams in 18 provincial capitals, and they are
most of them between 15 and 20 personnel.
Dr. Snyder. And that has worked out reasonably well.
Ambassador Bremer. Yes. We still have to complement it with
additional civilian personnel from the Coalition Provisional Author-
ity. We are doing that now.
When Mr. Hamre visited, which was in late June, he felt we did
not have enough people in the Coalition Provisional Authority. At
that time my staffing was 660 people. I currently have six times
as many people as I had in June.
Dr. Snyder. There was also some press reports in terms of the
money that is being spent on some redevelopment issues, that some
Iraqi business people were complaining that they didn't get what
they thought was adequate opportunities to compete for some of
that money.
What is the status of that? Are there Iraqis that are able to par-
ticipate in some of the reconstruction activities?
Ambassador Bremer. Yes, there are. In fact, I have given in-
structions that on all of the contracts which we let, whether they
are through appropriated funds or Iraqi government funds, pref-
erence is to be given to Iraqi firms.
In the case of appropriated funds, where the regulations require
that the prime contractor be an American firm, I have given in-
structions that they must give preference to Iraqi construction
firms, in most cases construction for the subcontracting. And that
is being done.
Dr. Snyder. Do you have an idea of a ratio or amount of money
that the Iraqi contractors have received?
Ambassador Bremer. We haven't got it accumulated yet. There
is one company, for example, Bechtel, which has the largest single
contract. I have given them a target of trying to subcontract 70
percent of their funds. Let me put it a different way, I said to
them, "I would like to see 70 percent of the funds spent in Iraqi,
if possible."
Dr. Snyder. And Mr. Ambassador, David Gergen, two or three
nights ago on one of the news shows, made the comment that in
the last three or four months, the number of people showing up in
morgues in Iraq had doubled. And his statement was that it was
showing an increasing amount of people have died from violence.
Is that an accurate figure? And if so, what does that reflect?
Ambassador Bremer. Well, I don't know if it is accurate to say
it has doubled.
177
It is certainly an extremely violent society. And we have to re-
member that Saddam Hussein let free 100,000 convicted mur-
derers, rapists, burglars and kidnappers, and it is going to take us
quite a while to wrap them up. They are certainly a major part of
the security threat, particularly to Iraqis.
Dr. Snyder. General Abizaid, Mr. Abercrombie mentioned Eri-
trea and Ethiopia, but he didn't ask the question I wanted to ask,
which is that there are increasing concerns that this dispute over
this border delineation and what we hope will be the demarcation
of the border doesn't seem to be going well.
How do you assess that situation, because that would have nega-
tive consequences on not only those two countries, but also on the
war against terrorism?
General Abizaid. Well, thank you. Congressman.
I recently had the opportunity to be in Eritrea, last week, as a
matter of fact, and I spoke to President Isaias and before that I
spoke to Prime Minister Meles in Ethiopia. And it is clear that
there is a diplomatic problem that has clearly developed over the
demarcation of the border that came from the commission that was
responsible for that. It centers around Bodme, which is in the cen-
ter of the sector and other parts more to the east.
And I do not believe at this time, that it will necessarily move
toward military confrontation, but clearly we need to move dip-
lomatically to see what we can do to keep that contained.
Dr. Snyder. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Weldon. I thank the gentleman. His time is expired.
Let me try something here. We have a number of members that
have not asked questions yet. I have been informed that Ambas-
sador Bremer has to leave slightly before 4 to make the 4 o'clock
appointment.
So I am going to try to ask if members have one question for Am-
bassador Bremer, then perhaps we can get those out of the way.
Then we will go back to the regular order of five minutes each.
Do any of the remaining members have a specific question for
Ambassador Bremer?
One, two, three.
Okay, let's do those three questions. And four, you, John?
Let's do these four quickly before Ambassador Bremer leaves.
And then we will go back to the regular order.
Ms. Sanchez, you were next anyway. So would you just do your
one question? I will come back to you after you ask the question
of Ambassador Bremer.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Weldon. Thank you.
Ms. Sanchez. First of all, thank you all, gentlemen, for being
here today.
How do I start this? I guess the question is — and I know that I
have sent word to several, not just the Defense Department, but
also the reconstruction. So, Ambassador, you know, I come from an
investment banking background. And I used to put deals together;
that is what we used to do.
So if we would ask people to invest in a billion dollar project, and
a billion dollar project was considered a lot, we would do all sorts
of calculations, good scenarios, bad scenarios, worse case scenarios,
178
and we would put together a prospectus, and it would have all of
that in there, so that people who would be investing in a deal,
would get what be the best and rosiest situation and what could
be the worst situation, so they would know what the risk factor
was and what the vulnerabilities were to a deal.
You know, I am getting a little frustrated, because I have asked
for that type of information on this, both from the Defense side.
What do we get for our $87 billion? And you know, I don't know
if the Defense Department or the State Department or whoever is
running this, just doesn't have financial people, doesn't have ac-
countants, it doesn't have people who do trend analysis, it doesn't
have people who can run financial models.
I mean, I don't know, maybe they don't have computers that can
do that. But you know, this is so easy to do today. And yet it is
very, very frustrating to hear, "Well, we just don't have an idea
past six months from now."
You know, the road is paved with people who are business people
who go to a banker and say, "I want to borrow money." And they
are required to do all of these plans, an operational one-year plan,
a five-year plan, a ten-year plan, assumptions. And if you don't do
that, you don't get the money. I don't understand why you can't
take a stab at this, as Mr. Spratt said.
I mean, can you give an answer to that? Because it is very frus-
trating. You know, we are sitting here safeguarding. The American
people trust us that we are going to ask the right questions to
spend the money they send to Washington the right way.
And by the way, I think being in Iraq is a moral obligation now,
that we need to finish it, that we need to get it back and going and
put it into the hands of Iraqis as soon as possible and get our
troops out in one piece. So I am not against that. I am just wonder-
ing why you are so bad at giving us good case, bad case, middle
case scenarios here.
Ambassador Bremer. Thank you, Congresswoman, particularly
for your statement of support. I agree that whatever one's position
may have been before the war, we are there now and we have to
succeed. As the distinguished Congressman Skelton said, "Failure
is not an option."
I spent a fair part of my career as a businessman, also, and I
understand what you are talking about. But I have also spent a lot
of time in public service and it is a bit different.
We have in the $20 billion here, the part for which I am answer-
able— made our very best assessment — and it has been done by
very competent people, including the Iraqi ministries involved —
about what their needs were.
It is very difficult to do a standard sort of cost/benefit analysis
on an irrigation canal. You cannot very well do a return on invest-
ment of a dam safety repair. It is not something you can quantify
the way you can quantify an investment in a bank or in a startup.
This $20 billion represents our very best assessment with the
Iraqi government of urgent, essential projects that should be done
in the next 12 to 18 months. There is a lot more that needs to be
done in Iraq, probably another $40 billion or $50 billion worth, but
this is the part which if we do it now directly serves our interest
by increasing the Iraqi ability to provide security for Iraq and by
179
providing the essential services that gets their economy going
again. And that essentially is the assessment that we have done.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.
I would just say that I am not asking you to tell me what the
worth of a dam project is or a river project is. What I am asking
you to do is to be up front with the American people. And that it
is not just $20 billion for this, but that they also have another $40
billion or $50 billion on the line and what that looks like for the
future. They need to know the full cost of what is going on.
Ambassador Bremer. No, that I agree with. That I agree with.
Mr. Weldon. I thank the gentlelady. I will come back to her.
Mr. Hayes had a question for Mr. Bremer.
Mr. Hayes. Thank you, gentlemen, for being here.
Let me first say, I am dismayed, disappointed and disgusted with
what happened with Senator Kennedy and Senator Byrd. You de-
serve better than that. Ambassador Bremer.
Thanks to all of you. And that does not reflect my attitude and
most of the people up here. Our soldiers deserve better than that
kind of treatment. Give us a history lesson if you want to, if it is
your stage.
My question is this: At the end of the actual combat phase of the
war, we had reporters embedded everywhere. They each had dif-
ferent stories about different occasions where our men and women
served admirably. That was a good thing.
Now they all seem to be gathered up in a wad somewhere. One
story comes in that is bad, and they all write that story and send
it home.
What can you do to get them scattered out again? [Laughter.]
Ambassador Bremer. Of course, the offer for them to rejoin com-
bat units is there. Some of them actually have gone out and re-
joined. I don't know if technically they are embedded any more, but
they do go out there.
I agree. Congressman. I say to the journalists, "Look, I under-
stand that the news cycle is driven by bad news. That is unfortu-
nately a structural defect of having a free press. But there are
every day, literally, dozens of good news stories. There are orphan-
ages that have been reopened, schools that have been repainted,
hospitals that have generators, irrigation canals that have been
opened, every single day." We have completed, Congressman, over
8,000 individual reconstruction projects in Iraq in the last three
months, 8,000 individual projects.
I can't say there are 8,000 good stories there, but I bet you there
are a thousand good stories there. And we have been trying to en-
courage the journalists to go out and look into those stories and tell
the story to the American people.
We are beginning to make some progress on that. We have a su-
perb new director of strategic communications who is very much
pointed in that direction.
And I just would repeat again my invitation to any of you who
have not been to Iraq that you come there and see it with your own
eyes. You have heard from people on both sides of the aisle here
today how much they learned. I would welcome any of you to come
again.
180
Mr. Hayes. Thank you very much. I was in Iraq before you were,
Ambassador Bremer, and I know what you guys have done. It is
terrific.
Mr. Weldon. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Larsen has a question for Ambassador Bremer.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ambassador Bremer, good to see you again. And I just wanted
to tell you before we started I had a follow-up based on our con-
versations yesterday, and this has to do with what I think is maybe
a critical choke point for Iraqi reconstruction, and that is the port
in Umm Qasr and the progress being made there in reconstruction.
If we are going to move $1.2 billion of this oil pipeline infrastruc-
ture and $5.6 billion of generators and other infrastructure for elec-
tricity grid to get all the power turned back on, it is going to be
absolutely critical. We can't move that stuff in, we can't fly it in,
and it is going to be very expensive and time-consuming to drive
it in. The best way to do that is to move it through the port.
The challenges that we face at the port are many, but I under-
stand progress is being made, salvage removal, wreckage removal,
repair of the terminals, and so on.
But in order to move those kinds of goods, it is going to take a
lot more work, including shore-side cranes. And from what I under-
stand, after all repairs are made we could at least handle eight
million tons of cargo a year through that port. But several things
need to take place and my question is around those things that
need to take place.
First is security, second is management and third is capital ex-
penditure. So if you could address, quickly, what is being done both
inside the fence, if you will, on security at the port, as well as out-
side the fence.
Second, with regards to management of the port, what are we
looking at in terms of tr5ring to either isolate or not isolate military
cargo coming in and out versus civilian infrastructure cargo coming
in and out?
And the third has to do with capital expenditure. There is $45
million in the supplemental request for capital expenditure. If we
are going to get things up and running 12 to 18 months from now,
that port has to be up and running 2 to 3 months from now — that
is a wild guess on my part — but sooner than 12 to 18 months. But
what of that $45 million is going to help us move things from the
water onto the terminals, inland?
Ambassador Bremer. Thank you.
The port was opened on June 16th. We still do have some work
going on there under a previous contract of appropriated funds to
move, as you pointed out, some of the sunken hulks that are there.
The $45 million is roughly speaking going to be given for getting
electricity and water back into the port. It doesn't have power. It
is not connected to the grid. Putting in perimeter fencing and secu-
rity lighting — we have had problems of security around the port as
you pointed out, Congressman — that would take care of that.
I think the most important thing is getting container and bulk
handling equipment. The note I have here says we are supposed to
be able to unload 18,000 tons a day, that is the target, and to build
181
a new customs facility, because as we get more stuff coming
through a port, we have to have a customs faciUty.
I don't have any greater granularity on it than that, but that is
what that $45 million is intended to do.
Mr. Larsen. Mr. Chairman, just a quick followup. You are not
going to be in Baghdad this weekend. Could you make available
staff members while we are there, and we can ask some questions
to them?
Ambassador BREMER. Yes, surely.
Mr. Weldon. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Cole is recognized for a question of Ambassador Bremer and
then we will quickly follow with Mr. Reyes, Mr. Spratt.
For those who just came in, we are just doing questions of Am-
bassador Bremer. He has to leave in the next two minutes.
So Mr. Cole, you are next. This is not counting against your five-
minute time.
Mr. Cole. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I will try and
be quick and I know that the ambassador's time is quite valuable.
But first, just to thank you for what you are doing. I think we
have given you, frankly, one of the toughest jobs any American has
been asked to perform, and I just think you have done a magnifi-
cent job under extraordinarily difficult circumstances.
Ambassador Bremer. Thank you.
Mr. Cole. This may be a little bit beyond your purview, but, you
know, obviously one of the great challenges you face is getting an
economy up and running and a semblance of civil society restored
in an effort to expedite our withdrawal.
Along those lines, could you tell me, number one, where we are
at in any discussions we might be having with foreign governments
that hold sizable debts to Iraq, particularly debts that were obvi-
ously run up by Saddam Hussein?
And two, regardless of where we are at on that or how candid
you could be, how helpful would it be to be able to eliminate that
debt and how much would that speed on your pressure?
And then one third point. You know, sometimes it is a little bit
easier for Congress to address these issues in resolution form. I ac-
tually have a resolution on this issue, asking the French, the Ger-
mans and the Russians and others to forgive the debt as a con-
tribution toward reconstruction. So I would particularly appreciate
your observations on the foreign debt issue and Iraq recovery.
Ambassador Bremer. Thank you. Congressman.
Yes, there have been discussions. Effectively, there was a deci-
sion taken in June by the Group of Seven leading countries to sus-
pend all debt-servicing and payments on Iraqi debt for another 18
months, in other words to the end of 2004, to give us time to re-
negotiate the debt.
It would be very important for us to get that relieved. It is a
huge overhang over the Iraqi people. And I think any help Con-
gress could give would be welcome.
I would point out that Iraq owes us about $4 billion, so there is
something there for us.
Mr. Cole. Thank you very much.
Mr. Weldon. Mr. Reyes had a question for Ambassador Bremer.
Mr. Reyes. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
182
And thank you, Mr. Ambassador.
I have really a two-part question. And I have been to Iraq, and
one of the concerns I have is that we have got our troops in the
middle of a very difficult situation, as it pertains to groups, tribes,
ethnic and religious.
Can you tell us, what is our plan to get them to work coopera-
tively or work together, in terms of everything from standing up an
army to taking care of their own infrastructure business, all of
those things? What is our plan to get these groups to work to-
gether? Because that is something that I think should be a real
concern to us.
The second part of the question is, the $21 billion that you are
asking us to provide for reconstruction, does that have any money
built in for increased sabotage? Say, for instance, we build the elec-
trical grid or we build the water distribution system, they blow it
up. We build it again, they blow it up again. How much is built
in there, if we are not going to be able to control a lot of this sabo-
tage?
Ambassador Bremer. On the first question, about how we work
together, of course, the whole h3q)othesis of the president's strategy
is to turn responsibility for Iraq over to the Iraqis as quickly as it
responsibly can be done, in security, in economics, in politics.
And this supplemental request was put together with the Iraqi
ministries, as I explained earlier to Ms. Sanchez. That is to say,
this was done together with the Iraqis. So they are engaged. They
want to make this happen.
There were two very able members of the Iraqi cabinet here this
week — some of you may have met them, the Minister of Public
Works and the Minister of Electricity. They met with the President
and they said, "We will help you make this happen."
Actually, it is only $20 billion I have. The other billion goes to
the Afghans. The $20 billion assumes that by bringing up security,
we will get a relatively secure environment. But, obviously, we
have to make some allowance in our planning for the possibility
that they will continue to knock down towers.
I think, frankly, what happens here. Congressman, is we get to
a tipping point. We get to a point where it no longer is profitable
for either a terrorist or a looter to knock down towers, either be-
cause they are going to get shot or because they see if there are
political saboteurs, that it no longer has the big effect it used to
have because we have, for example, auxiliary generating capabili-
ties and they can't take out a whole system.
So at a certain point, you get to a tipping point and it no longer
is as enticing to attack these targets. That is our assumption.
Mr. Reyes. So there is money built in?
Ambassador Bremer. There is no particular line item.
Mr. Reyes. Oh, no, no. And that is not what I am asking. I am
just making sure that if what you have asked for here, that if it
is provided, that you don't have to come back.
Ambassador Bremer. We think this is what we need to do the
job.
Mr. Reyes. And the answer to your first question, I still didn't
understand what the plan is to get the Shiites to work with the
Sunnis.
183
Ambassador Bremer. Oh, I am sorry. I misunderstood your ques-
tion.
Well, the governing council is the most representative govern-
ment that has ever been in Iraq. It actually has a majority of Shi-
ites. And the Shiites and the Sunnis are working together there.
Obviously it is something we are going to continue to encourage
every way we can, particularly in what I call the elements of civic
society, the professional associations which cut across those sectar-
ian divides, where you can encourage people to work together.
Mr. Chairman, I am due at another hearing.
Mr. Weldon. Mr. Ambassador, we appreciate your time.
We understand and you are excused from this hearing. We ap-
preciate your working with us and staying as long as you have. We
thank you, especially for your efforts.
Ambassador Bremer. Thank you for the opportunity. I always
enjoy the opportunity to meet with representatives to talk about
this. It is an important and urgent subject about which I hope you
will agree with the President.
Mr. Weldon. Thank you very much and we will see you in Bagh-
dad.
Ambassador Bremer. Thank you.
With that, we will go back to our regular routine, which is the
five-minute questioning sequence. And Ms. Sanchez is now recog-
nized for her time.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And once again, thank you, gentlemen, for being here.
I just wanted to put two things on the record. The first is that
the ambassador had said that somehow the public does finance dif-
ferent than the private sector. And I just wanted to put on the
record, I actually did public financing and pretty much we did it
the same way. So we do plan in the public sector for more than 6
months or 18 months.
And I also wanted to note that he mentioned that the American
people were probably on the line for another $40 billion to $50 bil-
lion of reconstruction, after this $20 billion that we have in the
next 12 to 18 months.
And gentlemen, I would also like you to answer the question
about, you know, why we can't do more than a one-year operational
plan, with respect to this war.
But I also have another question with respect to our end-
strength and I guess more importantly about our troops on the
ground.
Yesterday, Secretary Rumsfeld said that he didn't think that
there were going to be any troops, really, coming from the inter-
national forces. So one of the things that the commanders have told
us over and over is that, "There are three things that we really
need to win the fight: Iraqi troops to join the fight, more inter-
national troops and more actionable intelligence on the enemy."
And clearly, what they are saying is they need more troops to win
the fight.
Since we are not going to see more international troops in the
combat zone, I would like to get your idea of what you think with
respect to this Iraqi army, whether you really are going to get it
up by next September, the three divisions that we are talking
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about, whether they are going to be just doing guard duty on
things or whether they are really going to be doing combat oper-
ations, whether they are going to be a truly independent Iraqi
army.
I was talking to General Zinni today and he seemed to think that
maybe we could do a division every year or 18 months, but not 3
by next September.
Until we get to that point, since we are probably not really going
to see international troops, what are we going to do about the
American troops that are actually facing guerrilla warfare in that
zone right now? Would you consider using Marine units, more spe-
cial forces, our National Guard units? And how are you going to
make this rotation happen, so that we have the troops there that
we currently have and even more, if that is really what some of our
commanders are saying?
General Abizaid. Well, thanks, Congresswoman, for that. I am
the person that you quoted, I believe. And I agree that there are
three components to this. Number one, get more security in the
hands of the Iraqis; number two, to the extent possible, build up
international capability; and number three, really focus our intel-
ligence.
But I have asked my commanders, down to brigade commander
level, whether or not they need more troops, more American troops,
in particular. And they have uniformly answered, no, and I agree
with their assessment.
Ms. Sanchez. I understand that. General. That is why I am ask-
ing what about the Iraqi army?
And I am not talking about the policemen, you know, because I
know that we have been told there are between 40,00 and 60,000,
whether it is civil or whether it is regular policemen, and that they
are trained and ready to go. I don't know how you do that, consid-
ering we don't train that many policemen, even here in the United
States, with all the training programs we have in a year, yet, four
months.
But I am actually talking about people who are really going to
be able to do something about helping our troops who are facing
some of this guerrilla warfare, either an independent Iraqi army
and what it is going to take to get that up and what is the time-
table, or international troops, which we now know are really not
arriving.
So how are we going to fill that gap? That is the question I have
for you: How are we going to fill that gap?
General Abizaid. First of all, we are already training the Iraqi
army. The first battalion graduates in one week. We will have
40,000 Iraqi soldiers on duty, that is 3 divisions' worth, in Septem-
ber-October of next year.
We have about 3,000 Iraqis in what we call the Iraqi Civil De-
fense Corps that are in company and battalion-size strength that
are working directly for our divisions. That number will go up
higher, to about 25,000 or 26,000, here within the next 6 or 7
months.
And that has been a very, very effective program. It has put a
lot of Iraqi capacity on the streets; that is military capacity that
relieves us of some of the burden.
185
We also have a facilities defense group that is over 20,000 right
now, that is essentially static guard force that we use to guard key
parts of the infrastructure and relieve our forces of that burden.
And then, finally, what I would like to say is that we haven't
given up completely on the international forces. Some of the talk
that you have heard is that we can't count on it in the very short
term, but I think it is possible that we will get a Turkish, Paki-
stani or other Muslim country that will come forward to provide a
third coalition division framework if we continue to work it hard.
It is a political issue, of course. We certainly would welcome ad-
ditional coalition forces, but we are not counting on it. And one of
the things that you are seeing play itself out in the press now, is
that as we make our contingency for not having a third coalition
division, it causes the Army to look very closely at who might come.
And clearly, that goes to National Guard units for the Army, but
it doesn't necessarily need to be National Guard units from the
Army; it could be Marine Corps units or some other solution or
combination thereof.
Perhaps General Keane would like to add something to that.
Ms. Sanchez. I would also ask, in the supplemental, these addi-
tional Reservists that may be called up to replace the 101st, which
is the one that I think that we are trying to pull out and that were
going to be replaced by international troops, but, of course, we can't
get our diplomatic efforts together to get these troops in, so it looks
like we are going to have to call up National Guard or something
else.
Where are we going to pay for that? Is that in this? Is that in
a separate bill, et cetera, et cetera?
General Keane. Yes, Congresswoman, it is in the supplemental,
because we knew that reality could present itself to us many
months ago when we were putting the plans for the supplemental
together. So from the Army's perspective, in the supplemental re-
quest are a request for two enhanced brigades in the event that the
multinational division does not materialize.
Mr. Weldon. The lady's time has expired.
Ms. Sanchez. I am told that the dollars are separate from the
$87 billion; that you have requested them, but they are separate.
You are telling me that they are in the supplemental?
Mr. Weldon. There are other members waiting to ask questions.
I think we should move on.
Mr. Cooper.
General Keane. I will answer the question. My information is
that it is in the supplemental. And if it is not, I will correct it for
the record.
Ms. Sanchez. Okay. Well, check on that.
Thank you. General.
Secretary WOLFOWITZ. And if I could just correct a point, Ambas-
sador Bremer didn't say that we would be coming for another $40
billion or $50 billion. I think what he referred to is the fact that
there is an anticipation of $40 billion or $50 billion of other re-
sources from the international communities and from Iraq's own
revenues.
186
Our $20 billion is aimed at getting the most urgent needs met
that will help our troops, help us bring our troops down and bridge
to the money that will come in more slowly.
Ms. Sanchez. I would appreciate it if the Secretary would put in
for the record in writing where you think those $40 billion to $50
billion from the international community will come. Thank you.
Mr. Weldon. I thank the lady.
The chair recognizes Mr. Wilson for five minutes.
Mr. Wilson of South Carolina. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And gentlemen, thank you very much for being here today.
And I am very grateful that I had the opportunity of being se-
lected by Congressman Skelton to go on the delegation with him
to Kuwait and Iraq. And I was very, very impressed by our mili-
tary forces, by the Coalition Provisional Authority, by the demo-
cratically elected Iraqi personnel that we ran into as we went all
over the country. It was just an extremely impressive opportunity
that I had to see the progress being made.
I had a real personal interest in it, in that, until six weeks ago
I was in your command, in the Army National Guard with the
218th Mechanized Infantry Brigade, and I just retired. But I ran
into a lieutenant who I had prepared his will as Judge Advocate
General (JAG) officer, so it really made it personal to me.
And I also have two sons in the Army National Guard and I have
another son who is an ensign in the Navy. So I have a very per-
sonal interest and appreciation of what you are doing.
The concern I have is the media coverage, the constant harping.
And for General Abizaid and General Keane, I would like your re-
sponse to the constant citing of quagmire. Are we in a quagmire
or are we not?
General Abizaid. Certainly, I don't think we are in a quagmire.
I think we are in a tough mission, and we have got to be patient.
We have got to be courageous.
But when I talk to the troops out in the field, all the way down
from the lowest level to the highest level, they know that we are
winning. But it is a slow win, and it is going to take some time.
Our troops are doing great work out there. And like you, I am
also very committed to this, because I have a son who is a soldier,
I have a son-in-law who is a soldier and I have a daughter who is
involved in the Department of Defense.
So all of us are deeply committed to the success of this mission.
And it is not a quagmire.
General Keane. Mr. Congressman, I will piggy-back on John's
answer there.
First of all, thank you for your service and for your many years
of service that you provided as a member of the Army National
Guard and also for your family's service.
This is an interesting question you are posing, because the re-
ality is that our media, rightfully so, reports every single day when
a soldier is hurt or killed. And that is appropriate. And we want
the American people to know what happened and who it happened
to and the circumstances surrounding it.
But the other reality is that every single day in Iraq our soldiers
are doing just magnificent work with Mr. Bremer's people in estab-
lishing a new government, political reconstruction and a physical
187
reconstruction of a country that was in destitute. And for some rea-
son, that story isn't being told any way, shape or form near the re-
aUty that is taken place there.
And it would provide balance to what is taking place. And it
would give people, I think also, a sense of worth in terms of what
their efforts are and the accomplishments that are taking place.
This is a serious issue, because if you accept the premise that our
opponents are attacking the political and moral will of the Amer-
ican people, that is their strategic objective, this issue we are dis-
cussing here is very important. Because the American people there-
fore need to have the other information to help balance the loss of
life that is taking place every day and to see, practically, what the
gain is for that loss of life and the value that is added to Iraq and
also to our own national security.
So it is a troublesome issue, and one that we are all very con-
cerned about, sitting at this table, and our leaders are all very con-
cerned about it, as well.
Mr. Wilson of South Carolina. And another way that they
shoot at you is to raise the specter of Vietnam. How, again. Gen-
eral Abizaid and General Keane, would you differentiate what we
are doing today from Vietnam?
General Keane. Well, I think it is dramatically different, but
there are also some parallels.
In Vietnam, militarily there were sanctuaries in Cambodia and
Laos. And we were not permitted to conduct a ground campaign
into North Vietnam. So there was a completely different military
setting.
We have made a regime change in Iraq. That has taken place.
And what we are attempting to do is provide the political and phys-
ical reconstruction of a new regime so it can serve its people. I
think that is dramatically different.
What may be similar is the fact that we are dealing with the pos-
sibilities of a protracted campaign here. Given the challenges we
have had in Bosnia and Kosovo, this does take time. And it does
require patience on the part of the American people.
And it is also a responsibility for those of us in government, mili-
tary leaders, speaking for myself, and also our political officials, to
educate the American people as much as we possibly can about
what this is really all about. And we also need the assistance of
the media to help in the education. Congressman.
General Abizaid. The only thing I would add to that. Congress-
man— and let me add my thanks to that of General Keane for your
service.
The only thing I would add is that it is just absolutely essential
that we tell you what we think and that we not let this thing get
perverted the way things started to get perverted in the Vietnam
War, where we didn't really tell the truth. We have to tell you the
truth every day. We have to call it hard when it is hard. We have
got to make sure people understand that this is a tough mission.
And if we do that, we go into this with our eyes open, it will be
okay.
Mr. Wilson of South Carolina. Thank you.
188
And again, it is reassuring to see you here. And I have to con-
clude that I also have a nephew in Kyrgyzstan in the Air Force,
so I am covering almost all the branches except Marines.
Thank you very much.
Mr. Weldon. The gentleman's time has expired.
The chair recognizes Mr. Cooper for five minutes.
Mr. Cooper. Thank the chair.
I would like to thank the panel for their great service to our na-
tion.
Due to the brevity of the time, let me make a couple of quick
points.
First, General Abizaid said it is important to make sure our
troops know their go-home date. Well, the 118th Air Wing, Na-
tional Guard, in Nashville, just returned home after eight great
months of service to our nation. They fly C-130s.
They have already been told they are about to go back. That is
a crushing blow to their morale, especially since they have counted
six or seven other C-130 units that have never been deployed. So
they do not know why they are having to do double sacrifice, when
others in the Guard have not even been called up once.
So I asked that question of an aide to Secretary Rumsfeld this
morning. I would like to have an answer to that question, please.
Secretary Wolfowitz?
Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I think that some of those people flew me
around in Iraq, when I was there in July and I had the same ques-
tion or a similar question. And I have asked for an answer. The
one I have gotten so far, I don't find satisfying, but we will try to
get you one that satisfies you, as well as me and, most importantly,
them.
Mr. Cooper. With your rank in the Pentagon, and you asked
that question in July and you still don't have an answer, we have
got disorganization in the ranks here. So let's please find an an-
swer to that promptly.
General Abizaid. Congressman, I would just like to add to this.
And first of all, we asked for capability at CENTCOM and we are
pretty demanding. And services are looking very hard to fill the re-
quirements that we asked them for. And so, in this case, it goes
to the Department of the Air Force. The Department of the Air
Force meets the requirement, sends it forward.
But I will discuss with the Air Force this particular unit and try
to understand their rationale for what they are doing, and I will
personally get back to you on it.
Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I think part of the answer. Congressman,
is there are different types of C-130s and that may be, in fact,
where the answer lays, but we haven't pinned it down yet.
General Abizaid. That is what I suspect.
Mr. Cooper. Well, we in the Volunteer State know that we have
the best. But it is unfortunate that our aircraft have missed two
scheduled maintenances already. So I would question even the via-
bility of those planes, if they are missing a lot of maintenance.
I thought General Abizaid made an extremely important point a
while ago when he said, "What is most important is for us to be
honest." And I worry that when the American public looks at the
$87 billion figure, and let's whittle it down to the $71 billion that
189
Congressman Spratt mentioned that was directly applicable to
Iraq, you know, Americans are busy, hardworking folks. They have
a short attention span.
And some people forget we have already appropriated $62 billion
for this, so that means it is $133 billion effort- already. And the
Democratic leader got a call on the night of September 7th from
the White House basically saying another $75 billion they hoped
would be forthcoming from allies, others or revenues, et cetera.
But as we see zero jrield from the President's U.N. speech yester-
day and we see a long delay in the oil revenues, it makes us think
that probably it is a $200 billion effort already and perhaps a $400
billion effort, as Congressman Spratt mentioned earlier.
We need to know the cost, as well as the benefits. And I would
agree with General Keane: It is very important that we encourage
our media and others to stress the good things that we are doing
over there, that it is important to be honest on both. Is this a $200
billion conflict? Is this a $400 billion conflict? Is this a $600 billion
conflict.
And granted, no one has a crystal ball. But the American public
is entitled to know this is not just an $87 billion conflict. And that
number alone was startling to them, because they were not fully
informed of that in advance.
But the number is so much larger than they are imagining today.
I think we need to get that number out there and help them under-
stand the need for this. And if we can't justify it, so be it; if we
can, so be it. But being truthful and honest is sometimes painful
up front.
And I see a lack of communication here, not only with this com-
mittee and this Congress, but also with the American people.
And your response?
Mr. Weldon. The ranking member is recognized.
Mr. Skelton. Yes. May I make a suggestion, Mr. Secretary? The
figure of $40 billion to $50 billion was mentioned earlier as coming
from foreign sources, is that correct? It is coming from foreign
sources?
Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Including Iraqi revenues.
Mr. Skelton. Yes, yes.
And understanding Mr. Cooper, the minority leader received a
phone call regarding $75 billion from foreign sources, is that cor-
rect, Mr. Cooper?
Mr. Cooper. Yes, and that was apparently received the night of
September 7th, the very evening the President made his speech to
the American people asking for $87 billion.
Mr. Skelton. May I make a suggestion, Mr. Secretary? As
money does come in from foreign sources, I would suggest that you
communicate that to this committee, so that we can know that our
allies are coming through, so we would not be saying they are not.
And I would strongly suggest that, you know, $1 billion from
here, $5 billion from there, et cetera, as it does come in and you
learn about it, it probably won't be front page, is my guess. But if
you could notify us, the chairman — I am sure he would notify ev-
eryone else — I think it would be very helpful to us in the future,
if I may make that suggestion.
190
Secretary WOLFOWITZ. It is a very good suggestion, Congressman
Skelton. And I am sure, in fact, we will be keeping you very closely
informed.
The major target for raising international funds is the donors'
conference that will take place in Madrid where Secretary Powell
will be representing us. And there is, I think, a meeting next week
in Madrid to go over the international assessment of needs.
And remember, there are several moving parts here. One is an
estimate of what the investment requirements will be for Iraq over
the next three to five years; that is where we get this $50 billion
to $75 billion number. There is what we have in the supplemental.
We have so far, before we came up for the supplemental, had
international pledges on the order of $1.5 billion; it is very small
compared to what we hope to get. But with leverage of what we
are asking of our own people, we think we can get much bigger
contributions from the international community.
And then there is Iraqi oil revenues, which have grown slower
than we had hoped but faster than some people have noticed. We
are now reaching close to the two million barrel a day mark. I be-
lieve the pre-war average was somewhat over two million barrels
a day, the pre-war peak was close to three million barrels a day.
So that can begin to bring in significant revenues.
Mr. Skelton. Well, if I may make that suggestion, if you just
communicate it to Chairman Hunter, I think he would tell the rest
of us.
Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Okay. Thanks so much.
Mr. Weldon. Thank the gentleman.
The gentleman from Texas is recognized for five minutes, Mr.
Reyes?
Mr. Reyes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you for being here. I know you have been here
a long time, but I think it is important that we all get an oppor-
tunity to voice our comments and our concerns.
I want to start by telling you that three and a half decades ago,
I was one of those young soldiers that if anybody asked me, we
were doing the right thing in Vietnam. We were fighting for democ-
racy, we were fighting for freedom, we were fighting for all the
good things that this country stood for. So I am not surprised that
today we have that same can-do attitude by our military.
In fact, I am very proud of our military. I will do anything and
everything that I can, both personally and as a Member of Con-
gress, to support our military.
And thank you, gentlemen, for your service, because I know to
you the term, "Vietnamization," is not something you have never
heard before.
And I am struck by the way that we are, in my opinion, trying
to avoid comparisons to Vietnam when we are talking, to use the
term "sanctuaries." I would submit, you know, when you have Iraq
and it is surrounded by Saudi Arabia, Syria and Iran, those prob-
ably are sanctuaries. I mean, given the information that we are
getting, in terms of how porous those borders are, the borders can
be used to bring people in and bring people out, bring goods in and
bring goods out.
191
Also, I am also struck by — and I was talking to Vic Snyder, who
is another Vietnam veteran — the fact that we are in a blame game
with the media, which is essentially another issue that became a
big issue in Vietnam during the Vietnam War because of the re-
porting.
As I look at how we are spending the reconstruction money, and
I looked here at $3.7 billion to expand access to safe drinking water
and improved sanitation, representing a border district where
colonias are prevalent, they don't have clean drinking water and
they don't have sanitation.
$875 million to rehabilitate irrigation systems and restore
marshlands; we on the border, the New Mexico-Texas border, be-
cause of a severe drought, are having a really tough time in terms
of water. And we have repeatedly asked for money to line canals
with concrete to be able to help in that regard with the seepage.
So that is an issue from a border district perspective.
$850 million for a new pediatric hospital and to upgrade hos-
pitals and clinics; big issue on the border, where 11 million people
currently live. El Paso does not have a pediatric hospital. We pay
some of the highest rates, and we have the most disproportionate
ratio between physicians and population.
$470 million to build houses, repair and rebuild government
buildings, and repair and rebuild roads and bridges; all stuff that
we desperately need in my district and all along the border.
So it is a tough sell. And people take note of this, that we are
spending $20 billion to reconstruct a foreign country when we can't
get the money to take care of our own people here in our country.
It is a tough sell.
And that is why I preface it by saying I will support our military,
but things like this are tough on those members that have some
same kinds of needs in our respective districts.
I have been to Iraq. And the trip that I was on, we talked to our
troops, who told us they didn't have enough armored Humvees.
They were having to spend the nights in their armored personnel
carriers or Humvees. There was a shortage. And today, it still ex-
ists, a shortage of body armor.
One group of soldiers told us that 55-gallon drums of oil, whose
flash point is 153 degrees, were exploding in the hot sun there in
Iraq. Those things I think we should have planned for.
In your statement, Mr. Secretary, you make mention of a Zogby
group poll that shows 70 percent expect their country to be better,
et cetera, et cetera. Who commissioned this poll? Do we know who
paid for this poll?
Secretary Wolfowitz. I don't, sir. It wasn't government commis-
sioned. It may have been a cooperative venture with the American
Enterprise Institute.
Mr. Reyes. With who?
Secretary WOLFOWITZ. American Enterprise Institute, as I read.
There is another poll, a recent one, a Gallup poll just from Bagh-
dad, with some fairly significant results in very much the same di-
rection. In fact, one of the more remarkable things in the Gallup
poll — and this is Baghdad, which is not the friendliest part of the
country for us — a majority of people say it was worth the sacrifice
of the invasion even though a majority say they are worse off today
192
than they were immediately before the war started. That is a pret-
ty powerful statement of how grateful they are for being rid of Sad-
dam.
Mr. Reyes. Sure. And Mr. Secretary, I agree with you that they
are grateful. And they should be grateful.
Secretary Wolfowitz. They should be.
Mr. Reyes. A couple of days ago, I was at Walter Reed on an-
other visit to our troops. They damn sure better be grateful, be-
cause our troops are making the ultimate sacrifice in some
cases
Secretary Wolfowitz. I agree with you.
Mr. Reyes [continuing]. Ajnd continue to make sacrifices.
If I can. General
Mr. Weldon. Quickly.
Mr. Reyes. Yes.
I just wanted your opinion. General, because you are an expert
in the Middle East. How do you see the issue of making sure that
the Shiites and the Sunnis and the Kurds and all of them come to-
gether and work together in order for us to be able to put Iraqis
in terms of their own control for their safety, for their military, for
their infrastructure?
From my perspective, everything that I have seen, everything
that I have read, other hearings that people have testified before
us, it is a tough situation. Since you are an expert on the Middle
East, I want to get your opinion on that.
Thank you very much.
General Abizaid. Thanks, Congressman.
I actually don't consider myself an expert on the Middle East.
But I would tell you that you have put your finger on a major prob-
lem, and that has to do primarily with the integration of the Sunni
community into the future of Iraq.
The Shia community is moving politically with us. The Kurdish
community is moving politically with us. Many of the other smaller
minority communities in Iraq are moving with us. But in the Sunni
community, you still have an awful lot of pro-Baathist feeling on
the one side and an increasing amount of extremist tension on the
other.
What we need to have happen, from a political point of view, to
bring them along, is a moderate political entity developed from the
Sunni community that will join us in the reconstruction and the fu-
ture of Iraq.
And you will see, when you look at the resistance that we face
in the country, it is almost all concentrated in the Sunni commu-
nity. Which doesn't mean there are not dangers elsewhere, because
there are. But right now, the key problem is bringing the Sunnis
along politically.
And we have had some good success in recruiting Sunni soldiers
into the new army and into the civil defense corps. So we are slow-
ly but surely breaking into the Sunni community, but we have a
lot of work to do.
Mr. Weldon. The gentlelady from California is recognized for
five minutes.
Ms. Davis of California. Thank you.
Thank you all for being here. Thank you for your leadership.
193
I know that many of the members have gone. I actually will be
arriving and going over to talk to troops and certainly to see on the
ground. I think we all want to see it for our own eyes. And it is
important that we have an opportunity to get a feel for the balance
because there is good and bad.
And unfortunately, we may not have nearly as many embedded
reporters as we had during the early part of the conflict. And that
is probably another need, as well.
I have also been to Walter Reed Hospital and had an opportunity
to talk to a number of soldiers there. And one thing that continues
to strike me is their concern — it is always a concern as I read in
a number of articles — that we don't know always who the enemy
is. That is difficult in wars. But in this particular one, that seems
to be something that people are struggling with.
My colleagues have mentioned the armored vehicles. That is
something that people have mentioned. One question is, are we
ready and geared up? Can we supply what we need?
But my second question really goes to the training, because we
can put people in armored vehicles. We can put them behind walls.
We can do all that we can. The key is to get the Iraqis there in-
stead of our men and women. But what are we doing regarding any
additional adaptation and training to enable people to help support
the Iraqi people so that we are not offending?
General Keane. Let me take the issue with the armored
Humvees and also the armored vests that Congressman Ortiz was
talking about.
It is true. We do not have as many up-armored Humvees, as we
refer to them, as we would like to have, in Iraq. Our requirement
is 1,700. We have 800 there. And we are producing them and mov-
ing them from other places as fast as we can. To complete that re-
quirement is going to take us a few more months. We are working
very hard on it. It is probably an appropriate criticism, why didn't
we have them all there to begin with.
Ms. Davis of California. Right.
General Keane. To be honest with you, we just did not expect
this level of violence in Phase Four that we are currently dealing
with. That is the straight answer.
The second thing, dealing with the vests themselves, we will
have — all of our soldiers have an outer vest that protects them
from fragmentation. But what we want to do is add to that, by put-
ting in a small armor protective insert to that in the front of their
chest and to protect their back and obviously we are protecting
vital organs. And that gives them an added degree of protection up
to a 7.62 weapon and caliber bullet. We will have that complete by
November.
And we are pretty proud of that and we have a deal with Amer-
ican industry to do that for every single soldier. We have had that
protection in Afghanistan. And we had that protection initially in
Iraq during, what we called. Phase Three combat operations for
those who were fighting the war themselves. And given the scale
of this operation and how it is affecting everybody, obviously not
just people who were doing the fighting, but people who were
transporting goods and services on roads and others who were just
doing a simple protection mission.
194
Ms. Davis of California. May I ask in the small time that is
left, are there any other needs then, in terms of protection, that
aren't being met? Is there anything else that I might be hearing
about or seeing that would concern me, that is not being met there,
in your eyes — in your view?
General Keane. No, in terms of actual protection, I think we are
on pretty solid ground in what I just discussed with you.
And the other thing is training. The United States Army had
foreseen this kind of conflict back in the 1980s, and we formed a
training center — initially at Fort Arkansas and now it is at Fort
Polk, that deals with this kind of warfare.
And we sent to that training center our Special Operations
Forces, our conventional forces and our air forces to deal with an
enemy that not just fights you from the front, but fought all around
and blended in with the population. And we created population
centers there with enemy inside them, so our people would develop
the skill sets in how to deal with an enemy that is embedded with
a population and you cannot distinguish the two.
And that has been a developmental process for our officers and
our non-commissioned officers for many years.
And the other thing is the Army is an experienced force in deal-
ing with these type of operations because we have conducted oper-
ations in Bosnia and Kosovo for a number of years, as well. The
scale of violence is, admittedly, different. But working in a different
culture, working with ethnic strife and working through difficult
problems on those streets in Bosnia and Kosovo has added to our
professional development.
So I think what you find in this force is what you see in the re-
sults, is enormous flexibility and adaptability to deal with a chang-
ing environment. You know, the American soldier and Marines and
others reflect the kind of values that the American people have and
we are a very adaptable, flexible force.
Ms. Davis of California. I would agree that there is tremen-
dous innovation and some adaptability, but I guess I would ask,
are these isolated incidents then that are being reported to us and,
again, are being shared with us from some of our men that are
here in the hospitals, that they didn't feel prepared? How can I
think about that? Does that concern you that that is one of the
issues that they are sharing?
General Keane. Well, if you are in a vehicle and you are am-
bushed, and you are harmed by that ambush, I think most soldiers
dealing with that situation are going to be surprised by it, sur-
prised by the violence of it. And while we prepare soldiers on how
to react to an ambush, the actual incident itself is brutal, it is ter-
rifying, and certainly would lead one to think by the shock of it,
"That maybe I wasn't as prepared to deal with that."
I mean, war has a very human dimension to it. You know, death
is always a silent companion to our soldiers every single day that
is taking place. And it would be impossible for us to prepare them
for everything that could happen to them. But we work very hard
at it.
And it is just not the physical preparation. There is also a tre-
mendous investment in the psychological preparation to deal with
it.
195
Mr. Weldon. The gentlelady's time has expired.
And just for the record, Chairman Hunter has asked Chairman
Hefley and I to co-chair a small task force, bipartisan task force,
to look specifically at shortfalls, and examples have been brought
forth, and to do interviews to assess whether or not there are other
areas we could be focusing more effort. And I am sure I will be
talking to the distinguished ranking member about that, whom I
will be happy to yield to.
Mr. Skelton. Yes. Thank you very much.
And at this time, I ask unanimous consent to place a statement
in the record from Congressman Tim Ryan and also a statement
from Congressman Jim Cooper.
Mr. Weldon. Without objection.
And now, we will move to five minutes. Mr. Simmons.
Mr. Simmons. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, I would like to associate myself with the remarks of
Mrs. Wilson. I believe that we do have an end-strength problem
and I think we have a responsibility to address it.
But more importantly, as somebody who has served over 30
years in the Reserves, I think the issue of logistics, civil affairs,
military police (MP) has been with us for a while. And I would en-
courage that we strengthen our capacities in the Active Component
in those areas.
Just yesterday a constituent who has a son overseas in civil af-
fairs said his son has been extended now beyond the original de-
ployment. And it looks like they will be extended again, because we
are just lacking in civil affairs in the Active components. So I
would definitely encourage that we address that issue.
I don't believe that the deployment of Guard and Reserves is a
draft by default, however. As somebody who served in the Reserves
over 33 years — I have worn these around my neck since 1965 — we
know what we are getting into when we sign off on it every year.
So it is not a draft by default.
I was drafted in 1965, but when my soldiers were deployed in the
mid-1990s, when my unit was activated for a year deployment this
past year, we weren't drafted, we were called to active duty to do
what we were trained to do. And I think that that is important to
distinguish.
That being said, I would like to address my questions to the
panel at two levels.
General Abizaid, you say on page six that you are focusing your
efforts in five areas to improve intelligence, and then you have four
others. I would like to ask you — to the extent you can in open ses-
sion— what you are doing to improve intelligence. I assume that is
at a tactical level.
And then, I would like to ask a second question of Secretary
Wolfowitz dealing with a more strategic issue on intelligence. And
if you could hold your responses until I complete that question.
Last fall there was a national intelligence estimate (NIE) with
key judgments on weapons of mass destruction. The bones of this
analysis have been released as a public document. It goes to the
issue that we judge that Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and
their efforts are subject to denial, deception, but they have a chemi-
cal weapons effort, they have a biological weapons effort. They are
196
working with unmanned aerial vehicles, aerial sprayers, covert
operatives, et cetera, et cetera.
Air Force intelligence and the State Department bureau of Intel-
ligence and Research (I&R) disagreed with parts of this analysis,
but their disagreements were published in the NIE, so this was
available to members of Congress who sought it out. Those judg-
ments were reflected in the national media all spring. This exam-
ple from Newsweek shows that the issue of weapons of mass de-
struction was discussed and how Iraq would fight and a whole se-
ries of judgments and comments were made in the national media
about this.
A question has been raised as to whether these strategic assess-
ments were correct, whether they were over-stated or in some re-
spects under-stated, and I understand that we are waiting for Mr.
Kay to publish his report. I think that report's very important, be-
cause I think the confidence of our people in our government goes
not only to our ability to perform our duty — and I think we are per-
forming our duty in a very excellent way in Iraq — but also our abil-
ity to assess our threats.
And my question to you, Mr. Wolfowitz, is, have we in all of this
examined the possibility that the Saddam Hussein regime, in an ef-
fort to protect itself, has created a Potemkin village of weapons of
mass destruction and has disinformed our own intelligence commu-
nity through various means? Has that possibility been evaluated?
And, if so, is there any way you can comment on that for the
record?
General Abizaid. Thank you, Congressman, let me take the first
question that your raised.
As you know, there is nothing more important in this type of con-
flict than good intelligence. In order to get at the cells, in order to
unravel them, in order to get at the enemy, you have really got to
have great intelligence. And it requires not only good people on the
ground that are doing it tactically, but a system all the way
through the interrogation that provides feedback from the ultimate
interrogation point back to the commanders on the ground.
And we have found that that feedback loop wasn't really working
the way that we wanted it too. And so, more interrogators, more
strategic analysts, more experts in this field are on the way to
work it. We have learned a lot of lessons from our experience at
Guantanamo.
We have to work this program very, very hard in order to close
the Intel gaps, because really actionable intelligence is more impor-
tant to us than another division, to be quite frank with you.
The other thing I would tell you is that we have to also under-
stand that we Americans probably will never, ever break in com-
pletely into the Iraqi culture to understand exactly what is going
on in a way that allows us to get the type of actionable intelligence
against terrorists and other fighters that are operating in this cel-
lular structure.
So it is important that we work with them — and we have found
over time that we have had more and more of them work with us,
but it is important that we continue that effort so we can get at
the problem.
Mr. Simmons. I thank you for that answer.
197
Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Let me just try to answer by saying, the
national intelligence estimates that you were quoting from I think
is substantially the national intelligence estimate that were done
five years ago in 1998.
It has been a rather consistent conclusion with very small dif-
ferences on the margin throughout the intelligence community. In
fact, there isn't always that level of agreement.
Second, we are talking about what they euphemistically call a
hard target, it may be a more graphic way to say a hard target.
Iraq is a place where people who said things they weren't supposed
to say could have their tongues cut out or their children murdered
for it. So it was very, very hard to find out what was actually going
on in that country.
And it is a difficult job. And no one should underestimate the dif-
ficulty of getting to the truth about a place like Iraq or North
Korea.
And if that is a hard target, I would say the terrorist networks
are even harder targets, because they are more obscure, they are
at least as ruthless. They are like gangsters, but much, much
worse and with more resources and more international networks at
their disposal.
So it seems to me that while it is obviously very important to
find out what was going on in Iraq, and that is what David Kay
is charged with doing and doing it for Director Tenet, and I am
sure it is going to be done very systematically and well. It also
seems to me that one of the lessons that we should draw in general
is a level of maturity about what intelligence can tell you about the
world and what it can't.
It is a tool, an indispensable tool. We learn marvelous things
through the efforts of ingenious people and frequently courageous
people. But particularly when it comes to terrorism, we are not
going to have a precise picture of our enemy and we are not going
to know when a threat is about to strike us.
And that is, in fact, why we believe that a major lesson of Sep-
tember 11th is you have to deal with this threat in a much more
systematic way and create a climate in which these people can't op-
erate, because you can't be good enough to prevent every single
thing they plan. We have done impressively well so far, but there
is just so much we don't know about that threat, it makes the old
Soviet Union look like a transparent display case.
Mr. Weldon. The gentleman's time has expired. I thank him for
his questions.
And special kudos for our two newer members of the committee
who have sat out this entire time, who will close out the question-
ing. We will start with Mr. Marshall and complete with Mr. Cole.
Mr. Marshall is recognized for five minutes.
Mr. Marshall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I was fortunate enough to participate in the Skelton-Forbes
CODEL that went to Iraq, not this past weekend, but the weekend
before. And I went, in part, because I had noticed a real disconnect
between what we were hearing here in the United States media-
wise about our progress and then reports we would get here in this
room from DOD representatives.
198
I wanted to go see for myself. I had been in Vietnam. I wanted
to see what I could do to help. I came back — and some here know
that I wrote an op-ed that was published and caused quite a bit
of furor here. I have been on a lot of talk shows and it got a few
folks upset.
I tell you, the straw that broke the camel's back — and this is
what I wanted to share with General Keane and General Abizaid —
was stopping in Ramstein, Germany — we had to on the way back;
some rule concerning the crew. We would have been happy to fly
all the way back and not stop at Ramstein — and getting up in the
base officers quarters (BOQ) the next morning and seeing this
newspaper, Stars and Stripes.
They say in the media, if it bleeds, it leads. Look at the headline:
"Iraqi Police Chief Killed Near Fallujah. First Armer Division (AD)
Soldier Dies Of Wounds After Separate Attack. Turn to page six,"
which I did, by the way, about six o'clock in the morning.
Once again, big headline, same headline, essentially, and about
12 column inches. It isn't until you get to the very end of the arti-
cle, the last two column inches, that this is reported.
First, "In Saddam's hometown of Tikrit, the U.S. military contin-
ued its raids, arresting five men suspected of helping to finance at-
tacks against the American-led occupation force." There's a quote.
And then the final three quarters of an inch, "Later Monday, dele-
gates from the province of Salahuddin, where Tikrit is located,
elected their first interim council; the first such election in more
than 30 years. The council's main tasks will include reconstruction
and resettlement of displaced Arabs and Kurds."
It is good news, and it is buried at the end of an article that I
think is in Stars and Stripes, because of what I said to start out
with, and that is and the media believes that if it bleeds, it leads.
And that is what Stars and Stripes is doing. And so, Stars and
Stripes itself is, sort of, contributing to what I perceive to be a
problem.
Now, General Keane, I though you were quite eloquent in re-
sponse to a similar message from Mr. Wilson, who's no longer with
us. And Randy Forbes had a similar message, as well. And you said
that we are in a battle here, that there is a strategic problem pre-
sented by this, because we are in a battle for the political and
moral will of the American people.
I take it a little bit further than that. From my experience, and
it is a microcosm, it is an absolute necessity to have the enthusias-
tic cooperation of Iraqis in this endeavor. We cannot do it our-
selves. We are not going to be able to ferret out a bunch of insur-
gents with a population that is willing to hide them. We just can't
do that. It didn't work in Vietnam; it won't work here. It will be
a miserable experience for us to attempt to do that.
So we have to have the willing cooperation of the Iraqis. And I
think our world has changed dramatically since Vietnam, as far as
communication is concerned. You have Al Jazeera; CNN is shown
over in the Middle East.
I would like your comments about how, if I am right, and there
is a bleak picture being presented, which I think may lead some
of us to say things that perhaps we ought not to be saying, that
199
can get to the wrong ears. Polls here in the United States show,
you know, concern that then gets spread in the Middle East.
What impact does that have on our ability to enlist the kind of
support we really need to have? We need to have Iraqis willing to
step up and take bullets, go ferret out the guerrillas and jail them,
kill them.
Any comment from the two of you? You are experts.
General Keane. Well, first of all, I agree with your premise that
the Iraqi people are part of their solution, certainly, and we have
to get their willing cooperation.
As General Abizaid has pointed out many times, the solution lies
there, in and among the people themselves, to turn in those who
would harm them and harm us.
But I also think that what you all have done here in going to
Iraq and finding out the facts for yourselves — every weekend you
are back in your districts, you are talking to the American people,
and you are educating them about what is really taking place. And
it is critical that the rest of the members also go and capture this
firsthand.
Certainly, communicating effectively within Iraq to the Iraqi peo-
ple in a quality way that they would want to tune in. And I think
that has been challenging for us. And enlisting the support of the
private sector to help us do some of that. And that is being done.
And I think it is very important.
So that I am convinced in my own mind that some of the
progress that is taking place throughout the country, if you were
living in the south, you don't understand the enormous progress
that has taken place in the north even though you are seeing some
progress every day. And that is particularly true within the core
of Baghdad itself.
But this issue of public communication and its relationship to an
open, democratic society is very important to us. And we have to
work it every day.
I think there is probably some things we can do to help the
media a little bit, in my own mind. And we don't talk about it, but
certainly the media has to be terrified going back and forth on the
roads inside Iraq, driving from Kuwait to Baghdad or driving from
Baghdad up to Mosul in pursuit of the story. And providing some
assistance to them to do some of that certainly is something we can
do. And we are in discussions about that.
General Abizaid, this is his territory and he can add to the com-
ments that I have made. But I really appreciate the conclusions
that you have made, Congressman, based on your visit there, be-
cause I think they are right on the mark.
Mr. Marshall. Thank you, sir.
General Abizaid. Well, Congressman, thanks very much.
I am often scratching my head how this great country of ours can
sell ever5^thing but itself. And it is amazing to me — and I don't
know that I have any better answers than anyone else, other than
to say this whole notion of strategic communication, especially with
the Iraqis, is absolutely essential. Because the most interesting
thing that I saw there right after the liberation was the thing that
proliferated first, that changed the way that Iraqis lived the most,
happened to be television antennas, satellite dishes, so they could
200
get Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya and all the various media. And, of
course, they get CNN International, et cetera.
But what they don't have is a CPA television station that has the
same quality of Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya that is telling our story.
And I know Ambassador Bremer and all of us are working hard to
figure our way through that.
But it is a challenge for us. And not only do we need to fix it
in Iraq, but we need to fix it for the future, because we have to
get our message out, especially to the part of the world where
CENTCOM is located, to make sure that people understand that,
"This isn't an occupation, this isn't a war against Islam. It is really
a battle of moderation against extremism. And if you come to the
side of moderation, peace and prosperity will come your way."
Mr. Weldon. The gentleman's time has expired.
Thank the gentleman.
Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Could I just say one thing?
Mr. Weldon. Yes. Absolutely.
Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Congressman, I appreciated your op-ed
very much. I read it with great interest.
There is no question we need to try to do a better job in commu-
nicating. I think there is also no question we will always have
some disadvantages. Ambassador Bremer, I think, called it a struc-
tural defect of a free media, that bad news leads.
We have another disadvantage in the Middle East, which is our
enemies have no reservation about putting out lies. And they get
them transmitted very quickly on all kinds of networks. And we do
have to deal with facts.
So in the end of the day, we need very powerful facts to overcome
the lies of our enemy. And the $20 billion request here for Iraqi re-
construction is a very powerful fact. It says to the Iraqi people that,
"We didn't come here to take your oil. We came here to build a new
country." And when the Congress passes that, it is going to be a
powerful message that has to get through.
And when those facts start being created on the ground and peo-
ple have electricity and they have police and they have courts, hon-
est courts — the first independent court in Iraq has just been stood
up — I do think the facts do start to speak in spite of all of the noise
that they have to penetrate.
Mr. Marshall. You are going to get your $20 billion, and you are
going to get it pretty quickly.
Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Thank you, sir. It is very important.
Mr. Weldon. Mr. Cole is recognized for five minutes.
Mr. Cole. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, gentlemen. It has been a very long day, I know,
for you. But you provide a service in being here and communicating
with us and, frankly, through us, with the rest of the country.
A couple of comments before the questions. I think, like a lot of
people, I am always bothered by the concept of end games and exit
strategies, because I am not exactly sure what that means. And it
implies to me that we have only been there just a little while and
in a little while we are going to leave.
When I read, I think, through the history, we have been there
for a very long time in a variety of ways now and dealing certainly
with this regime, in a military capacity, since at least 1990 and
201
1991 because of the threat it posed. And we were always there in
between.
We announced as our poHcy of this country in a previous admin-
istration that we wanted to remove this regime. And, frankly, as
you have all suggested, in the wake of September 1 1th that became
perhaps more imperative than we had realized. So we have been
there a very, very long time.
And I think we should think in terms of outcomes rather than
exit strategies, because that is really what we are about here. We
are not going to walk away from this part of the world. We are a
great global power with great responsibilities and great obligations
and profound interests. We are looking to create an area in the
world that makes sense for the people that live there and, obvi-
ously, for us, as well.
So that leads me to ask and direct a couple of questions toward
you.
Number one, we get a lot of information about how unsafe Iraq
is. And it certainly is, when American soldiers are being killed,
when innocent civilians are being killed.
But I would like to ask you to put that both in a military and
a civilian context in comparison to what had been going on in Iraq
to the Iraqi people for a decade before, when 300,000 people, if that
is the current estimate, had died over a 10-year period, when we
found dozens and dozens of mass graves. Is the average Iraqi citi-
zen safer today, frankly, after the arrival of coalition forces than
the average citizen was beforehand?
General Abizaid?
General Abizaid. Sir, we do hear a lot that Iraq is unsafe and
it is in chaos.
It certainly is not in chaos. And many of the places, I would de-
scribe them as being safe. As a matter of fact, in most of the places
that you would travel to in the south and in the north, it is what
I consider to be very stable. And that is how my commanders
would also characterize it.
There is no doubt that there are areas in the country that are
unsafe, as a result of action, improvised explosive devices, activity
from resistance groups, et cetera. And there is always the lack of
safety that comes about by having a terrorist problem, which cer-
tainly exists in many of the urban areas.
All that having been said, there is a clear problem in Iraq that
we must continue to wrestle with, which has to do with all the
criminals being let out. And so, from that regard, we have a lot of
work to do and we will need Iraqi police to help us solve that one.
But over time, we will start to get on top of that with the Iraqis.
But for the other, when you compare what life was like in Iraq
before to what it is like now, there is no comparison. How can you
compare the knock on the door in the middle of the night where
your family is dragged out and shot on the spot or where a group
of people are rounded up and put in a mass grave and buried alive?
It is just inconceivable to me that anyone would want to go back
to the good old days because Saddam made the trains run on time.
Mr. Cole. Well, he didn't do a very good job of that. And I would
suggest that it depends on which side of the gun you happen to be
on. I mean, there is a big difference between a systematic, systemic
202
and institutional violence directed at individuals and random and
sporadic violence that comes from armed and dangerous and hostile
minorities. I mean, when you have the apparatus of the state to
use against the individual, which is what we had there.
And frankly, you and your colleagues have freed the Iraqi people
from that, which is a blessing internally to them and a security
measure for people beyond the borders of the country. And we are
very grateful for that.
Yes, sir?
Secretary WOLFOWITZ. The poll numbers show it. I mean, the
Iraqis who say that their life is harder today than it was five
months ago, and yet in overwhelming numbers say that the inva-
sion was worth it, that getting rid of that criminal was worth it.
I think the Zogby poll identified half of Iraqis they polled had a
friend or relative who had been killed by the regime. We had this
terrible bomb go off in Najaf that killed 150 people in front of a
holy mosque. They don't hate us for it, they say the Baathists are
the people who did it — the people who murdered thousands of peo-
ple in that area before. So just the sheer level of brutality.
Bernie Kerik who was the former New York City police commis-
sioner, who was out there to stand up the police, had an op-ed in
the Wall Street Journal the other day. He mentioned something I
hadn't heard before that they have a videotape of Saddam Hussein
watching one of his generals eaten to death by dobermans because
he was suspected of disloyalty.
And this wasn't just brutal, it was sadistic, beyond belief, and
the Iraqi people are overwhelmingly relieved to be rid of it.
Mr. Cole. Yes. I would suggest in the long view of history, we
might, you know, 20 years from now, be asking ourselves why we
didn't act earlier, rather than why we acted when we did.
General Keane. You know, I think one of the things maybe
that — I know I misunderstood is that despite the horror of the re-
gime and the fact that was a rogue state, what I failed to grasp
is the stranglehold of fear that Saddam had on his people and what
the 35 years of cumulative repression would mean on the psychosis
of the people. And that leads to their general skepticism about the
permanence of our role there and could this regime possibly come
back again to infect them with that disease that they have had for
35 years.
And that reality was brought home, to me, from a woman in
Basra who took down a picture of Saddam Hussein because he had
bludgeoned her cousin to death. And she told a neighbor, who told
another neighbor in the apartment building who was a Baath
Party member. And they took the time and energy to imprison her
for three years for that minor act of defiance.
The level of control that they had over the people is just so dif-
ficult for us to comprehend. The last time, maybe, we saw some-
thing that was that comprehensive was during World War II in the
Nazi Party.
Mr. Cole. Let me ask one other question, if I may, Mr. Chair-
man.
And I agree with my good friend, Mr. Marshall. I think you are
going to get everything you asked for, and you certainly ought to.
203
But I am concerned, because we will have one level of debate
that goes on in the Congress that runs something like this. "I am
willing to fund the military effort, but I am not going to, you know,
pay for anything in terms of civilian reconstruction," or, "I want to
obligate, you know, Iraqi oil revenue to at some time, pay that
back," as if that money, in and of itself, is not needed to operate
the country and to, you know, frankly, help with the rebuilding
itself; it is simply that much less that we have to spend.
So I would ask you, one, from a military standpoint, if that sev-
ering took place between the civil expenditure and what is nec-
essary for the strictly military effort, how would that impact what
you are trying to achieve militarily?
And then I would ask a second question really directed to you,
Mr. Secretary, what would be the perception outside Iraq, in your
opinion, the broader Arab world, if we got ourselves into a situation
where we want $20 billion back or we want some sort of conces-
sions out of the energy industry, in exchange for the commitment
that we are being asked to make today?
General Abizaid. Thank you. Congressman.
I believe that severing the military part from what Ambassador
Bremer has requested for security and reconstruction would be a
very unwise thing to do.
The military part of the supplemental essentially keeps us where
we are. The part of the supplemental that Ambassador Bremer has
submitted allows us to build Iraqi security capacity very quickly.
And that is important for the ultimate outcome, which is to turn
Iraq over to Iraqis. That, after all, is what we are all after.
And so, I think that not only the $5 billion portion of his request
that deals with security is important, but I also believe that he has
targeted those areas in reconstruction that have a direct impact on
security that would allow us to move further, faster toward making
Iraq a getter place and turning it over to the Iraqis.
So I would urge Congress not to split it.
Mr. Cole. Mr. Secretary?
Secretary WOLFOWITZ. And I think Ambassador Bremer spoke
quite eloquently earlier and elsewhere also about the comparison
between what was done to Germany after World War I, when they
were saddled with crushing debts that helped to destroy an econ-
omy and bring in fascism.
First, is the generosity of the Marshall Plan from which we, in
the end of the day, benefited enormously. And I think that is the
spirit in which we need to approach a new Iraq. It is a spirit in
which we need to get the international community to approach it.
If we start acting like rug merchants then, believe me, you can only
guess what the rest of the international community will do.
I think it is very important to emphasize speed and generosity
here. Speed, above all, because, as General Abizaid just said, you
can't separate the reconstruction piece from the military piece. Get-
ting electricity going, getting police trained, getting prisons built,
is key to reducing the danger of our troops and ultimately reducing
their number.
Mr. Weldon. The gentleman's time has expired.
204
Mr. Cole. Well, again, you have been enormously generous with
your time. And thank you very much. I very much appreciate your
service to our country. Thank you.
Mr. Weldon. For a closing statement, I turn to the ranking
member, the distinguished gentlemen Ike Skelton.
Mr. Skelton. If I may have the last word — thank you, Mr.
Chairman — if anything came through clear on our trip, it was the
utter brutality of the Saddam Hussein regime and him especially.
And, Mr. Secretary, my recollection is you did an op-ed piece in
The Washington Post, spelling out his brutality — what? — two, three
weeks ago. Am I correct?
Secretary WOLFOWITZ. That is right. Even I was amazed at what
I saw when I was there.
Mr. Skelton. Well, we were horrified by what we saw and by
what we learned in talking with some Iraqis that we met.
You have a story to tell regarding this whole effort. You also
have a story to tell regarding the young folks in uniform, particu-
larly the Army, wonderful, wonderful work that they are doing, not
just the artillery men and infantry men doing patrol and police
work for which they were not trained. They are doing humani-
tarian work, up north, 3,001 projects that the young folks are
working on.
Soccer fields, schools, a lot of good things that these young Amer-
icans are doing. And it is a wonderful story I would urge you to
follow through on.
And a word of thanks to each of you for your service and a spe-
cial thanks to you for your testimony. I realize our comments may
be tough; they are sincere. Our comments, our questions may be
searching; they are sincere. But we are doing our constitutional
duty and you are doing yours in testifying as you have, and so a
special thanks for that.
Mr. Chairman, thanks so much.
Mr. Weldon. Thank you, Mr. Distinguished Ranking Member,
Ike, for the great service you provide to our country.
Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Sir, can I just say a word of thanks to
Congressman Skelton and Congressman Spratt, who gave me, I
think, about an hour and a half of time the other night to report
on their trip and the things they learned? They are not only sin-
cere, they are smart and well informed and we appreciate it enor-
mously.
Mr. Weldon. We thank the distinguished Secretary for his com-
ments and we all know that extremely well in this committee.
Let me just add two additional comments, before closing out the
hearing. The first is that hindsight, I think we should have put
more focus on the human rights abuses in Iraq. I told Secretary
Powell that in a classified briefing that we had among the mem-
bers, right before we went into the conflict, because the American
people understand that.
Aiid it wasn't too long ago — in fact, it was in 1999 — that the
French and the Germans pushed America to go into a conflict to
remove a sitting head of state in Yugoslavia, specifically because he
had committed human rights abuses, and that was Milosevic.
Well, if you look at the U.N. record, the record by people like the
former U.N. rapporteur for human rights, he made the statement
205
years ago that the Saddam Hussein regime had no equivalent since
World War II and Adolf Hitler. So while Milosevic was bad and he
is a war criminal, Saddam Hussein made Milosevic look like a com-
mon street thug.
And it was okay for France and Germany to push us into a
war — and not go through the U.N., by the way, because France and
Germany knew in 1999 that Russia would veto a U.N. resolution.
So France and Jacques Chirac convinced us to avoid the U.N., and
instead go to NATO for the one and only time NATO was used as
an offensive military force, to invade a non-NATO country.
And that seemed to somehow get lost in this country, that it was
Jacques Chirac and the Germans who pushed us into a war to re-
move a sitting head of state for human rights abuses, yet Saddam
Hussein's human rights abuses are worse than any human being
since Adolf Hitler, documented by Amnesty International and all
the other human rights organizations.
And so, for some people to somehow say that this is a different
scenario, I don't understand that. But I think what we didn't do is
perhaps make the human rights case strong enough and I am glad
that you wrote the op-ed that you did. Secretary Wolfowitz.
Second point about money: I think back to 1994 and 1995, I told
you we had 38 deployments during the 1990s, and all but one of
them were not paid for — the one was Desert Storm, where we reim-
bursed $50-some billion. And I think back to what we were told
about Bosnia. We weren't told what it could cost. We were told to
go in. And you know what we were told: "We will be out in one
year. You will be out in one year."
Well, this is 2003 and we are still in Bosnia. And do you know
how much we have spent there? Over $30 billion. But the dif-
ference is, back then we weren't told where the money would come
from. So the Pentagon had to find a way to shift dollars around,
apply taxes on items like across-the-board cuts to pay for our de-
ployment and our nation-building in Bosnia.
This administration — and I applaud you for it — has come to us
up front and they have said, "This is what it is going to cost," and
it is high. But I think the candor that you are giving us in telling
what the dollar amount is, is better than having us commit our-
selves and then find a way to force the Pentagon leaders to cut pro-
grams to pay for the cost that we should have had upfront, before
we made this commitment to go in and do the job that needs to
be done.
So I thank you for the great job you are doing. I think you will
find, as our colleagues on both side of the aisle have said, the sup-
port that you need to get this supplemental through. We will con-
tinue to ask tough questions and we will continue to be candid.
That is our job and that is our function as a co-equal branch of the
government.
But most importantly, we thank you for the service that you pro-
vided the country.
And to our men and women in uniform, we say that you are the
best. This committee has always been watching out for your inter-
ests. We have consistently worked in a bipartisan manner to put
more money in the defense budget than each year is asked for by
the Pentagon, because we want to give the support for the quality
206
of life that our families in the military need to continue to serve
America.
Thank you and this hearing now stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 5:16 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
APPENDIX
September 25, 2003
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
September 25, 2003
OPENING REMARKS OF CHAIRMAN HUNTER
Iraq Operations and Policy Hearing
September 25, 2003
The committee will come to order.
I want to welcome Secretary Wolfowitz, General Abizaid,
and Ambassador Bremer to the committee today.
Given your frequent appearances before this committee in
closed session over the past few months, I don't think formal
introductions are still necessary, but we may have a few guests in
the audience. For them, our witnesses are:
Honorable Paul D. Wolfowitz
Deputy Secretary of Defense
Ambassador L. Paul Bremer, III
Administrator
Coalition Provisional Authority
General John Abizaid, USA
Commander
United States Central Command
(211)
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It's been six months since coalition forces crossed the Iraqi
border and began combat operations to depose Saddam Hussein. It
took three weeks for our miHtary to reach Baghdad and topple the
regime, and then a few more days to conclude major combat
operations.
But that didn't end the war, which shouldn't surprise us.
After all, Hussein and his cronies ruled through terror. They have
nothing to gain — and everything to lose — from a peaceful, stable,
and democratic Iraq. So, regime die-hards, criminals, and foreign
fighters attack coalition forces in the forlorn hope that they can
drive us out, that they can retrieve power through terror against our
military, against the United Nations, and against defenseless Iraqi
civilians.
Instead of a strategy, they have terror. It's not going to beat
us on the battlefield, which they know they can't do. Instead, our
enemies are using terror to create the perception that Iraq is chaotic
and ungovernable in the hope that we will lose heart and cut our
commitment before the job is done. If the combination of pro-
2
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Saddam die-hards, criminals, and foreign jihadists succeed in their
aims, we will leave prematurely and Iraqi democracy will die
before the people of Iraq are ready and able to defend it.
That is what's at stake in Iraq today; whether our staying
power is stronger than that of the terrorists. For the sake of our
security, it must be.
Our military is up to the task. We have taken losses. They're
particularly painful because these soldiers are the best America has
to offer. But everyone over there — civilian or military — is now
serving on the front lines in the battle between terror and
civilization. That is as noble a responsibility as the fights against
fascism and communism were in the last century. :
There are some who would pass that responsibility off onto
the United Nations or who criticize the coalition mission in Iraq •
because it hasn't unfolded as neatly as a Hollywood screenplay.
But those critics rarely offer plans for winning the war on terror,
that go much beyond asking someone else to bear the burden.
They're missing the point.
3
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Iraq isn't like the peacekeeping or stability operations of the
1 990s. There, the United States sought to keep warring parties
apart. We tried to be fair and impartial. In theory, if not practice,
other states and the UN could also play that role.
In Iraq, the stakes are much, much higher. Regime holdouts
and foreign jihadists aren't flocking to Iraq to defend its people;
they're flocking to Iraq to kill Americans and restore a terrorist
regime. The forces of terror are genuine enemies of the United
States and all that we value. That makes this a war in which we
are active participants, not a peacekeeping exercise in which
American resources are interchangeable with those of the United
Nations.
Because our security depends on victory, we cannot entrust
either to the dictates of others. We can, should, and do welcome
allies in the fight against terror. Indeed, some 32 nations have
committed military resources to building a secure, stable, and
viable democracy in Iraq. Their contributions are important and
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more allies will be welcome. Nevertheless, our security demands
that we prevail, with or without them.
We're at war with terror. It's a war the terrorists started, but
it's a war we must finish on our terms.
As the President noted before the United Nations just two
days ago, peace comes from freedom, and we secure that freedom
with courage. We have years of hard work before us in Iraq; we
need to demonstrate the courage to do it.
Gentlemen, we all look forward to your testimony and
appreciate your appearance before the committee this afternoon.
Let me now recognize the committee's ranking Democrat,
Mr. Skelton, for any remarks he may wish to make.
[Following Mr. Skelton's remarks)
The entirety of our witnesses' prepared statements will be
entered into the record.
Ambassador Bremer, the floor is yours.
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Opening Statement for The Honorable Ike Skelton (D-MO),
Ranking Member, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of
Representatives
Full Committee Hearing on U.S. Policy and Operations in Iraq
September 25, 2003
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I join you in welcoming Secretary
Wolfowitz, Ambassador Bremer, and General Abizaid and thank
them for testifying before the committee. It's also good to see Dov
Zakheim with us again.
Just a few days ago 7 of us from this committee returned from
a most enlightening trip to Iraq. This nation's mission in Iraq is one
of the most important international efforts we have ever
undertaken. If our mission is successful there, we will bring
responsible self-government to a fractured nation, encourage
stability throughout the region, and prevent terrorists from taking
advantage of the current instability.
Our American forces, along with a few allies, especially British,
were magnificent on the battlefield — demonstrating the joint vision
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that those of us who worked on the Goldwater Nichols legislation
knew was possible. Our forces in combat reflected the superiority of
the education and training they received, from basic training to the
War Colleges.
But it is the conflict's aftermath that has given us a challenge
of monumental proportion. On September 4'\ 2002 and March IS**"
of this year, I wrote the President and various Secretaries involved
in national security issues warning of the dangers in planning for
the aftermath. I ask for unanimous consent that both of these letters
be placed in the record. To quote Sun-Tzu "to win victory is easy;
to preserve its fruits difficult." In order to preserve our victory, I
pointed out the importance of managing Iraq's transition to a post-
Saddam regime. My advice went unheeded.
Little attention was paid to the post war Iraq. To say that the
assumption made by many in the administration — that the Iraqis
would welcome us with open arms — was incorrect is an
understatement. It was a downright blunder. Worse yet, it is a
blunder that could have been avoided by taking into consideration
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the ethnic and tribal strains that existed, particularly the Baathist
Party's persistence. It breaks my heart to see troops wounded and
killed due to the lack of foresight in the post-victory planning.
I need not recount the short tour of duty of Retired Lt. Gen
Jay Gardner or all of the problems that resulted under Ambassador
Paul Bremer, but I can tell you this: America needs to win this
effort. Failure is not an option. That is why I support the
Administration's request for funds for Iraq as well as Afghanistan.
Congress must hold the administration accountable for every penny,
but we must provide it. Just like the idea that second place doesn't
count on the battlefield, there is no other choice but to finish the job
and to finish it fully here.
On September 14, 2003, our delegation flew from Baghdad
back to Kuwait. We had the honor of escorting the body of an
American soldier and peacemaker. This fine soldier, who was killed
in a guerilla attack in the valley of death in Baghdad, was
performing his daily duty with honor, ingenuity, and a dedication of
which we can all be proud.
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That American soldier and all of his brothers in arms in this
conflict put me in the mind of Lord Alfred Tennyson's poem, the
Charge of the Light Brigade. His second stanza says:
'Forward the Light Brigade!'
Was there a man dismay'd?
Not tho' the soldier knew
Some one had blunder'd:
Theirs not to make reply.
Theirs not to reason why.
Theirs but to do & die.
Into the valley of Death
Rode the six hundred.
This poem ssays more eloquently than I that the cost of poor
planning isn't just dollars, it is the lives of our best men and women.
It is because of these soldiers that we MUST win the peace in
Iraq; we have no other choice. There are other reasons too — for the
good of the Iraqi people, for the safety of the American people, and
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for the credibility and leadership of this nation — but it is also as
simple as saying that we owe it to these soldiers who have chosen but
"to do and die."
So, we have no choice. We are there, we are in Iraq. We can't
un-ring that bell. We must be successful. In my opinion this effort
can be won. But it can be lost. It is like a teeter-totter, it can go
either way. To lose in this historic mission would be to let down
those amazing American troops who have served and those who
have died in this cause. So let us go forward — with commitment,'
with accountability, and with better planning — to honor our soldiers
and bring this mission to its victorious conclusion.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
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Statement as Prepared for Delivery by Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz
Prepared for the House Armed Services Committee
September 25, 2003
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: One of the things that is most important
for troops facing danger on the front lines is the knowledge that their dedication and sacrifice is
appreciated by the people of America. On behalf of the men and women who serve our country
so faithfully and so well, let me begin by expressing gratitude to you, the Congress, for the
support that you have given our Armed Forces.
The young men and women who gave the ultimate sacrifice to liberate Iraq are heroes,
and we and the Iraqi people will remember them as the heroes that they were with profound
gratitude. The best thing we can do to honor their memory is to finish the job they began and
give the Iraqi people the opportunity to build a free and democratic country — a country that will
be forever indebted to the brave Americans who liberated it.
I've traveled to Afghanistan and Iraq, as have some of you, and I think you'll agree, Mr.
Chairman and members of the Committee, that the men and women of America's Armed Forces
support this national endeavor with the greatest pride, their very best efforts, a clear
understanding of their mission, and the strongest possible determination to win.
America: a Nation at War
Just two years removed from the most brutal attack on our nation's soil since Pearl
Harbor, we remain a nation at war. Like World War II and the Cold War. this war is fought on a
global stage. And like those previous conflicts, the stakes are enormous and our very freedom is
threatened. However, we also need to realize that this war is different from any previous war.
When the time came to make a choice, America took the fight to those who would rob us
and others of our freedom. We acted decisively to keep gathering threats from becoming even
more deadly attacks on the American people — because sitting back and hoping we don't get hit
again is not a strategy.
It will take more than killing and capturing terrorists and dismantling terrorist networks —
as important as that is. It will also require winning on what could be called the second front of
the war on terror, what the President called "building a just and peaceful world beyond the war
on terror," particularly in the Muslim world.
In the two years since September 1 1"*, there has been measurable progress in the global
arena in rounding up terrorists, dismantling their networks, and denying them the support and
sanctuary so important to their efforts. As a result of active cooperation among some 90
countries, hundreds of terrorists have been killed or captured and dozens of plots have been
broken up — some aimed at us here in the United States, others aimed at our allies in Europe or
elsewhere around the world. As the CIA has reported, although al Qaeda retains many middle
managers and foot soldiers, its group of senior planners — those who have bin Laden's trust and
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the requisite skills to organize and lead sophisticated attacks, esp)eciaily in an increasingly hostile
climate — are being whittled away. The successes to date should not lull us into a false sense of
security or a belief that the terrorist threat has been defeated. We have made significant
progress, but we have a long way to go.
Just six months after the war began in Iraq, there has also been measurable progress on
that front: We have removed a sadistic tyrant, and liberated 23 million Iraqis from a republic of
fear. The killing fields and execution chambers are no longer slaughtering innocents and the
genocide of the Marsh Arabs has been halted while a remnant of that ancient people still
survives. And we have captured or killed many of those who so brutally enforced the regime's
oppression of the Iraqi people and who made Iraq a sanctuary for terrorists.
This is not a war that's going to be won on defense. We need to kill and capture terrorists
on the streets of Iraq just as we need to do it here in the United States, just as we need to do it in
London and Paris and Jakarta and Riyadh, and all over the globe.
During my trip to Iraq, General Abizaid placed into larger perspective the battle in Iraq,
saying, "The whole difficulty in the global war on terrorism is that this is a phenomenon without
borders. And the heart of the problem is in this particular region, and the heart of the region
happens to be Iraq. If we can't be successful here, we won't be successful in the global war on
terrorism." Success in Iraq, said the general, offers "a chance, when you combine it with
initiatives in the Arab/Israeli theater and initiatives elsewhere, to make life better, to bring peace
to an area where people are very, very talented and resources are abundant, especially here in
Iraq."
We need to measure progress in Iraq not by a standard of perfection but by what is
reasonable to expect five months after the demise of an extraordinarily sadistic dictatorship that
tortured and abused Iraq and its people for 35 years. We should not compare Iraq today to what
we have achieved in this country after more than two centuries. A more reasonable standard
would be to look to what the countries of Central and Eastern Europe have achieved in the 14
years since the Berlin Wall came down. By that measure. Iraq has come an extraordinary
distance in just five months — progress all the more remarkable since a low-level war continues
by people who attack success in Iraq in order to defeat us and bring back tyranny to Iraq.
As the President said on the same day that he announced the end of major combat
operations, "We have difficult work to do in Iraq. We're bringing order to parts of that country
that remain dangerous. We're pursuing and finding leaders of the old regime, who will be held to
account for their crimes." And he added, "The transition from dictatorship to democracy wilt
take time, but it is worth every effort."
In a relatively short time, there have been strides in Iraq's transition to representative
government. But we won't know for some time the full extent of what we've achieved in Iraq.
We won't know, among other things, the degree of democracy that will develop in Iraq, the
effects this will have on the region as a whole, or the final costs of removing the threat of the
Hussein regime.
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These costs will be substantial, as we have said from the start. While none of us could
predict the future, no one ever claimed that waging the war on terrorism would be easy or
bloodless, quick or cheap. No one ever suggested that we should go it alone. No one should
have thought that winning the peace in Iraq would be quick or easy. In fact, for some time, we
have been stressing just the opposite.
Fortunately, our planning helped avert much damage to oil fields and infrastructure.
However, we still have to face the damage done to Iraq's infrastructure — not mainly from war,
but from years of neglect and often deliberate abuse. As Secretary Rumsfeld put it recently:
"Iraq was damaged by 30 years of Saddam Hussein, with a Stalinist-like economy, denying the
people of that country the money and the ftmds and the resources and the investments that they
could have had."
We embarked on this front of the war on terror recognizing that. the costs and
commitment would be considerable. But, we also recognized that the risks and costs of inaction
far outweighed the costs of action. Certainly two years removed from 9/1 1 is not so long a time
for us to forget that estimates of the economic cost of the September 1 1* attacks on New York
City alone over a space of three years would likely reach $100 billion. The cost to the national
economy in terms of lost productivity, sales, jobs, airline revenue, and countless other areas were
estimated to be hundreds of billions of dollars beyond that. And, of course, the cost in human
lives, and the pain and suffering of so many thousands of Americans who lost loved ones that
day can never be calculated.
In that context, we estimated that the costs of inaction included:
• The risk of another disaster on the scale of 9/1 1 or perhaps 10 or 100 times greater;
• Continuation of a status quo in the Middle East that has bred terrorism over the last
decades;
• Continued costs of containing Iraq, measured in lives and dollars, and also in the
propaganda it provided Usama bin Laden and the sUain it placed on key regional
countries.
We knew there were risks. But, on balance, we considered that the risks of inaction were
much greater than the risks and costs of action, even though the President recognized the
significant risks of action. These included:
• The potential of a large war, with very heavy American casualties;
• The potential for massive destruction of Iraqi oil fields and accompanying environmental
catastrophe;
• The possibility of a large-scale humanitarian crisis;
• The possibility of military intervention by neighboring countries;
• The possibility of ethnic violence particularly among Arabs, Kurds and Turkoman in
Northern Iraq;
• The possibility of anti- American religious extremism particularly among the large Shia
population of Southern Iraq;
• The possibility of bloody and protracted urban warfare in Baghdad or elsewhere;
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The possibility of Israel being drawn into the war;
The possible threats to friendly Arab governments;
The possible use of chemical or biological weapons.
Most of these terrible outcomes were avoided, in part because of the way we dealt with
them. But no amount of planning can make war predictable, much less risk-free. We repeatedly
said that making accurate estimates of major combat and recovery costs would be extremely
difficult — as difficult as estimating the risks of continuing to treat terrorism as a manageable
international evil.
As the President said in his recent address to the nation: "Our strategy in Iraq has three
objectives: destroying the terrorists, enlisting the support of other nations for a free Iraq and
helping Iraqis assume responsibility for their own defense and their own future.
"First, we are taking direct action against the terrorists in the Iraqi theater, which is the
surest way to prevent future attacks on coalition forces and the Iraqi people. ...
"Second, we are committed to expanding international cooperation in the recovery and
security of Iraq, just as we are in Afghanistan....
"Third, we are encouraging the orderly transfer of sovereignty and authority to the Iraqi
people. Our coalition came to Iraq as liberators and we will depart as liberators."
Helping Win the War on Terror
To help this nation finish what it has begun and continue to victory in the war on terror,
Vm here today to ask for help in three critical areas:
1 . Obtaining the appropriation and the authority to train and equip foreign military forces; and,
2. Giving us the flexibility to reduce the stress on active duty end strength by making it easier to
convert military jobs to civilian jobs.
3. Supporting the President's request for adequate resources to wage and win this war and
sending the message to friend and foe that we have the will to finish the job.
Training and equipping foreign military forces: In the Authorization Bill, we asked the
Congress to provide us with $200 million in authority to train and equip foreign forces that are
fighting alongside our forces — and often in place of our forces. Both the House and Senate
deleted that provision from the bill.
We need flexibility to respond quickly to operational needs so we can benefit from
contributions that foreign military forces could make — most critically those in Iraq and
Afghanistan and friendly nations nearby. In some cases, however, these forces are unable, or are
limited in their ability, to provide effective assistance without additional equipment, training, or
funding. Currently, when we try to assist these countries, we operate with a patchwork of
authorities whose gaps constrain our overall efforts— gaps such as dollar limitations, the ability
to pay for salaries of foreign military trainees, and the pending expiration of authorities. The
225
language we are requesting would cover these gaps, and would apply to Iraq, Afghanistan and
other countries in those regions.
General Abizaid and his commanders have said repeatedly that not only don't they need
more American troops, they don't want more American troops. What they do want is more
international troops to share the burden of providing stability forces and to reduce the political
liability of a US-only occupation. What they need most of all are Iraqi police and security forces
who are prepared to fight and die in defense of a free Iraq.
Former New York City police chief Bernard Kerik, who jitst completed four months
helping Iraqis rebuild their police force, also favors empowering Iraqis over sending in more
American troops. He said: "If you triple the number of coalition forces, you'll probably triple
the attacks on the troops. The future is not in the military but in getting control back in the hands
of the Iraqi people."
Currently we have more than 60.000 Iraqis serving with us in providing security for their
country, making Iraqis the single largest member of the coalition after the United States. These
Iraqis are fighting with us and taking casualties with us.
Their numbers are made up of roughly 40,000 members of the Iraqi police, as well as
members of the new Facility Protection Service, the new Iraqi Civil Defense Corps, and the
border guards. By January, we plan to have 15,000 members of the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps,
and 20,000 members of the Facility Protection Service.
With additional resources, those numbers could be expanded further, because there is no
shortage of Iraqis willing to serve. We also have plans to field 66.000 police and 3 divisions of
the new Iraqi Army which could be speeded up substantially with the additional resources the
President has called for.
We should not find that we are held back by a shortage of money or authority to give
those willing and able to fight on our side the projjer training and equipment to do the job.
Converting military jobs to civilian jobs: As long as we have to continue deploying large
numbers of ground forces in Iraq, the stress on the force, both active and reserve, will be
considerable. We are working to reduce that stress by accelerating the pace at which Iraqis
assume responsibility for the security of their own country, by seeking additional contributions
of coalition forces, and by examining ways that contract and civilian personnel may be able to
provide some of the support capabilities now provided by reserve formations.
In this regard, it will also help if Congress gives us the authority we have requested to
transform the management of our civilian personnel, to facilitate the rapid shaping of our civil
work force to meet immediate needs. With the fiexibiliiy requested in the FY 2004 National
Defense Authorization Bill, the Department plans to convert military in functions such as Law
Enforcement, Personnel Support, Installation Management, Administrative Support for
Recruiters, and Training Development. The converted military would be used to provide Light
Infantry and additional high demand capabilities such as Military Police.
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The National Security Personnel System we seek is essential to managing the demands of
the Global War on Terrorism without increasing military end strength. While estimates vary, it
is widely believed that tens of thousands of military billets are today devoted to activities and
responsibilities that could be assumed by civilian government personnel. The use of military
personnel instead often reflects the great flexibility that the statutes governing military personnel
provide, in sharp contrast to many of the rules under which we must manage civilian personnel.
We realize that achieving the goal of reforming the Defense Department's civil service
system requires some bold moves to constitute real transformation. We are asking you now to
help us take such a bold step and help us with our proposed National Security Personnel System.
That we are fighting a tough and sustained war on terrorism only makes the need to take that step
to reform our personnel system even more pressing.
Providing the necessary resources: We fight this war to win. That is why, in his recent
address to the nation. President Bush submitted a request to Congress for additional funds to pay
for military and intelligence operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and elsewhere in the war on
terror and to help pay for the recovery of both nations.
The bulk of the President's request ($66 billion) will ensure that our men and women in
uniform have the resources they need to complete their missions in the war on terror. The rest
($21 billion) provides for essential investments in infrastructure and security for Iraq and
Afghanistan that can help bring the stability our forces need.
The undertaking in Iraq, as the President told the nation a couple weeks ago, is "difficult
and costly — yet worthy of our country, and critical to our security." This undertaking is so
critical because, as the President said, "Iraq is now the central front" in the war on terror.
"Enemies of freedom," he said, "are making a desperate stand there — and there they must be
defeated."
There is no question that a powerfti! signal will go out to the terrorists and their allies that
defeat in Iraq will be theirs when Congress acts quickly on the President's request. Prompt
approval is especially vital for the Coalition Provision Authority (CPA) to continue recovery at a
time when rapid progress is essential to a stable and peaceful Iraq. Accelerating progress now
can hold down long-term recovery costs and hasten a scaling back of U.S. operations and troops
levels. Adequate funding now is also critical to getting the Iraqi economy moving, which will
improve security and strengthen the Iraqi people's resolve to defeat those seeking to sabotage
success.
The costs are large, but it is a battle that we can win and we must win, because victory in
this battle will be a major victory in the war on terrorism and a major defeat for the global
terrorist networks. As large as these costs are, they are still small compared to just the economic
price that the attacks of September 1 1 have inflicted, to say nothing of the terrible loss of
priceless human life.
America is behind the troops: By those actions and what Congress says, you can help us
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send the message to the world, and particularly to our enemies, that America is behind her
troops, and has the staying power to fight this war on terrorism to victory.
The Baathist bitter enders and their foreign terrorist allies believe that if they inflict
casualties on us, like in Beirut and Somalia, we will give up and go home.
The sooner these terrorists understand clearly that our will can't be broken and that the
Iraqi people, despite hardship and difficulty, will persevere in building their new society — the
sooner the terrorists will come to terms with their defeat.
That is why we urge the Congress to expedite passage of this supplemental request to
cover ongoing military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq to ensure our troops have the
resources they need to complete their mission.
Indivisibility of Recovery and Security: The request for supplemental funds for Iraq
addresses the situation there as a whole — it recognizes that the issues of security, recovery of the
infrastructure, invigoration of the economy, and the creation of a new political reality are all of a
piece. Progress in one area depends on, and contributes to, progress in the others.
It would be a mistake to argue that, while the military portion demands quick passage -
to "support the troops" - it would be safe to delay the civilian part, and perhaps condition it on a
host of factors, some of which involve secondary matters, and others which we simply do not
control. This approach misunderstands the situation. Standing up Iraqi police and security
forces will hasten the day when our troops can step back. Progress in recovery — especially on
items that affect people's daily lives, such as electric power production and transmission and
employment — will strengthen the sense among the Iraqi population that the transition that began
with the overthrow of Saddam's regime can and will result in a prosperous and free Iraq.
Delaying funds for the acceleration of the recovery effort doesn't '"support the troops" - it
makes their job that much harder and more dangerous.
A speedy bipartisan passage of the entire supplemental request would send a strong
message to our friends and our enemies — and to our troops, who are giving us 1 00 percent.
They need to know we are behind them 100 percent.
View of the Military Front: Afghanistan: The United States remains strongly committed
to success in Afghanistan, which entails the establishment of a moderate and democratic political
order that is folly representative of the Afghan people. Afghanistan has suffered a great deal
over the last quarter century and it has come a long way since the fall of the Taliban regime in
2001 . The United States shares and supports President Karzai's and the Afghan people's hopes
for a peaceful, democratic, and prosperous country that can serve as a partner in the region and
as a model for other Muslim states.
As part of our ongoing commitment to success in Afghanistan, we seek to accelerate the
progress the United States, our Coalition partners, and our allies in the Afghan government have
been making to bring lasting peace to the war torn country.
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We have accomplished a great deal and we recognize that much more remains to be done
to ensure success in Afghanistan. The war on terror is one aspect of our involvement in
Afghanistan. The other is our commitment to promoting a functioning moderate and democratic
political order that can serve as the foundation for lasting peace in the country. Realizing this
vision will require increased commitment on the part of the United States and the international
community.
Iraq: There are still many challenges remaining for our troops in Iraq. And. as our
commanders consider military operations in Iraq, there are at least two things they tell us they
would like more of Number one is Iraqis fighting to secure their own liberty, which I mentioned
earlier.
Their number two critical item is forces from other countries, an.d we're making
substantial progress there. So far, 31 nations have sent over 23,000 personnel to Iraq. So far, 60
nations have made pledges or contributions totaling about $1.5 billion. In southern Iraq, Polish
forces have assumed command of an international division, and we are hoping to add another
division above and beyond that. The President's request will provide financial support for the
troops of our coalition partners with limited resources who are interested in providing support.
In that same multinational division, the Spanish brigade has taken charge of the other
major holy Shia city, Najaf Further south, under the British multinational division, an Italian
infantry brigade of 2,300 — including some 400 carabinieri — is performing security and stability
operations.
To facilitate more international assistance, we are actively pursuing the option of a UN
resolution, which would lead other countries, whose laws or domestic politics require such a
resolution, to contribute more.
Before the war began, we consistently voiced our support for another UN resolution,
because there are some countries for whom that is necessary for them to commit troops. For
example, 1 said in March that "it would be nice to get another resolution because there are some
countries for whom that's crucial." We are encouraged in the efforts to finally bring that about.
Before the war, there was also a unified, interagency policy to appeal for international
troops. We sought international participation in this effort from the beginning. In December, I
went to NATO to seek support from out Allies in the event of war and in post-war operations. In
March, Secretary Rumsfeld told members of the SAC and HAC that the enormity of the
challenge in tackling the recovery of Iraq "will require a significant international effort."
From the outset, our diplomatic effort that began last November included identifying and
engaging countries that might be prepared to contribute assets for an Iraqi stabilization effort in
the eventuality of a conflict. Not surprisingly, it was only after the conflict itself had begun that
detailed discussions on this question began with most of the interested countries. In planning for
the post-conflict phase, we repeatedly engaged those interested countries bilaterally and
repeatedly solicited additional countries for potential contributions. We continue to do so.
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The decision-making process for countries contributing to the stabilization effort has
taken the time necessary to address and resolve legal, financial, transportation, equipment, and
sustainment issues. Arrangements for most of the 3 1 countries and the 23,000 troops that are
now deployed were completed late in the spring. From the start, our planning effort has taken
into account this necessary time lag from decision to deployment and we have acted to expedite
deployment by other countries wherever possible. We continue to plan in advance in this way
with the approximately 14 countries with which we are in ongoing dialogues about possible
future contributions.
In addition, we went to the UN before and after the conflict and Security Council
Resolutions 1483 and 1500 are evidence of broad international understanding and support for
what we are doing.
Specifically, Resolution 1483 appeals to member states to contribute to security in Iraq,
among other things. The Administration regarded this as a sufficient mandate for foreign forces.
However, some others did not. Therefore, in July we began working with our colleagues in the
State Department on the outlines of a new resolution that would go beyond 1483 and 1 500 and
more explicitly endorse international participation in the security of Iraq. Our current efforts at
the UN are a direct result of those efforts.
Our efforts to attract international help for the post-war phase have already been
successful. Thirty-one nations have sent military forces to Iraq, and they are augmenting and in
some instances replacing U.S. troops. We believe that the recovery of Iraq is a global security
task in which the international community should be involved, and we expect additional foreign
force contributions.
This interagency effort to give our commanders more international support will continue.
Iraqi People are With Us
The Zogby Group conducted a poll in August — the most scientific poll yet conducted of
Iraqi public opinion — that gives some sense of how Iraqis felt four months after the fall of
Saddam's tyranny. The results are generally heartening. For example:
• 70% said they expect their country and their personal lives to be better five years from now.
• 60% opposed Islamic government; 33% were in favor. Despite what one might gather from
the press, Shi'a were less receptive to Islamic government than Sunnis.
• By a heavy margin of 74% to 1 8%, Iraqis favored punishing Baath party leaders who had
committed crimes.
Finally, more than two-thirds of those who expressed an opinion wanted Coalition troops to
remain in Iraq for at least another year.
These numbers offer some encouragement, especially as we continue the difficult work
we have left to do. Even though the enemy targets our success, we will win the peace. But, we
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won't win it alone. We don't need American troops to guard every mile of electrical cable. The
real center of gravity will come from the Iraqi people themselves — they know who and where
the criminals are. And they have the most at stake — their fiiture.
When inevitable challenges and controversies arise, we should remind ourselves that
most of the people of Iraq are deeply grateful for what our incredibly brave American and
coalition forces have done to liberate them from Saddam's republic of fear.
When we've shown Iraqis we mean to stay until the old regime is crushed, and its
criminals punished - and that we are equally determined to give their country back to them -
they will know they can truly begin to build a society and government of, by and for the Iraqi
people.
Planning: It seems to have become fashionable for some to say that there were no plans
for post-war Iraq. These suggestions somehow ignore the fact that, without a plan, it we could
not have gone from no Iraqis helping us the day Baghdad fell to where more than 60,000 Iraqis
are helping us today, as police and other security forces in the field.
A military or political-military plan is not like a blueprint and detailed schedule for the
building of a skyscraper, that is, a statement of exactly where every I-beam, window, pipe or
electric circuit is supposed to go, and in what order it is to be installed.
In truth, the first principle of military planning is that no plan survives first contact with
the enemy. Unlike the Stalinist planning system favored by Saddam Hussein, we know that we
caruiot prescribe every detail from Washington or Centcom. Instead, we strive to create a
construct, engage good people, give them the resources to do the job, and support them as they
make adjustments to reality on the ground. In the course of several months, this approach has
succeeded. In fact, our commanders in Iraq who have served in the Balkans tell us that we have
moved substantially faster in Iraq than we moved in Bosnia or Kosovo. One particularly
important achievement is the standup of the Iraqi security force.
America's troops and those of our coalition partners — among whom we would emphasize
are the Iraqis themselves — are determined to win. And they will win, if we continue to give
them the moral and material support they need to do the job. As the President said recently, our
forces are "on the offensive." And as Army Vice Chief of Staff Gen. John Keane said in
congressional testimony, "They bring the values of the American people to this conflict. They
understand firmness, they understand determination. But they also understand compassion.
Those values are on display every day as they switch from dealing with an enemy to taking care
of a family."
I've seen the troops in Iraq, as have many of you here. And 1 think you'll agree that Gen.
Keane is absolutely right.
America's armed forces will not be deterred from their mission by desperate acts of a
dying regime or ideology. And there is no question that America's commitment to secure a
10
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peaceful Iraq, back home, must be at least equal to the commitment of our troops and to the
stakes, for it is related to nothing less than our security and that of our children and
grandchildren.
We look forward to doing our part to work with the members of Congress to help support
our Armed Forces throughout the world who are doing their part to make America and her
people more secure. We thank you for your support.
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Page 1 of 19
Statement as Prepared for Delivery by
Ambassador L. Paul Bremer, III
Prepared for the House Armed Services
Committee
September 25, 2003
Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee,
thank you for this opportunity to discuss the
President's supplemental request.
Before I begin, I want to pay tribute to the men
and women of our armed services. Leading a
coalition, our armed forces delivered a military
victory without precedent.
In roughly three weeks they liberated a country
larger than Germany and Italy combined. And
they did so with forces smaller than the Army of
the Potomac.
Our armed forces accomplished all this while
absorbing and inflicting minimal casualties.
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Iraqis understood that we tried to spare the
innocent.
Mr. Chairman, I know that you and all
Americans hate waking up to hear a newscast
that begins, "Last night another American
solider was killed in Iraq... " I am among the
first to know of those deaths and no one regrets
them more than I do.
But these deaths, painful as they are, are not
senseless. They are part of the price we pay for
civilization, for a world that refuses to tolerate
terrorism and genocide and weapons of mass
destruction.
Those who ambush Coalition forces, who set the
truck bombs, are trying to thwart constitutional
and democratic government in Iraq. They will
win some batdes, but they are going to lose their
war with history.
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President Bush's vision provides for an Iraq
made secure through the efforts of Iraqis. It
provides for an Iraqi economy based on sound
economic principles and bolstered by a reliable
infrastructure. And finally, the President's plan
provides for a democratic and sovereign Iraq at
the earliest reasonable date.
If we fail to recreate Iraq as a sovereign
democracy sustained by a solid economy we will
have handed the terrorists a gift.
We must deny terrorists them the gift of state
sponsorship, which they enjoyed under Saddam,
and must deny them the chaos such as they
thrived in during the 1980s in Lebanon.
But creating a sovereign, democratic,
constitutional and prosperous Iraq deals a blow
to terrorists. It gives the lie to those who
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describe us as enemies of Islam, enemies of the
Arabs and enemies of the poor.
That is why the President's request has to be
seen as an important element in the global war
on terrorism.
Our national experience teaches us how to
consolidate a military victory.
We did not have that experience we emerged
victorious from World War I. Many had
opposed the war and wanted to solve problems
at home. We won the war and did not
consolidate the peace.
We know what happened. Extremism, bred in a
swamp of despair, bankruptcy and unpayable
debts, gave the world Fascism in Italy and
Nazism in Germany— and another World War.
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After that conflict we showed we had learned
that military victory must be followed by a
program to secure the peace.
In 1948 the greatest generation responded with
the boldest, most generous and most productive
act of statesmanship in the past century— the
Marshall Plan.
When Secretary of State George C. Marshall first
described the Marshall plan he laid out some
truths that resonate today.
"Its purpose,'* Marshall said, "should be the
revival of a working economy... so as to permit
the emergence of political and social conditions
in which free institutions can exist."
The Marshall Plan, enacted with overwhelming
bipartisan support, set war-torn Europe on the
path to the freedom and prosperity which
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Europeans enjoy today. After a thousand years
as a cockpit of war Europe became a cradle of
peace in just two generations.
The grants to Iraq the President seeks bespeak
grandeur of vision equal to the one which
created the free world at the end of World War II.
Iraqis living in freedom with dignity will set an
example in this troubled region which so often
spawns terrorists. A stable peaceful
economically productive Iraq will serve
American interests by making America safer.
There are some things I would like to point out
about this supplemental request:
• We have a definite plan with milestones and
dates.
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• No one part of the supplemental is
dispensable and no part is more important
than the others.
• This is urgent. The urgenq^ of military
operations is self-evident. The funds for
non-military action in Iraq are equally
urgent. Most Iraqis welcomed us as
liberators. Now the reality of foreign troops
on the streets is starting to chafe. Some
Iraqis are beginning to regard us as
occupiers and not as liberators. Some of this
is inevitable, but faster progress on
reconstruction will help.
The link to the safety of our troops is
indirect, but real. The people who ambush
our troops are small in number and do not
do so because they have undependable
electric supplies. However, the population's
view of us is directly linked to their
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cooperation in hunting down those who
attack us. Earlier progress gives us an edge
against the terrorists.
• This money will be spent with prudent
transparency. Every contract of the $20
billion for Iraq will be competitively bid.
• It is essential that the money come as a
grant and not a loan. Initially, offering
assistance as loans seems attractive. But
once again we must examine the facts and
the historical record. Iraq has almost $200
billion in debt and reparations hanging over
it as a result of Saddam's economic
incompetence and aggressive wars. They
cannot pay what they owe now, much less
take on more debt.
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The President's first priority is security and he
has a three-element plan.
• Public safety— police, border enforcement,
fire and a communications system to link
them.
• National defense— a new army and civil
defense system.
• Justice system— courts and prisons
This security assistance to Iraq benefits the
United States in four ways.
First, Iraqis will be more effective. As talented
and courageous as the Coalition forces are, they
can never replace an Iraqi policeman who knows
his beat, who knows his people, their customs,
rhythms and language. Iraqis want Iraqis
providing their security and so do we.
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Second, as these Iraqi security forces assume
their duties, they replace Coalition troops in the
roles that generate frustration, friction and
resentment— conducting searches, manning
check points, guarding installations.
Third, this frees up Coalition forces for the
mobile, sophisticated offensive operations
against former regime loyalists and terrorists for
which they are best suited.
Finally, these new Iraqi forces reduce the overall
security demands on Coalition forces and speed
the day when we can bring troops home.
Security is indispensable, but by itself is
insufficient and cannot endure.
A good security system cannot persist on the
knife edge of economic collapse. Saddam left
behind an economy ruined not by our attacks
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but by decades of neglect, theft and
mismanagement— he never once prepared a
budget.
The Iraqis must refashion their economy from
the Soviet- style, command economy Saddam left
them. That poor model was further hobbled by
cronyism, theft and pharonic self-indulgence by
Saddam and his intimates.
Important changes have already begun.
The Iraqi Minister of Finance on Sunday
announced a set of market-oriented policies that
is among the world's boldest.
Those policies include:
• A new Central Bank law which grants the
Iraqi Central Bank full legal independence.
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• Foreign firms may open wholly owned
companies, including banks, or buy them.
Foreign firms receive national treatment and
have an unrestricted right to remit profits
and capital.
• Tariff policy is simple. There is a two-year
"reconstruction tariff' of five percent on
most imports and the rest come in with no
tariff.
• On October 15, Iraq will get a new currency,
the New Dinar, which will float against the
world's currencies.
The Iraqi Government has put in place these
legal procedures for encouraging a vibrant
private sector. But those policies will come to
nothing if they do not rest on a sound
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infrastructure in a reasonable security
environment.
We have made significant progress restoring
these essential services. The widely predicted
humanitarian crisis did not occur. There was no
major flow of refugees. All of Iraq's 240 hospitals
and 90 percent of its health clinics are open.
There is adequate food and there is no evidence
of epidemic. We have cleared thousands of
miles of irrigation canals so that farmers in these
areas have more water than they have had for a
generation. Electrical service will reach pre-war
levels within a month.
However, the remaining demands are vast,
which is why most of the President's request for
non-military assistance is for infrastructure
programs.
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On another front there is already good news.
The democratization of Iraq, on which so much
global attention is focused, is further advanced
than many realize.
Encouraging a quick political transformation, we
have laid out a clear, seven-step process leading
to sovereignty. Three of the seven necessary
steps have been completed;
1. An Iraqi Governing Council was appointed
in July.
2. In August the Governing Council named a
Preparatory Committee to recommend a
mechanism for writing Iraq's new,
permanent constitution.
3. Earlier this month the Governing Council
appointed ministers to run the day-to-day
affairs of Iraq.
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4. The fourth stq>, writing a constitution,
frames all that follows. The constitution will
be written by Iraqis.
5. The constitution will be ratified by popular
vote of the entire adult population.
6. After the constitution is ratified, elections
for a new government will be held.
7. The final step will come after elections,
when we transfer sovereignty from the
Coalition to the new government.
Some, including members of the Iraqi Governing
Council, suggest we should give full sovereignty
to an Iraqi government immediately or very
soon.
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I firmly believe that such haste would be a
mistake.
No appointed government, even one as honest
and dedicated as the Iraqi Governing Council,
can have the legitimacy necessary to take on the
difficult issues Iraqis face as they write their
constitution and elect a government.
The only path to fuU Iraqi sovereignty is through
a written constitution, ratified and followed by
free, democratic elections. Shortcutting the
process would be dangerous.
As you examine the President's plan I am sure
you will see that every part depends on every
other part.
The need to protect the Coalition and the
populace alike against terrorists and common
criminals is obvious and indispensable.
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The United States must take the lead in restoring
Iraq as a friend and democratic model. There is
a donor conference in Madrid in late October.
We must set the example for other nations of
goodwill and work with them to avoid the near
anarchy in which terrorists will feel right at
home.
When we launched military operations against
Iraq we assumed a great responsibility that
extends beyond defeating Saddam's military.
If, after coming this far, we turn our backs and
let Iraq lapse into factional chaos, we will have
sewn the dragon's teeth which will sprout more
terrorists and eventually cost more American
lives. Make no mistake. These requested funds
represent an investment in America's national
security.
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You may think I exaggerate. I ask you to look at
what happened in Afghanistan, another country
which, after it was debilitated by decades of war
and mismanagement became easy prey for the
Taliban and al Qaida.
The reconstruction of Iraq may seem distant
from American concerns today. Eight time
zones and two continents separate the East
Coast of the United States from Iraq. The West
Coast is effectively half a world away.
Iraq only seems far away. Today Iraq is a focal
point in our global war on terrorism. Failure
there would strengthen the terrorists morally and
materially.
All of this requires the help of Congress.
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee
we respectfully ask Congress to honor the
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President's supplemental request, which
responds to urgent requirements in order to
achieve the vision of a sovereign, stable,
prosperous and democratic Iraq at peace with us
and with the world.
Mr. Chairman, I welcome your questions.
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For Official Use Only
Until Released by t±ie
House Armed Services Committee
TESTIMONY OF
GENERAL JOHN P. ABIZAID
COMMANDER,
UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND
BEFORE THE 108TH CONGRESS
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
25 SEPTEMBER 2003
For Official Use Only
Until Released by the
House Armed Services Committee
252
It is an honor to report to this committee on the situation and our actions in the
CENTCOM Area of Responsibility. As you know, our command is focused on three
main priorities: defeating transnational terrorism and creating safe and secure
environments in Iraq and Afghanistan. CENTCOM operates within the geographic and
ideological heart of the Global War on Terror. It is a war without borders that spans all
twenty-five countries in the region. There is no doubt that The War on Terror is
connected to our efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq. Success in Afghanistan and Iraq will
result in stable States that do not harbor terrorists and provide a visible alternative to the
terrorist vision of hatred and conflict.
The over 195,000 U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines now serving in the
CENTCOM Area of Responsibility are engaged in a wide range of activities, each of
them critical to maintaining our national security. These include counter-insurgency,
counter-terrorist, stability, and civil-affairs operations. Over twenty ships and 200
aircraft are sustaining our land forces and providing a potent deterrent to our
adversaries. Our servicemen and women are also occupied with training exercises
designed to increase our ability to operate with regional partners as well as enhance
their military effectiveness. I visit our troops and their commanders frequently and they
remain confident that we are winning the war on terrorism and winning the peace in Iraq
and Afghanistan. They are also realistic and understand that success will not come
without cost or without the cooperation of local populations. Those of you who have
visited the region understand the great strides our servicemen and women have made
toward accomplishing our objectives. We all recognize, however, that there are no
easy answers to the problems we face in the region. At CENTCOM we also know that,
253
while we are the military centerpiece of our national security efforts in the region, none
of the problems with which we are engaged will succumb to military force alone.
Integrating our efforts with those of other agencies and ensuring that our operations
advance our political objectives are essential to our success.
WAR ON TERRORISM
We have had good effect against terrorists throughout the Central Command
Area of Responsibility. Our success has not been due to military actions alone. The
United States Government, in cooperation with our regional partners, has killed and
captured terrorists and attacked their infrastructure. CENTCOM is proud to have played
a role in an effort marked by unprecedented cooperation between various agencies,
regional partners, and members of the largest international coalition in history.
Despite remarkable victories, the fight against terrorism is far from over. The
enemy's ideological base, financial networks and information networks remain strong.
Indeed, the demographic and economic conditions that breed terrorists may be
worsening and those conditions are heightening the ideological fervor associated with
radical Islamist extremism. It is clear that we must continually reassess our efforts and
improve our effectiveness.
We at Central Command, partnered as we are with many Islamic nations,
recognize that the War on Terrorism is not a war against Islam; it is a war against the
enemies of Islam. It is not a war against religion; it is a war against irreligious
murderers. Securing all of our futures depends mainly on collective action and
international cooperation. Each of the three main Combined Joint Task Forces in our
Area of Responsibility has an important role to play in the greater regional effort against
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terrorists. Through these task forces and Component Commands, we synergize
theater cooperation efforts with other nations and build indigenous capabilities to
combat terrorism and control borders. Central Command, our regional partners, and
the seventy-one members of the Operation Enduring Freedom Coalition will remain on
the offensive until terrorists no longer pose a threat.
IRAQ
In Iraq, our forces are working alongside the Coalition Provisional Authority to
provide military capacity in our interagency and intemational efforts toward building a
unified and stable country. The CPA's endstate for Iraq calls for a democratic and
sovereign nation, underpinned by new and protected freedoms and a growing market
economy, and made secure through the efforts of Iraqis - able to defend itself, but
posing no threat to its neighbors or the intemational community.^
Coalition servicemen and women, alongside many Iraqi partners, are fighting our
enemies and making progress toward a return of Iraq to the Iraqi people. While Iraqi
police capacity still remains below requirements, joint Coalition and Iraqi police
operations are bringing to justice criminal gangs that have been preying on the Iraqi
people. Neighborhood watch programs are springing up throughout towns and villages.
Although large reconstruction projects will require considerable time and resources,
military commanders are working with local townspeople to prioritize small
reconstruction projects; thousands of these have been completed. Town and city
councils are in place throughout the country. The first battalion of the New Iraqi Army
' This more closely follows Amb. Bremer's testimony yesterday. It reads: "President Bush's vision,
in contrast, provides for an Iraq made secure through the efforts of Iraqis. In addition to a more secure environment,
the President's plan provides for an Iraqi economy based on sound economic principles bolstered by a modem.
255
will graduate on 4 October and the second battalion begins training the next day; these
soldiers are proud to be part of the New Iraq. The first two thousand men and women
of the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps are assuming security responsibilities alongside
Coalition soldiers. All this and more has been achieved in just over four months,
despite the utter collapse of virtually every Iraqi institution. Our achievements, however,
have not come without sacrifice and there is more fighting ahead.
Iraq has tremendous potential, but the Coalition and our Iraqi partners must defeat
our enemies and overcome considerable obstacles before the future of Iraq is secure.
While all but a very few Iraqis recognize the promise of freedoms they are enjoying for the
first time - freedom to express their personal views, freedom to practice their religion,
freedom from fear, freedom to determine their own destiny - there are those who would
deny the Iraqi people the peace and prosperity they so richly desen/e. We continue to
experience attacks on Coalition forces, our Iraqi partners, and infrastructure punctuated by
larger high-visibility attacks to discredit the Coalition, disrupt reconstruction, and cause
unrest. While former regime loyalists remain the focus of our operations, extremists,
foreign fighters and terrorist groups are emerging as a major threat to Iraqis, the Coalition,
and the international community. Criminal activity continues to frustrate reconstruction
efforts and is the major source of instability in some regions. While our enemies are too
weak to challenge us militarily, they believe that we do not possess the will to persevere in
Iraq. They are wrong.
We are taking the fight to the enemy in Iraq. Attacks against our forces are
localized in the Sunni areas and the city of Baghdad. Over seventy-five percent of
reliable infrasmicture. And finally, the President's plan provides for a democratic and sovereign Ir^q at the earliest
reasonable date."
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violent incidents and sabotage have occurred in only four of the eighteen provinces.
The preponderance of the country, including Baghdad, has achieved a very high degree
of security and stability. Iraqis are providing intelligence that pemnits us to kill or
capture the enemy and preempt attacks.
We are focusing our efforts in five areas; improving intelligence, developing Iraqi
security forces, internationalizing our security effort, protecting the infrastructure, and
helping to communicate our aims, plans, and successes to the Iraqi people. We have
also repositioned forces to concentrate our efforts in problem areas and establish a
higher degree of control over Iraq's borders. In areas in which we achieve stability, we
will disengage our forces and turn over security responsibilities to Iraqis while
maintaining the capability to anticipate and respond rapidly to any changes in the
situation. Later, as the New Iraq expands its security capacity, we intend to move our
forces to less visible locations from which we can react to external threats and prepare
to relinquish national defense responsibilities to the New Iraqi Army.
Violence, of course, is not the only obstacle to progress in Iraq. As you know, we
must maintain the consent of the Iraqi people. Popular disaffection sets conditions for
instability. Disaffection stems from many sources including high expectations, high
unemployment, a lack of essential services, suspicion of Coalition motivations for
liberating Iraq, residual fear of the Baath Party, and the sudden end to the former
regime's patronage system. Our efforts to rebuild Iraq are connected to the security
situation because general disaffection among the populace provides available
manpower to those who are inciting (and paying for) attacks against Iraqis, the
infrastructure and Coalition forces.
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We recognize that economic development, political development, and security
are interdependent. COMBINED JOINT TASK FORCE-7 and CENTCOM are
supporting fully the Coalition Provisional Authority's efforts in all areas. In addition to
securing critical infrastructure alongside our Iraqi partners, two U.S. Army task forces,
Task Force Restore Iraqi Oil and Task Force Restore Iraqi Electricity are accelerating
progress in restoring Iraq's failed oil economy - the financial engine to move Iraq
forward - and providing the key enabler for all economic functions and public needs -
electricity. Brigade commanders have partnered with Iraqis to complete over eight
thousand reconstruction projects. Also, our commanders and civil affairs personnel
worked with Iraqis to establish local and provincial councils as a foundation for regional
and national governance.
Over the past four months, we have improved our understanding of the situation
and identified what more needs to be done. We know what is working well and what
areas require additional attention and resources. CENTCOM, COMBINED JOINT
TASK FORCE-7, CPA. and our Coalition partners are working together in accordance
with our plans. We must remember, however, that the situation in Iraq is complex and
dynamic; we are certain to encounter unforeseen difficulties and opportunities and we
must remember that the future course of events depends not only on what we plan to
do, but on enemy reactions and initiatives that are difficult to predict. We are resolved
to reassess continually the situation, refine our plans, be prepared for contingencies,
and refocus our efforts whenever necessary.
Our commanders and troops are optimistic and feel that we now have before us
an opportunity to gain tremendous momentum, in the short term, we believe that if we
258
and our partners commit resources to accomplish ttiree things - restore basic services
(especially power), build Iraqi security capacity, and improve our ability to communicate
our plans and successes to the Iraqi people - we will accelerate progress in the next
months.
AFGHANISTAN
The next year in Afghanistan, with the constitutional Loya Jirga in December and
elections scheduled for June 2004, will prove critical to achieving peace and stability there.
We have achieved much in Afghanistan, but there is much work that we, the Coalition, and
the Afghans have yet to accomplish. As in Iraq, there is no purely military solution to the
problems we face there. We must simultaneously defeat our enemies, support the effort to
establish representative government and set conditions for economic growrth and long-term
stability.
The enemy adjusted after the devastating losses inflicted on them since the
initiation of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). Al Qaeda, Gulbiddin Hekmatyar's
Hizb-e-lslami (HIG) and Taliban forces are conducting low-level guerrilla and terrorist
attacks. Their attacks aim to obstruct reconstruction efforts and incite chaos. Al Qaeda
and HIG terrorist activity pose the greatest threat in the Northeast while Taliban
remnants have shown signs of reorganization and continue anti-Coaiition/anti-Afghan
operations in the Southeast.
We continue to seek out and defeat Taliban and Al Qaeda forces. Cooperation with
the Pakistanis will disrupt further the enemy's ability to reorganize and conduct operations.
The formation of the Afghan National Army (ANA) continues to be a success story as units
demonstrate their professionalism and gain operational experience. Our conventional force
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in Afghanistan is small in comparison to the force in Iraq, but it is very effective due to its
ability to conduct joint and combined operations. During a recent mission, COMBINED
JOINT TASK FORCE-180 successfully brought together U.S conventional. Special
Operations Forces, air, Afghan National Army and Afghan Militia Forces against a long-
known Taliban operational base.
Because political and economic initiatives will prove most important in
maintaining stability in Afghanistan, we must ensure that our operations support those
initiatives. The expansion of Provincial Reconstruction Teams from four to eight and the
possibility that NATO might expand its security efforts beyond Kabul are particularly
promising.
The most important person in Central Command is the young soldier. Marine,
sailor, or airman performing his or her mission on the frontline of freedom in the middle
of the night. It goes without saying that our successes will continue to depend on the
bright, talented, and courageous servicemen and women who are taking risks and
making sacrifices to preserve liberty and protect our nation. Our missions in
Afghanistan, Iraq, and in the Global War on Terror are bound to entail additional risks
and sacrifices. However, our airmen, sailors. Marines, and soldiers understand, as we
all do, that a lack of perseverance in any of our vital missions would lead to even
greater risk and loss. When I talk with them they invariably express to me their belief
that we "will either have to fight terrorists over here or fight them at home." I want to
thank this committee for your support to our men and women and for your oversight of
the vital operations we are undertaking in Central Command.
DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
September 25, 2003
COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY
REQUEST
TO
REHABILITATE AND RECONSTRUCT IRAQ
SUMMARY OF THE REQUEST
September 22, 2003
(263)
264
Security
Objective: Ensure a secure environment for people and property that enables citizens to participate
fully in political and economic life.
Create conditions and provide means for Iraqis to assume responsibility for their own security.
Request: $5,136 billion
Accomplishments:
• Security remains top priority. Major focus of CPA security efforts has been to increase Iraqi
participation and responsibility for a safe and secure Iraq
• Security situation is complex
- 80% of Iraq is permissive environment - people returning to normal pace of life
- Remaining 20% are less permissive, with entrenched Saddam loyalists, international
terrorists and general lawlessness hmdenng recovery efforts
• Nearly 60,000 Iraqis now under arms assisting in security
- 46,000 Iraqi police nationwide
- 8,700 facility protection officers augmenting the Iraqi police at 243 locations
- 4,000 border and customs police helping to enforce immigration and customs laws
along the borders and stem the tide of foreign fighters entering Iraq
- Civil Defense Corps is in the process of being developed
• Beginning to train New Iraqi Army; first battalion graduates in October
• In September, the Iraqi Ministry of Justice established an independent judiciary
Plan for requested funds:
I. Public Safety Projects ($2,141 billion):
• Reinforcement and training of police forces
- Recruiting police officers, continuing operations and maintenance ($1 50 million)
- New police training force of 1 ,500 focusing on democratic principles ($800 miUion)
- Recruiting and training of 5,200 traffic officers ($50 million)
• Establishment of a department of Border Enforcement ($150 million)
- 1 3,600 new personnel
- Rehabilitation of infrastructure
• Facilities protection, mine removal, fire service, and public safety facility and equipment repairs
($500 million)
• Establish Facility Protection Services ($67 million)
• Conduct Public Safely Training to increase professional standards ($274 million)
• Develop a National Security Communications Network ($150 million)
265
//. National Security Forces Projects ($2,076 billion):
• Establishment of New Iraqi Army (NIA) ($2 billion)
- Full manning by September, 2004
- Training 9 brigades, including 1 armored brigade and army aviation
- Small coast guard
- Military academies and military training facilities
• Establishment of Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (CDC) (S76 million)
- Military support corps for the 1 8 Iraqi govemates
- One battalion for each govemate
///. Justice and Civil Society Development Projects ($919 million):
• Technical assistance for investigations of crimes against humanity (SlOO million)
- Establish a working system of criminal investigations and trials
• Security forjudges and prosecutors, renovate and harden courthouses ($200 million)
• Witness Protection Program ($100 million)
• Other technical investigative methods ($10 million)
• Prison system rehabilitation
- Prison system technical assistance ($10 million)
- Reconstruction and modernization of 26 detention facilities ($99 million)
- 2 new 4,000 bed facilities ($400 million)
266
Essential Services and Infrastructure
Objective: Restore essential services to acceptable standards and to begin to create a civil society
which participates in improving social and physical infrastructure.
Provide foundation from which Iraqis can rebuild Iraq.
Request: $14,868 billion
Accomplishments:
• Under difficult conditions, there has been no food or health crisis
- Sufficient food stockpiles and distribution system; total distribution since the beginning
of ojwrations has exceeded 1.8 million MT
- All hospitals and primary care clinics are open, have power 24 hours a day, and are
being supplied with adequate medical supplies for the first time in many years
- All schools and universities are open
• Coalition and Iraqi engineers are working to restore electric power production to pre-war levels
- generation has improved from virtually nothing following major combat operations to 3,200
MW in July and 3,734 MW in August
• Water and sanitation - By July, much of Iraq at pre-war conditions; CPA has shifted focus to
specific rehabilitation projects; Baghdad had first ever city-wide garbage clean up in August
• Restoration of the oil industry is helping to rehabilitate the economy
- Iraqi/CPA oil management team is highly respected internationally
- Crude oil production is averaging about 1 .7mil barrels per day which is 160% higher
than June average and 70% of prewar output
- Oil exports are averaging 860k barrels per day which represents approximately S21
million and is 165%i higher than July average and 45% of prewar level
- Sabotage remains an issue
Plan for requested funds:
L Electrical Projects ($5,675 billion):
• Electricity generation {S2.9 billion)
- Rehabilitate existing power stations and spare parts
- New gas turbine generation
- New thermal power stations
• Repair, expansion, and rehabilitation of transmission (SI 55 billion)
- Repair, expansion of 400 KV and 1 32 KV lines
- Rehabilitation and construction of substations
• Rehabilitation and replacement of network infrastructure over several years ($1 billion)
- 33 KV and 1 1 KV substation and network rehabilitation and development
• Development of an automated monitoring and control system ($1 50 million)
• Institutional strengthening ($25 million)
• Security of stations and transmission lines ($50 million)
267
//. OU Projects ($2.1 billion):
• Investment in oil infrastructure ($1 .2 billion)
- Rapid repair caused by sabotage and looting
- Convert to topping plants to reduce importation of refined petroleum
- Establishment of transport redundancy due to sabotage
- Development of oil infrastructure and personnel security
- Increased efficiency of water plant for the Ramayllah reservoir
- Other repairs to rehabilitate upstream and downstream sectors
• Importation of refined petroleum products to overcome shortfalls due to sabotage and looting
($900 million)
///. Public Works Projects ($3. 710 billion)
• Raising potable water access to 90% from 60%
- Costs are estimated at S500/km for 15,000 km of water main line ($2.83 billion)
Includes efforts to reduce water loss ($30 million)
• Increasing sewerage service from 6% to 15% ($697 million)
• Improving solid waste management ($1 53 million)
IV. Water Resources Projects ($875 million)
• Replace pumping station standby generators, pumps, electrical control devices ($1 50 million)
• Rehabilitation of irrigation and drainage systems ($130 million)
• 1 0 major irrigation projects, reducing salinity loads to Tigris and Euphrates ($ 1 30 million)
• Dam repair, rehabilitation, and new construction ($125 million)
• Umm Qasr to Basra water pipeline and treatment plant ($200 million)
• Environmental restoration of Euphrates, Hawizeh Marsh, and Basra Channel Regulators to
benefit millions of people ($140 million)
V. Transportation and Communications Projects ($835 million)
• Airspace and airport opening in Baghdad and Basra, and 120 smaller airports ($165 million)
- Repair infrastructure, purchase avionic equipment, training to meet ICAO standards
• Umm Qasr Port rehabilitation ($45 million)
• Railroad rehabilitation and restoration ($303 million)
• Restoration of Iraqi Telecom and Postal Corporation ($124 million)
• Iraqi Communications systems, including Iraqi media ($109 million)
• Iraqi communications operations ($89 million)
268
VI. Housing and Construction Projects ($470 million)
• Housing (SI 00 million)
Construction of 3,500 new housing units including 7 bousing communities
- Pilot program for Ministry of Housing and Construction, 1 million housing units needed
• Public buildings ($130 million)
- 1 325 basic repairs and 140 refurbishment projects
- 6 major reconstruction projects at $7 million each
• Roads and bridges ($240 million)
- 2% of need for total road and bridge repair
- Repair to Expressway 1
VII. Health Projects ($850 mUlion)
• Major new children's hospital ($1 50 million)
- 4 1 % of total population is under age 1 4
- Demographics point to baby boom within next ten years
• Hospital reftirbishment ($393 million)
Reduce infant and childhood deaths by 50%
Refurbish 1200 primary care clinics and 5 regional matemal/pediatric referral centers
- Construction cost in Iraq is one-tenth that of US
• Equipment replacement ($300 million)
- Early studies estimate that 50% of all equipment needs replacement
- Equipment and training of technicians
• Partner with American health care organizations, intern, donors, and schools ($7 million)
VHI. Private Sector Development Projects ($353 million):
• An American-Iraqi Enterprise Fund ($200 million)
- Promote private sector of Iraq
- Independent fund would invest in private enterprises, and disseminate Western business
know-how
• Expand network of Employment Centers ($8 million)
• On-the-job training ($35 million)
• Maricet-oriented specialized training ($110 million)
269
Governance
Objective: Enable the transition to a legitimate constitutional government.
Help Iraqis on the path to a democratic society and full sovereignty.
Request: $300 million
A ccomplishm ents:
• Iraqi Governing Council, comprised of 25 men and women representing Iraq's religious and
ethnic diversity, was established on July 13th and has had several accomplishments
- Welcomed by UN Security Council as step toward a sovereign, democratic Iraq
- Appointed constitutional preparatory committee
- Appointed 25 member Cabinet, responsible for the day to day management of Iraqi
government ministries
- Iraqi Foreign Minister has been seated by the League of Arab States in early September
- Growing international recognition that GC is the political voice of Iraq
- GC prepared to open embassies in US, UK and 5 Arab nations
• 90% of the Iraqi people live under local representative governing councils
• Iraq has 3 pillars required for achieving a democratic society: free press and speech, freedom of
religion and an independent judiciary
Plan for requested funds:
I. Refugees, Human Rights, and Civic Society ($300 million):
• Migration and Refugee Assistance ($105 million)
• Local Governance & Municipalities ($90 million)
• Property Claims Tribunal ($30 million)
• Update antiquated banking system ($30 million)
• Catch up business training ($20 million)
• Human Rights ($15 million)
• Civic Programs ($10 million)
270
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
H.^. ^ousc of ^tpresentatibes
laaasljington, ©C 20515-6035
ONE HUMORED SEVENTH CONGRESS j**»sm maionsv, cow^ecpc jt
March 18,2003
The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500
Dear Mr. President:
This is a critical week for our nation and for the world. As you prepare to make
the most difficult decision of sending our troops into combat, the thoughts and prayers of
all Americans are with you. My colleagues here in Congress have many different views
on the wisdom of action in Iraq and the severity of its consequences. But we are united
in our support for all the men and women who serve this nation.
There is no doubt that our forces will be victorious in any conflict, but there is
great potential for a ragged ending to a war as we deal with the aftermath. 1 appreciate
the efforts that members of your administration have made to keep me informed about
plans for the administration and reconstruction of Iraq following military conflict. Your
team has thought about many of the things that will need to be done.
Secretary Rumsfeld frequently talks about the list he keeps of things that could go
wrong in an Iraq war. I have kept my own list — of things that could go wrong after the
war is over. The list below is indicative of this broader list My hope is that this will be
helpful to members of your administration as you continue to plan for all possibilities.
These are not complete scenarios but rather a series of possible problems that could occur
in some combination.
Internal Divisions and External Influences in Iraq
• Without access to Iraq through Turkey, U.S. troops are not present in northern Iraq in
large numbers. Turkey enters northern Iraq to establish a buffer zone and fighting
breaks out between the Turks and Kurds. A significant U.S. military force is needed
to separate the groups, complicating the governmental transition and international
support.
• An uprising in Kirkuk leaves the Kurds in control of areas of the city and surrounding
area. This triggers a large Turkish invasion to protect the Turkmen minority and to
prevent Kurdish control of oil resources. Again this would require U.S. military
resources with all the attending effects.
• In the event that Turkey crosses into Iraq, Iran may do the same, ostensibly to stem
the refugee flows from southern Iraq and to protect Shi 'a interests.
1
271
• Shi'a populations in the south rebel and undertake attacks against Sunnis. U.S.
troops must step in to protect the Sunnis and restore peace. These tensions resurface
during attempts to build a federal and representative government.
• Urban fighting in the south brings Shi'a into conflict with Sunnis. The resulting
devastation causes a refugee crisis as Shi'a make for the Iranian border. The results
of Saddam's policy of forced Axabization of areas like Kjrkuk >^eld dangerous
consequences. Groups like the Kurds flow back into these areas seeking to reclaim
their former homes and land, sparking conflict with Iraqi Arabs.
• Attempts to fashion a federal government in Baghdad prove difficult. Iran is able to
establish proxies for its influence among the Shi'a representatives. Once in Iraq,
infighting breaks out among members of the former Iraqi opposition in exile. The
United States is unable to transition the administration of Iraq effectively and has to
remain in place, with significant military backing.
• The war involves lengthy urban combat, particularly in Baghdad. Most infrastructure
is destroyed resulting in massive humanitarian problems. The emphasis on
humanitarian aid distracts from efforts to establish a new government. Once
established the government faces massive political pressure from the sustained
humanitarian crisis.
Weapons of Mass Destruction
• Saddam uses biological and chemical weapons against advancing U.S. troops, but
also inflicts substantial civilian casualties. Efforts to stabilize cities and to establish a
government are complicated by the need to deal with the large number of dead and to
decontaminate affected areas.
• Saddam uses biological and chemical weapons directly against civilian populations or
against another Arab country and seeks to affix blame for civilian suffering to the
United States. Over the period of occupation, this resentment complicates U.S.
efforts to maintain support for reconstruction efforts.
• U.S. troops are unable to quickly find all of Saddam's capabilities, requiring a long,
labor-intensive search and anxiety as to when the task is complete.
• Regional leaders, for money or to gain influence, retain caches of WMD and transfer
some to terrorist groups.
• Saddam attacks Israel with missiles containing weapons of mass destruction. Israel
retaliates. Arab countries, notably Saudi Arabia and Jordan, come under intense
political pressure to withdraw their support from the U.S. war effort. U.S. forces are
forced to reposition operational centers into Iraq and Kuwait, complicating
reconstruction and transition efforts.
OU Resources
• Saddam sabotages a significant number of wells before his defeat. Current estimates
mdicate he may already have wired up to 1.500 of these wells. The damage takes
years to contain at great economic and environmental cost and removes a major
source of reconstaiction funding.
• Internal groups, such as the Kurds, seize oil-rich land before American troops reach
the area, causing internal clashes over these resources. Militant Shi 'as seize other
wells in the South.
272
International Support
• The United States takes inunediate control of Iraq's administration and of
reconstruction. The United Nations can't agree on how involved to get given the
divisions among the Security Council about the need for conflict. The lack of b'N
involvement in the administration makes the European Union and others less likely to
give. This situation delays reconstruction and puts more of the cost on the United
States and a smaller number of partners.
• U.S. reconstruction efforts that give U.S. corporations a great role at the expense of
multilateral organizations and other participation — as was detailed in yesterday's
Wall Street Journal — spur resentment and again limit the willingness of others to
participate.
American Commitment
• Stabilization and reconstruction prove more difficult than expected. U.S. troop
requirements approach 200,000 — the figure General Shinseki has mentioned — for a
sustained period. This puts pressure on troop rotations, reservists, their families, and
employers and requires a dramatic increase in end-strength.
• Required funding reaches the figure suggested by a recent Council on Foreign
Relations assessment — S20 billion annually for several years. During a period of
economic difficulty, the American public calls for greater burdensharing.
It is my hope that none of these eventualities comes to pass. But as you and all
military leaders know, good planning requires considenng the range of possibilities. It
also requires advance preparation of the American people. You have regularly outlined
the reasons for why the United States must disarm Iraq. I urge you to do the same m
explaining why we must stay w^iih Iraq for the long haul, even with the economic and
military burdens this will entail.
As always, I am willing to help in any way I can to make this case to my colleagues
and the Amencan people.
Sinjcerely,
Ike Skelton
Ranking Democrat
Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
Honorable Paul D. Wolfowitz
Honorable Peter W. Rodman
Honorable Colin L. Powell
Honorable Richard L. Armitage
Honorable Condoleezza Rice
273
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES :^
2i.^. J^ouse of JRepresentatibes Sol
(KHasljmgton. S(C 20515-6033 i«;
ONE HUMORED SEVENTH CONGRESS J"«5 « M«.oN[r co««CTiait
September 4, 2002
The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500
Dear Mr. President:
Thank you for inviting me to the briefing this morning. [ share your concern about the
continuing threat posed by Saddam Hussem and his efforts to produce weapons of mass
destruction (WMD). I would like to offer my assistance as the administration considers how to
deal with this threat.
Before Congress can authorize any military action that might be part of the administration's plan,
we must have answers to more questions than were able to be raised at today's meeting. Our
constinjtional duty requires us to ensure that all implications of such action are considered in
advance. The case has not yet been fiiUy made as to what the threat is, why military force is an
appropriate way of addressing the threat, and why action must occur now. In short. Congress
and the American people must be clear on your strategic vision before we can authorize a
specific course of action. I believe, like Clausewitz, that in strategy there is an "imperative... not
to take the first step without considering the last."
Your strategy for dealing with Iraq must address the fundamental questions of the threat, the
method of acting, and the timing. Furthermore, any strategy to eliminate Iraqi WMD must also
address several component issues, each of which raises critical questions
1. How to manage Iraq's transition to a stable post-Saddam reeime
As I mentioned to you this morning, this is a crucial question for administration strategy to
answer in advance of any military action. I have no doubt that our military would decisively
defeat Iraq's forces and remove Saddam. But like the proverbial dog chasing the car down
the road, we must consider what we would do afler we caught it.
As Sun-Tzu said in the classic strategic treatise, The Art of War, 'To win victory is easy, to
preserve its fruits, difficult." Military planners and political leaders alike knew this in World
War II. Planning for the occupation of Germany and Japan — two economically viable.
274
technologically sophisticated nations — took place well in advance of the end of the war. The
extreme difficulty of occupying Iraq with its history of autocratic rule, its balkanized ethnic
tensions, and its isolated economic system argues both for careful cor^sideration of the
benefits and risks of undertaking military action and for detailed advanced occupation
planning if such military action is approved.
Specifically, your strategy must consider the form of a replacement regime and take seriously
the possibility that this regime might be rejected by the Iraqi people, leading to civil unrest
and even anarchy. The effort must be to craft a stable regime that will be geopolitically
preferable to Saddam and will incorporate the disparate interests of all groups within Iraq —
Shi'^a, Sunni, and Kurd. We must also plan now for what to do with members of the Baath
party that continue to support Saddam and with the scientists and engineers who have
expertise bom of the Iraqi WMD program.
All these efforts require careful planning and long-term commitment of manpower and
resources. The American people must be clear about the amount of money and the number
of soldiers that will have to be devoted to this effort for many years to come.
How to ensure the action in Iraq does not undermine international support for the broader
war on terrorism
In plarming for military operations in Iraq, we carmot ignore the lack of international support
to date. Pre-emptive action against Iraq is currently vocally opposed by many of our allies
and friends throughout the world and particularly in the Middle East.
When we are seen as acting against the concerns of large numbers of our friends, it calls into
question the "humble" approach to international relations you espoused during the
presidential campaign. More than that, it has several potentially damaging long-term
consequences. First, it risks losing the large number of partners needed to prosecute the
global war on terrorism. To ferret terrorist groups out of their many hiding places, we must
have broad allied support. Second, it risks seriously damaging U.S. moral legitimacy,
potentially providing states like India and Pakistan with a preemptive option that could drive
long-standing conflicts beyond containable bounds.
Finally and perhaps most dangerously, actions without broad Arab support may inflame the
sources of terrorism, causing unrest and anger throughout the Muslim world. This dynamic
will be worse if Iraq attacks Israel — perhaps with weapons of mass destruction — and draws
them into the conflict. Iran, which has the potential to seize a reformist path, may well move
away from the United States in the face of attacks that could next be taken against them.
Together, these dynamics will make achieving peace in the Middle East more difficult and
may well provide the rationale for more terrorist attacks against Americans.
These concerns do not make military action in Iraq untenable. They do, however, highlight
the depth and importance of the issues to be addressed before we strike. We need to ensure
that in taking out Saddam, we don't win the battle and lose the war.
275
3. How to ensure that the United States can execute this operation successfully as well as its
other military missions
As you are well aware, Mr. President, the consideration of military action against Iraq comes
at a time when U.S. forces are actively engaged throughout the world in a range of missions.
Given the operational pressures these forces currently face, we must ask what the risks and
trade-offs will be of defeating Iraq, particularly if Iraqi forces mass in Baghdad for urban
operations. How many casualties must the American people be prepared to take in a worst-
case scenario? What will the impact of sustained operations be on so-called high-demand,
low-density assets? What military operations might we have to forego because of continued
demands in Iraq? Will we still be prepared for the range of other threats that might emerge
throughout the world? With little allied support and contributions, will we still be able to
maintain military spending on transformational technologies and on sound quality of life for
our forces if we are bearing a huge wartime cost alone? What will be the impact on the
domestic economy of these resources drains and of the long-term costs of reconstructing
Iraq? These questions must be answered before any military action commences so that the
American people understand the risks and the sacrifices involved.
I ask these questions only to highlight the complexity of the undertaking and the need for
Congress, the American people, and our friends around the world to understand exactly what is
at stake and why we must act now. Only such a comprehensive strategic approach will ensure
that we commit U.S. troops consciously and with full knowledge of the range of challenges we
face — both in the initial campaign and in the long aftermath to follow. Even a strategy that has
military action as its centerpiece will require great diplomatic efforts to ensure its success. I look
forward to hearing the administration's answers and to working with you to find the best course
of action.
Sincerely,
%M/lu^
Ike Skelton
Ranking Democrat
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE
RECORD
September 25, 2003
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SKELTON
Mr. Skelton. You may recall that I mentioned that I have been given different
assessments of how long U.S. forces would remain in Iraq. Recognizing your answer
that U.S. forces will remain until the mission is complete, what are the measures
of success that we will reach before U.S. forces will be withdrawn whether it is next
spring, 2 years or 5 years from now? What are those measures in terms of critical
services, governance, and the ability of Iraqi forces to provide external and internal
security?
Secretary WoLFOWlTZ. The Administration has defined success in Iraq as leaving
behind an indigenous, broad-based, representative Iraqi government that:
- Renounces weapons of mass destruction;
- Does not sponsor terrorism;
- Seeks to live in peace with its neighbors; and
- Respects individual rights of all Iraqis.
On 16 November, the Coalition Provisional Authority and Iraqi Governing Council
have reached an agreement that spells out the timeline for the transfer of sov-
ereignty to an elected Iraqi government.
- 28 February 2004, "Fundamental Law" drafted and approved;
- 31 March 2004, bilateral agreements with Coalition on security completed;
- 31 May 2004, Transitional National Assembly elected;
- 30 June 2004, new transitional administration recognized by the Coalition;
- 15 March 2005, elections for Iraqi constitutional convention;
- 31 December 2005, elections for a new Iraqi government.
U.S. /Coalition forces will retain responsibilities for security until U.S. objectives
are met.
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SPRATT
Mr. Spratt. When visiting Hilla, we were accompanied by a CPA official who told
us that the CPA was seriously understaffed in that region and the lack of help con-
strained what the [sic] could do. The next day, we visited Mosul, and we asked Gen-
eral Petreaus about CPA staffing in Nineveh Province. He told us that there too,
CPA is seriously understaffed, and that the State Department typically did not as-
sign personnel for more than 120 days, which is not long enough to establish the
relationships necessary to be effective.
What is the Coalition Provisional Authority doing to make up these staff short-
ages? Are the shortages prevalent throughout Iraq?
Why are you short of people? Pay? Danger? Lack of recruiting?
Ambassador Bremer. CPA would benefit from staffing from more agencies across
government. We are attempting to extend tours to a minimum of six months but
doing so could limit the number of people interested in serving. Pay, danger, current
job work load and family considerations are all factors that comprise the personal
decisions an individual makes when deciding to voluntarily deploy. Shorter tours at-
tempt to strike a compromise and enable a great number of personnel to volunteer
to support forward operations. We are currently adding staff from a variety of agen-
cies to fill vacancies. Lack of experienced personnel and heavy home office work-
loads that have to be carried by those not deploying are additional factors that affect
the ability of organizations to deploy personnel. CPA will continue to press for addi-
tional personnel. Consideration to performing more work in the United States in
support of forward operations is also a potential solution to offsetting forward staff-
ing requirements.
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LOBIONDO
Mr. LoBlONDO. Is the Department of Defense issuing Iraqi reconstruction con-
tracts or is it USAID? I have been told by Office of the Secretary of Defense Legisla-
(279)
280
tive Affairs that USAID was the primary issuer and then told by USAID that DOD
ultimately had the final say on contracts being awarded.
Ambassador Bremer. Both the Department of Defense and USAID are issuing
contracts for Iraq reconstruction. Also, Iraqi Ministries are issuing contracts for Iraq
reconstruction using former Iraq regime funds. So far, USAID has issued contracts
and grants in excess of $1.5 billion of U.S. appropriated funds for the purpose of
Iraq reconstruction. Assignment of the responsibilities for specific reconstruction ac-
tions depends upon the work to be performed. CPA has a Program Management Of-
fice and Program Review Board that evaluates reconstruction requirements, cost es-
timates, and makes recommendations to the Administrator as to the proper agency
to execute the requirements.
Mr. LoBlONDO. Which specific agencies and organizations are issuing and manag-
ing all of the contracts for the purpose of Iraqi reconstruction? Is there one organi-
zation issuing all contracts or are they being issued from a variety of organizations?
What are the names and relevant contact phone numbers of the key organizations
issuing Iraqi Reconstruction contracts?
Ambassador Bremer. There are many organizations involved in Iraq reconstruc-
tion, including USAID, Department of State, and Department of Defense. As it per-
tains to DOD reconstruction efforts, the CPA and Army Corps of Engineers have
extensive information. Available information on the entire U.S. government recon-
struction effort can be found at: http://www.export.gov/iraq/contracts/index.html
http://www.hq.usace.army.mil/cepa/iraq/iraq.htm, http://www.usaid.gov/iraq/activi-
ties.html, and http://www.state.gOv/e/eb/cba/iraq/
Mr. LoBlONDO. Once contracts are issued, do prime contractors have authority to
issue subcontracts as they see fit? Is there a requirement for subcontracts to be com-
petitively issued?
Ambassador Bremer. Prime contractors have the responsibility to issue sub-
contracts to ensure successful performance. The government does not generally in-
tervene with prime subcontract decisions. Prime contractors are encouraged to com-
pete subcontracting opportunities. Under certain circumstances, the government re-
tains the right to consent to subcontracting.
Mr. LoBlONDO. From a subcontract perspective, are there any policies in place
that give U.S. companies opportunities to participate? What specifically are these
policies, if any?
Ambassador Bremer. The Federal Acquisition Regulation ("FAR") provides guid-
ance to prime contractors in subcontracting matters and subcontracting is encour-
aged. Subcontracting opportunities are highly dependent upon the type and location
of the work to be performed.
Mr. LoBlONDO. If federal tax dollars are financing Iraq's Reconstruction, it is my
belief that those dollars should, whenever possible, be spent with U.S. companies.
To what degree are "Buy American" policies being injected into the process of
issuing contracts for the Iraqi Reconstruction? To what degree is the U.S. Industrial
Base being utilized at the contract and subcontract level?
Ambassador Bremer. We are developing an acquisition strategy for the projects
funded by Public Law 108-106 that recognizes U.S. tax dollars are financing the
reconstruction of Iraq. For progress in Iraq, it is necessary to recognize that inter-
national support and cooperation is essential. To reinvigorate the country and to
promote self-sufficiency, the Iraqi people must be involved in the reconstruction
process. Our strategy will incorporate these key elements in order to provide Iraq
with a stable, peacefiil and democratic environment. The strategy is not quite com-
plete, but we will notify the Congress and provide any determinations as applicable
as soon as they are made.
Mr. LoBlONDO. What are each of the specific contracts which have been issued
for Iraqi Reconstruction so far? Who are the specific program managers and con-
tracting officers for each contract?
Ambassador Bremer. The website found at http://www.export.gov/iraq/contracts/
index.html is a comprehensive listing of awarded large US dollar reconstruction con-
tracts. Additionally, USAID, Department of State and Department of Defense have
also issued contracts in support of Iraq reconstruction. The Coalition Provisional Au-
thority Contracting Office, headquartered in Baghdad, has executed contracts sup-
porting the Iraq reconstruction using Iraqi funding. These awards can be found on
www.baghdadbusinesscenter.org under coalition tenders, and then awarded con-
tracts.
Mr. LoBlONDO. My understanding is that there are prime and sub-contracts re-
garding lumber used for the Iraqi Reconstruction efforts. Is there a uniform policy
for acquiring construction materials or is the acquisition of these items managed on
a contract by contract basis?
281
What are the names of the specific program manager and also the contracting offi-
cer for the lumber contracts issued thus far?
Ambassador Bremer. Hundreds of awarded contracts issued by a variety of U.S.
government agencies in support of Iraq reconstruction have requirements for lum-
ber. Procurement policies apply uniformly to lumber as well as to requirements that
do not involve lumber in support of Iraq reconstruction. Each of the U.S. agencies
engaged in Iraq can give you specific information about the contracts they oversee
and would be the best means of obtaining this detailed visibility.
Mr. LoBlONDO. Who, as contractor, provides fresh water for U.S. troops stationed
in Iraq? Who builds the Army base camps? Who provides force protection utilizing
polymers? Please be specific.
Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Several organizations procured water to support coalition
troops during Operation Iraqi Freedom. The majority of water is purchased using
U.S. Army Local Blanket Purchase Agreements. Using this contracting mechanism,
water for U.S. forces in northern/central Iraq is purchased in Turkey and trucked
overland. Water for units in southern Iraq is purchased in Kuwait and trucked
north. Also, the Defense Logistics Agency provided secondary support through con-
tractors in Greece, Bahrain, Germany and the United Arab Emirates to offset surge
requirements. As always, U.S. owned and operated Reverse Osmosis Water Purifi-
cation Units provided bulk purified water for distribution throughout the theater.
U.S. Army base camps are constructed, maintained and serviced by the contractor
Kellogg, Brown, & Root, Inc., who is working in conjunction with U.S. Army engi-
neers.
Regarding force protection equipment, on October 9, 2003 I approved a number
of items for priority funding and rapid fielding as force protection enhancements.
Some of these items include:
Body Armor (specifically the Small Arms Protective Insert (SAPI) plate). Body
Armor is produced by a number of manufacturers including: Armor Works LLC,
Ceradyne Inc., Simula Inc., Point Blank Body Armor Inc., ProTech Armored
Products, and ForceOne LLC. Vehicle Add-On Ballistic Protection Kits. The
Army is currently testing two versions of kits: the O'Gara Hess Eisenhardt kit
and the Armor Systems International kit. I note that these are potential manu-
facturers, pending results of the ongoing tests. Ballistic Protection Blankets.
Ballistic Protection Blankets are developed by the U.S. Army Tank Automotive
Research, Development and Engineering Center (TARDEC). Ballistic Protection
Blankets are manufactured by Protective Materieds Company.
OPERATIONAL LESSONS LEARNED FROM OPERATION
IRAQI FREEDOM
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, Thursday, October 2, 2003.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 9:00 a.m., in room 2118,
Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Duncan Hunter (chairman of
the committee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DUNCAN HUNTER, A REP-
RESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE
ON ARMED SERVICES
The Chairman. The committee will come to order. I want to wel-
come Admiral Giambastiani, Commander of U.S. Joint Forces Com-
mand (JFCOM), to the committee this morning.
A submariner by profession, the admiral is one of our most for-
ward-thinking military officers. And, Admiral, we worked on lots of
programs together, and it's good to be with you, and thanks for all
of your talents and what you bring to this discussion. So we are
fortunate to have you today. We are going to discuss lessons the
military is learning from our recent experience in Operation Iraqi
Freedom (OIF).
There is a popular saying, that generals always prepare to
refight the last war. U.S. Joint Forces Command is charged with
making sure that we are experimenting with new ways of winning
the next war. In accomplishing that mission, the command paid
close attention to the conduct of Operation Iraqi Freedom in order
to thoroughly assess the war's implications for future defense poli-
cies and programs.
To its credit, the Defense Department put the process in motion
before the first bombs fell. They knew that some things would go
well, some things would go poorly. That is the nature of war. The
Secretary moved to make sure that we captured all of those lessons
in real time as objectively as possible.
JFCOM embedded teams of analysts with the forces doing the
fighting in order to bridge the gap between the real world experi-
ence of troops on the ground and the abstract, theoretical concepts
of scholars working from an ivory tower. We didn't do that in Gre-
nada, Panama, Desert Storm, or Kosovo.
The Department's approach signified a remarkable openness to
self-assessment and recognized that criticism of OIF needed to be
based a realistic assessment of the facts on the ground, not on the
impressions created by reporters who are paid to make headlines,
talking heads who are paid to talk, whether they know anything
or not, or critics with their own axes to grind.
(283)
284
I think that is a lesson worth remembering as we review the on-
going war on terror. The admiral and his team had an opportunity
to brief some of us in a classified setting. But it is important that
JFCOM's efforts reach a wider audience so that we are better able
to assess and incorporate the lessons and nonlessons of Operation
Iraqi Freedom in our congressional responsibilities. Should it prove
necessary to meet in closed session, the committee will move to
Room 2212, which has been prepared for that possibility.
Admiral, we all look forward to your testimony, and appreciate
your appearance before the committee this afternoon. And also.
Brigadier General Cone, we welcome you, as well. And thank you
for being with us today.
And now let me recognize Dr. Snyder — excuse me, Mr. Taylor,
the gentleman from Missouri, who is the ranking Democrat at the
committee hearing, for any remarks that he might want to make.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hunter can be found in the Ap-
pendix on page 335.]
STATEMENT OF HON. GENE TAYLOR, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM MISSISSIPPI
Mr. Taylor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to read,
with your permission, a statement by Congressman Skelton.
The Chairman. Absolutely.
Mr. Taylor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
"I would like to join you in thanking Admiral Giambastiani for
being with us today. The admiral provided an excellent classified
briefing for a small group of Members several weeks ago. I am glad
that he is here to share his findings in an open forum.
"A recent trip to Iraq confirmed to me what we already knew:
That the heart of this critical, recent operation is the amazing
American soldier. Each solder, sailor, airman and marine, are oper-
ating more jointly in this conflict than ever before, enabling the
United States to achieve a stunning military victory.
"These great troops are currently serving as valiantly to try to
win the peace. The military victory in Operation Iraqi Freedom is
a testament to the efforts of those who fought for the Goldwater/
Nichols legislation, and to many officers who understand how much
joint operations enhance our military capability on the battlefield
and have worked to implement the law.
"It is also a testament to the quality of the education and train-
ing system of the American military, from our basic schools
through the war colleges.
"Mr. Chairman, the effort the admiral and his team have com-
pleted, and which brings him here today, is a critical one. The
American military systematic efforts to review its successes and its
failures from planing to execution at the strategic, operational and
tactical levels of warfare allow it to remain the finest fighting force
in the world.
"Joint Forces Command's analytical approach to Operation Iraqi
Freedom was a unique one, and it is clear that we will have a
wealth of operational data and insights to consider in making deci-
sions about the future of warfighting.
"But, Mr. Chairman, lessons learned at the strategic level are
critical, as well. I won't recount Lord Tennyson's 'The Charge of the
285
Light Brigade,' as I did to Secretary Wolfowitz last week, but it is
clear to me that there were blunders in our postwar planning.
"The success of the future of American operations will rely as
heavily on our ability to learn from strategic blunders as from our
mistakes on the battlefield. I look forward to future opportunities
to examine those lessons learned as well as those we will hear
about today. Admiral, I look forward to your testimony. Thank you,
Mr. Chairman."
[The prepared statement of Mr. Skelton can be found in the Ap-
pendix on page 338.]
The Chairman. Well, I want to thank the gentleman from Mis-
sissippi. And that was a great rendition of Ike Skelton's positions.
And, Ike, thank you for coming in. I know that this — we impinged
on something that is very traditional, which is the congressional
prayer breakfast, and we apologize for that. But that is the timing
we are faced with this time of year.
Admiral, once again, thanks for your great work. You have done
a lot of stuff with respect to undersea warfare that we have been
very impressed with. You have got a new set of challenges here.
And we did have a very good session in closed session. The floor
is yours, sir.
STATEMENT OF ADM. EDMUND P. GIAMBASTIANI, JR., COM-
MANDER, UNITED STATES JOINT FORCES COMMAND AND
SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER TRANSFORMATION (NATO);
ACCOMPANIED BY BRIG. GEN. ROBERT CONE
Admiral GlAMBASTlANl. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and distin-
guished members of the committee.
If I may, Mr. Chairman, rather than reading my longer written
statement, I would like to submit it for the record and provide you
with a summary version.
The Chairman. Certainly. Without objection.
Admiral GlAMBASTlANl. Thank you, sir.
What follows, Mr. Chairman, is a Joint Forces Command assess-
ment of capabilities that worked well in Iraq at the operational
warfighting level, to emphasize the point you made earlier. And
what I am going to talk about is those capabilities that require
greater improvement, those that measured up and performed well,
and, finally, those that did not measure up to our expectations.
But, before I proceed, I would like to first describe what this re-
view is not. It is not a systems analysis or an assessment report.
In other words, I am not going to provide you with how many air-
craft we need or should buy or what particular weapons platform
worked better than another.
This is also not a performance assessment of the services' tactical
operations. Our focus, again, was at the joint level of warfighting.
Mr. Chairman, we took this mission on with a clear understanding
that its success required a ruthless objectivity. For these reasons,
our standards to measure the effectiveness of our forces were exact-
ing and unsparing.
This is the only way, in our judgment, to guard against the
greatest shortcomings of our profession, as you have described, the
victor's disease. This affliction arises from overconfidence and com-
placency borne from previous military victories. One sjnnptom of
286
this disease is that mihtaries will focus on improving their
warfighting capabilities to fight the last war, as you indicated, in-
stead of anticipating and adapting for the future, which might be
wholly different, requiring new capabilities and clearly changed
methods.
I might mention that the two greatest transformational events in
my career, and I have told this committee before, were the creation
of the all-volunteer force, and the passage of the Goldwater/Nichols
Act, both of which were externally imposed on the military and the
Department of Defense (DOD). What we are attempting today is to
change from within, with the help of Congress, and in some ways
that is a greater challenge.
We all know that elite forces, like our Army, Navy, Marine Corps
and Air Force, plus our Special Operating Forces, remain dominant
because they have high standards and they enforce those stand-
ards. Our forces are elite because they are unsparing in their self-
analysis of the way they conduct business. This mentality of what
I call ruthless objectivity shaped our assessment of operational les-
sons learned for Operation Iraqi Freedom.
Such an attitude is a legacy of our military tradition to examine
ourselves critically in all of our endeavors. Given these ground
rules, there is no question but that a remarkable shift has occurred
in the way the joint forces operate today. This shift is what I call
a new joint way of war and leverages on four key dimensions of the
modern battle space: knowledge, speed, precision, and lethality.
Let me provide just two quick examples. In Desert Storm, we
had 30 operational detachment teams of special forces. I am not a
special forces commander, but working in separate missions from
the conventional force, totally separate missions from our conven-
tional forces. In Operation Iraqi Freedom, by comparison, we de-
ployed over 100 of these operational detachment teams. And they
were closely wedded to our conventional forces, and in many cases
merging the capabilities of both ground and air forces.
The net result is that we not only had precision munitions
launched from the air and ground, but also precision decisions to
direct our smart weapons, by the combination of both special and
conventional forces working jointly with all of our Armed Forces.
These are the elements that make up what we call overmatching
power. Based on these new dimensions, we organized our report
into three competitive categories, as I described. The first category
is what we call clear winners, and reached new levels of perform-
ance. They follow our joint integration and adaptive planning, ca-
pabilities that worked very well.
Our forces operated at a new level of jointness forged through
continuous operations. There is no doubt that Operation Southern
Watch and Northern Watch in Iraq, and over Iraq, as well as En-
during Freedom in Afghanistan, greatly aided in improving our
operational confidence in the use of command and control.
This high level of joint readiness enabled General Franks and
the Central Command to eliminate many of the gaps and seams
that were typical of ad hoc joint task forces.
The next category were capabilities that enabled — the next one
was capabilities that enabled joint force synergy. This is another
way of describing how coherently these teams operated together.
287
And, finally, under that first category of what really went real, is
the reemphasis of the point I just made on our integration of con-
ventional and Special Operations Forces. So there were three levels
that we considered to be working exceptionally well.
In the second category, we identified capabilities that dem-
onstrated considerable effectiveness but need improvement. These
were urban operations, information operations throughout the bat-
tle space, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. So we had
another level here that were good, but they would be what I would
describe as 60/40. Okay, 60 to the good, 40 to the bad; we need
some substantial improvement here.
And then, finally in the area of capabilities that fell short of our
expectations where we needed substantial improvement, in our
view, fratricide prevention is the first the one I list. Although data
that we have analyzed would indicate that we had improvement in
fratricide, our efforts for fratricide prevention required continuous
rigorous investigation and improvement in the future. Even one
death due to fratricide is too many.
Deployment, planning and execution is the second one I would
formally list right here, right now. We could not provide the flexi-
bility and adaptation demanded by late changes in planning as-
sumptions or other modifications. We weren't able to respond. We
had the lift, the mettle, but our process did not allow us to work
here. We are spending great effort in this area.
And, finally, reserve mobilization and deployment is the third
area under this not-so-good category. We didn't do well by our re-
serves in many cases, because we gave them short notice. The chal-
lenge here is establishing the right Reserve to Active Component
force mix. For example, we probably do not have the right mix of
early deploying combat service and service support. In other words,
those enabling force support units and high-demand, low-density
units that are in the reserves.
Mr. Chairman, I look forward to discussing these issues with the
members of the committee here in open session.
There is one final matter, however, that I must bring to your at-
tention. We found that a fundamental building mechanic at the
joint force capabilities rests in our command and control infrastruc-
ture.
This is often presented in our budget documents, unfortunately,
as information technologies. But they are far from that. They are
central to modern warfare. And part of that group of listings that
I gave you at the top on planning and adaptation, our ability to
have joint force synergy directly, are centered around our ability to
collaborate.
I cannot overemphasis, I can't emphasize enough our investment
in those initiatives such as the deployable joint command and con-
trol system, and the standing joint force headquarters prototypes,
how important they are to our future of joint warfighting.
These two capabilities build on our warfighting dominance today
to ensure that it continues well into the future. Mr. Chairman, we
are very grateful for your support and that of this committee on
our command and control initiatives. And we look forward to shar-
ing our progress in the months ahead. Let me close by saying that
in assembling these lessons learned, we have witnessed firsthand
288
our most important product, the quality of our men and women in
uniform.
I can tell you that every member of our team came away im-
pressed, awed even by the troops' service, devotion and resolve. We
were uplifted by their morale, confidence and good cheer, their
courage under fire, in the context of our commitment to produce as
penetrating and balanced an account as humanly possible.
I can also report to you that support, as well as that of the Con-
gress and the American people, has borne fruit in this best-trained,
best-equipped and best-led joint force I have seen in my profes-
sional career. I consider it a privilege to serve with these young
men and women at this critical time in our Nation.
Thank you for your allowing me this oral statement. I look for-
ward to your questions and that of the committee, sir.
The Chairman. Thank you very much Admiral.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Giambastiani can be found
in the Appendix on page 341.]
The Chairman. General Cone, did you have a statement?
General CONE. No, sir.
The Chairman. Well, thank you for being with us today, gentle-
men. We had a good session in closed session.
I will reserve my questions until we get to the end, and turn to
the gentleman who really has been a — has emphasized joint oper-
ations for many years. That is the gentleman from Missouri, Mr.
Skelton.
Mr. Skelton. Mr. Chairman, if I may, in deference to time, I will
reserve my questions, like you, if I may, for a few moments later.
The Chairman. The gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Saxton.
Mr. Saxton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral, General, thank you for being with us this morning. We
appreciate your being here and sharing your thoughts with us on
the pluses and minuses of the most recent military action.
Admiral, you mentioned — forgive me if I don't characterize this
exactly right — but in listing some things that you thought we may
have been able to do better, you mentioned information, intel-
ligence and surveillance.
And I guess most any military commander that completes an ac-
tion would always say, we didn't have enough intelligence. Because
you can always use more information. In this case, it appears
that — I was waiting to see if you would mention intelligence and
information gathering, because I think this is a really great point
that we need to concentrate on, or at least it seems to me, as an
outsider looking in, it is.
It seems to me that the information gathering apparatus that we
have grew up during the Cold War. And it seems to me that the
information that we needed to gather was a whole lot different
back then than it is now. And I am not sure how much of a transi-
tion we have made between our capabilities that existed up until,
let's say, 1990, 1991, and the type of information gathering that is
necessary today to be able to identify bad guys, who they are and
where they are.
Could you just talk on that point for a minute? Where do you
think we are in that transition? And what do we need to do in
order to be more capable with regard to those issues?
289
Admiral GlAMBASTlANl. I would be happy to address that, sir.
And if I could take just a moment, I forgot to officially tell you that
the general sitting next to me is a brand new Army brigadier, who
is the head of my joint lessons learned team. He spent most of his
time embedded in Iraq, which is why he is with me here today for
this lessons learned effort.
With regard to intelligence, what I would tell you is that when
we look at it from an operational level, what we mean by that is
from the combatant commander and the joint task force command-
er's level, we have been able to transition our intelligence gather-
ing reasonably well to, in fact, be able to give us force dispositions,
for example, before we start operations. We know how to do that
and we do that reasonably well.
In other words, where forces are, what we think we are being op-
posed by, what their capabilities are, and also a static assessment
of their readiness conditions. We do that, frankly, pretty well.
Where we fall short is when we are in a high-speed, fast-moving
campaign like this one was, where our forces are moving very rap-
idly, the ability to be able to do effects assessments or battle dam-
age in a rapid fashion lags seriously behind the movement of our
forces. So our ability to assess what effects we are having on the
battlefield as we move to a certain area, as we attack things, is not
as good as it used to be. What we would like to describe that battle
damage assessment is an older term. For example, it is a compo-
nent of this intelligence gathering.
And we don't do this as well as we would like, because we can't
keep up with the rapidity of our movement. It is later than we
would like. So we have to use things like armed reconnaissance.
You have to have armed reconnaissance units. We do have a good
idea, and, of course, commanders feel here in the reports that he
does get from his tactical intelligence units make a significant dif-
ference. But the bottom line is, is that it is difficult to keep up with
the immediate intelligence operationally on the battlefield.
So I would talk to you from that level of command. I hope that
is helpful.
Mr. Saxton. Thank you. Let me just ask this. I guess we never
know where the next war we are going to fight is. And, therefore,
it is kind of hard to know what our enemy is going to look like.
But we know now that we are not finished with the war on terror-
ism and that we are facing a rather unique set of foes.
Could you give us an idea of the kinds of capabilities that you
would like to see us have that perhaps are not up to where you
would like to see them?
Admiral GlAMBASTlANl. What I would say to you is that, first of
all, there is a series of capabilities that we need to improve on. One
is our ability to collaborate at a high level. We have done well, but
we need to do much better.
Now, this isn't a specific aircraft system or something else that
I can give you. But what it is is to allow our commanders and their
component staffs and their battlefield commanders to operate with
voice, video, and data in a real-time way to exchange information
as they pick it up, so that rapid information is able to be ex-
changed, turned into knowledge, so that our commanders can act
290
on that information. That is very, very key. So that is an area that
I think is extremely significant.
Another area where we need to improve our capabihty is in
bringing our abihty to exercise jointly at a high level all of the way
down through the tactical level with our forces around the United
States. And let me give you some examples. This is what we call
our initiative, the joint national training capability. Typically, we
only can operate at this high level of jointness when we are actu-
ally in a fight. And we don't like to have to operate at this level
in a fight; we would rather practice it.
So we use a sequence of simulations. One of them would be a
war game. But we would like to be able to use actual movement
of forces. We would like to take the National Training Center, for
example. We would like to take Top Gun. We would like to use Red
Flag. We would like to use Eglin Air Force Base. I can go to all
of these different ranges around the country, and we would like to
be able to net them in a way where our joint task force command-
ers can exercise control over and command of forces that are oper-
ating, frankly doing unit-level and service functions, but put them
together in a way that allows them to train jointly. But we do it
both live, virtually, and what we call in a constructive fashion, so
that we can tie them together. That is a capability that is excep-
tionally important.
Another capability that is very important for us to introduce is
our ability to do mission rehearsals. Let me give you an example.
In preparation for potential combat operations. Joint Forces Com-
mand supported General Franks and his Central Command staff in
conducting mission rehearsals in Qatar, in Kuwait, in Saudi Ara-
bia. We actually moved forward about 200 what we call observer
trainers at the joint level, and sent them and embedded them
throughout General Franks' command and all of his components,
with six retired, three- and four-star officers as senior mentors in
addition to my active duty team.
And what we did is, we conducted two mission rehearsals in De-
cember and one in February. Now, the reason why I am bringing
this up to you is what you didn't see and what General Franks'
people didn't see is that in Suffolk, Virginia, my Joint Warfighting
Center, I had 500 support people in a joint exercise control group
conducting simulation, inserting changes in battle problems, fixing
things.
Well, that is a pretty manpower-intensive operation. And the ne-
cessity of having simulation software to allow me not to have that
much manpower to exercise at this level of warfare is exceptionally
important. Those are a couple of examples. I can give you probably
seven or eight more right now. But those are a couple of big ones.
If you would like, I would be happy to go on.
Mr. Saxton. Sir, thank you very much. My time has long since
expired. But I would really like to have a longer conversation with
you on these issues. I was going to ask you about special forces and
the role they played, and how they did, but we will save that for
another time.
Admiral GiAMBASTlANl. Thank you.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman, the chairman of the Sub-
committee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities.
291
And I would now recognize the gentleman from Mississippi, Mr.
Taylor.
Mr. Taylor. Mr. Chairman, I think Dr. Snyder was actually here
at the gavel.
The Chairman. I think Dr. Snyder just deferred to you.
Mr. Taylor. Thank you, General. Thank you. Admiral. Thank
you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral, I want to take exception with one thing you said, and
that was that you don't learn from the previous wars. I think you
actually are not giving yourself credit. In the previous Gulf War,
there was an enormous problem with the destruction of oil wells
and the environmental problems and the health problems that re-
sulted from that.
Quite frankly, the American military did an excellent job of pre-
venting that from happening this time. In the previous Gulf War,
we had a heck of problem with Scud missiles. Again, because of the
actions that you took, to a very large extent we prevented that this
time. So again, these are two lessons learned from previous con-
flicts. And I do want to offer that as a compliment, because I don't
find your branch of the service saying that enough.
To that end, though, there is obviously something the Iraqis have
learned and seem to be getting better at by the day, and that is
improvised explosive devices. I am concerned that a nation that can
find $10 billion to spend on national missile defense this year, on
a problem that probably will exist in the future, is expending such
a pitifully small amount of money toward the problem that exists
today and is probably going to result in the life of a young Amer-
ican today, just like it did a few days ago.
I would really encourage you to take whatever steps are nec-
essary to see to it that in this supplemental appropriation, that
whatever resources are necessary to solve that problem. I am told
that on my recent trip to Iraq, that the convoy that I traveled in
was afforded a certain level of protection from those devices, with-
out getting into details.
Quite frankly, I am going to have a bit of trouble explaining to
the widow of Sergeant Jones and Wiggins of Mississippi or wher-
ever, that we couldn't find the resources to protect his Humvee.
You can do it for the big shots like myself, that go to Baghdad; we
ought to be doing it for every vehicle. And I have been given the
briefing on how many vehicles are the target number to protect. I
find that woefully inadequate.
Second thing, I think, is a lesson learned. And again I don't pre-
tend to be an expert, but I hopefully listen to the experts. I met
with a young Marine lance corporal from a neighboring State, who
had lost a leg in the war. He was telling me that he felt one of the
reasons why his vehicle was singled out was a lack of camouflage,
that it was painted green, amongst a convey of vehicles that were
painted to match the desert.
I am not in a position to say whether he is right or wrong. But
in his mind, that was the problem. I realize that the paints do a
heck of a lot more than just camouflage the vehicle, that they are
there for chemical protection and other things. But I've got to be-
lieve that a Nation with the resources the United States has, can
find — I understand that some of our prepositioned ships are
292
green — the vehicles inside — some of them were desert color. I un-
derstand that.
But there has got to be a way for a quick changeover as we move
from theatre to theater. And again, if it is a matter of resources,
then this committee needs to know that, because this is where the
resources start.
I wish you would comment on those two things. But I am par-
ticularly concerned with the Internet and the ability to transmit in-
formation quickly. I am concerned that improvised explosive de-
vices are not just a problem in Iraq, but in Afghanistan or anyplace
where young Americans are going to be sent.
I think this is a problem today, and it is only going to get worse.
I would like to know what we are doing about it.
Admiral GlAMBASTlANl. I would like to be able to answer you and
give you a good solid answer so you would feel more comfortable,
because I, too, am just as concerned as you would be on improvised
explosive devices.
My team and I have not been stud3dng that, if you will. So I
can't — I am not prepared to answer that question for you. But I
would be happy to take it for the record and go after it.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix begin-
ning on page 355.]
Mr. Taylor. While I have got you, last point. On our trip, Con-
gressman Skeleton, several of my Republican colleagues, we were
made aware by Dr. Kay — who was, if I am not mistaken, an admin-
istration appointee. So he certainly has no political axe to grind.
We were told of 55 large weapons caches that are identified, but
no one is guarding them. That story has since been released to the
press, so we are certainly not talking out of school. Again, since all
it takes is one of those artillery shells to become an improvised ex-
plosive device, what is being done right now to get those caches so
that they do not become a source of weapons for our enemies?
Admiral GlAMBASTlANl. As to your last question, sir, once again
I am unfamiliar. I have not looked at anything that Mr. Kay is
doing. I haven't seen any reports. I am unfamiliar with this, be-
cause I am dealing with a major combat operations piece, but I will
take it for the record and will get back to you on this.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix begin-
ning on page 355.]
Admiral GlAMBASTlANl. If I could, on the question of vehicle col-
ors, we in fact are looking at vehicle colors and what we had in po-
sitioned stocks both ashore and at sea. And we are doing an analy-
sis of that. I don't have the results of it, but we are physically
working on it right now, for the reasons you pointed out.
Mr. Taylor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman. The gentleman from Vir-
ginia, Mr. Schrock.
Mr. Schrock. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Admiral and Gen-
eral. Thanks for being here and thanks for your comments.
When I was in Vietnam, there was a statement that we used to
talk about where we said, war is hell and peace is worse. If you
think about that for a moment, you realize that we did a magnifi-
cent job in 21 days, but the hard part is now and is ahead of us.
293
And I am not so sure there are so many blunders in the postwar
planning as the unknowns in this phase of the operation.
I was in a briefing the other day with some Iraqi officials, and
the former President Chalabi. And he was saying that — someone
asked him how many people surround Saddam Hussein. He said,
without hesitation, 2,000. And my question was, if we know for a
fact there are 2,000 around him, why can't we find some of those
people? It is like you can't get there from here. And they had no
answer for that.
So I think for us to think for a minute that we are going to end
this thing very quickly, we are fooling ourselves. It would be won-
derful if we could, but I don't think that we will.
Two of the things — one of the things you commented on. Admiral,
that I am real concerned about, as well, is the reserves and the Na-
tional Guard. I know I have talked to the head of the National
Guard in the Commonwealth of Virginia, and he is very concerned
about the stress that it is putting on his folks. Some of them are
over there a lot longer than they thought that they would be, and
what it is doing to them financially and other ways.
I wonder how we can address that? Like my friend, Mr. Saxton,
I am very interested in the Special Operations Forces (SOF), as
well. A great number of them are headquartered in the district I
represent. And I know there was testimony here some months ago
that said we are going to need a couple of hundred thousand
troops. That was disputed by the Pentagon. I was one of those who
believed we needed a couple of hundred thousand more troops until
I went to Iraq; I don't believe that now. And I believe more intel-
ligence people and more Special Operations Forces, is exactly what
the commanders in the field said they need.
And I would be curious to know, too, you know, where you think
the role of the SOF is going, what role they are going to have as
we hopefully come to a conclusion on this thing in the next year,
because that is a great concern to me.
Would you be willing to comment on that? And the Reserve and
the Guard issues, as well.
Admiral GlAMBASTlANl. Thank you, Congressman Schrock. The
first thing I would do is, I would make a comment. And this goes
back to Congressman Saxton's point earlier with regard to intel-
ligence. There is one area that we are seriously deficient in, and
that is human intelligence (HUMINT). I didn't mention that pre-
viously. And it is an important piece to bring up. We have what
we call tactical human intelligence teams that are with certain of
our units that we have deployed.
But in general, HUMINT is something that you need more of,
particularly when you are operating against forces that potentially
don't use the type of communications sometimes, or other ways
that we can pick up externally what is happening. So, HUMINT is
a very key component here. And additional HUMINT is needed in
our view.
With regard to the reserves, if I could for just a second. What I
would tell you is, is that in April, as a result of all of our deploy-
ments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs tasked me to do a series
of mobilization studies, because we didn't do mobilization very well
294
in some areas. We did well in some places, we did very poorly in
others, to be frank with you.
And then subsequently in July, on the 9th of July, the Secretary
of Defense (SECDEF) sent a memo out, of which I had happened
to be one of the addees, to in fact look at how to properly rebalance
our forces within the Defense Department as we continued to sus-
tained this Global War On Terrorism no matter where it is, in Af-
ghanistan, in Iraq, et cetera.
And in that Reserve Component, mobilization was a major part
of this. And I was assigned to work on a study group, if you will,
and send a series of conclusions up in policy areas on Reserve Com-
ponent mobilization. And I, in fact, have done that. And I signed
a paper out yesterday morning, after about three months of study,
in conjunction with Dr. Chu who is the Under Secretary of Defense
for Personnel and Readiness.
And both Dr. Chu and I are sending forward a joint set of ten
recommendations on what we call quick policy wins. Now, since the
Secretary of Defense has not seen this yet, it is hard for me to get
into a lot of details. But I will give you a couple of examples. We
were not as good as we would like to be, for example, on how we
dealt with the Individual Ready Reserve. Okay. How do you make
prudent and judicious use of those reserves? We looked at how we
prepared Reserve Components for activation.
For example, many don't know that the reserve — for example, re-
serve forces under title 10 do not come under my combatant com-
mand until they are mobilized. So they are under service control
until they are mobilized, and then they come under my combatant
control.
Mr. SCHROCK. Mobihzed or in theater?
Admiral GlAMBASTlANl. They always remain — when they come
under my combatant command, they stay with me. After we train
them and deploy them, we turn over operational control then to the
forward-deployed regional combatant commander. So what happens
is we have some issues with how we do that and our lack of notifi-
cation of reserves, items like that. So we worked a whole series of
initiatives to fix those, if you will.
How do you backfill active forces with reserves? We have got
some initiatives in that area. And what I would leave it as is how
do you deal with the mobilization cap and how do you work with
the services underneath that? So those are a series of areas that
I will tell you.
Mr. SCHROCK. I know I have the red light. It would be interest-
ing at some point after the Secretary has seen it for us to see that.
Let me make one other comment in a response to Mr. Saxton's
comment about intelligence gathering. You made the comment, and
I think I am quoting, "not as good as it used to be." That comment
really bothered me. Not the fact that you said it, but the fact that
that situation exists. And why that we have allowed — I say "we"
collectively. Congress — has allowed that to happen is a mystery to
me. We darn well better get our act together or we are going to be
in more trouble than we have been in the past. We have got to take
that into consideration. Thank you both for being here.
Admiral GlAMBASTlANl. Yes, sir.
295
Finally, on the SOF piece, I would just say here I would really
like to defer to — SOF is getting bigger and working more with con-
ventional forces. How I would tell you it is important, there are five
regional combatant commanders in the United States. All of them
have a special operations command underneath them. There is one
other combatant command who has a special operations command,
and it is mine. The reason why that is, is because we are a joint
force provider and we work on making conventional and special op-
erations force operations together, that integration, a high priority.
So that is why I have one under my command, and doing that is
very important to how we operate in the future.
That is one of the high points, as I report here. So you are going
to see more Special Operations Forces-conventional force integra-
tion in the future. And you will see a lot more work in this area.
Mr. SCHROCK. That is terrific, because I am convinced the Spe-
cial Operations Forces folks could be those who win the peace.
Thank you.
Admiral GlAMBASTlANl. Yes, sir.
Mr. Hefley [presiding].
Dr. Snyder. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Admiral and Gen-
eral, thank you for being here. Mr. Chairman, I think you and I
sat in on the closed session briefing that we had a couple of weeks
ago, and it got cut short because of interruptions. And my recollec-
tion is that it was about a 90-minute briefing. It may be worth-
while if we can get commitments from people somewhere down the
line of having a set number of people, because it is a very extensive
briefing.
It would be good to hear from beginning to end. And maybe we
can curtail our enthusiasm for interrupting and get the full brief-
ing. But I thought it was very helpful.
Admiral GlAMBASTiANl. We would be happy to provide that.
Dr. Snyder. I know it is a lot of effort on their part. But if we
got a commitment from eight or ten members to be there.
Mr. Hefley. I think that would be a good idea, because it was
a very difficult time frame we were dealing with.
Dr. Snyder. I think if we had it from 8:00 to 9:30 or something,
some morning when there wouldn't be interruptions, and get com-
mitments from members to be there, it would be worthwhile.
I also appreciate you all being here. I notice that you are kind
of in the midst of this, which I guess goes on for a long time. I note
the slides you have are labeled "draft." We have had quite a few
discussions in the last few months on whether you can learn any-
thing from something marked "draft," but apparently you can. And
we appreciate you being here.
I assume that this is an ongoing process though, that this is just
a work in process for literally years — I mean months, if not years;
is that a fair statement?
Admiral GlAMBASTlANl. Yes, sir, it is a very fair statement. For
example, what we did is we provided a 200-plus page quick look
that we worked through the draft and we are reviewing that now.
And then v/e are working on a final report. And we have incor-
porated most of that 200 pages into the final report, which is going
to be larger.
296
And General Cone over here next to me heading that team, I am
going to let him talk to that, just a second, to the process. But the
important point is that we have a continuous process that we have
started. One of my problems with lessons learned in the past is
when I came to the command, and this is no reflection on my pred-
ecessors— they had other priorities that they had to send people to-
wards— I only had two full-time people working on joint lessons
learned, one military and one contractor.
I now have about 45 or so who are working on this. Most of them
are out of hide within my command, but I think it is that impor-
tant to have this real-time effort going on, where we can feed it
back to the combatant commands and get it into the process, with-
in the programing and budgeting side of the Pentagon, so that they
can see where there are needs and we can respond as quickly as
possible.
We also have a series of analysts, and we have partnered with
the Institute for Defense Analysis and the Center for Naval Analy-
sis to provide us with some good solid analysis on specific subjects.
Bob, do you want to add anything on that?
General CONE. Sir, we started this effort back in March. We were
the first to stand this up. We had about 35 folks. We have really
been experimenting over time of how to best do this, how to get
at — how to access the information you need, how to triangulate
data, how to use interviews and backups.
But I think the most important dimension is that we are collect-
ing this as it is happening as opposed to waiting after the fact.
And, very fortunately, warfare today creates a digital footprint, if
you will. For instance, key intelligence briefings can be captured,
et cetera. So we have amassed, just for the major part of the oper-
ation, about 80 gigabytes of key briefings, satellite feeds, et cetera.
I think that would be very helpful as we try and recreate and con-
tinue to study this.
Our efforts are ongoing. We still have people remaining in thea-
tre. And we are looking to expand our study now to the entire
Global War On Terrorism. And, again, this is fascinating work,
something we started in March. I have just been extended another
year to continue working this for Joint Forces Command.
It is something that you just have a difficult time putting down.
The most rewarding part of this is when you go to a combatant
commander, like with U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) or with
U.S. Forces Korea, and give a briefing and have a combatant com-
mander say he is going to make changes tomorrow, based upon
what you told him, to his war plan, I think that is taking lessons
and making them lessons acted upon.
Admiral GlAMBASTlANl. I might address one last thing. Dr. Sny-
der. We have in my Command today, in the second of a four-day
period, the capstone group of flag and general officers. These are
our brand new flag and generals.
Bob just finished — General Cone just finished giving this brief to
them, full up lessons learned brief, just as we offered here to the
House Armed Services Committee and had tremendous feedback
from them. And we are trying to embed these as quickly as possible
in the training. So we like to call this a dynamic interactive real-
time diagnosis versus a static post-mortem.
297
Dr. Snyder. I had several questions, but my time is running out.
Five minutes goes by fast. You specifically mentioned Goldwater/
Nichols and how important that was. Have you, or will you, as part
of this process look at potential need for legislative changes to
Goldwater/Nichols?
Admiral GlAMBASTlANl. The Secretary has asked the Chairman
and other senior civilians and military to provide him with a list
of changes. I have provided inputs to the Defense Department lead-
ership on recommended changes for legislation. And those have
come forward in the package that has been sent up to the Hill over
this past six months.
Mr. Hefley. Mr. Skelton.
Mr. Skelton. Let me at this time ask my question, if I may. Ad-
miral, you stated that your study is that of ruthless objectivity.
Right?
Admiral GlAMBASTlANl. Right.
Mr. Skelton. You also said the purpose is to improve our
warfighting capability. Is that right?
Admiral GlAMBASTlANL Correct, sir.
Mr. Skelton. General Cone just said that you are collecting this
as it happens. Is that right?
Admiral GlAMBASTlANL Correct, sir.
Mr. Skelton. History tells us that we have had parallel guerilla
warfare, because General Abizaid announced we are in guerilla
warfare; one tjrpe of warfare phased into another and never really
stopped. Is that correct?
Admiral GlAMBASTlANL I understand, and I did not hear him say
that, but I read some press accounts that he talked about it in that
fashion.
Mr. Skelton. Well, from your studies. Admiral, the force on force
combat phased into a guerrilla warfare. Is that correct?
Admiral GlAMBASTlANL Would you repeat that one again. Con-
gressman?
Mr. Skelton. The force on force combat, our forces against their
forces, phased into what General Abizaid now calls guerrilla war-
fare. Is that correct?
Admiral GlAMBASTlANL I would say to you the way I would de-
fine this
Mr. Skelton. Is that correct or incorrect?
Admiral GlAMBASTlANL I don't know if it is correct.
Mr. Skelton. You are aware of the various eras in history where
the French were thrown out of Algeria as a result of guerilla war-
fare in 1962?
Admiral GlAMBASTlANL Yes, sir.
Mr. Skelton. Where we faced guerilla-type warfare in Lebanon,
where the Russians today are facing guerilla warfare in Chechnya,
similar type of conflict has occurred in Northern Ireland, the Brit-
ish had guerilla warfare in Malaysia, and the British fought the
Mau Maus in Kenya in the 1950s and the 1960s.
With all of that history in mind, what lessons from your study
have applicability for the combat operations that are still occurring
today? In other words. Admiral, what are you telling our command-
ers on the ground now to win this guerilla war?
298
Admiral GlAMBASTlANl. What I operate at is an operational level,
operational level of lessons learned. Which means at the joint task
force and combatant commander level. So what we focus on — and
of course the purpose of the brief today was on major combat oper-
ations— but what we focus on at Joint Forces Command is how our
units and our commands collaborate together and how they are
able to take information and use it, which would be useful in both
major combat operations and any other type of combat operations
or lesser operations, guerilla warfare and the rest. That is what we
focus on.
So my focus, my team's focus, is how to enable those commanders
to exercise command and control while they are conducting an op-
eration. And, in fact, what I would tell you is, is I have a team
going over to work with Lieutenant General Sanchez. They are
coming over in another week. This is the second visit they are mak-
ing. And they are focusing on just that, the collaborative informa-
tion environment to allow them to conduct operations in the way
that they can do it, the speediest and the most precise.
Mr. Skelton. Admiral, that is all process. What are you telling
the commanders on the ground now to win the guerilla war?
Admiral GlAMBASTlANl. I don't tell them what to do to win the
guerilla war, sir.
Mr. Hefley. Mr. Cole.
Mr. Cole. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate that.
Admiral, I would like to pick up on the line of questioning that
my colleague from Virginia raised on the Reserve units in particu-
lar. As you are trying to focus on lessons learned there, can you
tell us, does that take you to any conclusions that you can share
with us at this time about the mix of Active Forces that we have
in two regards?
One, do we need different kinds of units in the active service that
we have, given the problems we have in calling up some of units
we have used quite heavily from the reserves?
And, two, to stretch it a little bit further, does any of what you
are studying suggest to you we frankly need a larger military in
general, that we actually need more manpower to make sure that
our commanders in the field have literally all of the tools, all of the
units that they need for this type of conflict?
Admiral GlAMBASTlANl. As a force provider. Joint Forces Com-
mand spends a significant amount of time looking at these mobili-
zation issues. We are spending more because of all of that tasking
I mentioned earlier. With regard to activations, let me give you a
couple of quick examples.
One would be that we late notify a unit, for example, and we
alert them, unfortunately, at a later date. We don't give them a
prior notification. That would be one example of what would hap-
pen. And, unfortunately, instead of giving them maybe 30 days of
alertment period, we give them 3 or 4, 5 or 6, or some shorter pe-
riod. That is not really one that is conducive to their job, their fam-
ily, and the rest.
A second one would be some Reserve units and the readiness lev-
els. If they are in a Reserve unit where we need to use them as
an enabling Reserve unit — for example, I need them as a support
unit to be out in theatre to receive the active forces that come be-
299
lind them — we need to be able to get them out at a certain time,
vhere we have to get them trained properly, if they are not already
rained, in a certain period of time.
We had some difficulty with some of our units, because we had
0 alert them at such a late time, that we had to send their gear
brward. The gear was in theater. We had to go use gear from an-
(ther unit to train that particular unit, and then send them for-
vard. We have to figure out how to rectify some of this.
Mr. Cole. Was this a situation where simply not enough time;
here is one set of difficulties here that are clearly a great chal-
enge to the individual Reservists or Guard and family.
Admiral GlAMBASTlANl. Some are time, some are process.
Mr. Cole. The process is what I am interested in.
One, I want to repeat my question, and perhaps it is not appro-
)riate for you to answer it, but is there, from what you have seen,
i suggestion that we need more of particular types of unit in the
ictive service; this is not a process easily fixed, and we need them
;here? Or, two, were these Reserve units up to speed? Were they
eady to do what they needed to do?
Admiral GlAMBASTlANL Some units have a readiness level for ex-
ample, that we call in the military C-3 or C-4, that means they
are not ready for deployment. C-3, C-4, C-5, that means they are
lot trained for deployment. So, therefore, you have to go through
a training period before you can, in fact, send them forward.
You know that already. The bottom line is that some of these
units that we need immediately on a short-notice base are, in fact,
tept at a C-3, C-4 level.
Mr. Cole. Well, is it to suggest that this is a problem that you
can deal with by simply upgrading what we are doing in the re-
serves, or are you going to need some of these units that we right
now are basically counting on in time of need calling up? Are you
going to need them in the active service, or are you going to need
a larger military?
Admiral GlAMBASTlANL What I will tell you is that some of the
units that we have that are in these enabling units probably need
to have more of those units in the Active Component.
Mr. Cole. Can you specify what types of units?
Admiral Gl\mbastianl I don't have specifics. But what we have
studied amongst our reserve forces policy people — these are the re-
serves themselves, the National Guard, our Under Secretary who
is responsible in this area, the services themselves— we are looking
really at things like in combat service and combat service support;
we need more of those, for example.
And if we get the mix properly, we feel that a lot of this we can
take care of The other piece is, there are a huge number of policy
issues we have got to fix.
Mr. Cole. Let me ask you one other question because my time
is close to expiring.
Again, focusing on this same thing, and in terms of having indi-
vidual units ready to go, I will relate a quick anecdote to you. I
talked to one of the generals at Fort Sill, and I said, what is your
big problem with the reserves? He said, I have learned more about
teeth in the past two, three weeks than I ever wanted to know in
a lifetime. What are the kinds of things we ought to be doing, in
300
terms of providing benefits or things that frankly enable reservists
to be in the physical condition to be immediately mobilized and de-
ployed that we are not doing now, things that we should be doing
on the back side in expanding things we make available to our Re-
serve soldiers.
Admiral GlAMBASTlANl. One of the things I found personally as
I went to, for example. Army bases — Congressman Taylor had
asked me this question separately — and I found out that I was
looking at clinics where we had to deal with tooth problems in get-
ting reservists ready from a dental perspective to deploy, and I
found, surprisingly, many more problems in this area than I ex-
pected.
So we made this part of the program to figure out how we can,
in fact, deal with the dental end of the forces, particularly those
that are high demand, low density, or those that have to be in a
high readiness state, because obviously you cannot wait to get a
whole series of dental problems fixed if we need these people in 48
hours if they are in that type of unit.
Mr. Cole. Thank you. Admiral. Mr. Chairman, I 3deld back my
time.
Mr. McHuGH. Will the Chairman yield and may I have 30 sec-
onds?
The Chairman. Yes.
Mr. McHuGH. Just for the edification of everyone here, and I am
sure we are all aware of it, the House authorization bill provides
for preemployment Tri-Care services, dental and medical for these
units, to try to address the very problem that the gentleman, Mr.
Cole, asked about and the Admiral responded to, so we are trying
to stay on that curve.
Thank you, sir.
The Chairman. Good.
Thank you.
Mr. Cooper.
Mr. Cooper. Thank you. Chairman and Admiral and General.
At the beginning of your testimony, you note the limitations of
this report, specifically that it will not help us in our procurement
decisions. I think you've done very valuable work, but to build on
that, do not we need some sort of independent study that would
help this committee in its procurement decisions get some DOD ex-
perts?
You know, let's have the SECDEF appoint them, but also to try
to remove the service rivalry problem that I am sure you still have
to face. Wouldn't that be a helpful way to help overcome some of
these parochial interests?
Admiral GlAMBASTlANl. Sir, there is a definite need for advice on
how to make systems decisions and how to procure at the system
level within the services and between the services. That is why I
tried to give you the knots up front.
I definitely do agree with you that there is a need for that. I just
wanted you to make sure that you didn't have an expectation that
we were going to tell you that.
Mr. Cooper. So you would endorse some sort of independent
study that would follow up?
301
Admiral GlAMBASTlANl. What I tell you is that I endorse any ef-
fort to do an analysis and assessment of these systems. Now, many
of these are ongoing right now inside the Department, but as you
say, some of them are going on within the services themselves and
sometimes, unfortunately, when we look at ourselves, we may get
an answer that may not be as— or we may get an answer we think
is very pleasing to us but not to others.
Mr. Cooper. This is a small example. It is my understanding
that the Army is continuing to buy line-of-sight radio systems, and
blue force tracker seems to work a whole lot better, and yet we are
still seeing procurement linger on. But that is just a small paro-
chial example.
The ultimate line of reasoning, and I am not askmg you to en-
dorse this, might be for the joint command to actually do the serv-
ices so that you would eliminate the service bias that might be in-
herent when they do their
Admiral GlAMBASTlANl. That is the Holy Grail that I thmk every-
body has been trying to get at. I am not sure a combatant com-
mand should do that, but I take your comment. I might also men-
tion that on the blue force tracking piece.
We are very, very strong on the need across all services, ground
forces, air forces and the rest, for two components of fratricide pre-
ventions. One of them is blue force tracking, and the other one is
the associated combat identification that comes along with it.
Those two things are absolutely essential to prevent blue on blue
and fratricide, and they have to be used in concert to be effective.
Mr. Cooper. I am glad you brought up from that time side again,
because you have listed that as probably the number one concern.
It has recently come to my attention that no Purple Hearts are
possibly awarded for victims from that time side, including, even,
bomblet demolition experts whose task is to disable bomblets that
we have dropped, because apparently 10 to 15 percent of these do
not explode as planned. That just seems inherently unfair, because
if you take a bullet in combat in service of our country, does it real-
ly matter whether it is fired by the enemy or a mistaken effort on
our path?
Admiral GlAMBASTlANl. Sir, I am unaware of the policy on this,
because we haven't looked at it, but we will take it for the record
for you and refer it to the right people if that is okay with you.
Mr. Cooper. That would be very helpful. I have no more ques-
tions at this time.
TThe information referred to can be found in the Appendix begin-
ning on page 356.]
The Chairman. Mr. Thornberry.
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral, several years ago, I introduced a bill to create a Joint
Forces Command, because I thought it was critically important
that somebody, other than the joint staff, bring together all the
services around the world and also look out into the future, rather
than just concentrating on the very difficult challenges of operating
services day to day.
I think we are to the critical testing point, in my view, for Joint
Forces Command and the lessons learned from this engagement
are very important. They will have a lot to do with what sort of
302
military we have in the future, and as you know, sometimes when
you learn the wrong lessons, you sow the seeds for future defeats.
And yet there are bureaucratic struggles and a lot of things that
go on in fighting over what lessons to be learned.
I guess what I want to ask is related to a comment you made
that the lessons learned need to be turned into lessons acted upon.
We all have lots of studies sitting on our shelves and nothing
comes of them. What I am most interested in is okay, you say these
are the things we have learned.
Now what? How is this going to be translated in — maybe not into
action, you know, telling the commanders on the ground tactically
what to do today, but in future budget requests that come before
this committee, and at the appropriate level where you are making
recommendations, how is that going to happen?
Admiral GlAMBASTlANl. Thank you. Congressman Thornberry.
What I would say to you is that I like to emphasize to my staff,
product, product, product, which is what you are talking about
here. How do we get this entered into the budget programming and
the rest?
Well, one of the ways is to immediately engage for these major
combat operations lessons learned with the service chiefs, the
Chairman, the Vice Chairman, the Secretary, the Deputy and the
other senior leadership in the Department, and we have done that
repeatedly over about 84, 85 — I don't know, it is just over 100
briefs. |j
What is it, Bob?
General Cone. We are at about 103 now.
Admiral GlAMBASTlANl. We are at 103, now. It goes fast and most
of this has been to the folks who write for guidance. For example,
the Defense Planning Guidance will have much of what we have
got from this written into it; for example, that is one way to ensure
that it gets directed into the program in the budgeting system.
It is the embed part of this in the Defense Planning Guidance.
Mr. Thornberry. What if it goes against the culture of a par-
ticular service and is a very difficult haul?
Admiral GlAMBASTlANl. Sir, the services, not surprisingly — if you
take a look at them, the services agree with a lot of our findings.
What they do not agree with, potentially, would be some of our rec-
ommendations, and that is going to happen, and that is the way
we do business. But my view on that is that is why we have got
a Secretary of Defense, a Deputy, a Chairman, and a Vice Chair-
man, to help out here.
Mr. Thornberry. Is there a way for your recommendations to be
fed into the process, other than the Secretary himself saying do
this? In other words. Secretaries come and go.
Admiral GlAMBASTlANl. Yes, sir.
Mr. Thornberry. Commander, Commander in Chief (CINC) —
well, whatever we are calling you now. You cannot be a CINC —
come and go. How do we institutionalize this to overcome paro-
chialism that exists in any organization?
Admiral GlAMBASTlANl. In October when I arrived last year, and
today — I have been in Northern Command one year as of today —
and when I arrived last year, I instituted a program called trans-
formation change packages. And every time we come forward with
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a recommendation, we put forward to the Joint Chiefs, for example,
through the Joint Requirements Oversight Committee and to the
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), we put in transformation
-hange packages, because I would hke to have a method and a
technique of tracking what we have even put into the system and
hopefully foster it through the system that they get embedded in
policy changes, guidance changes, planning, programming, and
budgeting. And, in fact, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs,
General Pace and myself are personally tracking these issues.
I have had two video teleconferences recently with him and two
meetings with him, and he is coming down to see me in another
week or so just to follow up on this very issue that you are talking
about, because we are very serious at the senior level in getting
these things embedded into the system.
Mr. Thornberry. Good. I hope so.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Mrs. Wilson.
Mrs. Wilson of New Mexico. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I wanted to follow up on the line of Mr. Cole, and I wanted to
ask your perspectives, because you were over there in Iraq seeing
what was going on in the theater, particularly with respect to the
A.rmy, but also the other services to the extent that you saw them.
Do we have, not only looking back on this operation, but looking
forward to the likelihood of continued rotations, do we have the ac-
tive duty end strength that we need in the military, in order to sus-
tain these operations?
General CONE. Ma'am, that would— in terms of the things that
I studied, that is not something that I would have looked at. I
would view that as a larger area, and frankly
Mrs. Wilson of New Mexico. I am not going to let you duck
this one. General.
I understand it may not have been within the scope of the par-
ticular study you were looking at, but you are a smart guy, you
have looked at what was going on over there and you have been
around a little bit, and I really want to know what you think.
General CONE. I would prefer to restrict my comments to things
that I have studied and have empirical evidence and background
on, ma'am.
Admiral GlAMBASTIANl. If I can help out here, because I have got
him working just specifically in operational warfighting.
As a force provider, with the force services, right now we have
adequate forces, maybe not in all the areas that we need, and we
are working always to resource all of these right now, under my
combatant command, we have just over 80 percent conventional
forces, and we are looking at how to feed full subsequent rotation
of forces overseas as we always do. Some areas we have a surplus,
some areas we have deficits. Some areas are in what we call high-
density, low-demand outfits. Others are in areas we do not need.
For example, there is significant pressure on military police, sig-
nificant pressure on civilian affairs, where we do not have large
numbers of these forces, and in some cases, we do not have suffi-
cient numbers in that area, but we do have them in other areas
which we can retrain to use. So I will tell you right now, for the
short term, we are fine. For the short term, I think we are fine.
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Mrs. Wilson of New Mexico. General, I would like to follow up
a little bit.
General CONE. Ma'am.
Mrs. Wilson of New Mexico. I really want to know your opin-
ion. You have got a lot more experience than most of us who are
sitting up here
General CONE. Right.
Mrs. Wilson of New Mexico [continuing]. On whether the
Army is going to be able to sustain this over the next 18 months
to 2 years without breaking the force that I suspect that you love.
General CONE. I have seen various briefings on the Army's pro-
posal to do that.
Frankly, it is a significant strain. I think that there are alter-
natives, in terms of activation of enhanced brigades, et cetera, but
from what I have seen, it is a very tight time line in terms of bring-
ing folks in, and frankly, there is a significant human cost in terms
of folks owing — separation from families, et cetera. So if you look
at it, someone can say, is there a path ahead?
Yes, there is a path ahead for the next 18 months. Is there sig-
nificant friction, and how much? If variables change, or cir-
cumstances change, it becomes extremely difficult at that point. So
it is certainly not a comfortable solution, but it is a solution that
I think is doable, given the current variables that we have.
Mrs. Wilson of New Mexico. With respect to the Active and Re-
serve Components, and looking at what you learned from this spe-
cific experience on difficulties in mobilization, not only how you
smooth out the pipeline and the process to get people activated, but
are there units that — looking forward, are there units that are on
active duty that should be in the reference, and are there units in
the reserves and Guard that should be on active duty, and what
are your insights on how you would adjust that?
General CONE. I would shift, again, what I frankly observed in
the buildup to this particular campaign and the difficulties that we
had, particularly in logistics units and in terms of setting enabling
conditions. If you have this kind of a rolling start that we had here,
I mean, who is going to roll these forces forward? And so the prob-
lem was, in many cases, with some of the key logistical enablers
that were in Kuwait that should have been there sort of ahead of
time to project forces through.
Frankly, they came in after they were needed, so that is a par-
ticular area that I think — an area that was mentioned to me when
I was there was talking about military police and standing up to
military police brigade that was there. And frankly, the rear area
of military police were not available in the time that they were
needed.
So again, some specific examples of the problems we had to stage
in country would give you a type of idea of mission occupational
specialties (MOS). You have got to have the capabilities that are
consistent with your plan at the time you want to execute it, and
if you want to reach into the reserves, you have got to have the
time lines to have them when they are needed.
Mrs. Wilson of New Mexico. The inverse of that, when there
are units that are on active duty that you saw from your perspec-
305
tive might be able to be moved to Reserve units, and you do not
need them to be as ready or as far forward.
General CONE. I saw some very creative utilization of active
forces that were— for instance, the 75th Artillery Brigade served as
the 75th Exploration Brigade. And again, our military men are
very precise in their nature. They took these guys, they trained
them to help look for weapons of mass destruction. And again, they
were staged with the units and whatnot, so you could see— you
could look at the structure and say, you know, we had the ability
to try and — to train, retrain people on active duty for new capabili-
ties and responsibilities. That might be, you know, an idea of the
kinds of things that we might want to do in the future.
Mrs. Wilson of New Mexico. Thank you.
Admiral GlAMBASTlANl. I might mention, Congresswoman, that
some of those points that General Cone has made are what we
tried to feed back in the answer I gave to a couple of different Con-
gressmen here on Reserve Component mobilization and the mix of
forces. We have tried to feed those directly back in to what policy
recommendations we are coming in with.
Mrs. Wilson of New Mexico. Thank you.
The Chairman. Mr. Franks.
Mr. Franks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral, General, I know that the whole issue of fratricide has
been dealt with significantly here already today, but it occurs to me
that, as the methods of warfare advance, that it almost seems two
competing dynamics are at play. I mean, as we become a more le-
thal force and as we attempt to become a more integrated force, to
get the different disciplines of the different services to integrate, it
seems that there is more opportunity, more mathematical, well,
possibility, for friendly-fire tragedies. I know that there are very
few things more bewildering and more tragic to a commander or
to leaders such as yourselves than this type of an issue.
Having said that, it seems like the opposing dynamic also exists
and that the very methods that we use to integrate a force might
also be our greatest method to prevent fratricide. And can you tell
me if, indeed, that analysis is correct and what you see in the fu-
ture as ways that we cannot only integrate the force effectively, but
do everything we possibly can to prevent these friendly-fire inci-
dents, and what can we do as a committee in terms of policy to as-
sist that effort?
Admiral GlAMBASTlANl. Thank you Congressman Franks.
What I would tell you is, first of all, just to emphasize a point
I made earlier: Statistically, we did better in Operation Iraqi Free-
dom, statistically.
However, one is too many, as you have already suggested, or any
is too many.
In this particular operation, we had more ground combat days
than we had, for example, during Desert Storm. So the interaction,
for example, of air forces with ground forces, was substantially
greater during this conflict than it was during Desert Storm. So if
we look at that interaction with different forces plus interjecting
Special Operations Forces into it, you had a more complex battle-
field. So the good news is that we reduce these. Again, the bad
news is that we had any.
306
If there are two things that you should do in the committee here
as you look at budgets that come forward and programs from each
of the services, is to scrutinize how their combat identification and
blue force tracking solutions fit with the other services and jointly.
Now, we are working inside the Department, if you will, to pro-
vide more interoperability and integration here with a whole series
of recommendations that are coming out of this, plus additional
working groups in a combat identification evaluation team that I
have at Joint Forces Command. But the bottom line is, if you focus
on combat identification and blue force tracking and their integra-
tion and interoperability, you will be doing a very good thing in the
committee.
Mr. Franks. Well, I just want to thank you both and emphasize
the committee's appreciation for all that you do.
The Chairman. Mrs. Davis.
Ms. Davis of California. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral,
General, thank you for being here.
We have talked a lot about the Reserve and deplo5rment, and I
am wondering in that area, as well as others, the extent to which
your evaluation really looks at predictability. You know, what did
we know, I guess? When did we know it? ^^i^lo are we listening to?
Are we listening to the right people in evaluating that? To what
extent does your assessment get into those issues?
Admiral GlAMBASTlANl. Congresswoman Davis, how I would an-
swer is as follows: First of all, if we could have a perfectly predict-
able world, that would be the first thing we would sign up for, so
that if we knew we had to do rotations, for example, of units, we
could do that very nicely. We do that in Bosnia, in Kosovo today.
As a force provider, our units who are lined up for those know
a year, two years in advance when they are going to roll through
those particular assignments, so it is easily predictable in that case
for families, jobwise, et cetera.
When you have a contingency that arises such as this and then
potentially you have to continue to roll over forces, what we are
trying to do now is provide some predictability, for example, to
forces that are going into Afghanistan and into Iraq, so
Ms. Davis of California. I guess what I am asking is not so
much predictability to the forces but predictability in our thinking.
Admiral GlAMBASTlANl. Right.
Ms. Davis of California. And how do you assess that, how do
you assess that? And I guess it is maybe a somewhat rhetorical
question, but it seems like it is helpful in lessons learned to do
that, and I do not know whether — to what extent you actually iden-
tify that. Yes, we really knew that in advance.
Admiral GlAMBASTlANl. Any thought on that. Bob?
I am going to let General Cone take it for a second. I can address
it from a policy side because we've been trjdng to address some of
this predictability.
General Cone. This is a key issue, and one of the reasons we in-
cluded it in the report. I think we certainly captured the human
dimension in talking to — every commander we interviewed at the
brigade levels made comments that they wanted this in this report
because they felt that this is not a good way to do business; that,
in fact, we can treat people better than this; and that they want
307
to look at systemic t5rpes of changes. So I think that is the impetus
really for what we tried to document.
Ms. Davis of California. Thank you. Appreciate that.
Could you also share with us the extent to which Operation Iraqi
Freedom — I guess the 21 days, the march to Baghdad, et cetera —
how that is being separated from the post-21 days? And if I look
at areas like urban operations, for example, and also end
strength — I mean, whether or not, you know, having additional di-
visions on the ground, whether we would think about that as part
of the operation, as opposed to the post-operation.
To what extent is your assessment integrating the needs that we
would have during and post immediate conflict?
Admiral GlAMBASTlANl. In general, what I would tell you is what
we are looking at, and again of course, what we are addressing
today is our major combat operations period. We do have some ad-
ditional folks, as I already mentioned, who are going to go over to
be observer trainers and are taking the lessons learned with regard
to collaborative environments to assist the Joint Task Force (JTF)
commander, the current — Lieutenant General Sanchez, for exam-
ple.
We are also required to provide, in some cases, the replacement
JTF headquarters out of Joint Forces Command, so we get into an
organized train-and-equip function with the services in that re-
spect.
Because our Command is focused on warfighting — ergo the name
of my center that does this. Joint Task Force Training is called the
Joint Warfighting Center — we have not, in fact, looked at exten-
sively post-major combat operations in the past.
Now we are getting into that area is what I would tell you, be-
cause there is obviously a desire for that and a need for that with
this new lessons learned capability, so we are gathering and as-
sessing data right now, is what I would tell you, but we are in the
gathering and assessing phase right now.
Ms. Davis of California. So would you say then that is part of
transformation? Would that be part of some transformational
thinking?
Admiral GlAMBASTlANl. Yes.
Ms. Davis of California. That would be more integrated, that
we would need to think about that more in the planning.
Admiral GlAMBASTlANl. Correct. And that is why we have started
to do that. And we are looking at it from the military perspective,
from military operations, and, frankly, we have taken it on because
we think it is an important part of what we do every day.
Ms. Davis of California. Okay.
Admiral GlAMBASTlANl. But this is something we hadn't done be-
fore. Joint Forces Command. We have never done this before.
Ms. Davis of California. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Mr. Simmons.
Mr. Simmons. Thank you Mr. Chairman.
Welcome, Admiral. It is always good to have a submariner at the
witness table, because we love ruthless objectivity.
Now, in the spirit of ruthless objectivity, you made a comment
that HUMINT is a problem, and I agree. And I will just recall
briefly that in the sixties, I trained as a military intelligence officer
308
at Fort Holabird, Maryland, and at that time, HUMINTers were
trained for all military services at that location.
When I was deployed to Vietnam in the late-sixties, there were
military HUMINTers in civilian clothes, doing their thing in that
war zone. I do not know, we could quibble on how effective they
were, but they were doing it.
In the mid-seventies, as a consequence of the Church-Pike inves-
tigations and the disclosure that some of these military
HUMINTers were observing American citizens protesting the war,
that capability was essentially eliminated. And it was only in the
early 1980s, in the Reagan administration, that an effort was made
to reestablish that capability, a limited effort, and the training at
that point was reserved to the Central Intelligence Agency. The
Fort Holabird capability had been deactivated.
So, it is my assessment that this capability is weak, that it prob-
ably focuses primarily on IPW, interrogation of prisoners of war,
very little paid informants, and that this is a problem, a big prob-
lem. And whether or not you can discuss it in any detail in an open
forum, I think it is a problem for us as members of the Armed
Services Committee. I do not think it should be relegated simply
to the Intelligence Committee, because I think it has to do critically
with your capability, especially now, to conduct an unconventional
conflict, and I think it affects people's lives, and those people are
people of whom we have jurisdiction. So I would be interested in
your ruthless objectivity in addressing this issue and if you wish
to reserve this for a closed session, I would hope you would express
that.
Admiral GlAMBASTIANI. Sir, in the bounds of this particular
forum right now, I would tell you that, number one, HtJMINT is
definitely needed. I have said that already. Number two, tactical
human intelligence, in fact, is a skill set that is in some of our
units, and I am going to allow General Cone to talk about that for
a second. But without going too far in this area, HUMINT is a very
important thing to have, not only when you are in a fast-paced
moving battle, but it is an important thing to have, frankly, any-
time you have forces in an area. So there is a need for it, our classi-
fied report talks about it, and what I would do is just ask General
Cone maybe to address the tactical human intelligence of what, po-
tentially, some of our units have and do.
General CONE. I think in interviews with commanders, one of the
comments that is made frequently is, we are relearning the value
of tactical HUMINT. We are also relearning the value of our own
eyes and ears and skill sets that perhaps we hadn't trained in for
a period of time. I think we probably got about 95 percent of our
actionable intelligence from the human sources and, frankly, based
on available tactical HUMINT teams and the degree of exposure
we have, frankly what we are learning is everybody is becoming a
source of HUMINT. And, as I said, that is an important skill set
and it is something that takes experience. It takes a cultural back-
ground, et cetera, et cetera. But it really highlights, I think, future
structural changes in terms of how we address that.
It takes several weeks to get good at this on the ground. How do
we in the future ensure that we increase that capability so that we
309
are ready to go? And I think that has to do with answers from
higher levels into the integration into the tactical units.
Mr. Simmons. And so, it is my understanding that this is a col-
lection of information by uniformed personnel.
General CONE. A combination. But it is my understanding we are
doing a lot of it with HUMINT personnel.
Mr. Simmons. And that relies on intelligence of prisoners of war.
But I guess what I am driving at is the folks that were previously
trained to run informants and develop human source intelligence
were not uniformed personnel. They often operated in civilian
clothes and were able to penetrate much more deeply into the in-
frastructure of the country under consideration.
It is my sense that we do not have that right now as a military
capability. Is that correct or incorrect?
General CONE. That is a correct perception on the part of many
of the commanders on the ground who think that they could use
a lot more help from those type of resources that you are talking
about.
Mr. Simmons. I thank the Chair. And if I could make a request
for the record, I think it would be useful if we could follow up on
this subject in a little more detail in a closed session.
The Chairman. That is a good idea.
Mr. Wilson.
Mr. Wilson of South Carolina. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and
Admiral and General, thank you both for your service.
I am just so proud of what you helped contribute to what I con-
sider to be an historic military victory in Iraq and part of the war
on terrorism. It has just been a tremendous, I think, morale boost
to our military and tremendous effort again to the war on terror-
ism.
Additionally, I am impressed by your efforts on the joint lessons
learned. It is not going to be, as indicated, the after action reports
that — from the beginning, there is a real effort to learn about how
we can better prepare for any future conflict. And I in particular
am happy to have heard the comments about fratricide prevention.
In my 31 years in the Army National Guard, fratricide investiga-
tions were part of my duties as a Judge Advocate General (JAG)
officer, and I really felt — and, of course, every life is precious — I
really felt that it had been well-handled in the war.
But I do understand that our goal is none, and so I am impressed
that you actually list that as a capability that fell short, because
by many standards, it was as well as almost could be expected.
In regard to the planning also, I had the opportunity to visit Ku-
wait in the Middle East last November, again in February. I was
back last month in Kuwait and then had the opportunity to visit
Iraq, and I saw the advanced planning. I felt like the planning in-
deed has been excellent, and all the questions about planning real-
ly has disregarded the facts largely of what occurred. There are
certainly surprises, but these can be addressed and they are being
addressed.
In the process of lessons learned, did you identify any programs
or concepts that you consider to be winners or losers, and if so,
what can you tell us as to what they are and what that means for
the future of joint warfighting?
310
Admiral GlAMBASTIANI. Thank you, Congressman Wilson. Very
much appreciate those comments.
To get to your point directly with regard to what programs are
important, again because we focus on the operational joint level, I
am going to respond in a joint and operational level.
The first one that I would tell you would be the joint national
training capability that I spoke to earlier. That is a very key com-
ponent to be able to bring all our services together and allow our
joint commanders to train in a joint way. And your support of this,
frankly, gives us what we call an asymmetric advantage. In fact'
my staff has put together— we sat down and did a little brain-
storming, and this goes to training, and the heart of it. And the
way we like to describe this is training matters. Joint training mat-
ters more. It creates our asymmetric advantage and that is what
we think the Joint National Training Center will do for us in net-
ting, if you will, our existing ranges together so that we can oper-
ate in this fashion.
Another capability to support, in my view, is a simulation capa-
bility, as I said, to allow us to work on those high-level mission re-
hearsals and to be able to simulate without using very large num-
bers of people. We had a program in the past called Joint Simula-
tion Systems (JSIMS). Frankly, it was not executed well. We sup-
ported a decision to do an analysis of alternatives. We are in that
process right now, and I would ask you to support the analysis of
alternatives that turns out from that particular study.
Your support of joint concept development and experimentation
IS exceedingly important in my view because this allows us to prac-
tice at the wargame level, at the exercise level with our service
components, and physically fund those exercises and be able to put
them together in a way. For example, in May we ran our first ever
joint war game with the United States Army. We have never done
this before. It is a combination Joint Forces Command/Army war
game. It replaced the Army transformation war game. General
Shinseki and I personally sponsored the game. I think it went pret-
ty darn well. All the reports we get from outsiders who viewed this
game is that it was a significant step up from what we had done
in the past.
To follow on, next week I run a similar joint Navy war game. We
will be doing the same thing with the Air Force in the Spring, and
we will be doing the same thing with the Marine Corps next fall.
And so the chiefs of the service and myself sponsor these, and what
we bring from Joint Forces Command is a joint context for the
game so that we can test out various objectives. So your support
of joint concept development in this area, for example, is extremely
important.
We have a prototype effort called a Standing Joint Force Head-
quarters, and we also have a program in which the Navy is the ex-
ecutive agent that fully supports this effort. It is called the
Deployable Joint Command and Control System, and we ask for
your strong support in this, because this provides us with what we
call a collaborative information environment for these joint task
force headquarters to operate in.
Those are probably a good list. I have a few more I could give
you on the side, and they are all formal programs of record.
311
Mr. Wilson of South Carolina. And one final question. And
hat is, I am very interested in communications, and you ref-
erenced the exponential increase in bandwidth related to the com-
Darison of the Persian Gulf conflict and Operation Iraqi Freedom.
Dan you describe the increase and what the complications are for
:he future?
Admiral GlAMBASTlANl. Yes, sir. The good news is we had avail-
able a lot more military and commercial bandwidth. The bad news
s we had a lot more military and commercial bandwidth. And the
Dad side of this is we weren't able to get a lot of this bandwidth
iown to the lowest tactical user. We call it the last tactical mile:
How you get it, if you will, to that vehicle; how you get it to that
aircraft in a broad enough sense so that you can do the type of
kvork you need.
The other thing that happens when you provide more bandwidth
IS sometimes you have a tendency not to conserve bandwidth in the
ivay you have. So that is part of the bad news story. So the service
:hiefs, the Chairman, myself, the other combatant commanders,
would tell you it was great that we had more, but we still need
more to be able to get lower down into the operational organiza-
tion. So that is the bad news part of it and we are working hard
3n that.
Mr. Wilson of South Carolina. Thank you very much. And I
am very proud that you and I both have sons in the Navy, and
thank you for what you do.
Admiral Giambastiani. Thank you, sir.
The Chairman. Mr. LoBiondo.
Mr. LoBiondo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral, thank you for being here today. You have been very
helpful in what you said for us to understand a little bit better
what is going on.
A couple of my colleagues have touched on Guard/Reserve forces,
and one of the things that happens is that every weekend each of
us goes home to our districts, and very often we are with either
events or with the families of those who are serving. In some cases,
that is active duty. In some cases, it is Guard and Reserve. In the
case of Guard and Reserve, on so many occasions now I have had
the question where the families have been told that their loved
ones would be expected to serve for one year, and now that is being
extended because the time that they spent in some cases, months
and months on active duty, before being deployed to theater are not
being counted.
Now, they are all proud to serve. I think they are all supportive
of what the United States is doing and understand the results. But
with these families, the hardship that has created on them, I am
not sure that it is understood, and we do not have good answers.
I had the opportunity to ask Mr. Wolfowitz this question, and I
really didn't get any kind of a response. But when you have fami-
lies coming to you and members of the family have died while their
loved ones are away, children are born, and, you know, they are
told one thing and then something else happens, this becomes very,
very difficult to explain. And I am hoping you can give me some
hope that I can share with them or shed some light on this or take
it back and get back to us or something along these lines.
312
Admiral GlAMBASTlANl. I cannot give you a specific answer with
regard to — the Army pohcy I think is the one you are discussing,
where it has a one-year-in-theater announcement that I beheve
happened back in July — with regard to what immediate relief there
is.
I know General Abizaid has instituted a leave program within
theater. I have read about it. I haven't talked to him specifically,
and my staff is working with his to learn more about these details.
But to allow people, I think, a two-week leave period, at their
choosing, within mission constraints during that particular period
of time. And he has already initiated that particular leave policy.
That is one mitigating factor that he has tried to institute as the
combatant commander who has operational control over them.
The second thing is that one of the problems that we have with
regard to our reserves is that we have a multiple set of organiza-
tions that announce, and the services own many of these reserves,
so they announce those policies and they may be different between
services, which create some of the problems that we see.
I know that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the Secretary
of Defense are both focused in this area and are addressing it. But
I have to take it for the record, the remainder of the question, be-
cause I cannot answer those myself.
Mr. LoBlONDO. I thank you for that. And at the risk of being re-
dundant, just to repeat a couple of things, I do not think there is
any question that they are prepared to do their service to America.
They understood what they signed up for, but they also didn't un-
derstand that they signed up for active duty.
Admiral GlAMBASTlANl. Right.
Mr. LoBlONDO. And a year pulling away from their families,
pulling away from their jobs, pulling away from their life style, is
a commitment that they are prepared to make and willing to make.
But when we are in some cases months and months and months,
four, six, eight months being on active duty and told that doesn't
count, really is difficult, so anything you can get back to me will
be appreciated.
Admiral GlAMBASTlANl. I can tell you we are looking at that from
a policy side with regard to that actual period, and then when you
would actually have them usable in a theater somewhere, because
that is an issue we have to deal with and we are working on deal-
ing with it.
Mr. LoBlONDO. Thank you.
The Chairman. Mr. Gingrey, I think you were here before the
gavel and were lost in the mix here, and I apologize, but I will call
on you now.
Dr. Gingrey. Thank you. Admiral, General, I want to thank you
for your testimony.
I want to get back to something you said at the very outset in
your testimony, and you said one of the areas in which we are
not — have not done very well or needs improvement was battle
damage assessment. But then you went on and said that the battle
damage assessment is not as good as it used to be, and that ques-
tion was touched on a little bit earlier by one of the other members.
But if you would, explain to me what you mean by that and why;
I mean, you know, obviously, during the major combat phase the
313
performance was outstanding, in regard to that part of the — of
what is going on in Operation Iraqi Freedom, but what is it about
a battle damage assessment that is so difficult and why is it not
as good as it used to be?
Admiral GlAMBASTlANl. If I said it was not as good as it used to
be, then I probably didn't say it properly. I think our battle damage
assessment is probably as good as it has ever been. I think what
I was trying to say is that battle damage assessment is what we
call an old term in an old construct. What we are looking for,
frankly, at Joint Forces Command, and we are trying to get the en-
tire military community to move in this direction, is to do effects
assessments as opposed to battle damage. And I will explain that.
Battle damage focuses on how many tanks did you destroy, how
many aircraft did you destroy; and it works on numbers. And we
are more interested in effects on the battlefield than we are in just
how many things we killed or blew up or destroyed.
We are looking for what we call effects-based operations, and we
think the way to assess that is in an effects-based way. So that is
really what I was talking about in battle damage.
Now, the issue with battle damage that was poor is that we were
not able to keep up with the pace of movement of our forces be-
cause we were moving so rapidly. If you have a much slower mov-
ing battlefield, we are able to keep up with battle damage assess-
ment in its classic sense. But when you move very rapidly, like we
did in this particular operation, it is difficult to keep up with it,
no matter how many assets you have. And if you just revert back
to counting things, then it even gets harder. What we are looking
more for is the effect on the battlefield.
There are other pieces of battle damage assessment which we
think are effects based and those are nonlethal. What are the ef-
fects of nonlethal actions that you take on the battlefield? For ex-
ample, your psychological operations campaign — what you do with
information operations; how do you assess those? Our current
structure does not do that particularly well.
Bob, do you want to add anything to that?
General CONE. I think that was, in fact, the problem that we
saw: When you are attacking hundreds of targets, nearly 1,000 tar-
gets an evening, and then you are going to drive over that same
piece of ground in the morning, when we are synchronizing fires
with ground maneuver in a very effective way, what sort of system
can give you feedback in that short period of time to inform the
ground commanders. But I think they are very pleased with our
ability to kill things. The key is giving information to people who
need to have it so they can take more advantage in a way that is
useful.
Dr. GiNGREY. And I would think that is extremely important, be-
cause you do in one day, with rapidity, you do a great job; but if
you cannot get that battle damage assessment just as quickly, it
is continuing to lag behind, what do you do the next day? It seems
to me it is critically important, and I am glad that you mentioned
that. And as you assess this in hindsight, hopefully that battle
damage assessment will be nearly as rapid as your ability to seek
out and destroy.
314
Admiral Giambastiani. I might mention that there are some
folks who actually were participating in this intelligence collection
effort and the battle damage assessment effort. And the objectivity
that a number of you have continued to refer to, this ruthless objec-
tivity that you refer to, some of those folks weren't real happy
when we talked about this particular issue, but from an oper-
ational warfighting perspective, the commanders— i.e. General
Franks, his ground and air commanders — were not getting the type
of effects assessments that they needed, and they weren't getting
them as rapidly as they needed; which required them, for example,
to have armed recon distance units in some cases to make sure
they could keep up with the flow of forces, to stay up there, and
in fact probe to find out what was still there.
Dr. GiNGREY. Right.
Admiral GlAMBASTiANi. So
Dr. GiNGREY. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Mr. Meek.
Mr. Meek. Thank you Mr. Chairman, and Admiral, General,
thank you for being here.
I know before we went into Operation Iraqi Freedom that the De-
partment of Defense recognized that we needed to do exactly what
we are doing now, assessing lessons learned. And I heard you state
earlier that you are really looking at what actually happens as re-
lates to battle.
I know beforehand that part of the language was to capture all
lessons learned at all levels of warfare as relates to the joint com-
mand, with gathered lessons of joint operation levels of the entire
Department of Defense, lessons learned at the strategic level and
collective joint staff, but I couldn't help but take a look at some of
the mission you all had to carry out in over 400 focused interviews
with key leaders and staff in various points of battle— in battle.
Now, I know that we have individuals who are in uniform and
out of uniform, and how do we — are we looking at individuals who
are actually in the Pentagon that are making some decisions; are
you started at the joint command level only as relates to uniformed
personnel?
The reason why I am asking this question, we have many indi-
viduals that come before this committee, in uniform and out of uni-
form, from the Secretary of Defense to under secretaries, and we
know that there was a great effort for swiftness and accuracy and
quickness. For a minute there, I thought the news shows were real-
ly sitting in Central Command, "The Race to Baghdad," you know,
carrying on. The 503. We can talk about all of those things that
are uncommon in warfare in past years, preemptive strikes, things
of that nature.
How are you able to be critical, or not be critical but really define
what went wrong from individuals who are not wearing uniforms
that are making decisions as relates to how our military performed
in Iraq, and the ground floor of this question goes to the Kevlar
vests. We were told individuals who would be wearing hardened
body armor. We knew we didn't have enough. We were told that
all of the front line people will have that. Well, once we got into
Baghdad, I do not think that was really taken into consideration,
because we have individuals that are in the middle of urban war-
315
fare that do not have that body armor right now. So I know I am
asking you — I am not asking you to make a career decision, I am
just asking you to answer the question the way you can.
Admiral GlAMBASTlANl. True.
Mr. Meek. Because I think you have a difficult task. And the
general sitting next to you, I know the reason why he was reluc-
tant in asking — answering questions, certain questions where
maybe he did not have all the information, I think you were well
within your right in doing so. But I think it is very, very important
as we move forward, as administrations change, as philosophies
change, that we can look back on this time and hopefully save lives
in the future.
Admiral GlAMBASTlANl. Thank you. Congressman Meek. If I
could take your questions in a general sense first.
We look at lessons learned in a whole series of ways. I have been
in the lessons learned business in a couple of other assignments,
and my view is we didn't do it well, which is why we created this
Joint Operational Lessons Learned Team. But we do just that. We
look at the combatant commander-and-below operational level, so
in general we formally interview and observe at the military oper-
ational level, just to get directly to your point.
My team does not come back to the Defense Department, for ex-
ample, and interview people in the Defense Department or go over
to the National Security Council or that. That is what we call a
strategic level above us. And we focus on — the in-theater combat-
ant level is where we are focusing the joint warfare-fighting piece.
So there is a comment on how we do this, if you will, so we focus
at the operational level.
The second thing is that to explain our process, we embedded
General Cone and 30-plus other individuals throughout the entire
Central Command so that they would have direct observation be-
fore, during, and just after major combat operation, so we could
gain as much information as possible. And General Franks was
spectacular in opening up everything to us in this sense. He just
gave us free rein, and we sat in on everything he had with his com-
manders— and General Cone can talk about that in a second — so
we do it by direct observation.
A second piece that we look at is, is we do it by analysis, okay?
And, then, third, we do it by interviews. We will analyze, for ex-
ample, data. The digital data that General Cone talked about ear-
lier— he will sit down and analyze that, the reports, briefings. So
that is how we collect these things.
Mr. Meek. But the question
Admiral GlAMBASTlANl. Now, to get to your specific question on
Kevlar. I know we have a problem with vests in theater because
I know there is a significant amount of money that has been put
into the supplemental. I believe it is around $300 million to buy
additional vests.
Now, I am unfamiliar with anybody telling you that we had
enough or we didn't have enough. I am only interested in the fact
that if we didn't have enough, we report it and we tell them.
Now, I am going to ask General Cone to take this up because he
was there. Bob.
316
Mr. Meek. Before the general answers your question — and I am
glad that you were there, General — but the issue that we were told
was that the front line would have the vest. After major battles
completed — and I was over in Qatar, or Qatar, whichever one you
want to call it — over there with General Franks and others, three
or four days right after they moved into Baghdad. I was concerned
about the vests because I was told that we didn't have enough.
Admiral GlAMBASTlANl. Sure.
Mr. Meek. Right now we have individuals that are over there
that do not have things that they need to make things happen. It
makes things more difficult.
Admiral GlAMBASTlANl. Let me take this question for you for the
record.
Mr. Meek. Yes.
Admiral GlAMBASTlANl. And we will get you an answer.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix begin-
ning on page 356.1
Admiral GlAMBASTlANl. But what I will tell you is we rely on the
services to look at how they equip their specific forces, and only
when it impacts the operational level of battle do we then get into
it.
Mr. Meek. And the question is, what role does that play in the
decision-making in putting a division in a particular place where
you know there is close warfare, urban warfare, and how do we
prevent that?
Admiral GlAMBASTlANl. Clearly, our view is we ought to have our
front-line people who are out in combat in the support troops, be-
cause they may be in combat with the best line equipment always.
I am sure the service chiefs would tell you that. I cannot speak spe-
cifically to this Kevlar issue.
Mr. Meek. Thank you, sir.
Admiral GlAMBASTlANl. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Mr. Kline.
Mr. Kline. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you Admiral,
General, for your patience and your thoroughness in answering the
questions.
I want to follow up two lines of thought. You made it clear, an-
swering a number of my colleagues' questions, that you were work-
ing at the operational level of the joint task force.
Now, I am not sure exactly we know where they fall out, and one
of the questions asked was, do we have enough body armor, do we
have enough Humvees that are armored, do we have enough preci-
sion-guided munitions, do we have enough ammunition, period; do
we get the water to the troops on time? Those kinds of questions.
Are you working on those and, if not, who is?
Admiral GlAMBASTlANl. What I will tell you very specifically is,
we are working on some of them, and those that we are not work-
ing on in general we have the services working on them because
they are service-specific issues.
Let me address — if you would like, we will address a couple of
them
Mr. Kline. Please.
Admiral GlAMBASTlANl [continuing]. That you brought up.
317
In the case of water, for example, just to take that as a simple
thing. General Cone could give you chapter and verse on how we
were very good at moving water, fuel, and other essentials to the
areas we needed; but, in fact, many of our combat units did not
have the ability to get repair parts that may have been sitting in
Kuwait or somewhere else up to the battlefield area.
Now, that is a service issue. But we collected that information
in our interviews, for example, with commanders. So, from the
water side, the fuel side, those were good. With regard to armored
Humvees, I am not sure if we looked at that. Bob, did we, during
major combat operations?
General Cone. That is not a discussion of major combat oper-
ations, but has become one subsequent to that, and I would think
so.
Admiral GlAMBASTIANl. As you know, with the supplemental re-
quest for them, et cetera.
Mr. Kline. Well, I do not want to dwell on this too long, but I
guess where I am going — this is — you are looking at a piece of les-
sons learned.
Admiral GlAMBASTIANl. Yes, sir.
Mr. Kline. And the services are looking at a piece of lessons
learned.
Somebody, I hope, is pulling together all the lessons learned. Is
that an assumption that I can sit here and make today and that
you are comfortable in saying, yes, indeed we are going to look at
this, from whether or not we had tents strong enough to stand up
in the wind?
Admiral GlAMBASTIANl. What I would tell you is that we at Joint
Forces Command asked the Services to bring in their lessons
learned, and they actually gave them to us.
General Cone hosted a large gathering in Qatar on May 6th and
7th, right after the end of major combat operations and, in fact,
brought the service teams together. His folks worked with the serv-
ice teams, and they shared lessons learned. So they would look at
these types of issues.
So many of the service-identified lessons learned General Cone
and his team became aware of during those particular sets of ex-
changes of information. Now, who integrates all of that, including
the strategic level? It happens back at the Department. But I can
tell you my lessons learned team generally tries to look at all of
this tactical stuff, because there is an awful lot of impact some-
times at the operational level.
General CONE. I think we did have the opportunity, and we
worked very closely. We were collocated with the service collection
teams on a daily basis, decided who would look at what.
I can tell you that both the — in particular on the ground combat,
both the Army and Marine Corps made aware to me many of their
issues in regard to logistics. We focused more at the command and
control issues, sort of in transit visibility, sort of the higher connec-
tive type things.
They brought to me, to our attention, repair parts problems, dis-
tribution, network problems, et cetera, those kinds of problems.
Mr. Kline. Thank you. One more point. You have sensed, I am
sure, a great deal of interest and perhaps frustration, expressed by
318
a number of my colleagues about the Guard and the reserves and
those interests. Therefore, for a lot of reasons this impacts on fami-
lies and a lot of other things. I understand that you are doing your
look at the operational level.
I would say to you, though, I will add my concern and some frus-
tration to how we are treating this total force mix. But as a new
Member of Congress, I think the very first hearing that I ever par-
ticipated in, in this room in January, we were pressing the Depart-
ment to address those issues of, do we have the right mix? Do we
have enough end strength? And, frankly, the frustration level of
course has risen, and we seem not to have come to a resolution on
what the size of the active armed forces ought to be and what that
relationship ought to be.
I see my time has run out. Let me just ask very quickly, from
an operational perspective, how the Guard and Reserve is doing in
terms of their combat readiness when they have been deployed.
Admiral GlAMBASTiANi. What I would tell you is General Abizaid
and, obviously, General Franks and the other combatant command-
ers, when we employ the reserves, we get very good reports on how
they do, and the National Guard units that we send, too.
Mr. Kline. Very good. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Hefley. Mr. Israel.
Mr. Israel. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral, I would like to
focus on the first attribute of the four that you say will guide joint
transformation, and that was knowledge.
Your testimony points to increased satellite capabilities, new
communications links, more information, more quickly, with a
smaller footprint. You said that we had 40 times the bandwidth ca-
pability than we had in Desert Storm, and you also recount a pilot
in Afghanistan who said that he used real time Internet-based in-
formation to allow him to destroy an enemy column quickly be-
cause we were all on the same page.
Earlier this week. Admiral, I visited the DISA, the Defense Infor-
mation Systems Agency, and was extraordinarily impressed with
the work that they are doing in terms of global network operations
and protecting the quality of that information from cyber terrorism
and other potential attacks.
I was wondering if you could comment on their role and how in-
tegral it is to that first attribute of knowledge in guiding trans-
formation.
Admiral Glvmbastianl Thank you. Congressman Israel. What I
would say to you is that the defense — DISA's responsibilities are
important, very important in this area.
Specifically, my command works with them in the command and
control area, and how we add these intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance links into the command and control environment,
this collaborative environment we keep talking about here. They
have a whole series of connections.
One of them is through their global command and control soft-
ware packages, over which all of our military communications ride
on this software package, if you will, for command and control.
They have a series of new software releases that are coming out,
and Joint Forces Command has to work very closely with them and
make sure that we both understand our requirements, and, most
319
importantly, the interoperability that is required to bring in other
service feeds, agency feeds, other governmental feeds, and our abil-
ity to work with our coalition partners also, which is not as good
as we would like; it has to get better.
So DISA in the command and control area is absolutely crucial
to our business. They also work very closely with us on what \ye
call the joint deployment process. In other words, how do we, in
fact, deploy and employ forces overseas? How do we provide them
with the orders, check on their readiness?
All of those software packages, many of them are core to what
DISA has within their area of responsibility. There is a whole se-
ries of acronyms, and they are two numerous, like JOCS and oth-
ers, that I could sit here and talk about, that we are working on
significant improvement packages to them, and improvement up-
grades to them.
We, in fact, in many cases, come in and ask them and other
agencies to work by certain commercial interoperability standards,
and that is where we are working very closely with DISA. I have
been out to the joint interoperability test center at Fort Huachuca,
for example. I have spent time talking to that entire command
about their importance. We have just gotten some software en-
hancement for command and control approved by them recently.
Joint Interoperability Test Command (JITC) reports to DISA, I
hate to use all of those acronyms, but they do. And I have been
personally already to DISA to meet with the commander. He has
been at my command at least on two occasions so far. So I just
wanted to let you know there is a tremendous amount of inter-
change here and there has to be because of the importance of his
operation.
Mr. Israel. I appreciate that. And I yield back the balance of my
time, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Hefley. Mr. Marshall.
Mr. Marshall. Thank you, sir. I would like to explore the limits
of the study that you are doing right now so that I understand it.
You know, you read books 20 or 30 or 40 years after a war, and
the insights are in many senses a lot greater, because you are in
a position to make inquiries of the other side, what was the impact
of this tactic or that tactic on them, exactly what were they think-
ing in this engagement or that engagement.
The most recent example, in my case, of a book that has the ad-
vantage of years later and taking intelligence and conversations
and what not from the other side, is Vietnam: A Necessary War,
which I read recently, I can't remember when and, unfortunately,
I can't remember the name of the author.
But I was struck by some of the insights. Now, as I understand
it, you are not really doing that. You are focused — you are not real-
ly inquiring of civilians in the area, you are not inquiring of mili-
tary forces, the commanders, et cetera.
Admiral Glambastianl We are talking to the commanders.
Mr. Marshall. Commanders of Iraqi forces and how they were
impacted by your tactics.
Admiral GlAMBASTlANL What I would say to you is, in general,
we get reports from our military intelligence organizations, if you
will. And I am stopping because in this particular setting I would
320
like to not go too far down this road. But the bottom line is that
you have enemy prisoners of war. It shouldn't be a surprise to any-
one that they get debriefed and that we use information from
those.
Mr. Marshall. Okay. So that is part of the inquiry concerning
what are the limits of the evidence that you are gathering here.
The other part is, if I understood correctly, you really focused on
the conventional part of this and not on what I would refer to as
the guerilla or the insurgency part of this that followed the conven-
tional part. Is that correct?
Admiral Giambastianl We have focused in this report that we
have presented in classified briefing, and that we are talking about
today, directly focuses on the major combat operations up through
about the first of May, is what we focus on. And it is the conven-
tional side, and we also report on the special operations side of
this, and how they interrelate and interact with the Iraqis.
Mr. Marshall. Is that during that three-week period of time or
the special ops side you are referring to; does that go beyond the
major activities, what I would call conventional?
Admiral Giambastianl For this report it does not go beyond, sir.
We have focused on phases one, two and three, the just before, dur-
ing, and the immediate aftermath, that very short period up
through just about the first week in May.
Mr. Marshall. I gave a number of talks before we went in, and
in my talks I suggested to folks that the period after what I de-
scribed as a likely two or three-week conventional conflict, unless
we got bogged down inside cities, which would be awful, or he hit
us with chemical weapons or something like that, which would be
awful, the conventional part was likely to be less difficult for us,
at least insofar as attaining our defined strategic objectives are
concerned, than what came after the conventional part, that what
came after the conventional part could pose the greatest challenge
to us, not perhaps from a tactical military sense, but a broader
sense. And I don't want to go into — are we — what are we doing?
Are you involved at all? Are we— the military— are we involved at
all in sort of assessing that lessons learned?
Admiral Giambastianl Yes. That is what I was just going to
refer to. What I will tell you is that I am not prepared today, but
we are collecting data. We are doing some interviews with military
personnel, for example, and some others who in fact affect phase
four. But I am not prepared to talk about those.
And the reason is, is if I go back to a question that I have been
asked repeatedly, how do you put these lessons back into the sys-
tem to get budgeted for armored Humvees or other things; how do
you get these capabilities embedded so that they are lessons acted
upon?
Because this was such a unique effort, we immediately took Gen-
eral Cone and his team together after he met with the Services on
the 6th and 7th of May, and we had to work very hard with limited
numbers of people to put together this report. And we have done
so many of these briefs on major combat operations to make sure
that the right agencies, directorates and divisions, if you will, with-
in the Pentagon, both uniformed and civilian within the Office of
Secretary of Defense have heard this, so that they get embedded
321
what they have heard, and correctly program in the future through
the budget and the rest, so that we can turn this around as rapidly
as possible. , ^r. ^ ..u i. t u
So we focused the major part of our team s effort on that. 1 have
had a small cadre in theater, still working with the military com-
manders.
Mr. Marshall. When you say turn this around, you are reterring
to turn around your report?
Admiral Giambastlanl Correct. Turn around the recommenda-
tion. . • n
Mr. Marshall. And the focus there is principally on major com-
bat operations?
Admiral Giambastianl Yes, sir. What always happens, every
time you do something new, there is 45 other things that everybody
thinks of that they would really like you to do, but we have tried
to embed as much as we have learned as quickly as possible into
the budget process.
Mr. Marshall. Do you know— I think you made reference to
some effort ongoing at the moment that is focused on the post con-
ventional conflict part of this; what I thought was probably going
to be the more difficult part of this, if you take into account the
overall national objective here. Without going into specific details,
have you got somebody doing that?
Admiral GlAMBASTlANL Yes, sir. We are looking, from an oper-
ational, military perspective. We have a small team who is cur-
rently working with our joint commanders within U.S. Central
Command (CENTCOM) on this. As I said, the majority of my team
has been back here working on this portion. But we have left a
small element back there. I am not prepared to talk about those
today.
Mr. Marshall. Okay.
General CONE. Sir, if I can add one thing. I think your point on
the enemy perspective is absolutely essential, and I think one of
the things that we are very careful is not to overgeneralize about
the things that we learned from this war, based on this particular
enemy, their competence, and really a number of capabilities are
really in question.
So I think we have an ongoing study on the enemy perspective
to try and understand him, and it will only be after we kind of lay
these two pieces together that we will, I think, really have some-
thing very valuable. ti • • u
Admiral GlAMBASTlANL The way I describe this is, as a British
colleague of mine said, that this is a health warning. Every war is
different, and the lessons you learn from them may or may not be
applicable to the next one. You just need to figure out what applies
and what doesn't. That is not an easy business. But that is kind
of where we are applying ourselves. That refers to General Cone's
comment. That is the first health warning we always apply when
we are going through this.
Mr. Marshall. Well, just as a final comment here, I don't know
exactly how to say this, but it would be nice if at least the effort
that has gone into your analysis of the conventional part of this
should go into an analysis of the unconventional part of this. It
needs to be much broader than military operations, and so it may
322
be that the team needs to be much broader than that, State De-
partment, who, I don't know, RAND working with you. But there
needs to be at least that kind of effort put into the post conflict
operational analysis. And then the brain storming, the health re-
port, whatever you wish to call it, in anticipation of the future. We
have got already people calling for increasing our division strength.
One of the thoughts I have had is that rather than increasing
sheer numbers, we need to perhaps— I don't know, fundamentally
change the way we approach anticipated future conflicts. There is
going to be a quick conventional part, you have got National Guard
and Reservists who can come up and take care of that. Then there
is going to be perhaps a prolonged effort that doesn't require a tre-
mendous troop strength, but requires a different kind of effort than
the conventional troop strength would offer. It is almost like com-
munity policing in a sense in an alien country. Good luck. It is
tough.
And so, geez, a lot of thought needs to be given to that if we are
going to actually accomplish the national objective that we have set
with regard to Iraq. And then, if we set the same sort of objective
in the future, we need to be really thinking about this as a possible
lesson. Enough said. Thank you.
Admiral Giambastiani. Take your point, sir.
Mr. Hefley. Mr. Langevin.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And gentlemen, thank
you for your testimony today. Before I go into a couple of questions
that I have, I just wanted to echo the comments of my colleague,
Mr. LoBiondo, in terms of the strain that is being placed on our
Guard and reserves, and the things we hear from folks back home,
and how difficult it is on families, not only of the Guard and Re-
serve, but the families when, you know, they are told that deploy-
ments are going to be extended far beyond what they had originally
been told would be the case.
And I understand that you are probably not the right person to
direct these comments to, but for the record, I wanted to mention
that.
Admiral GlAMBASTiANi. Yes, sir.
Mr. Langevin. If I could, certainly your review of Operation
Iraqi Freedom has provided us with impressive insights ito the ef-
fectiveness of joint operations within the U.S. Armed forces. And
I was wondering to what extent you examined the coordination of
our operations with other countries' militaries, and could you brief-
ly assess how well joint operations with our allies were conducted
and whether we are working to improve that cooperation.
And, obviously, because international conflicts often require
international coalitions to resolve them, I am certainly interested
to know how well our forces are working with servicemen and
women from other nations and whether there is still any obstacles
that need to be overcome in order to enhance performance.
The second thing I would like to just mention, Rhode Island is
very pleased that representatives from your command are coming
to Newport next week to conduct a war game with the Navy at the
Navy War College, to my understanding. And let me just say for
the record that this type of operational planning, I believe, is es-
323
sential for joint operations to be successful. And I certainly applaud
you for your efforts to promote such cooperative exercises.
And as you, I am sure, well know, the war colleges and centers
of professional military education have certainly aimed to improve
officers' skills and understanding with regard to joint operations.
And, in your opinion, how can we best use our military education
system to move forward and implement some of the recommenda-
tions now that you have made your review of Operation Iraqi Free-
dom?
If you can address those, I would appreciate it.
Admiral GlAMBASTlANI. Thank you, Congressman Langevin. I
will try to take them in order. First of all, we did look at, from an
operational level again, our work with some of our allies, in par-
ticular, for example, the United Kingdom, and what our effort was
with regard to working with those countries and the use of their
ground forces.
I am going to defer to General Cone here in just a second, but
what I would tell you is that I could give you the good news, be-
cause the cooperation is just superb from the planning side of the
business. I talked to you about a mission rehearsal that I did. We
had allies involved in the mission rehearsals. That is significant.
And they were very appreciative of being in those mission rehears-
als, and they are a very important and key component of those mis-
sion rehearsals.
Where we have a significant problem is in what we call multi-
national information sharing. We plan with them. We will sit down
and do paper plans and the rest, for example. We will look at plan-
ning constructs, but we have some information technology hurdles
that we have got to get over, both policy, and to a lesser extent
technical, on how we share this information with them so that then
when they go back in their cubes they can work in it and provide
us with the updated version, as opposed to in a paper format, in
an information technology format.
Bob, do you want to add anything on the coalition side?
General CONE. No. I think we have certainly made the argument
of the importance of knowledge and information, and the premium
on that has increased, the ability to share that with our allies.
They understand the power of it, and they want it. And the prob-
lems we have right now are dealing with the specific — the systems
that pass the information, and then the policies that allow informa-
tion to be shared. And we have some recommendations. I think we
are making some positive headway. But I can't overemphasize that
the number of positive comments that I have had on the SOF com-
munity and the Marines, et cetera, in terms of the contribution and
the need for coalition operations.
Admiral Giambastiani. I would answer this way, is that Joint
Forces Command has sponsored, in the last seven months, two
multinational information sharing — what we call "limited objective
experiments" where we have had five allies participating with us,
and in fact brought in senior officers that are retired from those
uniformed militaries to work over a period of time with us to help
better describe this problem and come to a resolution.
So that is on the experimentation side. The other area that is
very important to resolving this and ensuring that we have better
324
coalition and allied interoperability is that on June 19th we stood
up within NATO a brand new command, the most significant series
of command changes within NATO in 50-plus years. We estab-
lished allied command transformation, and I am duel hatted now
as the Supreme Allied Commander Transformation \vithin NATO.
So we have two commanders: General Jones, who is both the
United States-European Command (EUCOM) and Supreme Allied
Commander in Europe, and myself, in the title I just described to
you. And the purpose of that is to foster allied operations and inter-
operability. And my staff at Joint Forces Command and our allied
command's transformation staff are working much more closely
than we have ever done in the past to help solve some of these
issues, and the one obstacle is this information sharing.
Finally, on the Newport side, we are pleased to be up there next
week. As I said, this is the second in the series. We did the first
war game with Carlisle, with the Army War College, and we actu-
ally conducted the war game at the Army War College, and we are
doing this one at the Naval War College, so we are pleased to be
there.
Mr. Langevin. Could you address the second half of my question
in terms of how we can best use our military education to move for-
ward and implement some of your recommendations?
Admiral Giambastiani. One of the best ways to employ the mili-
tary education system — and we are doing this already — is to take
this young man sitting next to me and his team and bring them
in to brief the results of these lessons learned at the operational
warfighting level to them. We are doing that now.
We, in fact, are feeding back into the joint education system at
National Defense University, Joint Forces Staff College, and the
war colleges the results of these, so that they can be put into the
education system, and they can be embedded in the joint profes-
sional military education of the officers. So that is what we are
doing to work these.
I pay close attention to the curricula for what we call JPME,
level one and two, which is Joint Professional Military Education.
The chairman runs those programs. I provide him feedback.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you.
Mr. Hefley. Mr. Akin.
Mr. Akin. Thank you very much. I had a couple of specific or
fairly specific questions. The first thing, I don't know if this was
asked earlier, because I came in late. The quality of the intelligence
that you had going into the whole situation, did you assess that?
Was that something that you can comment on?
Admiral GlAMBASTIANI. Yes, sir. I addressed that before. And
what I would tell you is, that I think we had good intelligence with
regard to the disposition of forces, the lay down of forces, the essen-
tial capability of those forces was probably good. And I think I
would rely on the judgment of the commanders involved. Remem-
ber, when I give you this, we are giving you the feedback from the
commanders, because that is where we have gotten our informa-
tion.
The second piece is that we were deficient in human intelligence
in particular, and also we were deficient in our ability to perform
325
what traditionally has been called battle damage assessment, or in
the future should be called effects assessments.
Mr. Akin. I remember you talked about that. So in terms of
knowing where different units were and where the targets were
and everything like that, that was fine. The details as to what are
they thinking, et cetera, that is where we would be weak?
Admiral GlAMBASTlANl. That is why we have to focus on human
intelligence, because sometimes that is the only way to gain that.
Mr. Akin. The second question was my understanding was there
were times, as much as we have been talking about, more and
more light types of equipment in the Army and being very fast to
be able to deploy them, there were times when we liked plenty of
good old steel around us, like when we would go into Baghdad with
the heavy tanks and all.
I understand there were some different conflict situations where
we were pinned down. We had Marines with very light equipment,
we were pinned down and all of a sudden an Abrams tank arrives,
end of story. Is that something that we are taking a look at, the
need for some heavy kinds of equipment at times? Has that
changed our perspective on doing everything on the light?
Admiral GlAMBASTlANl. What I would say to you is, when I get
down to the tactical engage level, typically we don't look in detail
at it from our operational level. However, the services do look at
this very carefully. We do work with them and get their reports on
this. That is the important thing.
Bob, do you want to add anj^hing to that?
General CONE. There is an area in our report that we called
overmatching strike. And this stems from, and I am sure you re-
member this, the sandstorm in the end of March and the great un-
certainty. We really were struggling at a point in time in terms of
understanding what the enemy was doing.
We had a good idea where the big pieces were. The problem is
there were several units that we didn't know where they were. The
air component did an excellent job in terms of pounding away. But
the problem was, how much of the enemy was left and should we
continue to march to Baghdad?
And one of the points that General Franks made is, he sensed
this opportunity that he had the enemy on his heels, that the
enemy was not organized, and he wanted to get to Baghdad really
before the enemy could set a defense.
And his comment at the time was that he saw a strategic and
operational opportunity to continue the attack and there was risk
involved because he did not really understand in many cases a lot
of this uncertainty. But he could accept that risk, because he had
the overmatching capabilities in terms of firepower, survivability,
mobility. And he could accept the risk and continue the attack and
go into essential movement to contact, you know, immediately after
that sandstorm.
So one of our major recommendations is exactly as we look to fu-
ture ground forces that we must have that overmatch, not just in
terms of equipment, but in terms of training, that our soldiers, sail-
ors, airmen and Marines have overmatching training against an
enemy, and that we have the mobility, survivability, and lethality,
to basically take someone on and win that red zone type of fight.
326
Admiral GlAMBASTlANI. So you saw in the very general piece, on
a ground engagement, this applies in a lot of areas here.
Mr. Akin. In other words, we are not looking for fair fights?
General Cone. Absolutely.
Mr. Akin. Thank you very much.
Mr. Hefley. Mr. Taylor.
Mr. Taylor. Thank you. General, thank you. Admiral, for stick-
ing around, and hopefully I will be one of the last. Mr. Akin kind
of touched on something that got me to thinking.
To what do you attribute the apparent monumental overestima-
tion of the Iraqi possession of and propensity to use weapons of
mass destruction?
Admiral Giambastiani. Intelligence. I mean that is — I can say it
in one word. I visited Iraq, or excuse me, I visited the forces in the-
ater in early March, where I took a number of my staff over. I had
on my hip a gas mask just like every other soldier, sailor, airman
and Marine in theater did. I traveled everywhere with them.
And what I would say to you is just simply the overwhelming
preponderance of intelligence information that was provided to us.
Without getting into specifics, that is what I would tell you.
Mr. Taylor. But obviously you have now had
Admiral Giambastiani. Commanders were seeing this. We were
seeing this.
Mr. Taylor. Seeing what?
Admiral Gl\mbastiani. Intelligence.
Mr. Taylor. Well, Admiral, I am beginning to believe it was al-
most like the rumor mill on Capitol Hill, where something gets said
and the next guy embellishes a little bit, and the next guy embel-
lishes, and again for fear of everyone wanting to be the first to
know it just grows.
At what point were there some reality checks in this process? Be-
cause, again, you guys did a wonderful job. You accomplished all
of your goals. But apparently there was a gross overestimate of
their propensity to use these weapons and the possession of those
weapons.
And, if you have — if there is a failure there, and I think there
was, that is it. Now, amongst the lessons learned, how do we keep
this from happening again?
Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. One of the ways we do this is that, for
example, the Secretary of Defense asked me to take this lessons
learned report and entire presentation to the Director of Central
Intelligence (DCI). And my team in fact has briefed him extensively
on this.
And what I can say to you is, we have taken it to DCI Tenet.
And he, in fact, took a lot of what we reported to him, and asked
just innumerable questions with regard to what he and his team
are doing and how they ought to go about, if you will, looking objec-
tively at the collection of intelligence from his side. In other words,
he wanted to see how we were structured and how we conducted
ourselves so that he could do a similar thing, if you will, to look
at himself.
Now, I don't know what the status of that is, but I can tell you
the Secretary asked me to brief him, and we have done that.
327
Mr. Taylor. Admiral, not to belabor the point, but I realize that
it is prudent to look at all of your foes' potential assets, and as best
as possible to defend against those assets. Therefore, it was pru-
dent to issue the chem/bio suits, it was prudent to issue breathing
apparatus, it was prudent to give the troops the shots. We have a
very real threat on the ground today in improvised explosive de-
vices. , „
We have the technology to deny the use to the enemy of some
of those devices. I would certainly encourage one of the lessons
learned to be, that you take the same vigor towards denying the
enemy the use of that weapon as you are willing to take towards
the potential use of chemical or biological weapons.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Hefley. Thank you, Mr. Taylor. Gentlemen, you have done
an excellent job of responding to quite a variety of questions, and
we appreciate it very much. Let me deal with one other issue very
briefly here.
I think on another occasion I raised the issue of close air support.
And, General Cone, I think you mentioned that the Marines are a
Uttle better at this than the Air Force and the Navy. Am I correct
in that remembrance?
General Cone. Well, sir, I think because of their procedures, be-
cause they have their own organic air, close air assets and the way
they fight, I think that they are— in their procedures perhaps at
the start of this conflict, were— you know, had demonstrated pro-
ficiency there.
But I would point out that over time, as was used in this conflict,
we saw tremendous growth in proficiency in all contributing serv-
ices and got better, the Army with the Air Force and what not. It
was a very impressive application of close air support.
Mr. Hefley. Well, if the Air Force and the Navy were not as
good as the Marines in this, I assume what we trained them to do
is to drop points off at a distance, and also to do air to air combat.
We don't have a lot of air to air combat threat right now, it doesn't
appear. So are we putting too much emphasis on those roles and
not enough emphasis, do you think, on close air support on those
other two branches of our Air Force?
Admiral GlAMBASTlANL If I could, sir. What I would hke to do
is just take this directly because it is— we have an initiative that
we brought forward called the Joint Close Air Support Initiative.
And Joint Forces Command is the chairman of this executive group
working on this. We have got a whole slew of— and I would love
to come up and brief you on the extent to this.
But simply stated, we have pushed very hard from the training
side of this to make each of these units as proficient as possible no
matter what service they are in.
Number two, actual performance in theater was quite impressive
by Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps close air support, both fixed
wing and rotary. We had more ground combat combined days of op-
erations with air power than we had by a long shot in Desert
Storm. We delivered a significant amount of ordnance, of which
about 70 to 80 percent was directed in— 79 percent was directed in
support of ground operations.
328
And that is from all of these services providing that. So that is
a pretty impressive total. And one of our joint lessons learned here
is how effective this air support can be across the board. It doesn't
mean, for example, we can eliminate artillery, it just means that
you have got support from the air when you need it.
So that is a good news story on how to provide this seamlessly,
no matter who is flying around, if you will, in an engagement box
ready to drop ordnance in support of some units, special forces, spe-
cial operations forces. Army or Marine Corps or, for that matter.
Navy Seals, et cetera.
Mr. Hefley. Well, of course, that is a goal we ought to strive for.
But it does continue to raise a question in my mind, I hate to bring
it up, because every time I bring it up I get the Marine Com-
mandant in my office before nightfall.
But I continue to raise the issue of why we need so many air
forces in our Armed Services if we are going to train them all. We
are talking all of this jointness, jointness. That sounds good. That
is what we ought to be doing. But why do we need all of these air
forces? Is it a matter of pride? A matter of history? Culture? And
if I was a Navy pilot, I would resent the fact that they tell me, oh,
no, the Marines are better at close air support than I am. Are you
looking at that at all?
Mr. Anastasio. Sir, we don't want anybody to describe that the
Marines are better at close air support than the Navy or the Air
Force. We want them to say, I don't care what is up there, I need
capability and I need it now. That is where we are going.
It is out of my lane because I am not Service Chiefs involved,
and the Service Secretaries. But what I would tell you is, my expe-
rience on the Navy staff with Admiral Clark and also General
Jones at the time, and it has been carried forward with Admiral
Clark and General Hagee, is to bring together the Navy and the
Marine Corps in a tactical air (TACAIR) integration program. That
has been a priority of the Secretary of Defense. And that priority
is proceeding on, so that we get a very high degree of integration,
for example, on the naval side.
General Jumper on the Air Force side, for example, placed, if you
will, air command and control type units within the ground force
commander's command post. Bob Cone here could talk to you chap-
ter and verse on how significant this move was. So that the air
commander understood exactly what was necessary from the
ground forces.
Those are all very positive moves. We are getting better here. We
are working hard on it. We will get better in the future. And we
will do this, and I suspect you will see, my personal prediction, you
will see this with probably better integrated, somewhat smaller
units for the reasons you are talking about.
Mr. SCHROCK. Mr. Chairman, may I add one thing to that? To
add on to what the Admiral said about jointness. The Navy now,
there is a Marine Corps colonel, who is the first commander of an
air group on a carrier. And that is something very new, that I am
sure the Navy bristled at that a little bit.
Admiral GiAMBASTiANi. Not at all.
329
Mr. Hefley. And we want each branch of the service to have
their pride and so forth. But we do want jointness when it comes
out to doing a mission.
Admiral GlAMBASTlANl. Remember what I said before? The Ma-
rines use their aircraft as fling artillery. So they practice it all of
the time. So if you practice more than anyone else at it, you are
going to be better. That is why we need a joint national training
capability so that I can use air from Air Force, Navy, and Marine
Corps aircraft to support Army or Marine Corps gi'ound units or
special operations forces from all of the services.
Mr. Hefley. Thank you very much. Any other questions from
this committee? If not, the committee stands adjourned with our
thanks and appreciation for you spending the morning with us.
[Whereupon, at 11:35 a.m., the committee was adjourned.l
APPENDIX
October 2, 2003
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
October 2, 2003
OPENING REMARKS OF CHAIRMAN HUNTER
Operation Iraqi Freedom: Lessons Learned
October 2, 2003
The committee will come to order.
I want to welcome Admiral Giambastiani, Commander of
U.S. Joint Forces Command, to the Committee this morning. A
submariner by profession, the Admiral is one of our most forward-
thinking military officers. We are fortunate to have him here to
today to discuss lessons the military is learning from our recent
experience in Operation Iraqi Freedom.
There's a popular saying that Generals always prepare to re-
fight the last war. U.S. Joint Forces Command is charged with
making sure that we're experimenting with new ways of winning
the next war. In accomplishing that mission, the command paid
close attention to the conduct of Operation Iraqi Freedom in order
to thoroughly assess the war's implications for future defense
policies and programs.
1
(335)
336
To its credit, the Defense Department put the process in
motion before the first bombs fell. It knew that some things would
go well and some things would go poorly. That's the nature of
war. The Secretary moved to make sure that we captured all of
those lessons in real time as objectively as possible. JFCOM
embedded teams of analysts with the forces doing the fighting in
order to bridge the gap between the real-world experience of troops
on the ground and the abstract, theoretical concepts of scholars
working from an ivory tower. We didn't do that in Grenada,
Panama, Desert Storm, or Kosovo.
The Department's approach signified a remarkable openness
to self-assessment and recognized that criticism of OIF needed to
be based on a realistic assessment of the facts on the ground — not
on the impressions created by reporters who are paid to make
headlines, talking heads who are paid to talk — whether they know
anj^hing or not — or critics with their own axes to grind. I think
that's a lesson worth remembering as we review the ongoing war
on terror.
337
The Admiral and his team have had an opportunity to brief
some of us in a classified setting. But, it's important that
JFCOM's efforts reach a wider audience so that we are better able
to assess and incorporate the lessons — and non-lessons — of
Operation Iraqi Freedom in our Congressional responsibilities.
Should it prove necessary to meet in closed session, the committee
will move to room 22 12, which has been prepared for that
possibility.
Admiral, we all look forward to your testimony and
appreciate your appearance before the committee this afternoon.
Let me now recognize the committee's ranking Democrat,
Mr. Skelton, for any remarks he may wish to make.
(Following Mr. Skelton's remarks]
The entirety of our witnesses' prepared statements will be
entered into the record.
Admiral, the floor is yours.
338
Opening Statement for The Honorable Ike Skelton (D-MO),
Ranking Member, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of
Representatives
Full Committee Hearing with JFCOM on Joint Operational Lessons
Learned from Operation Iraqi Freedom
October 2, 2003
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'd like to join you in thanking
Admiral Giambastiani for being with us today. The Admiral
provided an excellent classified briefing for a small group of
members several weeks ago, and I'm glad he is here to share his
findings in an open forum.
My recent trip to Iraq confirmed to me what we already
knew — that the heart of this critical recent operation is the amazing
American soldier. Each soldier, sailor, airman, and Marine —
operating more jointly in this conflict than ever before — enabled the
United States to quickly achieve a stunning military victory. These
great troops are currently serving as valiantly to try to win the
peace.
339
The military victory in Operation Iraqi Freedom is a testament
to the efforts of those of us who fought for the Goldwater-Nichols
legislation and to the many officers who understand how much joint
operations enhance our military capability on the battlefield and
have worked to implement the law. It is also a testament to the
quality of the education and training system of the American
military — from our basic schools through the war colleges.
Mr. Chairman, the effort the Admiral and his team have
completed and which brings him here today is a critical one. The
American military's systematic efforts to review its successes and its
failures from planning to execution at the strategic, operational, and
tactical levels of warfare allow it to remain the finest fighting force
in the world. Joint Forces Command's analytical approach to
Operation Iraqi Freedom was a unique one, and it is clear that we
will have a wealth of operational data and insights to consider in
making decisions about future warfighting.
But, Mr. Chairman, lessons learned at the strategic level are
critical as well. I won't recount Lord Tennyson's The Charge of the
340
Light Brigade as I did to Secretary Wolfowitz last week, but it is
clear to me that there were blunders in our post-war planning. The
success of future American operations will rely as heavily on our
ability to learn from strategic blunders as from our mistakes on the
battlefield. I look forward to future opportunities to examine those
lessons learned as well those we will hear about today.
Admiral, I look forward to your testimony. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
341
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
UNTIL RELEASED BY THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
STATEMENT OF
ADMIRAL EDMUND P. GIAMBASTIANI, Jr.
COMMANDER
UNITED STATES JOINT FORCES COMMAND
And
SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER TRANSFORMATION (NATO)
BEFORE THE 108TH CONGRESS
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
2 OCTOBER 2003
FOR OFFICL\L USE ONLY
UNTIL RELEASED BY THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENT ATFVES
342
Mr. Chairman, distinguished Members of the Committee, I am honored to testify on the
Joint Lessons Learned collected from OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM and to share some of the
insights obtained.
After I took over as Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) in October 2002,
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and I conducted extensive discussions on how to
significantly improve the collection and implementation of joint lessons learned. Shortly
afterwards in January and February, 2003, Joint Forces Command established a Joint Lessons
Learned (JLL) team of subject matter experts to observe, collect and analyze lessons learned
from contingency operations at the joint operational level. We focused on military issues, not on
the civilian side. We subsequently deployed the team to the U.S. Central Command
(CENTCOM) area of responsibility. Today, I am here to report on the insights we gained on the
Major Combat Operations phase of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF), which was conducted
from 18 March to 1 May of 2003.
From the beginning, we understood that our mission was pathbreaking. The Army, Navy,
Air Force, and Marine Corps all have long experience in forming similar teams to capture
service-specific lessons from operations and translating those lessons into new approaches and
innovative capabilities for each of the services.
Now, for the first time, our defense leadership has instituted a joint lessons learned team
for the express purpose of gathering joint opCTational insists on a comprehensive scale and in
real time.
Because our Lessons Learned team focused on joint operations, we did not employ the
typical systems-assessment approach appropriate for analyzing a specific platform or weapons
system, but rather concentrated on the issues that mattered most to the joint warfighter, in this
1
343
case the Combatant Commander conducting Operation Iraqi Freedom. Taken as a whole, we
examined how well service and special operations force warfighting systems and methods
actually worked together as a coherent joint team, including operations with other U.S. Federal
agencies and with our coalition partners.
We had over 30 members of my staff embedded throughout CENTCOM and its
component headquarters, with extensive reach back and analysis capability on call here in the
United States at my headquarters and warfighting centers of excellence. We were there before
operations started and followed the entire campaign in real time. We had complete access to all
commanders and their staffs for all operations, at all levels. General Franks set the tone and
welcomed this team with open arms. That, in my experience, is unprecedented. The team was
guided in their collection and assessment by a newly promoted brigadier general and by a man I
call JFCOM's "senior" senior mentor, retired Anny General Gary Luck, a former joint
warfighting commander himself General Luck's judgment as senior mentor proved
indispensable to both the team and to General Franks.
The team's mission was to observe processes, collect data, interview participants, assist
and enable operations where possible, and provide feedback to Genera! Franks in real time. The
team conducted hundreds of interviews, collecting gigabytes of data. We also worked closely
with our Service counterparts, and leveraged their tactical level insights. At the conclusion of
major combat operations, the team began to codify and assess their data into draft preliminary
conclusions. We shared our methods and insights with an independent group of respected
scholars and analysts led by Dr. Eliot Cohen of Johns Hopkins University to obtain the objective
review essential to producing a useful report.
344
As we considered our preliminary insights, we concluded that one overarching theme
summarizes the results of the joint transformation that has occurred since Desert Storm: what we
have come to characterize as the competing notions of Overwhelming Force versus
Overmatching Power.
As an example, in Desert Storm, our military thinking was to field Overwhelming Force
to oisure victory. Certainly, this entails fielding well-trained and well-equipped forces, which is
as important today as it was back then. However, the emphasis was on numbers as befits a
traditional, attrition-based campaign. What our observations in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM tell
us is that there is another approach to modem warfare. We like to describe this new approach as
the employment of Overmatching Power.
Under this construct, the emphasis is no longer just on numbers — ^which remain
important — but rather on harnessing all the capabilities that our Services and Special Operations
Forces bring to the battlespace in a coherently joint way. Advances in technologies, coupled with
innovative warfighting concepts joined together by a new joint culture, are enabling a level of
coherent military operations that we have never been able to achieve before. The difference in
approach characterized as Overmatching Power is based on the combined output of new ways of
joint warfighting, greater integration of conventional and special operations forces, and the use
of old and emerging capabilities by new concepts of operations - all integrated throu^ new and
more powerful schemes of joint training. The emphasis now is on the effectiveness of joint
capabilities employed at times and places of our choosing to achieve strategic effects. General
Franks later remarked on this level of jointness, saying "Operation IRAQI FREEDOM was the
most joint and combined operation in American history."
345
The insights and perspectives gained from Operation IRAQI FREEDOM emphasize four
attributes of the Overmatching Power theme that we think are the keys to military success in the
21st Century, and which should continue to guide our joint transformation. The four attributes
are: Knowledge, Speed, Precision, and Lethality.
In the area of Knowledge, for example, we used three times the number of Joint
Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) hours in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM as
compared to Desert Storm. The JSTARS system of OIF used increased satellite capabilities and
was connected to new communications links that vastly improved our forces' knowledge of
enemy dispositions before and during operations. What this means at the operational level of war
is that we could acquire more information more quickly with a smaller footprint over 3200
sorties in Desert Storm; fewer than 1 700 in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. Put another way, we
had three times the information output with about half the sorties.
As for Speed, our forces closed into the area of operations in less than three months as
opposed to seven months in Desert Storm. Similar to our advancement in methods and
capabilities for "Knowledge acquisition," we also reduced our logistical footprint while
increasing the overall throughput because of changes in methods and capabilities. We used less
than half the number of ships to support our logistics campaign in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM
as in Desert Storm. Equally important, the increase in "knowledge-centric" capabilities noted
earlier allowed for increased speed of maneuver. We had over 40 times the bandwidth capability
of Desert Storm, which allowed our forces to range more rapidly over the whole of Iraq in order
to achieve a far more complex mission: defeat and change a regime.
On Precision, one of the top lessons learned — and acted upon — was not just the precision of
weapon systems, impressive as that was, but how information capabilities allowed for "precision
346
decision-making." Again using Desert Stonn as an example, we had about 30 Special Forces
teams working missions separate from the conventional force 12 years ago. In Operation IRAQI
FREEDOM, we deployed over three times as many Special Forces teams, many of whom were
closely wedded to our conventional forces. In several cases, these Special Forces teams played
instrumental roles in merging the capabilities of both ground and air forces. We not only had
precision munitions launched from air and ground but also "precision decisions" to further direct
our smart weapons by the combination of Special Forces and Conventional forces working
jointly, armed with new capabilities. The result is that we were able to achieve our campaign
objectives using approximately one seventh of the air ordnance expended in Desert Storm - and
over 2/3 of the ordnance we delivered in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM was precision guided.
Such unprecedented precision allows us to craft an acceptable military response to enemies
embedded among innocent civilians and reduces the infrastructure damage by an order of
magnitude.
These new capabilities also greatly increased our overall Lethality. Whereas in Desert Storm
only about 10% of our air-ground operations were integrated, that figure jumped to the high 90*
percentile in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM^ — an unprecedented transformation. Advances in
technology and training, meanwhile, affected our ability to decrease our air signature while
significantly increasing lethality. It took an average of four aircraft to kill one target in Desert
Storm, whereas in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM just one aircraft could kill about four targets.
Similar "economies of innovation" occurred on the ground, where the total artillery batteries
employed dropped by a substantial margin in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM
The fiindamental point is that our traditional military planning and perhaps our entire
approach to warfare have shifted. The main change, from our perspective, is that we are moving
347
away from employing Setvice-centric forces that must be de-conflicted on the battlefield to
achieve victories of attrition to a well-trained, integrated joint force that can enter the battlespace
quickly and conduct decisive operations with both operational and strategic effects. Joint Force
Commanders today tell me that they don't care where a capability comes from so long as it
meets their warfighting needs. They also tell me that "it's not the plan, it's the planning." They
understand that the ability to plan and adapt to changing circumstances and fleeting opportunities
is the key to rapid victory in the modem battlespace. General Tommy Franks and his staff
practiced and trained to these standards.
Essential to the power of adaptive planning and execution is our ability to conduct large
scale, vertical and horizontal collaboration. Frankly, this collaboration is on a scale that dwarfs
any extant commercial application. In today's collaborative environment, every level of
command — ^throughout the entire force and including coalition partners — is electronically linked
to the Combatant Commander's decision-making process. Subordinate commanders and staffs
understand the context behind key changes across the battlespace and are fully aware of changes
in the commander's intent to guide their actions during specific missions. In short, the entire
joint force is acutely sensitive to any nuances that occur in the battlespace and are highly
adaptive to changes, seizing opportunities as they arise or preventing mishaps before they occur.
Just a few weeks ago, we received an observation fi-om a pilot in Afghanistan that seemed
to crystallize the effectiveness of our collaborative enviroimient. After an enemy column was
identified on the move, the pilot recounted how the real time, internet-style chat network in his
plane enabled him to collaborate with forces on the ground, planners at CENTCOM HQ and a
sister squadron. While gunships moved in stride toward the target guided by satellite
commimications, planners at CENTCOM HQ simultaneously confirmed the coordinates and
348
^proved the strike while ground commanders verified that "Blue" forces were clear of the area.
In the space of 30 minutes from the time the enemy was detected, the column was destroyed.
Upon reflection, the pilot gave this insight — and I quote: "Its amazing how fast we can clobber
these guys when everyone is on the same sheet of music." Mr. Chainnan, distinguished Members
of the Committee, with yoxir support, our transforming joint force dominates the modem
battlespace because we are acquiring the tools to operate on the "same sheet of music," around
the clock, around the world.
To sum up: if you know more and fight together as a joint and combined team, you can
act with greater precision, you can rapidly plan and adapt to fluid situations and you can move
about the battlespace with far greater effect than was possible in the past. In short, the whole of
the joint force operating together coherently is now greater than the sum of our separate Service
capabilities.
Certainly, we all understand that every conflict is different. We are also very careful not
to base our conclusions solely on the capabilities of a weakened or less than capable enemy.
Nevertheless, there is no question that a remarkable shift has occurred in the way the
Joint Force operates and this shift leverages on: Knowledge — Speed — Precision — Lethality.
Before I share with you our detailed findings, I want to emphasize the standard against
which we chose to measure our effectiveness. Elite forces are elite because they have high
standards and they enforce them. Growing up as 1 did in the Navy's nuclear submarine force, this
trait is almost part of my genetic makeup. Like many military systems and operations, operating
a submarine, underwater in mid ocean with a nuclear reactor and nuclear weapons, requires the
highest standards and unimpeachable integrity. Inspection reports for even the best-run
submarines record scores of deficiencies - because we have high standards in the Navy and we
349
enforce them. The same is true of our ehte warriors in the Army, Air Force, Marine Corps and
Special Operating Forces.
350
This mentality of what I call ruthless objectivity shaped our assessment of operational
lessons learned from Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. As a result, we organized our report into
three comparative categories of capabilities that are clear "winners" as well as those that
needed improvement and those that fell short of our expectations. We listed under each
category the key areas that proved most significant. The categories are as follows:
1 . Capabilities that reached new levels of performance and need to be sustained
• Joint Integration and Adaptive Planning
• Joint Force Synergy
• Special Operations and Special Operations-Conventional Integration
2. Capabilities that demonstrated considerable effectiveness but need enhancement
• Urban Operations
• Information Operations
• Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
3. Capabilities that fell short of expectations or requiring new initiatives to redress
shortfalls.
• Battle Damage Assessment
• Fratricide Prevention
• Deployment Planning and Execution Reserve Mobilization
• Coalition Information Sharing
I will be glad to address these specific categories and the capabilities they contain in a discussion
with the Committee, some of which may require a classified discussion in a closed hearing.
351
Beyond the previously discussed issues associated with the categories noted above, we have
also determined three general insights to future concepts that require our continued examination
and experimentation to define and clarify. These insights to future concepts include:
1 . The Emerging Battlespace
2. Knowledge-Enabled Warfare
3. Effects-Based Operations
Joint Lessons Learned Way Ahead
Although the formal Joint Lessons Learned report on Major Combat Operations is currently
being drafted, Joint Forces Command is already turning its preliminary impressions into focused
recommendations that are being vetted extensively with our partners in the joint, interagency and
multinational communities.
In summary. Joint Forces Command, in close partnership with the Services, Defense
Agencies, Combatant Commanders, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff and
the Interagency and Multinational communities, is working to turn "lessons learned" into
"lessons acted upon." As appropriate, we intend to work collectively to make comprehensive
changes to our doctrinal approaches and tactics; to streamline our organizations; to establish new
and innovative training methods and systems; to create new educational curriculums to develop
new skills for a new era; to develop a shared understanding of the future fight; and, acquire the
right capabilities at the right time for the right reasons. These actions, we believe, will help
ensure an ever-transforming dominant joint force.
10
352
Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the Committee, thank you again for the opportunity
to testify today, and for your continuing support for all the men and women of our Armed
Forces. I look forward to answering your questions.
11
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE
RECORD
October 2, 2003
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TAYLOR
Mr Taylor. Second thing, I think, is a lesson learned. And again I don't pretend
to be' an expert, but I hopefully listen to the experts. I met with a young Marine
ance corporal from a neighboring State, who had lost a leg ^"thf war He was teU-
ing me that he felt one of the reasons why his vehicle was singled out was a lack
of camouflage, that it was painted green, amongst a convey of vehicles that were
oainted to match the dessert. t^ ^^ • u- ~ ,q +v,o+
I am not in a position to say whether he is right or wrong. But in his mind, that
was the problem*^ I realize that the paints do a heck of a lot more than just camou-
flage the vehicle, that they are for chemical protection and other things. But 1 ve
got to believe that a Nation with the resources the Umted States has can find-
I understand that some of our prepositioned ships are green— the vehicles inside—
some of them were desert color. I understand that. th^atrf.
But there has got to be a way for a quick changeover as we move from theatre
to theatre. And again, if it is a matter of resources, then this committee needs to
know that, because this is where the resources start ^. , , j
I wish you would comment on those two things. But I am particularly concerned
with the Internet and the ability to transmit information quickly. I am concerned
that improvised explosive devices are not just a problem in Iraq, but in Afghanistan
or anyplace young Americans are going to be sent. t u ii,«
I think this is a problem today, and it is only going to get worse. I would hke
to know what we are doing about it. . tt c ko+ .,^\.i
Admiral Giabastini. In response to your question on damage to U.b. combat veni-
cles although not normally assigned to look in this area, our Joint Forces Command
Joint Lessons Learned Team forward element has investigated this issue and
learned that tactics, techniques and procedures remain the primary defense against
improvised explosive devices, namely the following:
- Maintain situational awareness
- Drive in the center of the roads
- Do not drive over anything in the road
- Conveys of patrols should have at least 4 vehicles
- Ensure proper functioning communications
- Know that common improvised explosive devices look like and be aware
In addition, there are a number of other initiatives underway They include pro-
viding a significant number of up-armored High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled
Vehicles (HMMWV) to our forces in Iraq and a HMMWV maintenance support cen-
ter that in addition to providing higher-level maintenance, also applies unit di-
rected modifications to standard HMMWVs to increase force protection and surviv-
^ ThJ'Army has established a special project team that is working with other gov-
ernment agencies and leading industry patterns to exploit developing technologies
in order to counter the lED threat. , . r. oi,^u^^
Mr Taylor While I have got you, last point. On our trip. Congressman bkelton
several of my Republican colleagues, we were made aware by Dr. Kay— who was
if I am not mistaken, an administrative appointee. So he certainly has no political
axe to grind. . , .^ i • . j
We were told of 55 large weapons caches that are identified, but no one is guard-
ing them. That story has since been released to the press, so we are certainly not
talking out of school. Again, since all it takes is one of those artillery shells to be-
come a source of weapons for our enemies. ^, «. 1, -..,■ T- * U^^„^o
Admiral Giabastini. While this issue does not directly fall within Joint forces
Command's reponsibility, I have look into the issue
From our Joint Forces Command Joint Lessons Learned team s discussion with
the Captured Enemy Ammunition (CEA) Manager for CJTF-7, we understand that
there is a tremendous amount of CEA, ranging from 600,000 to one million short
tons, to account for, process and protect. There have been over 100 large CEA de-
pots identified throughout Iraq, principally in and near areas of contention (i.e. the
Iraq/Iran border and along the Iraq/Kuwait border). As they are discovered, each
site is surveyed, with the most critical sites being secured with available security
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356
forces. Since there are not always enough forces to protect all sites, the most remote
sites are sometimes secured by welding the munitions bunker doors shut and bury-
ing the door.
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COOPER
Mr. Cooper. It has recently come to my attention that no Purple Hearts are pos-
sibly awarded for victims from that time side, including, even, bomblet demolition
experts whose task is to disable bomblets that we have dropped, because apparently
10 to 15 percent of these so not explode as planned. That just seems inherently un-
fair, because if you take a bulletin combat in service of our country, does it really
matter whether it is fired by the enemy or a mistaken effort on our path?
Admiral Giabastini. The Purple Heart's eligibility requirements have changed
dramatically to reflect the nature of warfare as it has developed in Low Intensity
Conflicts and advanced, technologically driven conflicts. The advent of fighting a
non-descript enemy coupled with the unfortunate, but rare instances of fiiendly fire
has become a norm that we need to address in all areas.
Per Section 1129 of title 10, United States Code, a Service member who is killed
or wounded in action as he result of action by friendly fire while directly engaged
in armed conflict, is eligible for award of the Purple Heart, unless the wound is the
result of willful misconduct of the member. This is one of the newer changes that
has been approved and distributed to the Service, and is in the process of being in-
corporated into the Department of Defense Award Manual.
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MEEK
Mr. Meek. I was concerned about the vests because I was told that we didn't have
enough. Right now we have individuals that are over there that do not have things
that they need to make things happen. It makes things very difficult.
Admiral Giabastini. The U.S. Army has increased production of body armor and
is intensively managing distribution directly to theater or to units deploying to thea-
ter. Initially, the Interceptor Body Armor (IBA) was intended as a routine fielding
for dismounted Infantry only. However, fielding and production were revised when
operational requirements became apparent.
Interceptor Body Armor consists of an Outer Tactical Vest (OTV) and a set of
Small Arms Protective Inserts (SAPI). The OTV protects against flack and up to 9-
millimeter ball ammunition. After adding the SAPI, protection is increased up to
7.62-millimeter ammunition. The basis of issue is one set of IBA per individual. In-
dustry is currently producing 20 thousand OTVs and 20 thousand SAPIs per month.
In December 2003, production will increase to 25 thousand per month of both OTV
and SAPI. At these production levels, the U.S. Central Command's requirement will
be filled completely in December 2003. OSD and Joint Staff will continue to track
IBA. The Department's goal is that each DOD civilian and all military in theater
will have a set of IBA by December 2003.
IRAQ: RECONSTRUCTION AND REHABILITATION
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, October 8, 2003.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:10 a.m., in room
2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Duncan Hunter (chair-
man of the committee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DUNCAN HUNTER, A REP-
RESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE
ON ARMED SERVICES
The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
This is the latest in a series of hearings the committee is con-
ducting on the conduct and consequences of Operation Iraqi Free-
dom, and we are fortunate to have as our witnesses today the Hon-
orable Peter Rodman, Assistant Secretary of Defense; the Honor-
able John Hamre, president of the Center for Strategic and Inter-
national Studies (CSIS) and a frequent visitor to the committee m
days past. And, Dr. Hamre, thank you for being with us. Secretary
Rodman, thank you. And also we have with us Mr. Dave Oliver,
who is the chief financial officer for the Coalition Provisional Au-
thority (CPA), and thank you also for being with us today. We ap-
preciate it. , 1 r 4.U
Just two weeks ago we reviewed the administration s plan tor the
reconstruction of Iraq with Ambassador Bremer, and today we've
asked the Department of Defense (DOD) official to update us on
that plan as the House considers the President's request for supple-
mental funding. So Mr. Rodman is joined by Dr. John Hamre, once
again of the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
At the Department's request, Dr. Hamre and his team visited
Iraq in late June and offered his thoughts on reconstruction as an
outside group. Among other things. Dr. Hamre's team highlighted
that the next 12 months would be critical in getting Iraq off on the
right foot. To its credit, the Department both asked for and quickly
embraced the results of Dr. Hamre's study.
Moreover, in the President's supplemental request we are seeing
an administration that is working to obtain the resources needed
to implement many of the report's recommendations. The adminis-
tration has thus clearly demonstrated a willingness to heed outside
advice when that advice is thoughtfully given.
I think that is the kind of advice you will get from us. On both
sides of the aisle, we are committed to supporting the troops and
doing what it takes to ensure Iraq does not become a future threat
to our security. Today's hearing will help us ensure that our advice
is based on an accurate understanding of the facts on the ground,
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358
not on secondhand media reports. So I want to thank Mr. Rodman
and Dr. Hamre and Mr. OHver for opening before the committee
this morning.
The Chairman. And so, before we turn the floor over to our wit-
nesses, let me turn to my colleague, the gentleman from Missouri,
Mr. Skelton, for any remarks he might want to make.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hunter can be found in the Ap-
pendix on page 421.]
STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM MISSOURI, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON
ARMED SERVICES
Mr. Skelton. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
I join you in welcoming Secretary Rodman and Dr. Hamre, and
also thank Mr. Oliver for being with us here this morning. I will
be very brief, as I know Dr. Hamre may have to leave by noon; am
I correct?
And I might note that I recently returned from an interesting
trip with several of my colleagues to Iraq, and the point is we must
win this effort, but the thing is it could go either way. There are
many news stories that are not being reported in the media, such
as the many reconstruction projects entertained by the American
military units throughout the country. It wasn't going as well as
it could or should, and I remain concerned about the security condi-
tions, whether the CPA has adequate people and resources to turn
the country around quickly. I hope the witnesses today will address
those as well as other issues.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Skelton can be found in the Ap-
pendix on page 423.]
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman, and the entirety of the
witnesses' statements will be entered into the record without objec-
tion.
So, Mr. Rodman, Secretary Rodman, thank you for being with us
this morning. The floor is yours, sir.
STATEMENT OF PETER W. RODMAN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
Secretary Rodman. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Mr.
Ranking Member, members of the committee. I want to thank you
for your courtesy in receiving us today. I want to thank you even
more for the bipartisan support that the committee has given to
this important national enterprise in Iraq, and, again, I thank you
for the opportunity to come before you today to talk about the im-
portant issue of postwar reconstruction. This is a matter of the
highest priority for President Bush and his administration as dem-
onstrated by the emergency supplemental appropriation request we
have submitted to Congress to pursue the war on terrorism.
I'm also honored to appear with John Hamre, former Secretary
of Defense and a friend, to discuss points he has raised in his re-
port, the report that he and his team published that the chairman
referred to.
As the chairman pointed out, this is a mission that Dr. Hamre
undertook at Secretary Rumsfeld and Ambassador Bremer's re-
359
^uest or suggestion. We wanted an independent view, and we val-
ued his judgment and his opinion.
His team was in Iraq from late June to early July. The report
said, and I quote, we saw significant progress everywhere we went,
unquote; but the report also included a very candid assessment of
the challenges ahead, things that needed to be done, and the report
made a large number of constructive recommendations.
We have taken those recommendations to heart. The administra-
jtion's commitment to intensify its efforts in Iraq, as demonstrated
again in the supplemental request, signifies our request to move
forward as rapidly as possible in areas that we and Dr. Hamre
agree are priorities. Since you have my prepared statement, I will
not read all of these points in detail, but I will touch on some of
them just briefly.
Dr. Hamre and his colleagues argue that we need a strong office
in Washington to backstop the Coalition Provisional Authority. We
have such an office, and even as we speak, we are in the process
lof expanding it, expanding its personnel and its capability. We
need such an office to help coordinate activities in Washington to
be a more rapid channel of communication between Baghdad and
the Pentagon, to facilitate decision-making in both capitals. It in-
cludes detailees from all agencies, all relevant agencies and depart-
ments of the U.S. Government that are supporting Ambassador
Bremer. This office also serves as a portal, as a place where busi-
nesses, non-government organizations (NGO), universities, others
who want to help in Iraq can go, a place they can turn to.
A second important point, in fact, perhaps, one of the most im-
portant points that Dr. Hamre stressed, was security, public safety
in all parts of the country as he put it, and we agree this is abso-
lutely essential. It is a precondition for the achievement of almost
every other goal we have.
We also believe that progress has been made, that most of the
country is secure, and the lives of the Iraqi people are improving.
Seventy thousand Iraqis, seventy thousand Iraqis have been
trained and armed to take on the security functions themselves of
different kinds in order to contribute to that stability.
Another point that was made in the report was Iraqi ownership
of the enterprise. The Iraqis must feel that they are — they own—
they have a huge stake in what is happening and what is being
done by CPA, and that is happening. Around the same time that
the report appeared in mid-July, the Governing Council (GO was
created, and the Governing Council may be one of the most impor-
tant things in the country. It is an achievement in itself The Gov-
erning Council brings together all of the major groups and regions
of the country, all of the forces and people that will make up the
future of democratic Iraq. It is an inclusive, broadly representative
body of Iraqis who are taking on increasing responsibility for their
own affairs, and this is the future. This is the future of Iraq, and
it is already there.
Turning Iraqi affairs over to Iraqis as soon as practicable is what
the mission is. That is what we are there to do in this context, to
turn over the country back to Iraqis in the context of freedom,
peace and prosperity so that they can continue on the course in
which things are headed.
360
The Hamre report talked about economic issues, employment.
There are public works programs that we have undertaken in order
to — for short-term — to make sure that there are no idle hands in
the country, and that is an important recommendation that we
have taken to heart.
But in the economic context, I wanted to take this opportunity
to mention something else that is about to happen; namely, the in-
troduction of a new Iraqi currency. This is a very significant mile-
stone in the formation or the reconstitution of the Iraqi economy
this is going to be happening in the next week or so, and it has
not only an obvious economic significance, it is the foundation of fu-
ture economic growth, but politically it signifies, again, a new step
in the supplanting of the old regime. Wouldn't have to look at
Saddam's face on the currency anymore, but it also represents the
unity of the country, because for a long period of time, as you
know, there has been a dual— dual currencies in effect, and this
now unifies the country in this important dimension.
Another point that Dr. Hamre and his colleagues mentioned was
a change in the Iraqi frame of mind, a national frame of mind, to
adapt from a centralized authority to significant freedoms, from
skepticism to hope. This is where the media come in, Iraqi media.
We know that much more work needs to be done in this area, but
the Hamre report was absolutely correct in pointing to the impor-
tance of that dimension.
Another point was internationalizing the effort, a new recon-
struction coalition that is significantly broader than the coalition in
the war. From the very beginning we have sought this ourselves.
In May, the United Nations (U.N.) Security Council— U.N. Security
Council passed Security Resolution 1843, which was a major reso-
lution that laid out an outline for the postwar effort, and that reso-
lution was a clarion call for broad international participation in the
security field, political field, economic and humanitarian fields,
and, you know, that is the mandate we have. Forty-five nations
have offered military support in Iraq, and other countries even now
are considering joining us in the security dimension. A conference
of international donors is about to convene in Madrid on the 23rd
of October, and that — so, again, we have always sought broad
international participation.
Another area in which we agree with the Hamre report is that
money must be significantly forthcoming and more flexible. The ad-
ministration's supplemental request and the international donors
conference are two essential elements of assuring that security and
reconstruction efforts are fully funded.
The last point that the Hamre report made is about timing,
about the sense of urgency, and this is an absolutely critical point.
The report said that the next 12 months may be decisive, and we
agree with that for a number of reasons. For one thing, there have
been a number of interesting pubHc opinion polls taken in Iraq
which tell us some encouraging news, that the people of Iraq not
only welcome their liberation, but they are willing to put up with
a period of hardship as the inevitable accompaniment of this period
of transition. But we all know that the patience of the Iraqi people
is not going to be unlimited. They have a right to see progress, to
see visible process, and it is in our interest to help them achieve
361
visible improvements in their situation at an early time to sustain
their hopes, to vindicate those hopes in order to sustain a demo-
cratic future.
But, in addition, from our point of view, the administration be-
lieves that a major commitment now offers the maximum chance
of having a decisive impact. We believe that this is a success so far,
and we think we should invest; that now is the time to invest in
the progress that has been achieved. Cutting corners, in our view,
may only add to the risk. It may only dilute or weaken the effec-
tiveness of what is being done now and could only end up being
much more costly in the long-run. So we believe that now is the
time for this country and the international community to make a
significant commitment to launch Iraq on the path to a brighter fu-
ture.
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, in April the armed
forces of the coalition won a great military victory, but ultimate
strategic victory in Iraq will come when, as I said, we are able to
turn the country back over to its own people in conditions in which
they are able to continue on course toward freedom and peace and
prosperity. With Congress' help and the American people's support,
we believe we can achieve that goal.
Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Thank you. Secretary Rodman.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Rodman can be found in
the Appendix on page 425.1
The Chairman. And, Mr. Oliver, I take it that you do not have
a prepared statement, but you are here to answer questions with
respect to your shop.
And, Dr. Hamre, I once again thank you for your service to your
country. You have visited us many times and on many issues past,
and you know we took your excellent judgment on this evaluation
and analysis, and we welcome your thoughts, sir.
STATEMENT OF JOHN J. HAMRE, PRESIDENT, CENTER FOR
STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, IRAQ RECON-
STRUCTION ASSESSMENT MISSION
Dr. Hamre. Mr. Hunter, thank you. And to Mr. Skelton, to all
the members of the committee, I am quite pleased to be invited
back. I think that's been 20, 22 years ago when I first had a chance
to come into this room as a humble staff member of the Senate
Armed Services Committee, and usually to try to defend the posi-
tion in conference, you know, with modest success, as I recall, and
it is great fun to have a chance to come back to be with you today.
Thank you very much.
I also was quite grateful to have a chance to be included on the
panel with Mr. Rodman, Dr. Rodman.
I do apologize that I have a constraint, that I have to leave by
noon, and this way I am able to get a statement in, and if I can
help in any way, I would be delighted to.
Let me say, also, I first met with Dr. Rodman before we were
sent to Iraq, and it was — and I want to say it because complete
openness in every step of the way, coming from the Secretary, Sec-
retary Rodman, Secretary Fife and others who asked us to go over.
And when we arrived, the first thing that Ambassador Bremer did
362
was invite us into his morning staff meeting, and he turned around
and he said, he has been sent here by Secretary Rumsfeld, he is
going to help us. Make anything available to him that you can. And
it was like that every step of the way, so it was complete openness.
And I turned around the corner and bumped into Dave Oliver, my
old friend Dave Oliver, who is running the Office of Management
and Budget (0MB) over there, and he was completely open about
everything that was going on. So I want to report to you this is —
we did not go as a criticizing agent. We went as an effort to try
to find the constructive set of recommendations that would help.
Let me say how crucial I think it is that you are holding this
hearing. I fear that the American willingness to stay the course
here is eroding, and I fear it is eroding significantly. We cannot
walk away from this challenge in Iraq. We have to succeed, and I
look, as I know you do, to worrisome trends that the public is not
certain that this is worth the effort now.
We cannot walk away from this. The American public is going to
be guided by what you do. When it is the declaration as, we, the
people, well, that is you. You are the ones who create the consen-
sus for the American people and lead us to what is involved. That
is why this hearing is absolutely crucial. You have got to help us
get this consensus as a country, stay the course on a job we have
got to complete, and so I thank you. I thank you very sincerely for
what you are doing.
As Dr. Rodman pointed out, we were there in June and July.
That is three months ago, and lots has changed since then. I have
not been back. I have had a chance to try to keep current with de-
velopments indirectly by talking to people here, and then we get
a lot of e-mail traffic from people in the theater who continue to
communicate with us. So I want to be fair to say that my knowl-
edge about the current environment is a bit derived, in the sense
I have derived it from conversations with others, but my knowledge
is still somewhat dated from when I was there.
The situation is dramatically better, even better than when I was
there, and I think that a good example is when I was there and
we would try to meet with Iraqis in the evening to say, let us have
dinner, as soon as it started getting dark, they were nervous. They
wanted to get home, okay? They were afraid to be out after dark.
That is not the case now. People are now out in restaurants late
in the evening, and they feel more safe in their homes. That is a
very important development. That was not the case, back then.
Now there is still, I think, a fair amount of general criminality;
you know, hijackings, carjackings. It is still kind of common unfor-
tunately. We do not have the police presence throughout the coun-
try that we need. But when I was in Baghdad driving around, I
saw a total of eight Iraqi cops, and now I think we have got 40,000
or something. So there is dramatic improvement, and there needs
to be.
The formula which the administration has embraced is to dra-
matically indigenize, and I think they are making strides in doing
it. And we are still a long ways away from having a secure environ-
ment, I think they would be the first to say that, but it is definitely
better.
363
About the money. You know, when I found out that Dave OHver
was putting together the budget, I felt, well, he is the most onerous
pup I have ever met in my life, and he is going to do a good job,
and he is the kind of guy that is going to put you through the de-
tailed steps to make sure there is a good rationale for what you are
asking for. And we sat down and talked about the process. I was
surprised; rudimentary, because it was the early days, but a very
good, solid process for determining priorities, arranging different
priorities against each other, a process of kind of arbitrating what
makes more sense, where it should be established, for sequence, et
cetera.
It was very clear then that we were going to run out of cash, and
we are going to run out of cash. At the time I was there, it looked
like we were going to run out in March. My guess is we are going
to run out in January, so we need the supplemental. There has to
be a supplemental appropriation. We are not going to get substan-
tial funds from the donors conference in any terms. We will get
gifts in kind, something they make up in their own country. They
trarely give cash, and we are going to need cash, and the supple-
mental is crucial. You have got to approve the supplemental.
[ There has been a lot of criticism that you do not know what is
in the request. It is a good thing Dave is here. He is going to an-
swer everybody's questions until the end. Now, he is not going to
know every answer. I mean, when I was the comptroller, you guys
kicked me in the butt for having incomplete estimates.
The Chairman. Well, sometimes you knew too much.
Dr. Hamre. Yes, sir. That was a very rare occasion around you.
When you do have to make an estimate, either your solution is to
be very transparent about what you had to assume, and I think the
administration is willing to do that. Frankly, there has been some
tension between Congress and the administration over defense
budgets, I understand that, and it is the backdrop of that that is
making this supplemental more questioned. But I promise you he
is going to give you as straight an answer as he has with me, as
straight an answer as he has got to how he built the estimate, and
you are going to have to trust his judgment on that. And you will
make up your own mind if you think it makes sense, but that is
the way the system is going to have to work. He cannot give you
a precise formula on everybody that is going to get paid for the
next 12 months, but he can tell you in general categories, and why
it is a fair number, and who's going to be looking over his shoulder,
and I think that is a fair process for you to ask of him.
Finally, I have been asked many times, because in our report we
said that there was a small window, and the window was closing,
and I have said many times — I say, we said the window is three
months. It is now three months. Has the window closed? Absolutely
not.
There has been a lot of change in Iraq through the efforts of the
CPA and the joint task force. We now have, I think, 20,000 of the
facilities protection people on the beat, you know, that are protect-
ing facilities. We didn't have that when I was there in June. We
now have 40,000 cops on the beat. Now, they are not as well
trained as they need to be. Jordan has really stepped up with a
364
substantial commitment to train policemen. It is just starting, but,
again, we are making great progress.
That window is not closed by any stretch of the imagination, and
we are seeing substantial improvement, but it absolutely hinges on
you appropriating the funds to keep this operation solid for the
next year. We are going to be there for a while, but we have got
to be there for a while. We have got to get this right.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I would be happy, of
course, to answer any questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hamre can be found in the Ap-
pendix on page 429.]
The Chairman. Okay. Let me start off with one question, I think,
is — kind of goes to the politics of the situation, the security of the
situation and how fast we get these economic wheels turning, and
that is a question of ready money.
Nothing is so disturbing and so productive of resentment as
promises that are unfulfilled. When those promises are the prom-
ises of increasing electricity hookup, and electricity hookup is nec-
essary to combat 110-degree weather like we had in the summer-
time, and because of sabotage and other reasons you are not get-
ting the megawatts that you intended, that obviously has a nega-
tive effect on the attitude of the Iraqi people and, I think, their ac-
ceptance of the leadership that we are tr3ring to maintain.
And, you know, we saw the early figures. I was over earlier with
some of our folks in late May, and we had our targets for electrical
hookups, targets for water hookups, targets for our security people
coming online, for the Iraqi security forces coming online. And I
think, generally speaking, the security process has been pretty
much up to speed, pretty much what we projected. I know it has
been difficult to get the electricity system online, and, similarly,
the water system is getting enough potable water, which I think at
one time below 50 percent of the populace was getting what we
considered to be potable water. It wasn't that much higher in the
days of Saddam Hussein. But I think those time lines seem to me
to be — my recollection of the numbers, that we lagged, that we
didn't meet those numbers in the closing months of the summer,
although we are making progress.
I guess my question is — and this goes to the system of standing
up these local governments, like the city councils, where you would
have division commanders like Ray Odierno of the 4th Division
taking this group of community leaders and electing from that
group of some 300 the city councils with the 6 Kurds, 6 Turks, 6
Assyrians, 6 Arabs and 6 independents, and, from that group, elect-
ing mayors, deputy mayors, and really putting together these local
governing bodies. A lot of that, the success of that construct, of
that — of getting the wheels turning economically and developing
viable local governments depends on ready cash. That means when
you have a project where you got to hook up a certain neighborhood
with water, being able to get the cash to buy the polyvinyl chloride
(PVC), to put the work crew together, to get the equipment to-
gether and to get the job accomplished, and, with respect to hook-
ing up electricity, running those lines, developing the generational
capability, all those things.
365
As I understand early on, and I know this is a long windup to
this question, the military commanders had ready cash. The Brit-
ish had, especially, a formula where a brigade commander had a
lot of resources under his power and could put out cash money to
get things done. I think that was valuable, and what I have heard
in recent times is it has gotten more — as the bureaucracy has set-
tled in, it has become more and more difficult to deliver ready cash
to projects that move our agenda forward. So, Secretary Rodman,
and maybe Mr. Oliver — incidentally, Mr. Oliver, we have worked
with you many times in the past. You have got a great reputation
as being a practical, pragmatic guy that gets things done. Are we
getting money into these important economic projects, and are we
getting it in in an effective and speedy manner?
Mr. Oliver. Mr. Chairman, yes, yes, and I think it has actually
improved, and it is a surprise because bureaucracies do not nor-
mally move that way.
We are now spending
The Chairman. Can you move that microphone?
Mr. Oliver. Yes, sir.
Is it better?
We are now spending, the miliary commanders are now spending
through the Commanders' Emergency Response Program $5 million
a week, and we have that programmed, and in part of the bill, not
Ambassador Bremer's part of the bill, but the Office of the Sec-
retary of Defense (OSD) requests money to continue that program
for the next year. General Sanchez told me that that was the right
number about two weeks ago.
The Chairman. Now, what is that again?
Mr. Oliver. It is called the Commanders' Emergency Response
Program, sir, and it is essentially $5 million a week in money that
goes to the military commanders, and then they spend, as you have
described, normally in small sums to fix things in the community
to make a difference, and it makes it effective for our soldiers to
react with the people.
The Chairman. Okay. Now, you have gone to the heart of some-
thing I think is very, very important to all of us. You are saying
in Kirkuk, for example, where Ray Odierno, General Odierno,
heads the 4th Infantry Division and has put together, built, this
local government, if a certain neighborhood loses power or doesn't
have potable water, and you need to run a 4-inch PVC line out to
them and develop some pumping power and maybe do some water
treatment, some basic treatment, and the city council decides they
need to do that, and they communicate that information to General
Odierno and he or his staff, we have a mechanism for quickly dis-
bursing the money and initiating that project?
Mr. Oliver. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Getting pipe in the ground.
Are you confident that that ability is presently there?
Mr. Oliver. Yes, sir, I am.
The Chairman. Okay. Dr. Hamre, what do you think?
Dr. Hamre. Sir, when we were there, they had a total of $17 mil-
lion for all of Iraq, and we said this is a great idea, it just needs
to be a lot more than that, and that is what Admiral Oliver has
just said. They put more money into it.
366
Now, you are absolutely on a crucial issue. You cannot create de-
mocracy at a local level if the local representative government
doesn't have any money.
The Chairman. Exactly.
Dr. Hamre. Now, at some point this needs to be less the military
providing the cash and more than the CPA through the Governing
Council providing the cash. We need to use this as a mechanism
to connect democracy. You know, they didn't have a tsixation sys-
tem in Iraq, and the local government had no way of getting
money, except it was handed down to them, so at some point we
have got to find a new way to revenue, to get revenue into local
government's hands. This is a good stopgap measure, and we need
to now extend it.
The Chairman. Okay. Let me just take it one step farther, Mr.
Oliver, and tell me if you know, and Secretary Rodman. Let us
take Kirkuk again. That is a place we were at, and we tend to re-
late to places we visited. If you need to hook up a certain neighbor-
hood, and you have maybe a million-dollar project or a $50,000
project or $150,000 project, and you need to get some pipe in the
ground, some pumping power, and deliver some potable water to
that neighborhood, is that done by the Americans, or is it done, as
Dr. Hamre suggested it should be, through this council that has
been elected, through this city council and through the mayor and
the deputy mayor, through this government? Are we empowering
this government with the ability to actually do things for its con-
stituents? I think that is a key thing.
Secretary Rodman, jump in any time, too.
Mr. Oliver. We are partway, Mr. Chairman. As you know, we
stood up two councils. I think there are 255. Anyway, we stood
them up, started paying the people. The council members started
pa3ring the mayors and the governors, started — and we gave
them — they have a budget through the Ministry of Public Works
and the military commanders.
As Dr. Hamre says, at some point you want to transition this
from the military to the civilians, and we have not planned — we
have a time frame we are thinking about doing that, but all that
has to work through. But the answer is we have money with them.
They have several mechanisms, and we are using the Iraqis to do
the work in most of these cases, sir.
The Chairman. Okay — go ahead, sir.
Secretary Rodman. Just one point as — as Admiral Oliver men-
tioned, the ministries at the national level are going to take on in-
creasing responsibilities in running their own affairs and their own
domain. Now, that is not the same as empowering the local institu-
tions, but at least the Iraqis are beginning to take responsibility for
these.
The Chairman. Well, I would think — and. Dr. Hamre, correct me
if I am wrong — but I would think empowering the folks who we
have taken, for example, in Kirkuk, the 300 community leaders,
and allowed them to elect their city councils and their mayors,
when you have leadership that you have supported, the best way
to support them is to empower them with the ability to carry out
for their constituents things that their constituents want. And if
you could get back to the committee and let us know. Secretary
367
Rodman, what the process is in these communities where you
have — and, incidentally, I think the leadership is tremendous lead-
ership. Interestingly, in this town we say, well, we guys with the
bow ties, we will take care of politics, and you military guys con-
centrate on winning wars.
Actually, military leaders have great leadership capability, and
most of them have some sense of diplomacy and know how to work
with people in the communities, and they have done, I think, excel-
lent jobs, but they have got to have ready cash behind them, and
whether or not they cut the check or the city council cuts the check
on a project is probably not relevant. What is relevant is if the city
council recommends it and is requested of it by their constituents,
and they end up delivering; if they fix the potholes so to speak,
they are going to be given credit for it, and that is something that
you — probably is going to be a slow boat to China if you wait for
the project to come down from Baghdad.
So I think we have a little bit of a comparable situation that we
have anywhere where you have the ability of local government to
work quickly as opposed to a federal project coming down from on
high. Usually the quick reaction is the local reaction. And so, I
would — if you could let us know what mechanism you have for em-
powering the American leadership, which has developed this
Iraqi — these Iraqi local governments and moving quickly to re-
spond to their requests on specific projects and having the ready
cash to get that done. I think that is a key thing.
Dr. Hamre, any other thoughts on that?
Dr. Hamre. Sir, I absolutely agree with you. I mean, these people
have frankly been pretty courageous to get elected, to represent in
a new government at some personal risk, so they have got to be
backed up and able to deliver, as you said.
I think this is something that I know that — I talked with Ambas-
sador Bremer. I know he wants to do it. The question is being able
to have the cash to do it. He has had to husband his scarce re-
sources. So I think it is a good step forward that he is coming up
now with five million every week. That is a huge improvement over
where we were, but we need to now make the next step, as you
say, get it into the hands of the local elected officials so they can
do it. The mechanism is to be determined.
The Chairman. I want to go to my colleagues, and I apologize to
the committee for taking so much time on this thing, but what I
have heard in feedback from some military leaders is that early on
we had this — when we were immediately there, you had command-
ers with ready cash who could do things, and as we begin to bu-
reaucratize the situation, some of their ability to spend money
eroded, and, with that, their ability to empower local leadership
and to be as credible to some degree. So if you could let the com-
mittee know what mechanisms we have in effect, maybe get that
for the record, and, if we are developed — continue to develop those
mechanisms, that would be important to us.
Thank you.
Secretary Rodman. Okay.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix begin-
ning on page 461.]
368
The Chairman. Now I recognize the gentleman from Missouri
Mr. Skelton.
Mr. Skelton. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
Dr. Hamre, you have answered my question that I was going to
pose to you regarding the security situation in Iraq, but your trip
report acknowledged that the CPA was underresourced, and from
what I saw, it was undermanned. To a great extent it was under-
manned. It was hard finding some of these people and in some of
the areas. Do you see any sufficient improvement on that?
Dr. Hamre. Mr. Skelton, I continue to believe that the CPA lacks
the manning resources that it needs to really carry out its job in
two dimensions. There aren't enough CPA personnel in Baghdad,
and frankly ^
Mr. Skelton. You say there are not.
Dr. Hamre. There are not. We need more. We especially need
Arab speakers. This is one of our great problems. We do not have
enough Arab speakers, so with that we need to work.
The other thing is, in my view, the CPA needs to have represent-
ative offices in the field. Now, they currently have — when I was
there, they had three field offices. They now have field offices in
17 of the 18 governances, but in most cases they only have a single
liaison officer. That is a step in the right direction, but we need to
have greater CPA representation because that becomes the con-
veyor belt that links up the Governing Council in Baghdad with
the local governments, and it is a very important thing to be able
to give them the resources to do that.
Mr. Skelton. Well, it appears to me in many instances the mili-
tary are filling in that gap themselves.
Dr. Hamre. They are, and the military would be the first to tell
you they would like to have the CPA do it. There is a popular myth
that the military wants to do it and keep the CPA out. Not at all.
From everj^hing we heard was that the military in the field would
say, look, I need them to come, I need civilian help. So I think this
is a problem that we could easily solve, but it is a resource issue.
Mr. Skelton. Dr. Rodman?
Secretary Rodman. Yes. I want to agree with that. We need more
people out there, and we know that. Secretary Rumsfeld has sent
a letter to his fellow Cabinet secretaries asking people from a vari-
ety of Cabinet departments to expand their ability.
Mr. Skelton. A lot of them are only there for 90 days. They are
in and out, and you cannot build up friendships, relationships,
whatever, unless they are there for an extended period of time; am
I correct?
Secretary Rodman. I think the longer people are able to stay, the
better, that is correct, but the Defense Department is digging deep
into its own personnel to try to expand the number of its people.
But as I said, civilian agencies that are playing a very important
role in the CPA, we want more of them, as well.
Mr. Skelton. Thank you.
Secretary Rodman, of course, you come to Congress for the sup-
plemental request that is before us now, and if we are going to be
there any particular length of time, which I assume we are, there
will be additional requests for additional funding in the days
ahead. And the mission is to bring freedom, peace and prosperity.
369
^sing your words, to Iraq, and what I was asking — and let me ask:
Do you agree with Ambassador Bremer when he says to complete
ithe mission would take four to five years?
Secretary Rodman. Well, I would state the mission — as I put it
n my statement, I do not think it is our job to remake Iraq. It is
;he job of Iraqis to rebuild their society. What I think we ought to
lim at is putting them on a certain path so that they can sustain
^he progress that is going to come; in other words, I do not think
we have to stay there forever. I think our job is to launch them,
to help create conditions of security, to train them to take on these
functions and to turn over the ultimate responsibility.
; Now, we may stay there in some form for a certain period. I
would not venture to predict what that period would be, but I think
we should state our own mission with some precision, which is to
launch them on a certain path to create basic conditions in which
they can then takeover the responsibility to build their own institu-
tions.
Mr. Skelton. So we in Congress will have some idea, and I know
it is somewhat difficult, but you are on top of this, and you study
it, and you live with it every day. In your judgment, how long will
this take to bring about freedom, peace and prosperity to that
country, which is our mission?
Secretary Rodman. Well, I think I share Secretary Rumsfeld's
general allergy about making predictions.
Mr. Skelton. I understand.
Secretary RODMAN. We do not know.
Mr. Skelton. I am not asking for predictions, I am asking for
your best judgment.
Secretary RoDMAN. I really hesitate to make a judgment. Ambas-
sador Bremer, who sees the condition on the ground — I respect his
assessment, but I would not want to
Mr. Skelton. You would not disagree with Ambassador Bremer,
then, four to five years?
Secretary RODMAN. I respect his judgment as the man who is out
there on the scene.
Mr. Skelton. Thank you.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
The gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Saxton.
Mr. Saxton. Dr. Hamre, thank you for being here this morning.
Thank all of you for being here.
Dr. Hamre, in your opening statement, you alluded to something
that I think is really important, and I know that the chairman's
ready cash concern is important. I know that we are all concerned
with how much money this is going to cost us and how long we are
going to have to stay and all those things.
But, Dr. Hamre, you put your finger on what I think is the basis
of my concerns, which is the willingness of the American people
and their government to stick with this. This is a huge — this is
the — this is the basis for everything else, and I think — I think we —
we ought to spend some time talking with the American people
about how important this is, because the American people view
this, as their government does, in the context of what our experi-
ence has been with military conflict. And our experience with mili-
tary conflict, if you look at modern history — and Ike Skelton can
370
walk through a lot better than I can because he is the real histo-
rian here. But to go back to World War I, there was a beginning
and an end. You move to World War II, there was a beginning and
an end. Korea, there was a beginning and an end. The end was dif-
ferent, but there was an end. And in more recent conflicts, Pan-
ama, there was a beginning and an end. Haiti, there was a begin-
ning and an end. And it wasn't until we got to Bosnia when there
was a beginning and a seemingly no end, or at least a very slow-
to-arrive end. And today in Afghanistan, in Iraq, the American peo-
ple are not accustomed, nor is their government, to a beginning
with no end in sight. So that is how we view this as a culture, as
a society, as a people, and as a government.
At the same time, our enemies have a different vision, and this
is important to understand, too. The vision of our enemies has to
be that they know that they cannot defeat us militarily. They do
not have the resources, they do not have the firepower, they do not
have the numbers. They cannot defeat us, but they are a pretty de-
termined lot, and they want to defeat us, so if they look at our pat-
tern of beginnings and ends and decide how to defeat us, there are
some lessons that they can look at.
One is Somalia. In Somalia there was a beginning and an end,
but it was a very destructive end in terms of setting a pattern of
activity for others to look at. In Iraq One, there was a beginning
and an end. We didn't finish the job in Iraq One, in my opinion.
This is all hindsight, and I am not criticizing anybody, but there
was a beginning and an end, and it was unsatisfactory. From the
standpoint of our enemy, we went away, just as we did in Somalia.
And in Lebanon, in Beirut, it was a set of activities destructive to
us, and we went away. And in Vietnam we didn't finish the job,
either. The American people got weary of it, and we went away.
So if I were an Islamist fundamentalist fighter or leader, I would
look at these two sets of facts and say, the American people are
used to a beginning and an end, and if we can keep them from get-
ting to an end, pretty soon they will go away.
Now, if you would — if you would just add your vision to it, am
I right? And how do we — how do we as Americans look at this so
that we do not have to see that immediate — the immediacy of the
end that we are used to seeing?
Dr. Hamre. Mr. Saxton, I think you are completely right, that
their strategy is clearly to confound us long enough for public opin-
ion to erode to the point where we are not willing to take it any
longer.
Now, how do we deal with that? Well, the first thing, we have
to develop a much stronger consensus for why we are going in in
the first place, and a durable consensus. And I think this is why
I think they are not able to find weapons of mass destruction — has
been a problem, because too much of the rationale in the public's
mind of why we went in was tied in to weapons of mass destruc-
tion. I was surprised we didn't find it, frankly. I don't think that
is a reason now to get out prematurely. I mean, we have got to stay
and we have got to make sure this situation is right. We have got
to build the right consensus and then we have got to sustain that
consensus by clearly communicating that we have got a plan. And
I think that the sense that people have had for the last several
371
lonths is that the administration has a vision but doesn't have a
Jtrategy. ^ . .^
■ Well, I think they do have a strategy now and we are seeing it.
Ve are starting to see the fruits of that. But it has been a confus-
ng time during the summer, and frankly a lot of damage was done
n the public perception about how things were going in Iraq. And,
00 much of the constant drumbeat of only the attacks is now what
B shaping people's perceptions, not enough perception about what
s going that is positive and constructive. That is why I think this
learing is very important.
! Now, sir, we are not particularly good as a government at help-
ng reconstruct civil society after wars. We have learned that. That
g how I actually was asked to do this, was because when I went
lo CSIS after leaving DOD I said, we can't get out of places like
Kosovo or Bosnia if we can't get civil society started again. I mean
vhat is our way of getting out if we are not good at recreating it?
5o we, along with the Association of the U.S. Army, studied every
)ne of the conflict situations over the last 54 years, and we have
lad about 50 of them, and tried to figure out what works and what
loesn't work. And it is on the basis of that, then, that the Sec-
retary asked us to go over and to look at the situation and offer
5ome suggestions for Iraq.
: We have to now be on a path that we demonstrate progress. We
^an rebuild this consensus in America, I believe. It has to start
vith you. We have to convince you that we have got a plan. If we
Ean convince you that we have got a plan, you are going to turn
around and share that with constituents. But we have got to have
:he stamina to stay through and see this done right.
Mr. Saxton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Taylor.
Mr. Taylor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank our
panel for being here. I agree with just about everything I have
heard thus far.
Dr. Hamre, I think what troubles me— and I looked at your com-
ments about the historical corruption in Iraq. I have got to think
that that fed a lot of cynicism amongst the average Iraqi in their
view toward government. And I have got to tell you, it is not
unique to Iraqis. A lot of Americans are cynical about the money
that is about, in all probability, to be spent there. I think the cyni-
cism was fed, quite honestly, by some people, including the former
head of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and
the former campaign manager for the President who said, "And I
can help you get that money. I am going to help you get that
money." .
So, what troubles me as someone who wants to support this is
the apparent lack of transparency as to how this money is going
to be spent, the apparent accountability of how it is going to be
spent. I come from a state where, if a city wants to spend, our
county wants to spend $10,000 for something, they have got to put
it out for bid. So you can imagine when we are talking $20 billion
of, apparently, things that are going to go to sole source contracts,
out of sight, out of the mind of the American people, I think it is
only going to take a couple of horror stories of that money being
372
misspent to have the American pubHc as cynical about our atten-
tions there as the Iraqi pubUc.
So my question to you as someone who has been through this,
how do we get the transparency we need? How do we get the ac-
countabihty we need? How do we see to it that every one of these
dollars is really put out and it is being done for the benefit of the
Iraqi people and not some contractor looking for a sweetheart deal
or a job for his brother-in-law who can't find a job elsewhere? How
do we do that?
Dr. Hamre. Well, sir, I really do think I should ask Mr. Oliver
to speak to this question, as well. But let me say, in general
terms — and I can only speak from my personal experience — when
you develop an estimate for a highly fluid situation, where you
really don't have a lot of certainty, you first have to just be as
transparent as possible about every assumption you made to try to
build a number and argue about it. I mean, say here is why I did
it, here is how I did it, here is the assumptions I made. And then,
just be completely open about it, so that you say, if you don't agree
with me, I will do another assumption. If it is more logical, I will,
of course, adopt that assumption. But share everything you can.
And as I said in my statement, and briefly, there has been a ten-
sion between the administration and the Congress over defense
budget issues, frankly, for the last year or two. And I think that
is a backdrop of
Mr. Taylor. Dr. Hamre, I don't think the argument anywhere is
over the defense portion of this supplemental. I think — because
there is some transparency to that. I know my concerns are the ap-
parent lack of transparency for the 20 billion going toward helping
the Iraqis.
Dr. Hamre. And then to that part of it, I think that you should
delineate, along with the administration as you approve this, the
conditions of transparency that you insist on. Who do you want to
be looking at and what kind of reports do you want? You know,
Dave Oliver is going to understand that. He is going to be here tell-
ing you. He told me everything he knew, and he told me, well, here
it is, the constraints. Here is what I don't know; here is what I
hope we are going to get from this.
So I think you have a right to ask that. Now, you have also
blended a second issue, which is the contracting side of the house.
And there have been some challenges on the contracting side of the
house. I think those are being worked out. Maybe not adequately.
That is an issue for you to explore further with people who are ac-
tually doing the work. You have a right to ask for transparency be-
cause you are being asked to appropriate the money, and you ought
to establish the conditions. But please do it in a dialogue with the
administration first and see if you are satisfied that way. And, if
necessary, then put it into the law. But I think it is possible to
work it out.
Mr. Taylor. Dave, let me ask you to join in.
Mr. Oliver. Congressman, I am trying to make this as trans-
parent as possible. And it wasn't as good in the beginning, because
I got involved in just doing too much and not recognizing how im-
portant that was. But I put every contract that Ambassador
Bremer has approved on the Internet and every expenditure. It is
373
on cpa-iraq.org. I think there are 420 items he has approved, of
money. So every one of them is on the Internet. And we do a meet-
ing that I chair twice a week, once a week in which we have mem-
bers of the Coahtion, the senior ambassadors, all present along
with other people; and then I put the minutes of those meetings
on the Internet, too, so that where they talk about decisions made,
et cetera, because I am trying to be as transparent.
We put the Iraqi budget on the Internet, also, and that is at the
same site in Arabic and English, as will be the 2004 budget when
it comes out this week. So we are trying to make these trans-
parent.
Mr. Taylor. Mr. Chairman, may I go about 30 seconds over,
with your permission?
Mr. Oliver, one of the things that absolutely appalled me after
the first Gulf War was a statement by one of our uniformed officers
who said, now — and I was part of a very large delegation that went
to Kuwait. This is almost verbatim:
Many of you are here because you represent businesses back
home who want to do business to rebuild Kuwait. This is how you
will do it. You will hire a member of the Kuwaiti Royal family, and
he will do absolutely nothing for you. But unless his name appears
on the letterhead — you will pay him 10 percent of the cost of the
contract — and unless his name appears on the letterhead, you
won't get any business.
Now, that is almost verbatim. That is how matter of fact it was.
I have got to tell you, I was appalled. We call that kickback, we
call that corrupt in America. But what is going to happen to keep
that Governing Council from becoming that?
Mr. Oliver. Yes, sir. First of all, the Ambassador has set up a
special office and we have selected the person that I happen to
think is the best person contracting in D.C. I recruited her from
the White House when I was at the Office of Secretary of Defense
to be head of contracting, a woman named Deidra Lee, who is going
to be head of that. She is absolutely above-board. We are — I am
terribly alert that if I hear anything like that, I have an investiga-
tion started out there. I mean, I dumped every one of my contracts,
every one, and severed all my business relationships completely be-
fore I went out there so there wouldn't be a question of conflict of
interest.
And we are going to be very alert to that. Congressman, abso-
lutely, because we cannot have that, for the reason that I can't
come back to you and the American people and ask for support if
you hear that that sort of thing is going on. So, we are not going
to let it happen.
The Chairman. If the gentleman would yield for a second. What
is the manner in which the contracts are awarded?
Mr. Oliver. It is going to be a complete and open bidding, sir,
just like Ambassador Bremer said. And we are going to put in —
for example, I was talking to the people that I talk to, Dave Nash
and Dee Lee, yesterday because what we are going to do is put in
the request for proposals. Part of the grading criteria is going to
be how many Iraqis they are employing; and, two, making goals on
time so we don't end up dragging this out.
The Chairman. And who makes the cut on who wins?
I
374 ■
Mr. Oliver. It depends on who — it is going to be an American
group. It is either going to be the Army Corps of Engineers; the
State Department has different organizations. But essentially, who-
ever does the contracting will do a fair and open competition, and
do it the same way you do all American contracts that you guys
appropriate through the State Department and Defense.
The Chairman. So part of the answer to Mr. Taylor's question
is, this is different from an award that is being conducted by the
nationals of another country in that an American entity will make
the decision as to who wins these contracts.
Mr. Oliver. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Okay. Go ahead.
Mr. Taylor. No. Thank you. I yield.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman for his line of questions.
The gentleman from Colorado, Mr. Hefley.
Mr. Hefley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And first of all, I apolo-
gize; I had to step out to speak from a group from Corpus Christi
for Solomon Ortiz, and right in the middle of your talk, Dr. Hamre.
Welcome back. You are back at your old stand, and I have missed
you. I think all of us have. And we are delighted to have you here
today, as well as the rest of you. And I don't want to plow a ground
that has already been plowed; so, if it has been, just say, no, we
have already answered that, and we will go on.
In looking at the budget, the 20 billion part of the budget for the
rebuilding, there are some things there that make an awful lot of
sense to me. You know, we need to get the electrical grid up, we
need to get the water service and the service and the highway in-
frastructure and some of those things. We need to make sure that
those are put back together. But then there were a lot of things in
there that didn't make any sense to me, things like bu3ring garbage
trucks for them. Well, they may need garbage trucks; but doggone
it, can't they buy their own? I mean, they are not a poor nation.
Can't they buy their own garbage trucks?
Management training, at a very expensive figure a pop, bothered
me in there. And there were a number of other things like this that
had nothing to do with really rebuilding Iraq. They were kind of
like a wish list, it looked to me like, of things that if you had all
the money in the world, why, this is what we would do. And, of
course, the United States has all the money in the world, so let us
ask for these things.
Would you respond to this? I may be misinterpreting it, that ev-
erything may be absolutely essential. And I don't know who is to
respond to it.
Mr. Oliver. Congressman, we don't have all the money in the
world, as you know. And, in fact, this is their balanced budget for
2004 that they are reviewing right now, and I expect Ambassador
Bremer and the Governing Council to Ambassador Bremer to ap-
prove.
Let us take an example. The purpose of the supplemental is to
establish the security environment so that the private economy can
grow to set up the conditions inherent in that. When you talk to
the business leaders — and I spend a lot of time talking to them —
what they recognize is they have been isolated since Saddam came
in to power since 1979. And so what they have missed is about
375
three or four business cycles of how to do good business. They are
good people, they are very smart people, well educated, sir, but
they have been completely isolated for 20-plus years. So what they
need and know they need in order to be effective so that they can
quickly establish effective businesses, because we are essentially —
they want to go and we believe they should go from a central to
a market-based economy, which is a difficult path. They need to be
able, they need to know what is going on in business. Because if
you think of the way business was done in the 1970's as opposed
to the way it is done now, it has just been a whole bunch of things
learned. And you do not appreciate how conditions are there until
you go into an office and realize that the largest pad on a guy's
desk is carbon paper, and that he is writing out orders or writing
out thoughts in longhand, using carbon paper to transmit them.
So what they asked for and what they have talked to Ambas-
sador Bremer and several of us about is what they need. They need
some people to come in — and they don't want them to stay and run
things. They want people to come in and give them advice, or they
want to go places and give them advice. And that is what that
money is for. That is what the management is for. And it is a
whole concept, and it is tied to this concept of, let us do the secu-
rity and let us provide — let us teach them how to fish. And I don't
mean teach them how to fish, because they will teach themselves.
But let us provide them the tools so that they can learn how to
fish, because we want that economy to grow.
Mr. Hefley. Thank you.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman. Mr. Meehan.
Mr. Meehan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Rodman, I heard you in response to Congressman
Skelton's question, avoid being pinned down on the notion of a four
to five year commitment. And Mr. Skelton has tried to get a better
grasp from people who have come and testified before this commit-
tee as to how long of a commitment this really is. Obviously, there
are estimates from five to ten years. There are some people who
suggest that if this goes — if this doesn't go well, that we will just
abandon it and get out before the next election. So I think a lot of
the questions are really important as we deal with this supple-
mental budget request.
But it is interesting to me that you go to great pains and lengths
to say, look, our mission is to get the Iraqi people up there as soon
as we can. We are making enormous progress. Yet today it is re-
ported that after only two weeks from the President's speech at the
United Nations, it appears that we are going to draw back and for-
get about trying to get a vote there, and it appears that we are not
going to get a U.N. Security Council resolution which would give
us the commitment that we need.
And I heard you loud and clear. First, we had 25 countries, then
we had 30; today I heard 45 countries. But we are still paying over
90 percent of this effort. And it seems to me that if the sticking
point is, why we can't get a U.N. Security Council resolution, that
the other countries of the U.N. Security Council believe that we
don't have a plan to put the Iraqis up and governing soon enough,
I don't get the disconnect there. Why is it that we can't get other
countries of the world to participate with us in this effort? I under-
376
stand we have 45 countries, but there isn't one witness that has
come before this committee since we got involved in this that has
argued with me that we are pa5dng at least 90 percent, that we
only paid a fraction of the expense in Bosnia or in Kosovo, only 50
percent in Afghanistan.
This would all be easier on the American people if there was a
sense that this was really a shared responsibility and that we are
going to the United Nations and getting that kind of a commitment
for troops and for resources. And I am just — why is that dis-
connect? We can't seem to get a commitment of how long we are
going to be there. We say that we want the Iraqis up and govern-
ing for us, but we can't get a U.N. Security Council resolution.
Secretary RODMAN. Well, you have raised a number of issues. We
absolutely agree that this ought to be an international effort. In
fact, the world community has a huge stake in Iraq, because Iraq
is an important country. And, in fact, I do see a convergence of
countries and of opinion that understands that we are not the only
ones with a stake in Iraq. A Security Council resolution is only one
piece of this. It would be good if there were a new resolution. I
think it would help, it might help stimulate some effort. But I
think whether there is one or not, we are continuing to mobilize
international support. There is a donor's conference in Madrid later
this month where we expect a lot of countries to come, and that
effort is independent of what happens in New York. And we are
making a major effort to remind other countries of the huge stake
that the world has in the stability of the Middle East and of Iraq.
We also think, by the way, that we have a better chance of en-
couraging international contributions in Madrid if they see that the
United States is continuing to make a firm commitment of its own.
And that is how it relates to the supplemental request.
Mr. Meehan. Mr. Secretary, you wouldn't dispute my 90 percent
figure, that at least 90 percent of this restructuring and the cost
of our operation in Iraq in the foreseeable future, whether it is 4
years, 5 years, or 10 years, that you wouldn't dispute the fact that
we are going to pay at least 90 percent of it, which is significantly
higher than anyplace else.
Secretary Rodman. Well, I don't have an exact figure. It is obvi-
ous that we are now carrying a lot of load. And the purpose of this
conference in Madrid is to slice and broaden it, and we expect a
lot of other major countries to be there and to help out — Arab coun-
tries, countries in Asia and Europe. I mean, we expect this to be
a — we expect it to succeed in broadening the base of support. That
is the purpose of it, and in the security field, as well. It would be
good to have a Security Council resolution, but a number of coun-
tries that — you saw the Turkish Parliament voting yesterday, so
even there we are talking to a number of countries about contribu-
tions in the security field.
And just again on the issue of a Security Council resolution, I
think it is incorrect to say that we have abandoned it. I mean,
when I talked to my colleagues at the State Department yesterday,
we haven't abandoned that at all. We are just looking at the situa-
tion, and we will make a decision at some point about how to pro-
ceed in New York.
377
Mr. Meehan. Mr. Secretary, would you say in the last two weeks
we have made progress toward getting a resolution, or would you
say that we have maybe gone backwards?
Secretary Rodman. I think what you see in the press is about
right. It is not moving forward, but I think we have certainly not
made a decision to abandon that. And we think there is a degree
of consensus, and it would be good to capture that in a resolution.
So we have not abandoned that at all.
Mr. Meehan. Mr. Chairman, can I ask Dr. Hamre just one
quick?
The President announced yesterday that he is giving
Condoleezza Rice, our National Security Adviser, authority to man-
age postwar Iraq and the rebuilding of Afghanistan. And I noticed
in your statement that you submitted — it sounded like while you,
in theory, would agree with the notion of the Defense Department
running this operation, as a practical matter it hasn't worked very
well. Is that accurate?
Dr. Hamre. Yes, that is my view. I think that when it was a log-
ical thing to do, to give the postconflict mission to the Defense De-
partment because it wasn't going to be a transitional environment
for some time, I don't disagree with that at all. I think the patterns
of coordination inside the administration have been a bit creaky,
and I think that this is definitely going to help. I think there has
been coordination in the National Security Council (NSC), but I
think they have raised the profile of the people who will be doing
coordination. I think that is a good thing.
Mr. Meehan. I think it has been creaky, and it is even more so,
because it appears from comments yesterday that Secretary Rums-
feld wasn't told either by the President or by the National Security
Council of this new restructuring to handle power. And I was just
wondering whether that is accurate or not.
Secretary Rodman. I would like to answer that and to make a
number of points. First of all, you have heard a consensus between
Dr. Hamre and the rest of us here that the situation is making
progress. I mean, Dr. Hamre said it is dramatically better than it
was in June and July, and in his report he said there was signifi-
cant progress then. So, I think there is a cartoonish quality to some
of the commentary in describing the situation as it is.
Second, this has been an interagency effort from the beginning
in this government. CPA is staffed heavily by not only Defense De-
partment, but many other agencies. And I mentioned that we are
eager to expand the participation by other civilian departments, as
well. I think what has happened, the new memorandum that we
have read about — I haven't had a chance to speak with Secretary
Rumsfeld, he is out of town. I think he was reacting, in my assess-
ment, that he is reacting somewhat to how it has been portrayed
in the media. The idea of interagency involvement is essential, but
I have seen the memorandum, and the memorandum talks explic-
itly in support of the Department of Defense and of Ambassador
Bremer. So that is perfectly appropriate. And it is a new arrange-
ment that at a certain level provides some additional coordination;
it may add additional responsiveness in support of what the De-
partment is doing. So this is not a big issue of having interagency
involvement.
378
But, there is a principle of unity of leadership, unity of effort. I
think it makes sense to have coherence in implementation, and the
President made that decision early on and he has not changed that
decision, assigned to the Department of Defense the leadership role
in the sense of making sure there is coherence.
Mr. Meehan. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Thornberry.
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Oliver, I just want to, I guess, express a little of the con-
cern that you have heard already from the Chairman and from Mr.
Taylor. I am a little concerned about how this desire for complete
and open bidding creates a tension with the need to get the money
out fast where it does the most good. And, you know, I am for free
and open bidding, too, but I also want to make sure that the re-
sults on the ground happen quickly. But I also believe that a few
horror stories will damage the whole effort. And I guess a lot of it
rides on your day-to-day operation and distribution of money and
overseeing the contracting process. And I know you understand
that, too. I do think a lot rides on how that comes out.
Dr. Hamre, I want to ask briefly, a major point in your report
and in your testimony is expectations. And I worry about that. You
make the comment that, okay, for the people, Saddam Hussein is
gone. Now, the sky is the limit, and they want it yesterday. You
know, it is challenging for us to manage popular expectations with
all of the media and political system that we have developed over
the last 200 years. How is that going to work, or — and I guess I
am grasping for what tools we have. I mean, having a pollster in
the headquarters, you know, is of limited value. I don't know that
mass psychology is of particular value. But how can we deal with
this expectation? Even if we do good things, if the expectations are
higher, people are going to be disappointed and that has real con-
sequences. How do we deal with this problem?
Dr. Hamre. Well, sir, I think that we — and I don't mean this in
a critical way. But we have probably not done as good a job on pub-
lic communication in Iraq as we should have early on. I think that
would have helped a great deal. And, again, I don't think we need-
ed to compete with al Jazeera. What we should be competing with
is C-SPAN. I mean, I think just putting up a camera and broad-
casting what the Baghdad city council is doing would help create
the perception of reality when, in the absence of good communica-
tion, people imagine an all-powerful America that can do anything.
And they tend to have an impression that we are not giving them
electricity because we don't like them, because that is what Sad-
dam did. When Saddam got mad with the community, he would cut
off the juice just to punish them for a while. Well, now when the
electricity goes out, they think we are mad at them. Well, the re-
ality is, is that some jackass blew up a transformer. And we ought
to say that. We ought to show a picture of it. We ought to tell
them, this is why you don't have electricity today, and here is what
we are doing to get it back.
I think it is really just good basic communication. And I think
that — again, I have been away for three months, so I don't want
379
to say this a problem today. It was, I think, a problem when I was
there, and I think we are making progress on it.
Mr. Thornberry. Well, I tend to believe that it is a problem for
us worldwide to some extent, that our government is not very good
at mass communication or that sort of a battle of ideas. And that
needs to be updated along with a number of other things.
Secretary Rodman, let me ask you to briefly comment on Turkey
and their decision, how you see that fitting in, and what difference
it makes.
Secretary Rodman. Well, we consider this a very positive devel-
opment, yesterday; that not only the Turkish Government, but now
the Turkish Parliament, has made a positive decision about send-
ing forces, contributing forces to stability. You remember on March
1st, the government made such an attempt and it failed. And now
there is obviously a consensus in Turkey to do this. And it is a deli-
cate matter because of the reaction of particularly the Kurdish
Iraqis, but we think that is manageable. I think there was some
misleading reports that the Governing Council had said no to this
Turkish involvement, but that is not quite the case. The Kurds, the
Kurds in Iraq are our friends. We have worked with them for many
years. The Turks, of course, are an ally. So we believe we can man-
age this. A Turkish force would not be in the north of Iraq, we are
smart enough to figure that out. But we managed it during the war
itself. I remember when the war began, there was fear that the
Turks might intervene, that the Kurds would end up fighting the
Turks rather than fighting Saddam, but we managed it. So we
think this is soluble, and, again, we think this is a very significant
development yesterday.
Mr. Thornberry. Okay. Thank you.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Reyes.
Mr. Reyes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, gentlemen, welcome. I have got a couple of different areas
that I would like for you to comment on. The first one I guess is
on the issue of establishment of a judicial system and what kind
of progress, what kind of priority we are placing on it, and the way
it interacts with the continuing standing up of a police force. And
I realize that we have a very large task that we are facing on many
different fronts that we have to address.
Before I ask you to comment on the judicial system and how it
interacts with the police force, I think it is important that I note
that when, Dr. Hamre, you talk about convincing Congress that
there is a plan and that this is an inherently important issue for
us nationally and internationally as we look at our leadership role
in the world, I don't think it is helpful when we have the Deputy
Secretary of Defense come here and tell us that we don't get it. I
think there has got to be less of a confrontational attitude on the
part of DOD toward Congress, and I think it is important that they
try to convince us by reaching out rather than by telling us we
don't get it. And that just happened a week or so ago in a hearing
here.
So if you can each comment on the issue of a judicial system and
how it is going to interact with the establishment of a police force.
380
Secretary Rodman. Let me start off, first of all, just describing
the police. I mentioned before that we are very pleased at the rapid
progress we have made in creating a new police force on a new
basis. The old — one reason we have had to reconstitute this is that
the old Iraqi police had a different view of what the job of being
police was; you know, breaking down doors in the middle of the
night. So we have had to train people. And we — the number I have
is about almost 55,000 Iraqi police now on duty and carrying out
the function in the manner that we would expect.
There is now an independent judiciary. Prestigious judges are ap-
pointed who are trusted and free of Baathist connections. There is
a council of judges that was just set up to supervise the system,
the prosecutorial system, the court system. I don't have other de-
tails except that perhaps Admiral Oliver knows a little bit more,
but I can certainly submit some more facts for the record. But this
is something that we think is going well. The courts are in session.
Trials are being held. We have staffed a judiciary. And this is, I
think, a real success story because it is brand new. But they are
capable people in that country, and we think it is making signifi-
cant progress.
Dr. Hamre. Mr. Reyes, when we were there we spent some time
with Major General Don Campbell, who is the American senior in-
dividual who is the adviser to the judiciary. A very talented man.
He is a former Judge Advocate General (JAG) officer, commander
in Army JAG in years past, an appellate court judge professionally.
And he had gone through the process of interviewing all of the
judges and the prosecutors in Iraq, and he told us that he was
pleasantly surprised it was pretty good. You know, Saddam didn't
trust his judiciary so he didn't really use them. He created a cut-
out rump judiciary and put it inside the Interior Ministry just to
give him guaranteed execution orders. He didn't really use this ju-
diciary. So it turned out about half of them were really pretty good,
and a good starting point. There was a bar association. It had been
fairly inactive. They tried to politicize it; it really wasn't too bad.
They went through the process of selecting a new bar leadership,
and they have gone through an interview. They have weeded out,
they have selected a new — as Dr. Rodman said, new courts that are
up and running.
The thing that General Campbell would say is, his great chal-
lenge is actually getting the penal institutions working, because
you don't want to take prisoners back to the old torture chambers.
I mean, just the image of that is so bad. And so we unfortunately
have had to do that in the near-term; but we do need to be building
new infrastructure for the penal institutions and, as you say, con-
nect them in a more modern western-style way, the police depart-
ment to the judiciary. But there is raw material here that is posi-
tive.
Mr. Reyes. Yes, sir.
Mr. Oliver. No, sir. I just can reiterate just what John and the
Secretary have said. And as you know, the supplemental provides
about $900 million to continue that work to give the security for
the new judges so we can protect them and their families for the
one — not the ones making the civil decisions, but the ones making
the criminal decisions who are at risk, to protect the courthouses
381
so that we can put this all back on the road, and then to hook it
up and get some maximum security prisons so we are not trjdng
to keep murderers in tents.
Secretary Rodman. May I add one point? In addition to that,
there is a special tribunal being set up to handle war crimes issues.
Mr. Reyes. Thank you.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Schrock.
Mr. Schrock. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I thank you all for coming here. I don't know when I have
heard a panel that I agree with more than I have today. And I say
that because I have been privileged to be to Iraq twice. I am going
back again in another couple weeks. The first time I went over
there, it was pretty grim because it was about a week after
Saddam's regime got toppled. And then, the second time I went
back, it was like I was in a different country. And the good news
is that there is a lot of good news. The trouble is, you are just not
getting that on the local news media because good news is no news.
They never report that 9,000 planes landed safely every day; but
let one crash, and that is big news. And it is. And we just have
to make sure that we get as many members over there as possible,
because I heard Mr. Reyes say that Paul Wolfowitz came and said
we don't get it.
He gets it; I get it; we went together the first time. But there
are Members who haven't gone over there. And that is probably
what he was referring to. Once they go over there, they get it.
Here, they can't get it. And I think that is probably one of the rea-
sons that comment was made. And clearly, the next 12 months are
decisive. Maybe by the end of 2004, by 14 months. If you look at
what we did in postwar Germany, some of the things that are al-
ready happening successfully in Iraq took anywhere from 14
months to 3 years to accomplish in Germany. And look what hap-
pened there. People were successful in bringing that country back.
And somebody — one of you and I can't think which one — men-
tioned we can't cut corners. Man, we cannot. Because if we do, we
are going to pay for it in the long-run.
And Dr. Hamre's comment that a willingness to stay the course
is eroding. We have to stay the course. If there is one thing I heard
on my second trip from Iraqis was, they know the words cut and
run. And they kept saying, please don't cut and run. Because, un-
fortunately, I think we have a history in the last few years of doing
just that, and I think they live in fear that we will do that. But
I think, I really believe we are on the course and the administra-
tion is on a course to see this thing through. We have to. There is
just no question about that.
Somebody talked about people being with the villagers 90 days
and then they are gone, 90 days and then they are gone, and that
doesn't build relationships. When I lived in the country of Vietnam
for two years we had civil affairs teams. I don't know if you remem-
ber those. And I don't know how successful they were there, but
it seems to me civil affairs would be a pretty good element to inject
in Iraq right now to try to work with the communities and help
them recover.
382
And the cynicism. Somebody mentioned the cynicism of the
Iraqis and the Americans. Well, it is no wonder if they watch the
news every night. And one thing I was amazed at when we flew
from — we were in a Black Hawk helicopter, which is a great experi-
ence for a Navy guy, quite frankly. When we flew from Baghdad
to Babylon, I swear to you every little mud hut had a satellite dish
on it. I have never, ever seen anything like it, something they were
not allowed to do during the Saddam regime. But they are seeing
what is reported here, and I think they are probably questioning
our resolve based on some — you know, they are probably getting
CNN, which as far as I am concerned is too bad, because I think
that is the only story they are getting. They need to get Fox News
to get fair and balanced things. But that is another story alto-
gether.
And you are right. Somebody mentioned we have a failure to
communicate. This whole thing is a failure to communicate and we
don't do a good enough job of getting our story out there. And, for-
tunately, the 70 members now who have been to Iraq are coming
back and saying, hey, the Iraq I saw up close and personal was not
the one we are reading about in the newspaper.
And I am going to probably embarrass him again, but my col-
league, again, Jim Marshall from Georgia, went over there, and he
came back and he spoke beautifully about what he saw over there.
I don't think anybody in this Congress could have said it any bet-
ter. So it is coming from both sides of the aisle. And the more peo-
ple we get over there, the more we understand and see the troops
and what a wonderful job they are doing, I think that message will
start to get through, and the media will be dragged along kicking
and screaming whether they like it or not.
So I really don't have any questions. I just happen to agree with
you, and I pray to God we stay the course. I don't want this to turn
into another Vietnam. And if we stay the course we are, I think
we will be very successful. Thank you all for being here.
Secretary RODMAN. May I just make a comment? I certainly ap-
preciate all of those comments. And one thing I would mention is
that civil affairs is to this day a very important part of what our
military are doing. And in Iraq, it is — they are the first people who
go in and, you know, help the people fix things. And there have
been an enormous number of projects that have been undertaken
by the civil affairs people. And I think, of course, the trick now is
to civilianize it, to get institutions working. But this is something
that I am very proud of. And we have seen this in both Afghani-
stan and Iraq.
Mr. SCHROCK. My uncle was a famous speaker from Ohio State,
and he used to say, "Don't give them the fish, give them the rod
and the bait." And that is what we need to do over there. And I
think if we do that, I think it will work.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
Dr. Snyder.
Dr. Snyder. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Just to comment about civil affairs. It is my understanding that
most of the civil affairs function in the military now is provided by
the Guard and Reserve forces, that we don't have enough in the ac-
383
tive. And that contributes to part of our need. I think — I talked to
former Secretary of Defense Bill Perry, and he thought we ought
to be looking at probably an additional 10,000 active civil affairs
troops. And I had a conversation with Secretary Rumsfeld about it,
too, and I think that is something that will be ongoing.
Dr. Hamre, you have been a little bit apologetic today about your
information being a bit dated. As you know, you refer in your testi-
mony to having testified before Congress but never testified on the
House side because you weren't invited to testify here. And I think
that was an oversight, and I think it is one of the problems we
have on this committee, in my view; we don't bring enough people
that have views other than just the Pentagon view. And so, I am
pleased to have you here, even though you are late getting here
with your information.
Secretary Rodman, just a quick question. In your written state-
ment, you refer to the fact that in your opinion, quote, "Most of the
country is secure." How do you define that specifically? I mean, if
you could just give a brief answer, because I don't have much time.
But if I am a U.N. expat employee or an American business person
or a Western aid worker, is your definition of "most of the country
is secure" — does that mean that in 70, 80 percent of the country
that I should feel free to be able to walk down the street of those
areas? Is that your definition of secure?
Secretary Rodman. I wouldn't put a percentage on it. But most
of the incidents taking place are in a limited area, what we call the
Baathist Triangle, where a lot of the die-hard resistance is. But the
north of the country, the south of the country are relatively quiet.
That doesn't mean there are not incidents once in a while. But
even the number of incidents overall — I mean, there are just a
dozen or couple of dozen things happening, some of them very
minor.
Dr. Snyder. If I might interrupt you, because I don't have much
time. If I get a call from one of my constituents that says, I am
an Arkansas business person looking to go to Iraq and walk around
and survey for a contract; or, I have been offered a job with the
International Refugee Committee to go to Iraq; or, the United Na-
tions wants me to go and survey that and I look like an Arkansan.
In those areas, is it safe for me to go and walk around on my own?
Secretary Rodman. I would ask questions about the specific
areas. But we heard Dr. Hamre talk about what he has been told,
that life is back to normal in much of the society, and I think that
is the dominant impression that one gets.
Dr. Snyder. Thank you.
Dr. Hamre, you talked about trust. By the way, I thought your
opening statement was a very eloquent one, both your written and
oral one here. We have a problem. You know, I have a different
take on what Secretary Wolfowitz said about people just don't get
it. I don't think it was just those who go over there versus those
who don't go. It is that you did such a good job talking about the
need for staying the course and seeing this through, but you don't
gloss over the problems. And in the view of some of us, we have
had statements, I think, over the last year or so that, in my view,
far too often glossed over the challenges and problems, and at some
point it got to the point where we felt like we were being spun. And
384
I don't think that that is a good way for a member of this commit-
tee to feel.
But two specific questions I wanted to ask you. In your written
statement, you refer to the fact that, to date, there has not been
a satisfactory accounting of how funds are being spent. And I am
not talking now about the difficulties of estimates for the future,
but you are talking about past spending. Mr. Spratt is no longer
here, but I just asked him a moment ago — he is our Ranking Mem-
ber on the budget committee. He has not been able to get the kind
of information he wants with regard to how past reconstruction
funds have been spent in the military, and I think that is a real
problem.
Any comments you want to make on that? Because that goes to
the issue of trust, too. We are asking the American people for $20
billion additionally for reconstruction, and yet elected Representa-
tives can't get the information they want as far as how previous
money was spent.
Also, in your written statement you refer to "bureaucratic strug-
gles," was your phrase, within the administration. I recently heard
from a former Ambassador who was talking about reconstruction
over the last decade, and he said Somalia was a disaster as far as
reconstruction. Haiti was better than Somalia. Our efforts in Bos-
nia were better than Haiti. Our efforts in Kosovo were better than
Bosnia. His point was that over the last decade there has been a
learning that has occurred. The problem is, when the administra-
tion made its decision with regard to Afghanistan and Iraq — I am
sorry, with regard to Iraq — the decision was made not to use those
people who were experienced, but to have the controlling agency be
DOD.
My question is, when we read in the last 24 hours about
Condoleezza Rice seeming to take the lead role in a lot of this, is
there not a danger if we start having reconstruction programs ad-
ministered out of the White House as opposed to being adminis-
tered by those agencies that know what they are doing? And if you
would just amplify in your comment about bureaucratic struggles.
Dr. Hamre. Well, sir, first of all, my understanding is that there
is not going to be administering the reconstruction out of the White
House. That it is a coordinating role. I think that is the right role.
I don't think you want to be running things out of the NSC. I don't
think that Condoleezza Rice wants to run anything out of it. But
there does need to be a strong coordinating function someplace in
the government.
Sir, to the question of bureaucratic struggles and the lack of in-
formation, I think that, unfortunately, the issue of Iraq,
postconflict reconstruction in Iraq, takes place inside the context of
general working relationships in Washington on a whole range of
issues. And, unfortunately, I think in the last couple of years I
have sensed a breakdown on coUegiality in working across — both
across the departmental boundaries inside the executive branch
and, frankly, across the boundaries between the executive branch
and the legislative branch. Now, it is normal. There are institu-
tional politics. I don't minimize that. And it is not inherently a bad
thing, because each side brings the richness of their own under-
385
standing, hopefully, to a process where you get a synthesized better
understanding.
A lot of what we are experiencing in the lack of communication,
I think, on Iraq reconstruction really has been in the context of
general difficulties of communication during the last couple of
years. That, I think, is a challenge. I think that the magnitude of
this problem and the importance of this problem really calls for an
exceptional effort on everybody's part. We have to reach out in a
much stronger way.
And, I think, it is a very good sign that Jerry Bremer sent Dave
Oliver over here to get the money. Dave, he's been in this town
long enough, he knows you are not going to give him the money
unless he tells you what it is he plans to do and you trust him.
I think that is a good thing. That is exactly the basis for reconnect-
ing with you. Because, ultimately, you know, the President can't
communicate the need of this to the American public if you aren't
convinced of it. Ultimately, it has to be — collectively Washington
has to come together to understand the importance of this. And it
just takes reestablishing the normal connective structures of co-
ordination in Washington that have gotten a bit fragile in the last
couple of years.
Secretary Rodman. May I respond, sir? I have been privileged to
serve in five administrations, and I have seen the bureaucratic
interaction over many years. And there is nothing unusual going
on right now. This is what government is like. It is a participatory
process. I don't see anything particularly unusual, and I think
there is much more collegiality than one reads about in the news-
papers.
Second, just to elaborate on what I mentioned before about Dr.
Rice's memorandum in the newspaper. The memorandum makes
clear that this is in support of the Department of Defense and the
CPA. So it makes no change in the unity of command, the struc-
ture under which this business is conducted in Iraq. What it does
do is add another form of interagency coordination, which is fine,
because there already is extensive interagency coordination at
many other levels. So this is perfectly fine.
And, actually, the third point, you mentioned that the people
with the expertise aren't there. And I would dispute that, as well.
The people with the expertise are out there, because it is an inter-
agency enterprise in Baghdad, the State Department, other Cabi-
net departments.
Dr. Snyder. What I meant to say is not that they weren't there,
but they are not in charge. A lot of people felt that the State De-
partment should be in charge of the reconstruction aspects of this,
not the Department of Defense.
Secretary Rodman. The head of the CPA is Ambassador Bremer.
His main colleagues are Ambassador Kennedy, Ambassador
McManaway, Ambassador Hume Horan was out there. Ambassador
Robin Rafael. There is a large State Department contingent. There
are contingents from other departments. The advisors to the dif-
ferent Iraqi ministries are drawn from other Cabinet departments
in this government as well as outsiders. It is an interagency effort
out there. What there is, given the fact that a war has just taken
place there, is a premium on unity of leadership and unity of effort.
386
and the President decided that the Department of Defense, in the
present phase of this activity, is the appropriate hne or appropriate
chain to manage this.
Dr. Snyder. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Franks.
Mr. Franks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Rodman, Dr. Hamre, Mr. Ohver, you know, I under-
stand that Secretary Powell set out what could possibly be a time-
table for putting together a constitutional election perhaps even
within six months, and I understand that that has become more
flexible. But as I am told that the U.N. will be assisting the Na-
tional Security Council in drafting a new constitution — and I think
that is a profoundly important consideration, because, you know,
we can take a page out of history here where we had to deal with
a world war situation with Japan that has had a constitution that
didn't really require religious liberty. And the same type of mis-
guided religious zealotry that caused young men to fly airplanes
into ships have now — you know, I think there are parallels that
cause young men to fly airplanes into buildings.
And sometimes we have to consider the obvious, and that is the
reason that we are in Iraq, ultimately — because of the threat of ter-
rorism. And so that we don't doom ourselves to deal with this again
in another generation, it seems critically important to me that we
have whatever necessary influences in place to make sure that the
new Iraqi constitution has a religious liberty clause in it.
And I guess I am a little concerned that with the U.N. influences
there that we may become victims of our own decency or, even
worse, victims of a U.N. political correctness that would say, well,
we just want the Iraqis to write the constitution. And while that
may sound good on the surface of it, that is what we said in Japan,
and they came back with constitutions that we couldn't abide, and
ultimately we were in the position of, having already imposed a
war, to have to impose a constitution. And now history has deemed
that very, very successful and very important.
And I am just wondering, what assurances do we have that we
can have a constitution that can redirect some of the religious zeal-
otry to the debate over religious issues within their own country,
where everyone has an individual liberty related to their religious
persuasion?
Secretary Rodman. Well, I am happy to start with that one. As
you said, the Iraqis are going to have the ultimate responsibility
for designing their own government. But the Iraqis who will do
this, we have confidence in. The governing council, which is the
body that exists at the moment, is inclusive; it is moderate, it in-
cludes all of the decent people and groups and regions that ought
to be represented in any future Iraq. So we expect that, however
they organize the process of constitution drafting, that they are
smart enough to do a decent job. I mean. Dr. Chalabi, who spoke
at the U.N. General Assembly the other day, outlined some of the
principles that he thought should govern a new constitution. He
talked about federalism, he talked about independent judiciary,
and checks and balances and so forth.
387
And I would add that, in Afghanistan, where there is a similar
process, much further advanced, I mean, we have the impression
that this is proceeding in a very sensible way and the people who
are governing Afghanistan are decent people and they will do it
right and they will come out with something that is what we would
expect of a decent and moderate modern country.
So, I mean, you are right, that I guess the international commu-
nity has a right to ask whether Iraq and Afghanistan, which in the
past have been a source of trouble to their neighbors, you know,
we would like to see the new countries being a model to others and
a source of stability in their regions. But I think we are reasonably
confident that that will come out.
Mr. Franks. Well, just to follow up. Dr. Hamre, it is my under-
standing that — at least in the case of Afghanistan, the very reli-
gious liberty clause that we are putting forth here looks like it may
not occur. It looks like that in the Afghan constitution that there
may be explicit statements that this will remain an — it is hard to
articulate it, but a Muslim nation. And certainly that is going to
be true in terms of the individuals that are there. But that may
give some of the zealots within the country the leverage that they
have so effectively used with the Taliban and others to maintain
this being able to gain an unfair — if that is a good word — hold on
the mechanisms of government that would allow them to contin-
ually use the mechanisms of government to foster the terrorist
mentality.
And I think sometimes this is hard for us to debate in a political
environment, but we have to recognize that if we are going to de-
feat terrorism, we have to do it more than just on a military basis;
that we have to deal with the core rationale that spawned it in the
first place. And there are certain mechanisms that were in place
that allowed it to begin to thrive. And I hope that we consider that
carefully and that we make sure that there are mechanisms there
to guarantee religious liberty. And for that matter, I don't even
know who is on our side that is in charge of drafting or helping
to draft that part, making sure that those elements are in place.
Secretary Rodman. Well, we are aware of the process as it is
going on. And the issue you raise is one of the issues that we are
interested in. And I don't want to go into details because this is,
again, something that they — you know, we don't write their con-
stitution for them, but I think we have reason to think that it will
come out in a humane and decent way that — because the Afghans
themselves have even more of an incentive than we do to make
sure that their society is not a breeding ground for terrorism ever
again.
But you are right to raise the issue, and I can just say that we
are watching it in the Afghan case. We will watch it in the Iraqi
case. But I think there will be decent people making those deci-
sions in Iraq, and — but we will keep an eye on it.
Mr. Franks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just hope we will keep
an eye on our historical lessons from Japan. We let them — they
were decent people. They had a reason to write religious liberty
into theirs, but they had three chances and they didn't, and finally
we had to make sure that that was there and history has ap-
plauded that.
388
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
And I know we promised Dr. Hamre that you would be able to
escape here, Dr. Hamre, at the stroke of noon.
Secretary Rodman. I would normally never do this, but I agreed
to participate in a celebration for a Defense Department agency
that I helped to establish, and I promised I would be there. So I
apologize that I have to leave.
The Chairman. Not at all. We really appreciate your time. Would
it be an imposition to allow Mr. Larsen of Washington to take the
last shot at you?
Mr. Rodriguez. Of course.
The Chairman. Mr. Larsen, you are recognized. And as soon as
you are finished, Dr. Hamre, go ahead and please take leave.
The gentleman is recognized.
Mr. Larsen of Washington. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Just a quick note about what I hear in my district. The people
in my district are tending to equate the size of this request, $87
billion request, with the size of some of the miscalculations the ad-
ministration made about postwar Iraq. It is a sentiment that I tend
to agree with. But also, I think that, you know, the successes the
administration is trying to portray don't give the full picture. But
I also believe that the failures that are occurring over there aren't
a complete picture, as well. It is really somewhere in the middle.
And I agree with your sentiment that there is progress being
made, but there is a long way to go. And this is based on 20 hours
on the ground in Iraq, which was about 10 days ago. I wasn't there
certainly as long as you were. But you know, progress is being
made, but there is a long way to go. And I just want to emphasize
that I think that that is the better message, a more honest por-
trayal. Every portrayal is honest, but just a better, rounder picture
of what is taking place. And I think the American people — at least
folks in my district — would appreciate that, that kind of portrayal.
I want to ask one question of you and then other questions for
the Secretary and Mr. Oliver. It has to do with Iraqi ownership,
the Iraqi ownership portion of your discussion. When we were in
Kirkuk, we met with the local governing council and one of the
main concerns — obviously, there is the Kurdish issue in Kirkuk —
but separate from the federalism debate that they want to engage
in. To a person, regardless of which faction they came from, they
talk about this disconnect between the Iraqi Governing Council and
Baghdad and them, the local Governing Council in Kirkuk. And
they didn't see a road, if you will, a path at which some point these
two groups would be connecting, they will be talking.
And I don't know if that is the same sentiment being expressed
in other parts of the country, that this Iraqi Governing Council sort
of operates separately or we haven't done the job at the CPA to
start those connections being made. But did you see that when you
were there? What are you hearing now? And is that a potential
source of conflict or something that is going to be — that we can eas-
ily take care of?
Dr. Hamre. Sir, first, I was in Iraq before the Governing Council
was announced. It was clearly very far in development, but we
were still in the final stages of recruiting people, so we hadn't an-
nounced who was on it. It turned out we had met with a number
389
of individuals who ended up being appointed to the Governing
Council. So my comments really are a bit dated in that sense.
Obviously, there is going to be a natural disconnect, because we
are creating something that hasn't been organic in Iraqi society for
quite a while, which is a government where at varying levels peo-
ple feel connected. This previously was a top-down centrally di-
rected government. And what we are really creating is democracy
at multiple levels. And to do that we need to really start thinking
about how we develop the connective tissue between those levels.
This is one of the reasons why we felt it was very important that
the CPA get CPA regional offices, that it become the backbone of
connectiveness over time. At some point we will want to get the
governance to have representatives in Baghdad, maybe as unoffi-
cial observers, for example, to the Governing Council. I don't know,
I haven't thought this through. But, some way we need to start get-
ting a sense of connectedness at those levels, as well.
Dr. Hamre. Right now the connectedness is too much through
tribal affiliations and religious affiliations and that sort of thing,
and we really need to be thinking about that as we are going
ahead.
I think they are, but this is a case as we are evolving the concept
of sovereignty, as we are helping the Iraqis to evolve their concept
of sovereignty, I think it is crucial that we build on the base of rep-
resentative government at the local level. I think we have done a
very good job of establishing governing councils at the local level.
We now need to find a way to connect them to their headquarters
by giving them money so that they can do real things on the
ground and then giving a sense of representation from the local
level to the Federal level.
Mr. Larsen of Washington. I think from building-a-democracy
perspective, this is probably our best challenge. It is easy to point
to a power plant being fixed, it is easy to point to few crimes being
committed. It is tougher to point to democracy being developed, and
so I think it is the biggest challenge.
Appreciate that, and I will let you go.
Dr. Hamre. If I can help in any way, please.
Mr. Larsen of Washington. I would like to follow up on some
thoughts. I appreciate that.
Mr. Oliver, you said you had a balanced budget for 04, and
they're doing it on a calendar year; is that right?
Mr. Oliver. Yes, sir.
Mr. Larsen of Washington. How big is the budget for 04?
Mr. Oliver. About $13.8 billion, sir.
Mr. Larsen of Washington. And what were the three major
sources of revenue?
Mr. Oliver. Oil, which is $12 billion; oil-for-food, unencumbered
money that's for the old oil-for-food program, which is about $1.3
billion; and $700 to $900 million in taxes.
Mr. Larsen of Washington. And this is strictly for the operat-
ing budget? This isn't any reconstruction?
Mr. Oliver. It actually has about $1.3 billion in reconstruction
in it, but mostly it is for the operating budget and salaries, et
cetera.
Mr. Larsen of Washington. And you said $12 billion for oil.
390
Mr. Oliver. Yes, sir.
Mr. Larsen of Washington. And '05 and '06 we are anticipat-
ing.
Mr. Oliver. Nineteen billion dollars in oil in '05, and $20 billion
in '06.
Mr. Larsen of Washington. If I could, Mr. Chairman, just ex-
plore that a little bit — the assumptions before the war about oil
and our ability or Iraq's ability to reconstruct the country, in my
view — sa3dng it kindly — wildly off, the ability to produce the
amount of oil needed to help with reconstruction.
My understanding from Ambassador Bremer's testimony a couple
weeks ago was that, if we are at $19 or $20 billion a year, '05 and
'06 and beyond, we are looking at about $5 billion of that being ac-
tually available for reconstruction, the remainder for the operation
of the government; is that correct?
Mr. Oliver. That's correct, sir.
Mr. Larsen of Washington. I guess I'm leading more toward a
statement than much of anything. And this is loan versus grant
concept and using oil revenues to pay back a loan. I understand
where the administration is coming from. I tend to agree generally
with the administration on that. It is really tough to, with that
small amount of money, to encumber that money when there is so
much need on the reconstruction side on Iraq alone, and I know
there is this debate going on about that. But I think if we look at
the math of oil production out of Iraq, the assumptions made about
it are not going to be — before the war — are not going to pan out;
and, in fact, the Iraqis probably have to use that oil revenue for
reconstruction purposes for the more immediate needs than not. Is
that an accurate reflection?
Mr. Oliver. Yes, sir. Congressman. I mean, I didn't look at the —
what they did before the war. I've been so involved in what's been
going on in time.
Mr. Larsen of Washington. Sure.
Mr. Oliver. So what I've been doing is monitoring — first of all,
we captured the data which was secret for the last 25 years in
their oil production in the fields, and, if you look at that and you
draw a parametric curve and you talk to the people, you come out
with the estimates that I have come out with. Those we have
checked through the World Bank and International Monetary Fund
(IMF), who agree with them, and those are the projections we are
using; because, given that it is a one economy country at the mo-
ment, until we can set up — that is the reason we needed the
supplementals, to grow this other private sector. Until then, they
are absolutely dependent on these estimates being right.
Mr. Larsen of Washington. Right.
Mr. Oliver. And so, the Iraqis agree with them, we agree with
them.
Mr. Larsen of Washington. And the World Bank and the IMF.
Mr. Oliver. And the World Bank and the IMF agree with it, and
they are on the Internet. I put them there so that you could see
for every month what I thought we were going to sell and what I
was estimating for the price, so you could see all that, so I think
that is pretty open.
391
I would like to say the loan issue is terribly important. Not only
are there all sorts of bad reasons that you were talking about; for
example, with respect to the fact that the country already has a
whole bunch of loans. The more important reason, in my perspec-
tive, is that I believe that the President has charged Ambassador
Bremer with the responsibility to get the — to accomplish a mission
in Iraq and to get the troops home as soon as possible.
Therefore, I think you have to give them the tools to do that. If
you do a loan and let's say you can find somebody legally in the
Iraqi Government to sign it, et cetera, then they are going to have
some choice. And their choices may not be the same as Ambassador
Bremer's, because their goals may not be the same as Ambassador
Bremer's.
I think you have to give him the right — give him the tools — the
primary tool we have to give him is money.
Mr. Larsen of Washington. Mr. Chairman, thank you very
much.
As a quick concluding remark, I appreciate you outlining the
thoughts on the loan but also on oil revenue and the assumptions
going into that. I think it is very important that those assumptions
continue to be vetted as we move forward, and I appreciate that
you have them through some organizations. It is going to be a criti-
cal part of moving forward there.
Mr. Oliver. Thanks.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Wilson.
Mr. Wilson of South Carolina. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and
I indeed share the sentiment of Congressman Schrock in the visit
that I had to Iraq. It was very eye-opening and it was a wonderful
experience to see the progress being made. And in particular, I was
very grateful that our chairman, Duncan Hunter, is offering to ev-
eryone the opportunity to go and visit the country and learn first-
hand. And I had the personal opportunity, being asked by Con-
gressman Ike Skelton, the Ranking Member, to go on his delega-
tion, and it was very eye-opening, very encouraging.
The information that really was very reassuring to me in particu-
lar, when we were in Mosul, and met with General David Petraeus
of the 101st Airborne, he gave an excellent presentation on the civil
action projects and how meaningful they were. And it just grieves
me that the American people do not see the small but very success-
ful and very meaningful civil action projects. And in particular, I
identified, because as a retired Army JAG officer of 31 years, I
found out that the JAG officer has a very prominent role in signing
off on the projects. And it is reassuring to see the efforts to help
the people, but also to avoid fraud, waste, and abuse, to protect the
resources of the taxpayers of the United States.
And I also had the opportunity to see the reopening of the Kisik
oil refinery. That was very encouraging, where 300 jobs were cre-
ated by reopening a refinery that had been closed for 4 years, and
we were there with the newly elected, democratically elected Gov-
ernor of Ninova Province. Things were coming together that I just
didn't realize were being done, but I am very grateful.
One thing I was concerned about, though, and I was happy to see
that right after we came back, that the laws are being changed in
392
Iraq in terms of foreign investment. And, of course, you identified
it as a Soviet-style economy, a Baath socialist economy, which pre-
cluded foreign investment. But then leave out the oil industry, and
that concerns me. I would hope that somehow this could be looked
at, the experience of Russia, where billions of dollars have been in-
vested in Sakhalin island by Exxon-Mobil.
Even in China, the exploration rights to Western oil companies,
and I know that Luk-oil of Russia itself would like to invest in
Iraq.
What are the prospects of trying to open up the oil industry to
private investment?
Mr. Oliver. Sir, the Governing Council made that decision, and
they essentially said we think — we think that it is the best thing —
we need capital, and we are not sure that — some of the people may
not have excess capital inside the country are the people that we
would like to invest. And so we need external capital; and so they
did, as you suggest, propose the most open and forward-leaning in-
vestment environment that we have seen in some time.
At the same time, they said, well, we are not in control of the
oil, and I believe Ambassador Bremer left it up to them because it
is their country and their oil field and it is just like if they ask us.
They said, how much money will it take to increase the oil outflow,
and we had done — we had looked at it because we wanted to get
a feel for it. And what Ambassador Bremer said to them was, you
ought to get your own experts and make your own decisions. That
is your oil. That is your future, and you need to make those deci-
sions.
Mr. Wilson of South Carolina. And I indeed understand it
should be their decisions. But I would hope that, looking at the ex-
ample around the world of the benefits of foreign investment in
their local economy, they would modernize; companies would have
a great interest, obviously, in providing security that would open
that up. But how sad it would be to have the second largest oil re-
serves in the world underground and you sit on them in a level of
poverty.
Mr. Oliver. I think they intend to do it, but as you know, it
takes several years.
Mr. Wilson of South Carolina. And I know the mentality
needs to be dispelled, too. And we cannot tell them, but I hope that
a lot of cheerleaders, as you are doing, will make that point.
Mr. Oliver. Yes, sir. Congressman.
Mr. Wilson of South Carolina. Thank you for what you have
done.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank the gentleman.
Mr. Cooper.
Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Oliver, it is my impression that you are the primary archi-
tect of the $20 billion that Congress is being asked to pass in the
supplemental appropriations bill in aid to Iraq; is that correct?
Mr. Oliver. Well, Ambassador Bremer set up the policy and I
put it together with the assistance of the Iraqis and members of
the team, yes, sir.
I
393
Mr. Cooper. Your official status today? You are a private con-
tractor for DOD?
Mr. Oliver. My official status as OSD made me a member of the
Senior Executive Service.
Mr. Cooper. What is your compensation, annual compensation
in your current rank?
Mr. Oliver. An SES-4, Senior Executive Service 4, sir.
Mr. Cooper. Could you translate that into dollar terms for me?
Mr. Oliver. I think it is 142,000 a year.
Mr. Cooper. What is your prior experience in nation-building?
Mr. Oliver. I have no prior experience in nation-building, sir.
Mr. Cooper. What is your prior experience in having lived in a
Muslim country?
Mr. Oliver. I have none, sir.
Mr. Cooper. What qualified you — I noted in your earlier com-
ments you were in favor of open and competitive biddings for con-
tracts— what qualified you to take on this major responsibility,
which amounts to almost doubling the annual U.S. foreign aid
budget?
Mr. Oliver. Yes, sir. As you know, I am the Director of Manage-
ment and Budget in Iraq, and I was the Navy — in charge of the
Navy — was admiral in charge of the Navy programming which pre-
pares the $90 billion Navy budget for four years. And then after
that, you know, I have written two books on management which
have been published on amazon.com; if you care to buy them, that
will raise my level. And I served in the last administration as the
number five person of the Defense Department in charge of Acqui-
sition, Development and Technology, so
Mr. Cooper. But those were all military duties, as opposed to
nation-building duties.
Mr. Oliver. No, those were civilian jobs, sir. In the last one, I
was a civilian.
What I am saying is management, I am in charge of manage-
ment and budget in Iraq, and I am saying I am qualified in those
areas, because putting the budgets together and understanding
management are the same.
Now, with respect to nation-building, with respect to the econom-
ics, et cetera, for example, which were run by Peter McPherson,
who is the president of Michigan State, the previous Director of the
U.S. Agency for International Development (U.S.AID), and is in
charge of all these economics things; and it turns out we happen
to be grand friends and work together in the same office, and so
I know exactly what happened with the investment issues.
Mr. Cooper. Is our nation building on the experience that we
should have gained in the last ten years, because it is my under-
standing we have been involved in nation building in some five
Muslim countries. It seems like we have a little bit of a policy dis-
connect here, when at least Ambassador Dobbins has written a
book for the Rand Institute basically demonstrating how we are not
building on our prior experience. And granted, we made multiple
mistakes in the past, but it seems we are almost relying on begin-
ner's luck as a policy here due to your lack of experience in nation
building and in dealing with Muslim countries.
394
I will grant you, you probably got great management experience
in general, but there are a lot of U.S. businessmen who have great
management experience. That would not make them necessarily
qualified to be lead nation builders in Iraq at this crucial time.
Mr. Oliver. Yes. And what I said was, because I am doing the
budgets and I have done bigger budgets than probably anybody
else, I think it is a great fit to use my skills in that area, sir.
Mr. Cooper. So you are qualified in advising this committee and
others that we should spend $50,000 per bed to build a new prison
in Iraq? We need to spend 900 million, what, to import oil products
into that oil-rich country? That is within your expertise?
Mr. Oliver. Yes, sir. As you — you may not know, but the price
of the bed is one — it is less than a quarter of what it is in Califor-
nia for maximum security prison. It is less than half of what it
takes to build the average bed in the United — or the average cell
in the United States for max security prison. And the way we are
getting that is because we have cheap labor in Iraq, because it is
less expensive.
At the same time, we have got conditions that make it difficult
with respect to — since the electricity, we have not yet — we are at
about 3,900 megawatts of power, right now. We need 6,000 in order
to run the economy and provide 24-hour service. So, of the seven
electrical plants or the seven concrete plants which use a great
deal of electricity, only six of them are operating. The price of ce-
ment is high. We are also having to import the rebars, et cetera.
And so we looked at the estimates and said, labor is going to be
low, the price is going to be high, we think we can do this for about
a third of the price in the United States. So, yes, I think those are
good estimates.
Mr. Cooper. Who were you working with from the State Depart-
ment and other agencies who had direct nation-building experience
in Kosovo or Afghanistan or one of the other Muslim countries that
we have been helping to rebuild in the last decade?
Mr. Oliver. Yes, sir. I think you should address that to Sec-
retary Rodman, sir; because I mean, as he said, the key people are
Paul Bremer, Clay McManaway, Pat Kennedy, Scott Carpenter,
Sarah Johnson. All those are Ambassadors from the State Depart-
ment in charge of — I mean, the top three are the only people in the
front office.
Scott Carpenter is in charge of the governor's committee; Susan
Johnson is in charge of foreign affairs. I mean, there is a signifi-
cant State Department drive in that whole — people driving that
whole thing.
Mr. Cooper. So you feel you have learned the lessons that we
should have learned from Kosovo and Afghanistan and other coun-
tries? Ambassador Dobbins was here this morning basically saying
we have not as a nation. We are trying to reinvent the wheel. We
are doing it all over again.
Mr. Oliver. Yes, sir. I am only talking about my area, sir, which
is the area of management and budget.
Mr. Cooper. I see that my time has expired, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
395
Incidentally, my friend, Mr. Cooper, has used the term, "nation
building." as I understand that, that encompasses government
building. That is, the development of the government.
You're not involved in that, are you?
Mr. Oliver. No, sir.
The Chairman. Okay. I think that as I just said to my friend
from Tennessee, I think that is the point that Mr. Oliver was mak-
ing, is that he is involved in procurement and money but not in de-
veloping the governments, either local or national.
Are you involved in any of that?
Mr. Oliver. I am also serving as the senior adviser to the Fi-
nance Minister, but that is because they do not have an office of
management and budget, so we are helping them set up some com-
puter systems so he can manage his budget better, sir, but not in
the context. That is really run by the Governance Committee out
of — Scott Carpenter.
Mr. Cooper. Mr. Chairman?
The Chairman. Certainly.
Mr. Cooper. Didn't we hear earlier in the hearing a statement
about handing out $5 million sums to particular military command-
ers so that they could ease the process of establishing local control,
local security, and local governments? It is my impression that
these are fundamental decisions and one of the reasons we are
being asked to support the $20 billion request, and I am inclined
to go along with that. I just want to know that we have the best-
qualified people in this country making these recommendations.
The Chairman. Well, let me just make a point on that, Mr. Coo-
per. You have got military leaders in these various communities,
like General Odierno in Kirkuk, who is commander of the 4th In-
fantry Division, who has been involved as a — as a government
builder, if you will, in that community. They took 300 leaders from
that community and had them through the democratic process,
some of which I think was televised here. I think we saw pieces
of it here, elect council members, city council members, and depu-
ties and a mayor.
My point is that these local leaders have problems in their city.
They have water lines that are breaking, they have electrical lines
that need to be put up. They have lots of local problems that need
to be fixed, and that one way that we can empower these new lead-
ers in the communities in Iraq is to help them with their projects.
Now, that would involve necessarily hundreds and hundreds of
small projects, whether it is fixing a 4-inch pipeline that is broken
in the east suburb, or rebooking up an electrical line that was dam-
aged by a bomb blast, and, so, giving to our military leaders — and
the British, incidentally, have this. They have a fairly effective way
of dispersing through their battalion commanders and above,
money to get local projects done. That, I think, is a necessity.
If we are going to put people in a position of power to give to
them the ability to get their potholes fixed — and, incidentally,
along that line, there is a fund that has been requested, as I under-
stand, in the emergency supplemental, or in this supplemental,
which is a commander's emergency fund, and I believe it is $180
million; is that right, Mr. Oliver?
396
Mr. Oliver. Yes, sir. It is in the OSD portion. That is right; yes,
sir.
The Chairman. Well, I do not think you can expect — if we expect
there to be an order from Baghdad every time we have a four inch
waterline break in a city, we are going to be in real trouble in
terms of getting things done.
Mr. Cooper. Mr. Chairman, I agree with you on the waterline
break, but will there be accountability for the other expenditures,
or is this going to be a local slush fund?
The Chairman. Here is what I would say, Mr. Cooper. You have
got a military officer — officers — who are through their entire ca-
reers held to a strong standard of accountability. They have to re-
port precisely on what has been expended. They have to use their
judgment. But on the other hand, somebody has got to do it, and
I think rather than look on them as a weak link where you are not
going to have accountability and money is going to go out, I think
you should look at them as an asset. You have hundreds of military
leaders who have been trained all their lives in terms of integrity
and leadership and judgment and accountability, and they write re-
ports on where this money goes, and so they are — their mission is
to respond to these communities which are lacking in potable
water.
When we were at Kirkuk, for example, General Odierno was
treating the water supply so that the children wouldn't have an
outbreak of cholera during the summer months.
Now, if he has to go submit a report that is going to be acted
on in 120 days in Baghdad to get chlorine into the water to save
these kids, it is not going to work. As it was, he was able to re-
spond, to react quickly, and they were treating that water while we
were there. So I think you do have to give some — give some author-
ity, along with the accountability that these folks have. And I
would say a military officer who has the lives of thousands of our
young people in his hands is certainly going to be — certainly meets
a level of responsibility for hooking up water and electrical sup-
plies.
Mr. Cooper. Mr. Chairman, as you well know, one of the things
that we hope will be in this emergency supplemental is proper body
armor for the 40,000 of our troops that currently lack it.
The Chairman. And that is designated in there.
Mr. Cooper. I just wish that some of our commanders had access
to these funds, had used the funds to buy proper bulletproof vests
for our troops.
The Chairman. Yes.
Mr. Cooper. Jammers, things like that, that our troops are ap-
parently lacking today.
The Chairman. I do say to my colleague that those items are in
this area.
Incidentally, our committee, our input in this bill pursuant to our
hearings and the concern on both sides of the aisle, have in fact
inserted a good sum for body armor and for some of the other
things that need to be talked about on a classified basis.
Secretary Rodman. Mr. Chairman?
The Chairman. Yes, sir.
Secretary Rodman. May I make a comment?
397
The Chairman. Yes, sir.
Secretary Rodman. I want to first of all come to the defense of
Admiral Oliver, who is one of the most exceptional public servants
who I have had the privilege to know. He has been invited to Bagh-
dad to do this job because he has exceptional expertise in an area
where expertise is sorely needed; first of all, by CPA to organize
its activities and to be able to prepare budgets and to come before
Congress to defend the budget; and second, to prepare Iraqis for
technical functions which they need to prepare themselves better
to carry out if we are ever to be able to turn responsibility over to
the Iraqis.
Now, there are — I am sure there are many people in CPA who
have Middle East expertise, who have expertise on other subjects.
Now, as for Kosovo experience, I do not know the resumes of all
of the civilians in Baghdad, but I know that the three division com-
manders that we have there have experience in Kosovo, and their
testimony is that we are far ahead in Iraq, far ahead of where we
were in Kosovo at a comparable time. So, I think, again, I think
certainly Admiral Oliver is owed our thanks for the job he is doing,
and I also think the way CPA is handling its business is good.
The Chairman. Well, I would simply say I think that I know Ad-
miral Oliver well; I have known him over the years, and know of
his reputation for being a practical, pragmatic guy who looks at de-
tails and analyzes things and has pretty good judgment. In the
end, what we have to have is people with good judgment.
And, similarly, I appreciate the judgment of Dr. Hamre, Mr. Sec-
retary, and yourself, and I think — go back to this point Mr. Cooper
and I were talking about. I think these military leaders that we
have in these positions, that we are paying so much money to
maintain with this military presence, are a real asset.
You know, when I went through all the things that General
Odierno had done in that visit we made to Kirkuk, he just met
with the clerks, asked them what they needed to try to accommo-
date a number of their concerns. He stood up this government, and
he had just met a Baathist element of some 75 fighters and de-
feated them, and he had a bunch of his people out purifying the
water supply so that kids wouldn't get cholera. He was juggling a
lot of balls and doing an excellent job. And in my mind's eye, I kind
of compared that to some guy driving up from the United Nations,
pardon me, saying where do I park my Mercedes? And these guys
that we raise up come from all corners of our country and go
through our system, do have good leadership and do have good
judgment; and in the end, you have got to give the ball to them
and let them carry it. And I guess my point is they have got to be
able to do this on the local level, because if everything has got to
be cleared through Baghdad, you are going to see as much frustra-
tion as you see in Congress when we are waiting for Washington
to clear something that we think our local community or state
should be able to do.
Mr. Cooper. Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Mr. Cooper wants to comment.
Yes, sir.
Mr. Cooper. Very quick points.
398
From what I am reading in the press, General Petraeus has had
to accomphsh his goals in spite of the CPA. He has had to rely on
his own means and his own military training to get the job done
in Iraq, despite the job done in CPA.
Second, the Washington Times reported a few days ago that we
are relying on mercenary American military contractors. One com-
pany is named, by the way, Custer's Battles, to supply private sec-
tor troops. So I like the military as much as you do, Mr. Chairman,
but I am worried that our military is being frustrated by this bu-
reaucracy.
One unnamed military spokesman was quoted in the Washington
Times as saying they are basically being forced to hire these U. S.
private contractors instead of relying on our own U.S. military per-
sonnel. So I am worried there is a different story in Iraq that we
are not getting, to be honest with you, from our top Pentagon offi-
cials.
Mr. Chairman, I do not think we have heard from any witness
in this committee who hasn't been a top Pentagon official or close
buddies with a top Pentagon official. I would like to hear from real
troops overseas, colonels and sergeants and privates who have
boots on the ground, who know what day-to-day living conditions
are like. We are only hearing from the top folks. Let's hear from
the real people who are over there.
The Chairman. Mr. Cooper, you have probably got four or five
Congressional delegations (CODED that are going to be launching
out of here in the next several weeks, and I look forward to hearing
your report when you travel out there. But, you know, I agree with
you in this sense, that there was — what I have gotten back from
a number of officers who were in Iraq is that early on they had
more flexibility than they have today; that they like the British
model. But I think we're talking about the same thing. We are
talking about giving discretion and empowerment to folks with
good judgment who are on the ground, who are in these local com-
munities with a modicum of bureaucracy. And I think that is al-
ways a problem that we have, is that as we start to develop this
government and this bureaucracy in Iraq, we have got to make
sure that we do not end up delaying important projects on the local
level.
That is the problem we always have up here, and when you have
put somebody in a position of authority, as we have, in putting to-
gether these — raising these governments from the ground up, these
local governments, you have to give them the ability to deliver the
necessities of infrastructure to their constituents, and we have to —
so, anyway, we are going to pursue that. I think to some degree
we are on the same line here.
I would just say this about Mr. Oliver, is that he is — in my expe-
rience, he is a practical guy who likes to go the shortest distance
between lines, between points A and B, and get things done quickly
in a pragmatic manner, and I have got confidence in him. I think
we have got a great folks like that in our government and I think
we have taken a lot of time here.
I think Mr. Gingrey probably has a question here. Gentleman
from Georgia.
Dr. Gingrey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
399
Before I get to the question, I do have a question, but I would
Uke to make a comment. And actually, Mr. Chairman, you and Sec-
retary Rodman have already addressed it to some extent, and with
all due respect to my colleague from Tennessee, it seemed to me
that his line of questioning of Admiral Oliver was designed to im-
pugn your credibility, and indeed maybe even your integrity, and
I feel very reassured by the resume which you outlined to us today,
and I feel that the $20 billion we are entrusting to you, to your ex-
pertise, will be spent in an appropriate and fiscally responsible
manner. I just want to make that statement. I feel very, very com-
fortable with you at the switch in regard to that.
The Chairman. Let me just say to my friend, Mr. Cooper asks —
he is a pretty tough cross-examiner, but he was asking for the wit-
ness to give us his credentials, and he asked the question in the
best way — best direct way he knows how, and I think the witness
answered it in a good direct way. But I think we got to all stipulate
we are trying to get to the same bottom line here and that is to
make sure this money is spent right.
Dr. GiNGREY. Mr. Chairman, I do not question anybody's right at
all, anybody's right to ask questions, tougher questions. I think
that is appropriate. And I just want to say I feel that Admiral Oli-
ver and Secretary Rodman and Dr. Hamre — I wish he were still
here — but we appreciate your being here and we appreciate your
expertise and I just want to make that comment, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Cooper. Dr. Gingrey, since you referred to me personally,
may I make one quick comment?
The Chairman. Absolutely, Mr. Cooper.
Mr. Cooper. You, as a physician, know the value of training and
experience. I believe you are an OB/GYN, right?
Dr. Gingrey. That is correct.
Mr. Cooper. You would not want even a physician who was not
trained as an OB/GYN to make a tough delivery of a baby.
And our witness, with all his vast credentials and reputation and
everything like that, admitted to us he has never been involved in
nation building before or lived in a Muslim country. I was just sug-
gesting those might be two helpful types of experience that would
have made him an even better administrator than I am sure he is
today.
Dr. Gingrey. And I thank Mr. Cooper.
And let me go ahead and address my question, and this can ei-
ther be to Admiral Oliver or to Secretary Rodman. My colleague
from Arizona, Mr. Franks, earlier was talking about the constitu-
tion, and I thought he would get to the aspect of when that con-
stitution would be up and running and the Iraqi people could lit-
erally have an election. And the reason I ask that question, and the
reason hopefully you can give us a little bit of a guideline there,
is because this question keeps coming up about at least the 20 bil-
lion out of the 87 that is going to rebuild and restore our infra-
structure in Baghdad and Iraq: Should it be a grant or should it
be a loan? And there are strong arguments on both sides.
I have discussed this with my staff, and certainly I can see both
sides of that issue. I think, obviously, the President, the Secretary
of Defense, the administration, has looked at this very carefully
400
and feels very strongly that this should be, indeed, should be a
grant for a number of reasons.
I would like for either one or both of you to tell us why you feel
that it should be a grant and not a loan and touch on that earlier
question about when do you think that there will be a constitution
in a legal government to which a loan could be made if we were
considering that.
Secretary Rodman. Let me start with the constitution question.
This is still under discussion within the Governing Council and in
a preparatory committee which was prepared a few months ago.
The Iraqis have not yet decided how exactly to constitute what will
be a kind of constitutional assembly, constitutional convention.
They are debating among themselves how to select the members of
this crucial constitution drafting body.
As to when elections will take place, this, too, you know, depends
on how they decide to organize themselves. It may well be that
elections — it is logical that elections will take place once the new
structure of government is settled and ratified by whatever means
they decide, so that — and I cannot give you an exact date. I mean,
there are estimates. Secretary Powell thought all this could be done
within six months. Historical experience suggests a variety, I mean
a range of time periods, but they haven't yet gotten to the first
stage of deciding how to organize this constitution drafting body.
Mr. Oliver. Sir, as your staff undoubtedly told you, there are
lots of reasons why a grant is preferable to loans in Iraq. There are
three primary ones that I think are terribly important, and the
most important one is giving Ambassador Bremer, whom the Presi-
dent has identified as a man who is responsible for carrying out —
accomplishing the United States mission in Iraq and getting the
troops home, giving him the money to get the job done, giving him
the tools.
If you do not do that, if you somehow can identify an Iraqi entity
to loan money to, you have not given Ambassador Bremer the tools,
while at the same time you have left him the responsibility. I
mean, that is in my opinion the most important aspect. And there
is no question, everybody, as this body does, has different thoughts;
and the problem is relying on that body if you give them that au-
thority to come up with the same priorities as Ambassador Bremer
has decided and to meet Ambassador Bremer's plan.
How can you hold Ambassador Bremer responsible for meeting
his plan if you do not give him the tools and give him the money?
I just think you lose the unit of commander responsibility. I think
that answers the most important issue.
The second issue, which is a practice one that I deal with be-
cause I have done a great deal of managing acquisition before, is
you will lose any control — you will lose a significant amount of con-
trol over who gets the contracts, because the United States, the
State Department, the Defense Department, the Corps of Engi-
neers, will not be awarded any contracts in my opinion. There will
be grants to the Iraqi Government, who will then direct it. And I
only point out to you that the key — that there are other countries
who had a significant involvement in that area before we did, and
they are the ones who have people on the ground and companies
on the ground and ties, and that is where that money will go.
401
Dr. GiNGREY. Thank you, gentleman. I see my time has expired.
Mr. Chairman, I thank you.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Turner.
Mr. Turner of Texas. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I have tried to look very carefully at the presentation, some 50
pages they have provided on the request that, Mr. Oliver, I guess
you put together. And I have noted a great deal of concern, both
personally and among my colleagues, about the size of this request,
$20 billion.
I note we have spent about $1-1/2 billion in Afghanistan, a much
poorer country, with certainly an equally serious potential threat
to be a haven for terrorists. And as you noted in the Washington
Post yesterday, even the House Republicans who have looked at
this package have found about $1.7 billion that they think should
be eliminated.
Particularly it comes down to the issue of what is our respon-
sibility here, and I think clearly we have a responsibility to provide
security to Iraq. But we are talking about a nation that has got the
second largest oil reserves in the world, and once they get on their
feet can well afford to manage their own country and to build their
own infrastructure. And I do not run from the idea that we ought
to repair that which was damaged as a result of the conflict, get
the water running and the lights back on. And I certainly agree
with the Chairman; I think funds in the hands of the commanders
is money that could be well spent and will travel a long way.
My calculation shows me that your $5 million per week in the
hands of our commanders translates to $260 million a year in a
country where I understand a dollar might equal about 10 by our
standards, like an investment perhaps of $1 billion in our own
country. So I have a great deal of concern about the nature of the
request in the sense that, obviously, much of it is multiyear. I no-
tice there is $1 billion in there to build thermal power generating
facilities that will be constructed over the next 3 years. I notice
there is a considerable amount of money for the justice system,
$100 million for technical assistance for investigation into crimes
against humanity, to hire 500 experts at $200,000 per expert. I
could go on and on, but I think you get the gist of my concern.
And I guess my question for you — I am sure that when you put
it together, you listened to all the requests, and it was your job to
kind of compile it. I have gone through here and made my effort
to try to cut back on some of the requests, basically on the propo-
sition that some of these things should be handled by the Iraqi peo-
ple, not the American taxpayer, where we already are half a tril-
lion dollars in debt, in deficit, this year alone.
So, you know, rather than hear the debate that basically says
we've got to do this because we've got to provide, you know — we've
got to prevail here, I would like to see a proposal that deals with
this on a more staged basis, that deals with what the cost would
be in the upcoming year, that emphasizes our obligation to provide
security and the basic necessities. But you know, there are some
numbers in here that just — you know, the proposal that we were
going to build seven model cities, $100,000; the proposal we are
going to build two maximum security prisons at $400 million, at
402
$50,000 a bed — that is what it costs to build them in Texas — secu-
rity detail for 400 judges at $50,000 per judge.
You want to spend $1.3 million in every courthouse in Iraq to up-
grade security. I would love to have $1.3 million on the 17 court-
houses in my district to improve them.
I think that is the concern that many Members of Congress have,
and I think that — I guess my question to you is, if you went back
and took a different approach, if you looked at it based on what is
going to be spent in the next year — I suspect we are going to be
significantly reduced in troop strength before the next election, just
to talk politics about it, and I think that it is a little bit — just
wrong to be asking the American taxpayers to put this money on
the table today and borrow this $20 billion, because we are going
to borrow it. And number one, it is not going to be spent in the
next year; number two, that it is for many things that many people
in our country cannot understand why we are going to spend it,
and the numbers are big. You know, $600 billion dollars to reha-
bilitate the Iraqi railroad system; I mean, I know this is somewhat
arbitrary, but I mean, I give them some credit for needing some
help there; but $600 million?
Airport improvements in over 120 airports. You know, that is a
lot of airports to put $165 million into.
Establishing a wireless network for the entire country, $73 mil-
lion. Construction of public buildings, $65 million; $240 million for
road and bridge improvements; $400 million for hospital refurbish-
ment; $300,000,000 for medical equipment. We are going to have
an international police training force of 1,500, and the request is
$800 million for that force, when we already have in your request
$200,000,000 to train and equip the Iraqi police force. Appears to
me to be excessive and duplication, and I think somebody that took
a sharp No. 2 pencil could cut this thing down and we could take
this a little slower.
How do you respond to that criticism?
Mr. Oliver. We started with $39 billion and cut it down. Con-
gressman. It has been very, very detailed. I think it is better — rath-
er than look at each one of those items, it is better to talk philo-
sophically.
The question is: What is the mission? The mission is to establish
the conditions that allow them to go from a central to a market-
based economy as soon as possible and establish the security condi-
tions that allow us to get our troops out as soon as possible.
It is personally important that, no matter how — no matter how
we got to the position we are today, we have a unique opportunity
to make a difference in the Middle East. To do that, we need to
go from a central to a market-based economy. To do that, you have
to have security so that people can build micro and small busi-
nesses and so that you can get foreign investment in, and you need
to have — you need to set the conditions that will facilitate foreign
investment.
Whether or not they are wireless, because it is the cheapest way
to approach it when you do not have cable throughout the country,
if it is to establish the electricity so that people can sign contracts,
because they have — they know that they will have electricity more
than three hours out of six, so therefore they can do continuous
403
production and the cement factories can run. If it is to do all of the
items in there, screened against those two simple criteria, what is
it that we need to establish a security environment? And if you no-
tice, there are funds in there, for example, and part of it I didn't
write as clearly as I should have — for example, the $800 million in-
volves training the rest of the police force, up to 77,000, and you
happen to hire 1,500 international trainers to do that along the
way, but you essentially are going from 90,000 security people to
201,000 within a year, because it is terribly important to make se-
curity be on the part of the Iraqis. And the rest of the money which
we will get under contract and we will spend, or we will spend or
have under contract within a year, is to establish the conditions
that will facilitate the development of small business so that it
doesn't become an unstable country, dependent on only one econ-
omy, so that we have to come back later, but is the stable market-
based economy that we need.
Mr. Turner of Texas. I appreciate the fact that you described
it as a philosophical difference, because I think you are right. I
think it is.
When I look at the numbers, it makes me — I am going to ask the
question: Do we not have the same obligation, then, based on your
philosophical vantage point, in Afghanistan?
I think the issue here comes down to, what should be the rightful
obligation of the American taxpayer to a people who are, from all
I understand, resourceful, hardworking, intelligent — some were
considerably more advanced prior to the conflict than Afghanistan
ever has been — and, second, the possessor of the second largest re-
serves of oil in the world.
So I think, on balance, my philosophical bent is to provide secu-
rity and then allow the Iraqi people to rebuild their nation. You
know, it does represent a difference of philosophy. You know, I look
at the record and what has occurred in Iraq, and see items on
here — like you mentioned, the wireless system. They didn't have a
wireless system before the conflict. I do not feel an obligation to
provide them one after the conflict.
So I think it is a philosophical difference, and I appreciate your
candor and I appreciate your hard work and your expertise that
you bring to the job.
Thank you, Mr. Oliver.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
The gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Marshall.
Mr. Marshall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I am one who accepts the principle that we are going to have to
have — in order for us to have security, we are going to have to re-
build Iraq somewhat. And I am not going to get into some of the
details that my colleague from Texas just got into, and I think they
are legitimate questions to ask.
I do think you have an enormously difficult task. I do not think
we will succeed in our objectives if we do not put this kind of
money into the effort; but on the other hand, I do not know that
we will succeed if we put this money into the effort. We have got
these cap expenditures that are going on right now, which seem to
me to be wonderful things to be doing.
404
I often thought when I was in Vietnam, we could have spent a
httle bit less on some of the bombs that were missing their mark,
and drop refrigerators and televisions, and that that would prob-
ably do more good, at least with the villagers that I was seeing.
But how you will transition from us providing those resources to
a government and an economy that has those resources and uses
them appropriately is an enormous challenge.
I really have two questions. As I talk with different folks about
this issue, one, the subject of loans versus grants, and often some-
body says well, they are already burdened horribly by loans. If you
add more loans to the existing burden, it is just going to — I have
gotten different signals from the country on the question of pre-
existing debt. To me at least, that preexisting debt is an obligation
of a regime that is no longer in power.
Those — most of those — who decided to lend to Iraq chose to deal
with that regime. Those folks probably need to look to that regime
to repay that money.
I understand that an awful lot of that is owed to France, Ger-
many, Russia — countries that did not support the current effort.
And it would seem pretty perverse to me for us to be putting a
whole bunch of American money in as grant funds to build up an
economy that then repays old debt, Hussein debt, to France, Ger-
many, and Russia. That seems quite odd.
Now, in conversations with Dr. Rice just this last week, I got
mixed signals on what the administration's intent is, whether or
not those governments are going to walk away from their debt, or
whether or not the Iraqi Government is simply going to say — that
is the last government — we are not paying you. I do not know
whether the World Bank is involved in this, the IMF is involved
in this, and to what extent they would put some pressure on to re-
quire these old debts be paid.
I would just like a comment on that and to be clear as to what
the objective is, because it doesn't make sense to me to put a bunch
of American money into a project to repay debt to France, Ger-
many, and Russia at the moment.
The other thing is, as I talk with different folks, just to use a
simple example, in one of the Presidential debates recently, a ques-
tion concerning the supplemental request came up. And one of the
candidates, a Democratic candidate, said, "Well, I support the
troops. I do not support Halliburton." That was it in a nutshell.
And the suggestion is that money spent on reconstruction and some
of the 67 that goes to private contractors who were providing serv-
ices to the military is money that is not being properly spent; that
somehow excess profits are being taken; that somehow cron3dsm is
involved, those sorts of things.
And it would certainly help me a lot in my conversations, in my
attempt to support it — and I do support it; I think we should do
it and do it quickly. I am on record as saying that. But, it would
certainly help me a lot if there was a simple answer to the re-
peated questions concerning the relationship between the military
and different contractors and the contracts that are here; and it is
just a simple "No, there is no profiteering that is going on; this is
the kind of accounting that is going to be done; it is transparent.
If it is not transparent now, it will be transparent. People will, in
405
fact, go to jail if those things are not done." Those things would be
very helpful.
So two things. Loans, old loans, being repaid by our current
grants makes no sense to me. And, two, it would help me a lot if
you could help us a little bit on the contracting.
Secretary Rodman. Let me start out to say a word on the debt
issue. I think one reason you may be getting unclear signals is that
a lot of decisions have not been made yet in our government be-
cause of the dilemma that you point out. And I think, in addition,
the Iraqis will have a voice in this in some form or another, either
the Governing Council or successor government, but that is my un-
derstanding of the State of affairs.
Maybe Admiral Oliver
Mr. Oliver. Ambassador Bremer said none of this money would
be used to repay debt.
In addition, I know that the Council absolutely wants this debt
"renegotiated," is the right term, and they want — they are going to
press. We are actually — we are saying, let's get through — let's focus
on one thing at a time. We wanted to get the '04 budget done,
which was this month. We wanted to get the Madrid conference
done, which is later on this month. And then I know that Secretary
Snow is working with the GC to approach this issue, which is the
debt.
Mr. Makshall. But you do appreciate, though, that the money
we are sinking into this is going to create productive capacity to
pay back their debt? I think it should be a grant, but I am really
troubled by it.
Mr. Oliver. I am just sure that none of that money is ever going
to go back to pay back that debt.
Mr. Marshall. Well, directly or indirectly, not directly, but indi-
rectly, yes, if in fact the debt still exists and we rebuild this coun-
try and its oil wealth is then used.
Mr. Oliver. I am sure that, indirectly, the problem is going to
get solved.
Mr. Marshall. Good. What about
Mr. Oliver. The contracting — there is nothing untoward going
on with respect to the Halliburton and Bechtel contracts, period.
However, the explanation is too long to serve with constituents, so
what we are doing is, both those contracts are being terminated
and recompeted, and open and full — a new, open and full. The Hal-
liburton contract with the oil fields is due any minute to be an-
nounced, it was due for some months, and we're not putting any
more money into them; in other words, terminated the moneys in
September, just because it was decided it was too hard to explain.
And the Bechtel one is being recompeted and I think it will be an-
nounced in December. So I think that is a nicer, quicker answer,
but there is nothing untoward going on.
Mr. Marshall. That is gi-eat. And you have said it — I assume it
is public, but is that something that is going to be public for some
time, that you are going to recompete?
Mr. Oliver. It is public, sir.
The Chairman. You all set, Jim? You all set?
Okay. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Larson.
406
Mr. Larson of Connecticut. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I
thank the patience of our panel here today. I have a question for
Dr. Hamre who is not here, but I hope you can — Dr. Hamre, you
can get me a written response.
The Chairman. We will make a note of that. Mr. Larson, we will
make sure he gets whatever question you want him to respond to.
Mr. Larson of Connecticut. Well, I agree with the premise
that he comes to the committee with and especially the responsibil-
ity that it is our responsibility to convince the people.
My question to him is, if the Congress cannot get the answers
from the administration that it needs before it is asked to vote on
a supplemental, would he vote for that supplemental absent the de-
tail? That would be my question to Doctor — to Dr. Hamre.
Second, Mr. Skelton asked a question early on, and I again bark-
en back philosophically to what I think is important, which is that
the American people understand the gravity of this situation, but
for the most part they feel that they are not being leveled with.
And the reason that they feel they are not being leveled is because
when you ask questions, when you have written letters, in fact,
outlining dramatically what the difficulties are going to be in ad-
dressing this — not post-Iraq, but predictions-Iraq — and there still
are lingering questions that do not get answered, it is pretty tough
to get the people to go along with that.
So, for example, when we ask, how long do you think that we are
going to be there, we are told that is not a question that we are
willing to make any predictions on. What has so far — so now you
are back in front of your hometown, and someone says how long
are we going to be there. Congressman? Well, I cannot tell you how
long we are going to be there, folks. We can only give you vague
guesstimates as to what is happening here.
Congressman, how about our troops? How about our reservists
that are over there? We are told six, then nine, now possibly a
year's worth of deployments, and we are stressed.
Can you tell us credibly when they will be back?
Can you give us any indication?
No, I am sorry I cannot answer that, but I do want you to sup-
port $87 billion worth of moneys, because it is absolutely necessary
for us. We will get back to you on the other issues, but please take
it on face value that we need this.
How do you — how do you respond to that? Why cannot we get
these questions?
Why cannot there be direct answers?
How do we garner the public support?
This lack of credibility that exists out here and, in the terms of
Mr. Hamre, the erosion that is taking place, is because we are not
giving — we are not able to answer the questions.
Secretary Rodman. Well, one reason it is hard to give a fixed an-
swer to those questions is so much depends on what we do. De-
pends on what we do now. If we do the right thing now, we shorten
the period.
Mr. Larson of Connecticut. Should we vote on this before the
donor's conference? How much are we going to get from the donors?
Mr. Oliver. Of that, I don't know what the estimate is.
Mr. Larson of Connecticut. Is there a ballpark?
407
Mr. Oliver. I personally do not have an answer to that. It may
be that the people working on this have an estimate. I think our —
well an3rway, I do not have an answer for you.
Mr. Larson of Connecticut. Well, that is what I mean. We are
in a public setting and citizens are saying, how much are we going
to pay? Various members on both sides say, well, this looks like it
is a 90 percent solution; meaning that the United States is in this
for the long-haul and we are going to be bearing 90 percent of the
burden all the way down the line. Is that a fair estimate?
Secretary Rodman. Our calculation is that we maximize our
chances at getting international contributions if the other countries
see that we are
Mr. Larson of Connecticut. You mean other countries haven't
seen our contribution to date?
Let me ask you this: Why haven't we been able to get other coun-
tries to participate in this effort?
Mr. Larson of Connecticut. Is it because of contracts? And I
note that it was pointed out that Turkey is involved, but I also note
that in the news this morning it said that that is because Turkey
has just been awarded, how much money from the United States
Government? Is that part of their commitment? In order to get na-
tions to compete or to go in with us, what is it going to take? Does
it take them sharing in part of the rebuilding of Iraq? And, if so,
what are those plans? Or are we going it alone all the way down
the line? We have an obligation to tell the public that if that, in
fact, is the way that we are going to go.
Mr. Rodriguez. Well, I have some figures on what we think is
the total cost of building the Iraqi infrastructure. That is estimated
to be anywhere between $50 and $75 billion. And so, our supple-
mental is a fraction of that. It is something like a quarter to 40
percent of that. So we are looking to the international community
to, in fact, bear the majority of the cost of this economic reconstruc-
tion. That is our — whether we get that, I don't know, but our cal-
culation, our intention, is to have the international community, the
lion's share of that
Mr. Larson of Connecticut. Absent the international commu-
nity paying for that, it will be the American taxpayer to pay for it,
correct?
Secretary Rodman. What we are asking from the Congress is
what you have before you.
Mr. Larson of Connecticut. Now, also we are told that we
haven't gotten an accountability for the $65 billion — as you heard
the question asked before by Mr. Snyder, and Mr. Spratt has asked
that question publicly. We are told that it is $87 billion, but 2 days
after the President made the announcement, people from the Pen-
tagon were on the Hill saying we are going to need another $55 bil-
lion more than that. Which is it?
Secretary Rodman. Well, I am here reporting the President's re-
quest. That is what we are asking for.
Mr. Larson of Connecticut. So we will need no more money
than what is being asked in this request?
Secretary Rodman. What we are asking for in this request is
what is in the request. I mean, I don't want to venture beyond
that. This is what the President assesses is needed to do now and
408
thinks it will help accelerate the time when we can turn over the
country to the Iraqis.
Mr. Laeson of Connecticut. I think you guys do a great job.
Don't get me wrong. You are under a difficult situation. But at the
very start of this hearing, we talked about the need to establish
amongst the American people the credibility behind us. And I know
that you have a job to perform, and I know in many respects you
don't have those answers, but surely you can understand, and
hopefully the administration understands, that the American peo-
ple ask the very same questions that Members of Congress do. And
when you say, well, I can't— this deals specifically just with this re-
quest; everybody in this room knows that we are going to be back
for another request. But instead of owning up to the American peo-
ple and pulling together, it is almost gamesmanship that people de-
spise so much about the whole process.
And I am not saying that that is your doing. You know, you are
carrying a message to the Congress because that is your job and
your responsibility, and you can't answer for things that, in fact,
you don't know. Is that
Secretary Rodman. What I can say is what I mentioned before,
is that if we do something now at a significant level, we maximize
the chances of succeeding in what we undertook. If we try to do it
on the cheap or try to cut corners or try to do the minimum right
now, we risk prolonging the process. And I think the President
made a decision that, if we ask for a big amount knowing that it
would be controversial, but if we ask for that big amount, that
gives us the best chance of accomplishing what we set out to do
and hastening the day when the mission will be accomplished. And
he could have asked for a lesser amount and would have known
probably that he would have had to come back again later. And I
think he asked for what Ambassador Bremer and we all thought
was the amount that would do the job, and that is something that
is urgent to do.
Mr. Larson of Connecticut. I will bet you dinner we will be
back again after this goes through, as well. The paying for this as
well as you heard a number of people and Mr. Marshall talking
about the debt and other people talking about the difference be-
tween loans, et cetera — the real problem, as well, is that we are
going to be assuming this debt and responsibility.
And another question that citizens ask of me all the time — it
seems like the only people who we have asked to sacrifice during
all of this have been the men and women who wear the uniform,
and especially our reservists. We are doling out tax cuts, and our
proposal is for even more tax cuts, and we are extending the de-
ployment of our reservists and National Guards and stretching
them to the mELximum. That is the credibility issue that is here in
terms of not the need — nobody wants to cut and run. Everybody
understands the responsibility that we have to the men and women
who wear the uniform and have performed so valiantly and ex-
celled. But it is caught up in this mishmash of lack of fully under-
standing what the full measure is going to be required of the Amer-
ican taxpayers and the American citizens.
The Chairman. Will the gentleman yield?
409
Mr. Larson of Connecticut. I just — my observation on this is
this is what it is going to take for the next year; is that correct?
Mr. Secretary? Mr. OHver?
Mr. Oliver. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. And I don't think anybody is saying we are not
going to still have expenses after this next year. But my impression
is kind of the opposite of my friend Mr. Larson, because in the past
we run these operations, and we have come in with $5 billion, $6
billion, $7 billion appropriations supplementals after we have
taken them out of hide, meaning we will pull it out of repair funds,
we will pull it out of operations and maintenance (O&M), we will
pull it out of maintenance. Then we put these — we basically take
it out of the cash register that we use for the operational forces for
training and equipping and maintaining, and then we make that
back up in bits and pieces in these supplementals.
This time the administration risked sticker shock. I mean, they
came in with $87 billion. So I think that if anybody was going to
criticize the way they presented it, it is in being very candid and
giving people this very major bill. But I think they made a decision
in the administration to be up front with folks. And $87 billion —
of course, that is a military piece, and this rebuilding piece is big.
You know, I just hope, like my colleagues, that we do this in a very
practical manner; and that if there are — for example, if there are
prisons that can be utilized with some refurbishing as opposed to
new construction, then we might be able to knock those prices
down below the 50,000-a-bed that Mr. Oliver referred to and follow
that blueprint in other ways.
And also, of course, the idea I think that we get this produc-
tion— if, in fact, the petroleum is going to be the future cornerstone
of their economy, getting that production up and running and al-
lowing that to pay for the modernizing, if you will, of this Iraqi
economy is preferable to paying for it with U.S. taxpayer dollars.
So I think this is going to take a lot of great judgment and a lot
of good practical wisdom, and I share my colleague's concern that
we do this thing right, but I think they have got to be given a pret-
ty good grade for being forthright. I think an $87 billion price tag
is a lot of forthrightness that I have not seen in our many past op-
erations.
Mr. Larson of Connecticut. I have never questioned that.
What I question is the total amount that is going to be needed,
given a lot of information that the Ranking Member on this com-
mittee provided in detail and questions that have been asked in
terms of what is the long-term commitment. And when you look at
this whole process, I mean, the whole concept of having a donors
conference and what actually is going to come out of that — I mean,
frankly, I just don't think the American public buys that, Duncan.
And that is not these gentlemen's fault here, but it also cuts to the
heart of, I think, a policy that differs dramatically from, we will
say, George Herbert Walker Bush, who was — earlier today someone
said, well, geez, I don't think we finished the job here. He did an
extraordinary job, and he did it within the parameters, and he did
it with multilateral support, where those nations ended up paying
for that, for what they should. And now we are in a position where
410
we can't get these countries to pay, and the American taxpayer
needs to know this.
The Chairman. Well, I would just say to my colleague, we have
other places where — I mean, we are going to pay billions of dollars
to destroy poison gas facilities in the Soviet Union, and it is going
to be a fairly sparsely attended fund-raiser in getting the rest of
the Western world, many of whom have put pressure on us to neu-
tralize these facilities. It is going to be the good old American tax-
payer who goes to places like Shchuchye and ends up spending the
billion-dollar capital investments to get that stuff done.
So I am with the gentleman; I don't think that donors conference
is going to be wildly popular, and it is going to be the United
States trudging along and having to go it alone. On the other hand,
that is the real world, and I think the key here is that the adminis-
tration has tried to project in the best way possible these real costs.
I think the other factor here that is tough for us is this: The
speed with which we hand off this country to the new Iraqi leader-
ship is dependent on the emergence of a new generation of Iraqi
leaders. Clearly, Saddam Hussein did away very quickly with any-
body who had any initiative in this country, and so the emergence
of this new leadership, which is coming along now and emerging
everywhere from the city councils to the national bodies, is occur-
ring. But the speed with which that occurs is largely a driver of
how fast we can hand off the government and move out, and I
think that is something that is just real tough to predict.
We have had the assassination attempts and indeed assassina-
tions of some of the stars in the Iraqi Government. I am thinking
of the councilwoman who was just killed here a couple of weeks ago
in Baghdad. That is another factor. You have got a tremendous
strain on these new leaders because they are targets. And so, I
think that makes it really tough to predict where this thing is
going.
So they tried to give it to us a year at a time. This year has got
a pretty big price tag, and it is going to be tough, and this is going
to be a major challenge. I pledge to work with the gentleman in
terms of the enormous strain that this puts on our reserves and
our first structure. We are going to have to work our way through
there.
Mr. Skelton. Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Certainly.
Mr. Skelton. I appreciate your comments and the comments of
Mr. Larson. Thinking a little bit ahead, the American taxpayer is,
of course, as you say, going to feel the sticker shock of $87 billion,
but I think there are three criteria that have to be successfully
faced, Mr. Rodman.
The first is the security situation. The Americans will not con-
tinue to support this if we keep seeing body bags come back and
injuries as we have seen in the hospitals. The security situation
has to get straightened out.
Number two, there is going to be some substantial monetary con-
tributions by our allies. Why they haven't bellied up to the bar,
they just haven't.
411
The third is there is going to be some substantial contributions
of troops to help us with this very thin strain that we have on our
young folks.
I think, if those three criteria are met, the American taxpayer
will feel a lot better about this, and the time will come, probably
a year or less from now, as to whether this — the American tax-
payer will feel this $87 billion was warranted or not based upon
those three criteria. And that is your job, to see that that happens.
Thank you.
The Chairman. And I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Larson, are you all set here? Do you have any other ques-
tions?
Mr. Larson of Connecticut. No. And I thank the chairman for
indulging in what was a lengthy conversation. I just would only
add that I hope we have a hearing at some point in the committee,
and God only knows, Mr. Chairman, you have been very good at
not only holding hearings, but also holding numerous briefings for
Members to attend on various aspects. But the situation that we
find ourselves in today is largely due to following the tenets of a
new doctrine of preemption and unilateralism. In a radical right
turn from the doctrine of Caspar Weinberger, the doctrine of Gen-
eral Powell, and finds us in the predicament we are today without
having the multinational capability to address some of these con-
cerns that truly are the concerns of the entire world and not just
the concerns of the United States.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
And my seatmate from San Diego Mrs. Davis.
Ms. Davis of California. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank you both for hanging in here, as well.
A number of the concerns that I have have really been asked, but
I wonder if we can just go back to a few of them. One in particu-
lar— we just talked about the donor conference, and we know how
much we would have liked to have had more international troops
in our effort. Are you — and I guess this is directed to Mr. Oliver,
particularly. There are a number of items that have not been in-
cluded on the list that we have that we are hoping other countries
will support. Have you put together those lists? Is that a combined
effort? And my question, particularly, is we have a credibility gap
here, clearly. What are we doing to assure other countries that
what they would be contributing and what their efforts would be
are, number one, very clear, very transparent, and that they would
be able to look back on their investments in the future and know,
in fact, that they have a very good story to tell for their constitu-
ents as well? How are we doing that? And are we sure that we are
doing it right?
Mr. Oliver. Let me tell you how I am doing it, and you can
make your own evaluation. And what we are doing is, we went out
to everybody, went out to all the local councils and the
governances, and also went out to the ministries and said, let us
identify those things that have to be done. And we put out a form
about two months ago, which I put on the Internet in Arabic and
English and said, everybody uses forms to identify those items that
have to be done. Let us say we want to build a school room or a
school as an example, and, in fact, since we have limited money.
412
the Iraqi budget does not fund several areas to the level they
should be funded, and one of them is education.
Ms. Davis of California. In fact, I think the perception is that
we are not funding much education at all.
Mr. Oliver. We are not, because our thought is that was much
more prone to attracting donors than prisons were, because nobody
likes to see a sign on the side of a prison saying, Contributed by
the Government of . . . But they really like to have it on school
buildings.
And so we actually had three things going on at once. We had
the supplemental for the logic I described to you; we had the Iraqi
budget; and then we said, now, there are other things we can't do,
and so we will do those at donors conference.
When I left 2 weeks ago, I had staff doing this and about 30 peo-
ple working on the Iraqis and some people from CPA. We had
about 12 feet of those 2-page forms done, and they are by areas,
and they are by regions, geographical, because some people like to
do villages so we need to do it by villages. And there are people
out in the road, Merick Belco, that used to be the deputy — he is
an ambassador from Poland; he was a deputy finance minister
when they changed from a central to market-based economy — is in
charge of this. He has been leading the international group of 27
different countries out talking to various countries, saying, here are
the types of project
Ms. Davis of California. May I interrupt you? About roughly —
is there a sense of how many of these may be picked up? Because
I think earlier in the discussion today it was mentioned that a lot
of this may be in kind, but not necessarily, you know, the dollars
or whatever that would be — the dinar, that would be required to
actually build the facilities, create the science labs, whatever that
may be.
Mr. Oliver. John said it was in kind, and I never say John is
wrong, except that I have talked to a whole bunch of people, and
I think what he meant by in kind was a government will fund their
companies to do it. In other words, instead of giving us the cash
directly, they will say, we want to have strings in this because —
for example, I don't know if you saw in the papers, a couple days
ago Japan said they are going to contribute $5 million over 4 years.
I would guess that they would like to have — if it involves building
roads, et cetera, they may — they are going to hire local people, but
they may want to have the management be a Japanese company.
That is sort of what I think what John meant by in kind. So I ex-
pect to see a lot of that.
I talked to Dov Zakheim
Ms. Davis of California. I am sorry, because our time is always
so limited. Will we be using the same, I guess, estimates for them
that we are also using for the Congress? In other words, it may not
be the prison we are asking them to build, but — is it padded? Is
it as close as you can
Mr. Oliver. It can't be padded or — I mean, I have come before
the Congress many times. Candidly, I can't pad something, because
if they ever catch me doing that, you wouldn't trust me again. And
so, it is the best estimate we have, and it is the same in both cases.
And I hope within the next five days to get all of those onto the
413
World Wide Web so everybody could see it, because what I want
is everybody in the world to be able to see it to be open and trans-
parent.
Ms. Davis of California. And perhaps we need to be sure that
we are including everjrthing that they need; I mean, go to our allies
who are willing to share that with us. What do they need to have
the comfort to actually engage?
Mr. Oliver. I agree. And in fact, we have also brought in the
IMF and the World Bank and the U.N. to help us put this list to-
gether.
Ms. Davis of California. Thank you. I appreciate that.
And if I could, Mr. Secretary, for having been in Kirkuk about
two weeks ago and met with General Abizaid as well as the coun-
cil, one of the concerns, and it has already been expressed, is that
there is no connectiveness with the CPA. And you said earlier that
we really don't have a lot of people out there in the communities
working with the council. I think that is a great need. What I am
wondering is if we haven't had that ability — and I understand it is
not money, it is not necessarily mindset, it is most likely the fact
that we actually haven't been able to get people there who are will-
ing to serve. Am I correct in that?
Secretary Rodman. That is right, we need more people. I mean,
we have had people, very dedicated people, doing it, but we need
more of them, and that is the current constraint.
Mr. Skelton. Mr. Chairman, would he answer that question?
She asked the question, are you having difficulty getting people to
serve?
Secretary Rodman. We have just initiated another sort of fund
drive. Secretary Rumsfeld sent letters to other Cabinet depart-
ments just recently to say, now we need to ramp up. And we are
doing the same — the CPA in Washington is doing the same thing.
They, just in the last couple of weeks, started a major hiring drive.
So
Ms. Davis of California. I think what concerns me is that this
should have been predicted. I mean, there were plans out there, I
understand, that would have actually had that kind of decen-
tralization. And it just seems to me that we are acting as if this
is a surprise, and we need to try and get these folks there, and,
in fact, we should have probably known that, because in order for
us to take some of that burden away from the military, we really
needed to have a civilian on the ground who could provide that
kind of support and connectedness.
Secretary Rodman. Well, let me say two things. One is the Presi-
dent didn't decide to go to war until he decided shortly before it
began. It is sort of hard to hire armies of people, civilians or what-
ever, just to stand by. I mean, things evolve.
Second, it is precisely because the military situation is, in our
view, stable and the needs of the country are more economic and
political that we are looking for more interagency participation and
trying to expand the civilian role. It is hard to find people at any
point in time, and it would not necessarily have been easier to hire
people in February on a hypothetical basis. So, I mean, things
Ms. Davis of California. Are we seeking out Iraqi Americans
here who
414
Secretary Rodman. Absolutely. That is one of the constituencies
we turned to early on and did our best to — and I think we have
got a number of — we did this in an organized way, and there is
Ms. Davis of California. I happen to have a number of very ca-
pable people in my district as well as others. But I just wanted to
say — and my time is up. I am sorry, I would love to continue the
conversation, but I think the chairman is getting a little anxious.
I — one thing I came away with being in Iraq was that their
greatest resource really is their people, And I think that we need
to really value that and to push the money down, as well, and to
find ways that we help them in that effort.
My concern as well in being there is that we also need to reach
out to well over 50 percent of the population, which is the women
of Iraq, as we look to small businesses, as we look to micro-
businesses, as we look to giving them the foundation to be actively
engaged in civic life there. I know that there is money in the budg-
et to do that. I would suggest that perhaps it could be more. I don't
know whether — we know there are at lot of items that we are not
being concerned whether we can spend them in a year, and yet I
hear that concern when it comes to the women's issues: Well, we
can't probably spend it in a year or a lot more of it. But we need
to be certain that we are not — we are not saying that about some
other areas, but we are saying that about that area. Any comment?
Mr. Oliver. You don't know this, Congresswoman, but my wife
graduated from law school with you; and she is insistent that I un-
derstand the true priorities.
Ms. Davis of California. Well, I appreciate that, and I hope ev-
erybody goes home to their wives and talks about that. Thank you
very much.
Secretary RODMAN. Dr. Chalabi, when he spoke to the U.N. Gen-
eral Assembly the other day, made a point about this, about the
need to empower Iraqi women, and so it is another encouraging
sign.
Ms. Davis of California. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. I thank my seatmate from San Diego.
And, Ms. Bordallo, you get the last word here.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I guess I am the fi-
nale. And I want to thank you and Ranking Member Skelton for
such sta3dng power here, we have been at it for several hours, and
particularly to our witnesses that have been answering questions
to the best of their ability.
I perceive in listening to everj^hing this morning that Congress
is more or less committed to granting the President's request, the
$87 billion, and in particular the 20 billion for reconstruction. How-
ever, I sit here with a heavy heart.
And I would like to just tell a very short story, Mr. Chairman.
I represent Guam, a U.S. territory. Sixty years ago a war was
fought in Guam, a U.S. territory, and we were occupied by enemy
forces for three long years. Many deaths and atrocities were com-
mitted during these three years. We were then liberated by the
U.S. forces and were very grateful. And to this day and in subse-
quent wars we have had more deaths per capita than any other
state in the Union.
415
Our capital city was totally destroyed during that war, bombed
and burned to the ground. The Seabees, the Navy Seabees who
were later stationed there, did build one main road, but other than
that, we were pretty much on our own.
Sixty years later our capital city still lies empty, devoid of the
beautiful prewar structures that were once there, and we did not
receive a single penny to reconstruct from the U.S. Government, al-
though countless requests were made over the years. The U.S. Gov-
ernment did, however, send money to our enemy to reconstruct
their cities.
And I guess what I am saying here is, if this should ever happen
again in our own country and our U.S. territories, let us not ever
forget the billions that we are pouring into foreign jurisdictions.
And I might add, Mr. Chairman, 60 years later this Congress — it
was in the last Congress, in fact — got around to set up a war
claims commission for Guam to compensate our people for the
atrocities that occurred. And I might add that many of them have
long since died.
So I hope this will never happen again, where U.S. citizens will
have to wait 60 years for compensation, and a U.S. territory has
to wait 60 years to rebuild.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. I thank the gentlelady.
And, gentlemen, thank you for being with us. We appreciate it.
Let me ask one closer here. If you are competing a contract
today, let us say for a road, for a piece of construction in Iraq, and
there is an American firm and there is a German firm, and the
German firm has the low bid, do they win the contract?
Mr. Oliver. Ambassador Bremer promised the Congress that the
money from the supplemental would go to U.S. contractors.
The Chairman. So it is all going to be U.S. contractors?
Mr. Oliver. Ambassador Bremer said that several times.
The Chairman. Could you check on one thing for us; and that
is, the German — at least there is a rumor out that German cement
trucks are being purchased by the authority for construction.
Mr. Oliver. I will find out, sir.
The Chairman. Okay. I appreciate it.
Gentlemen, thank you for your service to our country. Thanks for
your endurance. Any last words you would like to give us?
Secretary Rodman. No. Thank you for your courtesy.
The Chairman. Okay. We appreciate you. The hearing is ad-
journed.
[Whereupon, at 1:36 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
APPENDIX
October 8, 2003
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
October 8, 2003
OPENING REMARKS OF CHAIRMAN DUNCAN HUNTER
Hearing on Iraq Reconstruction and Rehabilitation
Wednesday, October 8, 2003
Just two weeks ago, we reviewed the Administration's plan
for the reconstruction of Iraq with Ambassador Bremer. Today,
we've asked a Defense Department official to update us on that
plan as the House considers the President's request for
supplemental funding. Mr. Rodman is joined by Dr. John Hamre of
the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
At the Department's request, Dr. Hamre and his team visited
Iraq in late June and offered their thoughts on reconstruction as an
outside group. Among other things. Dr. Hamre's team highlighted
that the next twelve months would be critical in getting Iraq off on
the right foot.
To its credit, the Department both asked for — and quickly
embraced — the results of Dr. Hamre's study. Moreover, in the
President's supplemental fijnding request, we're seeing an
Administration that is working to obtain the resources needed to
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422
implement many of the report's recommendations. The
Administration has thus clearly demonstrated a willingness to heed
outside advice, when that advice is thoughtfully given.
I think that is the kind of advice you'll get from us. On both
sides of the aisle, we're committed to supporting the troops and
doing what it takes to ensure Iraq does not become a future threat
to our security. Today's hearing will help us ensure that our advice
is based on an accurate understanding of the facts on the ground —
not on second-hand media reports.
423
Opening Statement for The Honorable Ike Skeiton (D-MO),
Ranking Member, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of
Representatives
Full Committee Hearing on Iraq Reconstruction
October 8, 2003
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I join you in welcoming Secretary
Rodman and Dr. Hamre. I also would like to thank General
Schwartz and Admiral Oliver for being available as well.
Mr. Chairman, I will be very brief as I know Dr. Hamre needs
to leave promptly at 11:15. I recently returned from an enlightening
trip from Iraq with several of my colleagues here. My view is that
we must win this effort but that things there could go either way.
There are many good news stories that are not being reported
in the media — such as the many reconstruction projects undertaken
by the U.S. military units throughout the country. But there is
much that isn't going as well as it could. I remain concerned about
424
the security situation in parts of Iraq and about whether CPA has
adequate people and resources to turn the country around quickly.
I hope the witnesses will address these concerns. I look
forward to their testimony. Thank you Mr. Chairman.
425
"Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Iraq"
Prepared Statement of
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
Peter W. Rodman
before the
House Armed Services Committee
October 8, 2003
Mr. Chairman and members of Ac Committee:
Thank you for the opportunity to speak to you today on the subject of post-
conflict reconstruction in Iraq. This is a subject of the highest priority for
President Bush and his Administration, as demonstrated by the Emergency
Supplemental Apprt^riation request we have submitted to Congress for the pursuit
of the War on Terrorism.
I am also honored to be appearing with Dr John Hamre, former Deputy
Secretary of Defense, and to discuss points he raised in the report that he and his
team published in July after a survey trip to Iraq.
The genesis of the "Hamre report" was in a trip that Representative Frank
Wolf took to Iraq in May 2003. In a memorandum that he wrote after the trip,
Congressman Wolf noted that a Commission on Post-Conflict Reconstruction,
sponsored by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and the
Association of the U.S. Army, had done a study and published a report last
January. He suggested that members of the Commission visit Iraq and assess the
reconstruction efforts there.
Secretary Rumsfeld and Ambassador Bremer agreed with that suggestion,
and we asked Dr. Hamre and his colleagues at CSIS to undertake that mission to
give us an independent view. Dr. Hamre led a team of experts to Iraq from 26
June to 7 July 2003. Their excellent report noted that: "we saw significant
progress everywhere we went." But it also iocluded a candid discussion of the
challenges we faced, and a large number of constructive recommendations. We
have taken these recommendations to heart. The Administration's commitment to
intensify its efforts in Iraq — as demonstrated, again, in the Emergency
Supplemental — signifies our commitment to move forward as rapidly as possible
in areas that we and Dr. Hamre agree are priorities.
Let me give a few examples, and touch upon the main areas discussed in
the report.
426
A Washineton OflPce. — One example is the report's recommendation
that DoD "should create a strong office in Washington to support the CPA's
needs..." We have done this, and are further strengthening it today. The Office of
the Coalition Provisional Authority Representative is the "backstopping" and
coordinating office in Washington, representing and supporting the headquarters
in Baghdad. This new office in the Pentagon is helping to facilitate
communication between Baghdad and Washington and to speed decision-making
in both places. It serves as Ambassador's Bremer's representative in Washington
and as his Washington base, and eyes and ears. Its staff includes detailees from all
USG departments and agencies involved in supporting the CPA's efforts in Iraq.
Even as we speak, we are seeking a rapid expansion of its personnel.
This office will also serve as an additional — and more convenient —
"portal" for businesses, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), universities, and
otiiers who want to contact Ae CPA. It complements the other mechanisms that
already exist, such as the Council for International Cooperation in Baghdad. As
we look forward to much more involvement in Iraq by non-governmental entities -
- such as business, humanitarian NGOs, private charitable groups, and so on ~ the
existence of a convenient "portal" becomes more important.
Stability and Security. — The Hamre report also stresses the need to
"establish public safety in all parts of the country." We agree that this is essential
~ indeed a precondition for the achievement of many other goals. We also believe
that progress has been made, and that most of the country is secure. In addition to
US stability forces, the United Kingdom and Poland are leading multinational
divisions in key sectors. Over 45 nations have offered military support
Moreover, 70,000 Iraqis have been armed and trained in just a few months and are
contributing to the security and defense of their country — to form an army, police,
border and customs police, a civil defense corps, and a facilities protection service.
Iraqi "Ownership". ~ The report also recommends that "Iraqi ownership
of the rebuilding process must be expanded at national, provincial, and local levels
and that decentralization is essential." This too is taking place. An Iraqi
Governing Council was formed in mid- July - approximately when this report was
published — to develop policies and appoint interim ministers to run government
agencies. This is an important achievement. It has brought together all the major
groups and regions of the country into an inclusive, broadly representative body.
This Governing Council is gaining increasing international legitimacy as well. It
has been accepted as the international representative of Iraq in the Arab League,
and has occupied Iraq's seat in the UN General Assembly. Local councils, as
well, have been established in almost all of the country. Turning Iraqi affairs over
to Iraqis as soon as practicable, in a context of freedom, peace, and prosperity, is a
good definition of the mission we have set for ourselves.
427
Employment. -- The Hamre report points out that "idle hands must be put
to work and basic economic and social services provided immediately to avoid
exacerbating political and security problems." A major public works program has
been established to address this need. Hiring is underway. The CPA also created
another popular program to hire thousands of Iraqis to perform maintenance on
irrigation ditches and canals. Since 1 May 2003, some 5,000 Iraqi small
businesses have opened.
In this context I should mention a major economic milestone that is about
to come - the introduction of a new Iraqi currency. This reform (which has been
in careful preparation since before the war ended) will be important for a number
of reasons. Economically, it will be the foundation of Iraq's fixture growth.
Politically, it signifies not only the supplanting of the old regime but also the unity
of the country, replacing the dual-currency system that persisted imtil now. It
represents important progress.
"National Frame of Mind". ~ The Hamre report suggests that "the
coalition must facilitate a profound change in the Iraqi national fi-ame of mind —
fi-om centraHzed authority to significant fi-eedoms, ft-ora suspicion to trust, firom
skepticism to hope." We agree. Free media are a prerequisite for fireeing the Iraqi
mind. CPA has stood up the new Iraqi Media Networic which broadcasts to the
Iraqi people in Arabic. We are working to move the service to the Arabsat
satellite used by al-Jazeerah and al-Arabiya, which should help increase Iraqi
viewership. We know that more needs to be done.
International Coalition. - The report argues that the U.S. "needs to
quickly mobilize a new reconstruction coalition that is significantly broader than
the coahtion that successfully waged the war." From the beginning, we have
sought international participation in Iraq. UN Security Council Resolution 1483,
passed in May, called for such broad international participation in the seouity,
political, economic, and himianitarian fields. I mentioned above that 45 nations
have offered military support. A conference of international donors will take
place in Madrid on 23 October. We have been prepared, in a new UN Security
Council Resolution, to broaden the UN's vital role in Baghdad. However, we also
believe that unity of effort and unity of leadership are essential to success. The
Coalition is now exercising sovereign authority in Iraq, until it can be handed over
to Iraqis, and the Coalition takes that special responsibility seriously.
Adequate Resources. — Another important area in which we agree with
the Hamre report is that money must be "significantly forthcoming and more
flexible." The Supplemental request and the upcoming donors conference are two
428
essential elements of ensuring that security and reconstruction efforts are properly
funded.
CPA has had flexibility in using the following for reconstruction:
• The Development Fund for Iraq (primarily oil revenues, but also
including the unspent funds in the UN's Oil-for-Food escrow
account).
• Vested assets held by the USG ($ 1 .7 billion spent).
• Seized assets ($800 million spent).
Appropriated USG fimds for reconstruction, of course, still require
traditional oversight.
Finally, the Harare report argues, and we agree, that the next 12 months
may be decisive. This is a crucial point, for a number of reasons:
• For one thing, a number of recent public opinion polls show that the
Iraqi people have great hope for their future in a liberated Iraq and are
willing to endure a certain period of hardship as the imavoidable
accompaniment of their transition. But their patience and fortitude are
not likely to be unlimited. Now is the time to seek visible
improvements in their situation, to sustain and vindicate their hopes.
• In addition, from our own point of view, a major commitment now —
investing heavily, and early, in the success achieved so far ~ offers the
maximum chance of having a decisive impact. Cutting comers now will
only weaken the effectiveness of oiir effort, and could prove much more
costly in the long nm.
Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, in April Coalition armed
forces won a great military victory. But ultimate strategic victory in Iraq will
come when, as I said, we arc able to turn the country back over to its own people
in conditions in which they are able to continue on course toward freedom, peace,
and prosperity.
With Congress's help and the American people's support, we can achieve
this goal.
Thank you.
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429
STATEMENT BY
JOHN 3. HAMRE
PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
BEFORE THE
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
OCTOBER 8, 2003
Chairman Hunter, Representative Skelton, distinguished members of the Armed Services
Committee; it is an honor to be able to testify before you on the issue of Reconstruction and
Rehabilitation in Iraq. I was privileged to be able to testify before the Congress in July after my
colleagues and I returned from our trip to Iraq on behalf of Secretary Rumsfeld.
This is a critical hearing. There must be "next steps'" for Iraq. America is now a Middle East
power. We cannot forsake our responsibilities or avoid our obligations. We must succeed in the
rebuilding of Iraq, to help create a government that is representative of its people, at peace with
its neighbors, and offers a future of hope and promise for its citizens.
My colleagues and I returned from Iraq with two broad suggestions. We need to dramatically
"indiginize" the security program in Iraq and we need to expand the international base of support
for the operation. We indicated that the Coalition Provisional Authority was rapidly running out
of money and would soon need supplemental funds. We also indicated that the security situation
in Iraq remained problematic and that without dramatic improvements in security, the remainder
of the rebuilding effort would be substantially impeded.
In the two-and-half months since we visited Iraq 1 believe there has been significant
improvement. We receive reports from friends and acquaintances in Iraq that the security picture
is somewhat improved, despite the attacks on our forces. There is some improvement, especially
in the northern and southern portions of the country.
But Iraq is far from a secure environment. Just a couple of weeks ago the major pipeline north
from the oil fields was yet again blown up. Attacks against our troops are becoming more
sophisticated and daring. The economic plundering of the country continues.
We continue to believe that the highest priority for enhancmg security should rest with
expanding the role of Iraqi security persormel. The Administration has launched new efforts to
recruit security personnel, as contract security officers for specific installations, as policemen,
and increasingly as border guards.
It does not appear at tliis point that there will be significant contributions of foreign military
persoimel. We have to build the capacities of Iraqis themselves to bnng security to the country.
430
President's Request for Supplemental Funds for Iraq
President Bush has requested that Congress appropriate an additional $87 billion for kaq and
Afghanistan. I know that there is a great deal of controversy associated with this request.
Nonetheless, Mr. Chairman, it is critical that the Congress appropriate these funds.
As I said at the outset, for better or worse, America is now a Middle East power. We now own
this problem. We cannot walk away fl-om the problem. We must now shoulder it. The
American people need to know that this investment is both necessary and well designed. Here I
believe the Administration has not followed through adequately.
To date there has not been a satisfactory accounting of how funds are being spent, and only
recently has the Pentagon begun explaining how these additional funds will impact the
reconstruction effort. I used to be the Comptroller at the Defense Department and I know full
well that we live in a world of estimates. The best-planned estimate will always be wrong. I
know that from first hand experience. But ] also know that the sharpest critic will accept this
fact so long as I offered a complete counting of the facts I could count on and the assumptions I
had to make. Congress will accept estimates so long as they understand how we made them and
conclude that they are reasonable.
I have full confidence in the DoD Comptroller, Dr. Dov Zakheim. I have woriced with him for
years and I know he is a thoroughly honest man. Unfortunately there has developed over the
past two years a general level of distrust between the Administration and the Congress on budget
matters and even on defense issues. This is now blocking the way to a full understanding of our
collective problem and the solutions we must adopt.
I strongly encourage the Defense Department to continue its efforts to provide as complete and
comprehensive an assessment as possible of the costs that we are incurring and are forecast to
incur during the coming year.
Up until just a day ago, we had too narrow an institutional base to support the reconstruction
efforts in Iraq. I think it was an excellent idea for Ambassador Bremer to establish a liaison
office here in Washington, headed up by Mr. Ruben Jeffries. But until the President named his
National Security Advisor, Condoleezza Rice to lead a broader interagency effort, it was a
problem that Mr. Bremer had to rely on a small staff in Washington to support him. In general,
the efforts to enlist a wider base of support in the federal government for the reconstruction effort
is a step in the right direction, and Fm more hopeful that we are getting on the right path.
This raises the question of whether or not the federal responsibilities for rebuilding Iraq should
have been assigned exclusively to the Defense Department. I understand and appreciate
Secretary Rumsfeld's view that the Defense Department would overwhelmingly field the assets
required for reconstruction, and therefore he should have complete authority to undertake the
task. In theory I agree with this. But in practice it has not worked. The patterns of cooperation
inside the Government broke down during the past year. DoD found itself having lo manage
tasks for which it has no background or competence, and it has not been effective in inviting the
support of others in the government who have that background and competence. So the
431
President's direction to Condoleezza Rice to lake over the coordinating function for
reconstnjction should improve collaboration with other, better skilled parts of our government.
The challenge of rebuilding Iraq is enormous. We have been eroding too much of our
effectiveness caused by bureaucratic struggles here in Washington.
Mr. Chairman, Representative Skleton, Distinguished Members, we must succeed in our task to
rebuild Iraq. This isn't a matter of America's credibility. This is a question of our security. We
will be substantially less secure as a nation if we fail. We have made important progress during
the past four months. This is challenging, but it is not hopeless. We have the capacity to
succeed, and I join you in ofTering my full efforts to make this possible.
Thank you. 1 would be pleased to answer any questions you may have at the appropriate time.
DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
October 8, 2003
i
Working Document as of October 1, 2003
(435)
436
I
[■ ■■;"," ; "/IiitroSiiiltion ';^:';^t"-J
This progressive plan is an overview of the strategy necessary for early restoration
of full sovereignty to the Iraqi people. The strategy is driven by more detailed
action plans (e.g., plans for the New Iraqi Army, the police, restoring electrical
power, etc.).
Oiir strategy has four principal objectives or 'core foundations':
• Security - establishing a secure and safe environment
• Essential services - restoring basic services to levels which promote
stability in Iraq
• Economy - creating the conditions for economic growth
• Governance - enabling the transition to transparent and inclusive
democratic governance
These objectives are intertwined: none can be pursued in isolation. Political and
economic progress depends in part on security, but should itself help to create a
safer environment.
L. Paul Bremer, Administrator
Coalition Provisional Authority
437
Summary
Now that Saddam Hussein's regime has been removed, the Iraqi people have the
opportunity to realize the vision of a stable, prosperous and democratic Iraq. The
Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), in close partnership with the Iraqi Interim
Administration (the Governing Council and Interim Ministers), the United
Nations, and the international community, has a key role to play in the next stage
of rebuilding Iraq.
This document describes the CPA's strategy for carrying out its role in this
historic process. While the CPA remains the legally sovereign power in Iraq, we
now have a significant partner in the Interim Administration. The Governing
Council now represents the voice of the Iraqi people to the CPA, and to the world.
Interim Ministers are now running Iraq's ministries. Together, Iraqis and the CPA
are forging a partnership to guide the nation forward in its transformation.
This document is designed to direct the work of the CPA and the coalition
militaries in a flexible manner. It recognizes the need to retain the support of the
Iraqi people in all that we do, knowing that their support is vital to our success. It
is also aimed at the international community whose political and financial backing
will be essential if our overall objectives are to be achieved. The plan recognizes
the need for further planning in coordination with the Interim Administration as
the process of rebuilding Iraq evolves. While full economic recovery will take
years, the economic reform program provides a vision of a future of freedom and
prosperity towards which we and the Iraqis will work in the short term.
The plan describes key action steps within the various core elements that
determine the CPA's priorities in the short, medium and long-term. From this, we
can review what we have achieved and where we need to adjust. Finally, the plan
will assist us and the Iraqis to allocate our resources and those of Iraq. It will also
assist in attracting critical resources and capabilities from the international
community.
438
After decades of a ruthless dictatorship, the Iraqi people can at last control their
destiny and establish the conditions for a free and stable future. With the
international community, the CPA will help the Iraqi people achieve the
President's and Prime Minister's vision for Iraq - a free Iraq governed by a
representative government chosen through democratic elections. At the core of
this new Iraq is the development of a democratic, accountable, and self-governing
civil society respectful of human rights and freedom of expression. The future
prosperity of Iraq's citizens depends on the use of Iraqi resources to foster the
development of a market-based economy. This needs to be done in a manner that
is economically, socially and environmentally sustainable for the long term benefit
of all Iraqi people. Furthermore, our goal is an Iraq free of terrorists and weapons
of mass destruction, at peace with itself and its neighbors and once again able to
play a responsible role in the international community. The Coalition is firmly
committed to the future of Iraq. The CPA succeeds when Iraq succeeds. Hence we
will stay as long as necessary, and not a day longer. But we will not leave until we
have succeeded in carrying out the President's and Prime Minister's vision. Our
foundation of authority is firmly embedded in international law and in accord with
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1483.
Xiie Mission
The CPA will work with the Iraqi people and the Iraqi Interim Administration to
establish the conditions for a free, sovereign, democratically-elected representative
government. We want to work with Iraqis to establish an Iraq that uses its
resources for the benefit of its people. It should be an Iraq that is stable, united,
prosperous, at peace with its neighbors and able to take its rightful place as a
responsible member of the region and the international community. This Iraq must
be free of weapons of mass destruction and terrorists.
The End-State
The ultimate goal is a unified and stable, democratic Iraq that: provides effective
and representative government for the Iraqi people; is underpinned by new and
protected freedoms for all Iraqis and a growing market economy; is able to defend
itself but no longer poses a threat to its neighbors or international security.
439
ACHIEVING THE VISION
Taking Forward the CPA Strategic Plan for Iraq
Goal
The primary goal of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) is the early
restoration of full sovereignty to the Iraqi people. We seek:
'^a unified and stable, democratic Iraq that provides effective and
representative government for the Iraqi people; is underpinned by new
and protected freedoms and a growing market economy; is able to
defend itself but no longer poses a threat to its neighbors or
international security."
A major step towards that goal was taken on July 13, with the establishment
of a Governing Council of 25 Iraqis representing all major strands of Iraqi
society. The Council has substantial powers. On August 15 the Council
appointed a committee to recommend a process for writing a new Iraqi
constitution. On September 1 the Council appointed 25 interim ministers.
The mmisters are now running Iraq's government on a day to day basis.
Iraq's Interim Administration will be consulted on all major policy issues
and on our planning for the transfer of power to a sovereign government.
Strategy
Our strategy has four principal objectives or 'core foundations':
• Security - establishing a secure and safe environment
• Essential services - restoring basic services to help stabilize Iraq
• Economy - creating the conditions for economic growth
440
• Governance - enabling the transition to transparent and inclusive
democratic governance
These objectives are intertwined: none can be pursued in isolation. Political
and economic progress depends in part on security, but should itself help to
create a safer environment.
Security
Coalition forces will help Iraqis to eliminate the threats to their security and
will remain in country for as long as they are needed. Over time the
transfer of security responsibilities to local military and police forces
will determine the speed with which we can advance reconstruction and
build up institutions of good governance.
The Iraqi people are already contributing to that effort but must acquire the
ability to assume full responsibility for meeting the country's security needs
as soon as practicable - thus enabling the draw-down of coalition forces.
Our priorities therefore include:
• Development and training of Iraqi security forces, including a new
Iraqi army, new civil defense corps and an effective police force
• Development of national security and civilian oversight mechanisms
• Measures to ensure border security
• Measures to build the justice system and improve the penal system
• Ensuring that Iraq is free of weapons of mass destruction.
Essential Services
Effective delivery of basic services is a major priority for the Iraqi
people and the CPA. Our program involves:
• Reconstituting the power infrastructure
441
• Improving water resource management
• Ensuring food security
• Improving health care - quality and access
• Rehabilitating key transport infrastructure
• Improving education and housing - quality and access
• Reconstructing the telecommunications system.
The Economy
To realize the country's full potential for economic growth, Iraq will need
initially to:
• Build financial market structures
• Promote private business
• Determine the future of state-owned enterprises.
Policy work is also in progress on:
• Monetizing and phasing out subsidies, while building a social safety
net
• Designing an oil trust fund
• Reform of the tax and tariff system.
%
442
Governance
Iraq has suffered from decades of tyranny. Effective representative
government, sustained by democratic elections, requires the rapid
development of new frameworks and capacities, including:
• A constitution drafted by Iraqis and approved by Iraqis
• Institutions and processes to conduct free and fair elections
• Open and transparent political processes
• Measures to improve the effectiveness of elected officials, including
strengthened local government systems
• Effective and fair justice systems
• Respect for the rule of law and human rights
• Creation of a vibrant civil society.
Information
Strengthening the media is essential for the development of healthy
democracy in Iraq. This will require legislation to protect free speech as
well as to regulate broadcasting and promote responsible journalism.
Professional bodies have a role to play in setting journalistic standards.
We must ensure that our policies are communicated accurately and
effectively at all times to the Iraqi people. The CPA's communications
strategy is designed to get our message out in an honest, clear and
timely way - and then to take account of the responses of the Iraqi people,
including their expression through the media.
443
Resources
It is difficult at this point fully to quantify the external assistance needed to
support Iraq's transition to representative government and a market
economy. Eastern European experience suggests that a substantial
international commitment will be needed. But Iraq starts the process at a
lower level of economic and political development. Its energy resources
have been badly mismanaged for decades, leaving the country unable from
its own resources at present to provide an acceptable living standard for its
people. All infrastructure sectors suffer from chronic underinvestment.
Clearly, the United States and the international community and institutions
must take the lead. Only a co-ordinated international effort can bring
prosperity and stability to the Iraqi people, discourage terrorists from
using Iraq as a safe haven and contribute to a lasting peace in the
Middle East.
Planning
Our planning, which is a dynamic and iterative process, involves:
• An unprecedented joint civilian and military CPA/CJTF7 planning
process to produce a joint strategic plan - the military contribute
vitally to all key objectives
• A comprehensive and evolving plan for the short, medium and longer
term, but
• Necessary flexibility to change, and to learn from experience.
The attached charts give further details, in their latest available iteration, of
the sectoral plans being taken forward in military and Ministerial plans. The
charts identify progress to date and establish targets and planning goals for
the next 90 and 360 days. We shall monitor progress against our strategic
objectives and continue to refine the detailed plans set out here, in
consultation with the Interim Administration and as the changing situation in
Iraq may require.
444
Iraq's Post-Conflict Reconstruction
A Field Review
And Recommendations
July 17, 2003
Iraq Reconstruction Assessment Mission
June 27 - July 7, 2003
Dr. John Hamre * Frederick Barton * Batlisheba Crocker *
Dr. Johanna Mendelson-Forman * Dr. Robert Orr
445
Foreword
At the request of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Ambassador L. Paul Bremer, 1 led a team
of experts in the field of post-conflict reconstruction to Iraq from June 26 to July 7, 2003 to assess the
reconstruction efTorts there. The other members of my team were Frederick D. Barton, Co- Director of
the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project at CSIS; Dr. Robert C. Orr, the Director of the Washington
office of the Council on Foreign Relations; Dr. Johanna MendelsorvForman, a Senior Program Officer
at the United Nations Foundation; and Bathsheba N. Crocker, a Council on Foreign Relations Fellow
at CSIS. The attached report synthesizes the issues we focused on during our 1 1 days in Iraq.
The team traveled throughout the country, visiting 1 1 major cities and two ports, including nine of
Iraq's 18 govemorates (provinces). We met with over 250 people, including Coalition Provisional
Authority (CPA) officials and staff, coalition military officers, international organization
representatives, non- governmental organization (NGO) staff, bilateral donor representatives, and Iraqis
from all walks of life (including Iraqi political leaders, ministry and local government officials, police
officers, professionals, NGO representatives, and ordinary citizens). We saw significant progress
everywhere we went, but the enormity of this undertaking cannot be overstated; there are huge
challenges ahead. We hope the recommendations in the attached rejwrt will assist in shaping a
successful reconstruction in Iraq. We are deeply committed to that success.
We owe everyone involved our deepest thanks. Without the strong support of the Department of
Defense, this trip would not have been possible. Ambassador Bremer and the entire CPA team gave us
incredible access and support in Baghdad and throughout Iraq. We thank Justin Lemmon, Matthew
Fuller, Dennis Sabal, Paul Hughes, Bill Krause, and Ambassador Hume Horan in particular. We
extend special thanks to Daniel Werbel-Sanbom, Milan Vaishnav, Caroline Maloney, Lena Hagelstein,
and Vinca LaFleur for their invaluable assistance and support.
John Hamre
President
CSIS
446
Iraq Reconstruction Assessment Mission June 27 - July 7. 2003
Executive Summary
Rebuilding Iraq is an enonnous task. Iraq is a large country with historic divisions, exacerbated by a
brutal and corrupt regime. The country's 24 million people and its infrastructure and service delivery
mechanisms have suffered decades of severe degradation and under- investment. Elements of the old
regime engage m a campaign of sabotage and ongoing resistance, greatly magnifying the "natural"
challenges of rebuilding Iraq. Given the dauntmg array of needs and challenges, and the national
security imperative for the United States to succeed in this endeavor, the United States needs to be
prepared to stay the course in Iraq for several years.
The next 12 months will be decisive; the next three months are crucial to turning around the security
situation, which is volatile in key parts of the country. All players are watching cbsely to see how
resolutely the coalition will handle this challenge. The Iraqi population has exceedingly high
expectations, and the window for cooperation may close rapidly if they do not see progress on
delivering security, basic services, opportunities for broad political involvement, and economic
opportunity. The "hearts and minds" of key segments of the Sunni and Shi'a communities are in play
and can be won, but only if the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and new Iraqi authorities
deliver in iiort order. To do so, the CPA will have to dramatically and expeditiously augment its
operational capacity throughout the country, so that civiliarvled rebuilding can proceed while there are
still significant numbers of coalition forces in Iraq to provide maximum leverage over those who seek
to thwart the process.
To succeed, the United States and its allies will need to pursue a strategy over the next twelve months
that: recognizes the unique challenges in different parts of the country; consolidates gains in those
areas where things are going well; and wins hearts and minds even as it decisively confronts spoilers.
Seven major areas need immediate attention.
1. The coalition must establish public safety in all parts of the country. In addition to ongoing
efforts, this will involve: reviewing force composition and structure, as well as composite force
levels (U.S., coalition, and Iraqi) so as to be able to address the need for increased street- level
presence in key conflictive areas; quickly hiring private security to help stand up and supervise
a rapid expansion of the Iraqi Facility Protection Service, thereby freeing thousands of U.S.
troops from this duty; ratcheting up efforts to recruit sufficient levels of international civilian
police through all available channels; and, launching a major initiative to reintegrate "self-
demobilized" Iraqi soldiers and local militias.
2. Iraqi ownership of the rebuilding process must be expanded at national, provincial, and
local levels. At the national level ensuring success of the newly formed Iraqi Governing
Council is crucial. This will require avoiding overloading it with too many controversial issues
too soon. The natural desire to draw anger away from the coalition by putting an Iraqi face on
the most difficult decisions must be balanced with a realistic assessment of what the council
can successfully manage. At the provincial and local levels, coalition forces and the CPA have
made great progress in establishing political councils throughout the country, but they need
direction and the ability to respond to local needs and demands. To achieve this, local and
provincial political councils need to have access to resources and be linked to the national Iraqi
Governing Council and the constitutional process.
447
Iraq Reconstruction Assessment Mission June 27 - July 7. 2003
3. Idle hands must be put to work and basic economic and social services provided
immediately to avoid exacerbating political and security problems. A model economy will
not be created overnight out of Iraq's failed statist economic structures. Short-term public
works projects are needed on a large scale to soak up sizable amounts of the available labor
pool. Simultaneously, the CPA must get a large number of formerly state-owned enterprises up
and running. Even if many of them are not competitive and may need to be privatized and
downsized eventually, now is the time to get as many people back to work as possible. A
massive micro-credit program in all provinces would help to spur wide-ranging economic
activity, and help to empower key agents of change such as women. The CPA must also do
whatever is necessary to immediately refurbish basic services, especially electricity, water, and
sanitation.
4. Decentralization is essential. The job facing occupation and Iraqi authorities is too big to be
handled exclusively by the central occupying authority and national Iraqi Governing Council.
Implementation is lagging far behind needs and exp>ectations in key areas, at least to some
extent because of severely constrained CPA human resources at the provincial and local levels.
This situation must be addressed immediately by decentralizing key fiinctions of the CPA to the
provincial level, thereby enhancing operational speed and effectiveness and allowing maximum
empowerment of Iraqis. The CPA must rapidly recruit and field a much greater number of
civilian experts to guide key governance, economic, social, justice, and also some security
components of the occupation.
5. The coalition must facilitate a profound change in the Iraqi national frame of mind -
from centralized authority to signiOcant freedoms, from suspicion to trust, from
skepticism to hope. This will require an intense and efTective communications and marketing
campaign, not the status quo. The CPA needs to win the confidence and support of the Iraqi
people. Communication between the CPA and the Iraqi people, and within the CPA itself -
is insufficient so far. Drastic changes must be made to immediately improve the daily flow of
practical information to the Iraqi people, principally through enhanced radio and TV
programming. Iraqis need to hear about difficulties and successes from authoritative sources.
Secondly, the CPA needs to gather infomiation from Iraqis much more effectively - through a
more robust civilian ground presence, "walk-in" centers for Iraqis staffed by Iraqis, and hiring a
large number of Iraqi "animators" to carry and receive messages. Thirdly, information flow
must be improved within the CPA itself through an integrated operations center that would
extend across both the civilian and military sides of the CPA, and by enhancing cell-phone
coverage and a system-wide email system that could ease the timely dissemination of
information to all CPA personnel.
6. The United States needs to quickly mobilize a new reconstruction coalition that is
significantly broader than the coalition that successfully waged the war. The scope of the
challenges, the financial requirements, and rising anti- Americanism in parts of the country
make necessary a new coalition that involves various international actors (including from
countries and organizations that took no part in the original war coalition). The Cotmcil for
International Cooperation at the CPA is a welcome innovation, but it must be dramatically
expanded and supercharged if a new and inclusive coalition is to be built.
7. Money must be significantly more forthcoming and more flexible. Iraq will require
significant outside support over the short to medium term. In addition to broadening the
financial coalition to include a wider range of international actors, this means the President and
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Iraq Reconstruction Assessment Mission June 27 -July 7, 2003
Congress will need to budget and fully fund reconstruction costs through 2004. The CPA must
be given rapid and flexible funding. "Business as usual" is not an option for operations in Iraq,
nor can it be for their funding.
The enormity of the task ahead must not be underestimated. It requires that the entire effort be
immediately turbo-charged - by making it more agile and flexible, and providing it with greater
funding and personnel.
449
Iraq Reconstruction Assessment Mission
Introduction
June 27 'July 7, 2003
The next 1 2 months will be critical to the success
or failure of the Iraq reconstruction effort. The
potential for chaos is becoming more real every
day, given the unclear status of the old guard -
former Republican Guard members and Ba'ath
party loyalists; the small irregular militias
throughout Iraq that could wreak havoc m the
absence of a strong coalition military presence;
the beginnings of attacks on Iraqis labeled as
"collaborators" with the United States; and
continuing attacks on U.S. military forces and
soft targets - such as power plants and civilians
(including NGO workers) - that are undermining
the CPA's ability to provide basic service and
reverberating into decreased popular support for
the mission in the United States and the United
Kingdom.
There are real threats to the CPA's efforts;
• the potential use of force (or at least
intimidation) by multiple internal and
external players;
• serious security breaches that could challenge
U.S. confidence and undermine U.S.
credibility;
• rising economic in.security, combined with
the entrenchment of pre-existing black-
market economic networks;
• a lessening of support for the occupying
authority within Iraq;
• suspicions about U.S. intentions with respect
to oil production and use of Iraq's oil revenue,
and the hand-off of the UN oil-for-food
program, which has fed large parts of the
Iraqi population for years;
• the prospect of internal fighting between
factions;
• the expansion of guerilla-like warfare.
In our travels throughout the country, Iraqis
uniformly expressed the view that the window of
opportunity for the CPA to Uim things around m
Iraq is closing rapidly. The following factors
coalesce to make the next few months
particularly crucial.
• The coalition has not addressed the
heightened sense of expectation among the
Iraqis as to how quickly the coalition can
produce results, and frustration levels are
growing.
• There is a general sense of steady
deterioration in the security situation, in
Baghdad, Mosul, and elsewhere.
• There are several key impending changes of
the guard - new coalition military forces are
rotating in; the overall lead is shifting from
military to civilian; and Iraqis are assuming
greater responsibility for key security and
governance tasks.
• The national Iraqi Governing Council came
together in mid-July. Thousands of Iraqis are
now engaged in local political councils, but
their function needs better definition m order
to link them with the national political scene
and take flill advantage of their current level
of energy and expectation.
• The coalition forces and the CPA have set up
a skeleton uifrastructure under extremely
difficult circumstances. The CPA must now
become increasingly operational, but it lacks
the resources, personnel, and flexibility to
move into the next stage of the mission.
• The coalition currently has two critical pieces
of leverage that must be taken advantage of
significant military forces are still in theater,
capable of carrying out pnority tasks and
handling spoilers and the CPA and the
military have some liquidity (due largely to
seized assets of the former regime).
• A series of upcoming external deadlines will
drive policy decisions with respect to Iraq:
(1) the U.S. budget process in September; (2)
the October/November donors' conference;
and (3) the oil-for-food transition in
November.
The coalition has made significant progress in
just sixty days.' This is due in large part to the
For example, in the area of securily, the CPA reports that
35,000 Iraqi police officers are back out on the streets,
conducting sensitive raids and arrests; a facilities protection
service is being trained to guard static sites, with some
450
Iraq Reconstruction Assessment Mission
June 27 -July 7. 2003
exceptional work of the coalition military forces
in carrying out tasks far removed from their
combat duties. Civil affairs contingents have
been key to their efforts, although much more
civil affairs capacity was needed in the early
stages of the reconstruction. The energy and
enthusiasm of the CPA staff is remarkable, as is
their sense of mission and dedication.
But the enormity of tiis undertaking cannot be
overstated; there are huge challenges ahead. Iraq
is a large country with historic divisions,
exacerbated by a brrital and corrupt regime. The
country's 24 million people, and its infrastrucmre
and service delivery mechanisms have suffered
decades of severe degradation and under-
investment. The CPA lacks the personnel,
money, and flexibility needed to be fully
effective. Military officers and civilians are
carrying out post-conflict reconstruction efforts
in a war zone. Every small step of progress is
counterbalanced by fundamental problems that
must be addressed before the CPA can capitalize
on the advances seen in particular towns or
provinces throughout Iraq.
In order to succeed, the United States and a
broadened international coalition will need to
pursue a strategy over the next 12 months that:
recognizes the unique challenges in different
parts of the country; consolidates gains in those
areas where things are going well; and advances
the national mindset of the Iraqi people while
decisively confronting spoilers. To put Iraq on a
successful path over the ne.xt year, seven major
areas need immediate attention.
promise in the south with the Basra River Service. In the
area of governance, the CPA reports that 85 percent of
Iraq's towns have town councils up and running' The new
Iraq Governing Council was established on July I 3, 2003
and includes representatives of all of Iraq's major political
parties, religions, and ethnicities, as well as three women.
In the justice realm, de-Ba'athifcation of Iraq's judges is
proceeding, courts are being reestablished and have started
to hear cases: and Iraq's laws have been stripped of
Saddam-era decrees On the economic front, quic k impact
projects have begun repairing schools and government
buildings throughout the country; civil servant and army
salaries are being paid; low level economic activity (street
markets) is burgeoning.
Seven Priority Areas
Establishing Public Safety
Virtually every Iraqi and most CPA and coalition
military officials as well as most contractors we
spoke to cited the lack of public safety as their
number one concern. The war continues, but it
has entered a new phase of active resistance to
the coalition's efforts, involving attacks on U.S.
troops and Iraqi "collaborators" as well as
sabotage of vital infrastructure. Even outside the
"Sunni triangle" (the area from Ramadi in the
west, north to Tikrit, and east to Baghdad), there
have been attacks on civilians, including NGO
workers; their vehicles have been shot at in
Mosul, and aid workers in Basra have had stones
thrown at them at reconstruction sites. Iraqis
(particularly in Baghdad) remain afraid to be out
on the streets after dark, and Iraqi women do not
attend school or run basic errands without
escorts.
Although the coalition military presence is large,
it is not visible enough at the street level -
particularly in Baghdad - nor is it sufficiently
agile,' implying the need to reassess the force
composition, size, and structure. The current
configuration of composite security forces (U.S.,
coalition, and Iraqi) does not adequately support
the reconstruction mission; and attacks on
coalition forces and civilians and the sabotage
and plundering of infrastructure continue.
Ultimately, Iraqis will have to take responsibility
for addressing these types of problems, but it is
unrealistic to expect them to have the
competence to do so in the near term. The new
Iraqi security forces will face well- trained, well-
financed, and well-organized irregular forces
throughout the country, in addition to the
Republican Guard forces that may be awaiting a
return. The new Iraqi security forces (whether
" A stgnificani number of U.S. troops are engaged in static
support rather than patrolling and policing. 5,000 troops
are being used to guard static sites in Baghdad alone, and
two and a half battalions are being used to guard the CP.A
headquarters in Baghdad
451
Iraq Reconstruction Assessmenl Mission
June 27 - July 7. 2003
paramilitary, the new Iraqi army, the Facility
Protection Service, or the Iraqi police) will not be
capable of handling security matters without
significant international oversight and rapid
response capacity for at least two to five years.
Joint patrols with coalition forces and Iraqis
should be initiated immediately. International
police trainers and monitors are also needed
during this time to conduct joint patrols with
Iraqis, and train, oversee, and monitor the Iraqi
police force.
Finally, battalion commanders and Iraqis
throughout the country were uniform in their
assessment that without an overwhelming
presence of coalition forces or international
police, potential spoilers will move in, whether in
the form of "self-demobilized" soldiers or local
militia members (e.g., the Iranian- backed Bad'r
Corps, the Kurdish Peshmerga, and smaller
regional militias such as that operating in the
Maysan province). The CPA has not adequately
addressed the need for demobilization,
disarmament, and reintegration (DDR) of Iraq's
armed forces, in part because of an assumption
that the "self-demobilization" of the Iraqi army
during and after the conflict means that they are
fully demobilized in actual fact. The CPA must
launch a major initiative to reintegrate these
soldiers and militia members, in order to
minimize the opportunity for them to pose
security threats in the future.
Recommendations
• The coalition should reassess force
composition and structure and troop levels,
commensurate with inrunediate needs,
including that of improving street- level
visibility of coalition troops, particularly in
Baghdad.
• The United States could use contract private
security forces to help rapidly expand
security at low-risk installations, freeing up
some coalition troops for other security tasks.
A standardized policy on uniforms and
identification could help alleviate concerns
about the proliferation of private militias
throughout Iraq.
• The United States must recalibrate its
expectations of how quickly Iraqis can be
expected to address the serious and growing
security problems and must plan for U.S. and
UK forces to be available in a rapid response
capacity wherever Iraqi forces are being
asked to take over security tasks. The CPA
must also raise and rationalize the salary
structure of the Iraqi forces. ■*
• The CPA should decentralize the process of
training and equipping the Iraqi police force
and Facilities Protection Service to allow for
faster and more enduring progress than the
centralized training of thousands of police
officers.
• The CPA must begin serious efforts to recruit
international civilian police (CIVPOL) and
should open all possible spigots for such
recruitment, including the United Nations, the
OSCE, and any potential bilateral
contributors.''
• The CPA must develop and implement a
reintegration program that provides
opportunities for demobilized soldiers to gain
' For example, most CPA and coaliiion military officials
we spoke to in the field thought that the current police
salary of $60/month was far too low to ensure a
professional, corruption-free police force.
' The United Nations has considerable experience in
fielding CIVPOL forces. The Organization forSecurity
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE I alone docs not have the
experience or recruiting capability to manage a CIVPOL
effort along the order envisioned for Iraq.
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Iraq Reconstruction Assessment Mission
June 27 ~ M\- 7 . 2003
counseling and placement, either in the new
Iraqi security forces or major public works
projects or other jobs. Reintegration
programs must include all the different
militias throughout the country in order to
protect against future problems these well-
organized forces could pose.
2. Iraqi Ownership
Iraqi responsibility for their own future must be
firmly established at the national, provincial, and
local levels. At the national level, ensuring the
success of the newly formed Iraqi Governing
Council is crucial. The CPA runs the nsk of
overloading the new council by pushing too
many controversial issues to it. which would
undermine this otherwise positive development.
The namral desire to draw anger away from the
coalition by putting an Iraqi face on the most
difficult decisions must be balanced by a realistic
assessment of what the council can successfully
manage.
The CPA has made great progress in establishing
municipal and provincial political councils
throughout the country, but those councils need
direction as to their piupose and the ability to
respond to local needs and demands. If not
properly resourced and hooked into the national
governing council and constitutional process.
These issues include appointing a new cabinet; approving
the national budget; initial preparations and plans for a
national constitutional process; food subsidies after the oil-
for-food program phases out in November 2003; salary
levels, agricultural price supports; the size of the new Iraqi
army; dc-Ba'athification follow-through; and currency
problems
these councils could result in heightened
expectations and dangerous levels of frustration,
ratter than positively harnessing demands for
change.
Recommendations
• The CPA must give the Iraqi Governing
Council time to build on a series of initial
successes. The CPA itself should make more
progress on some of the immediate, sensitive
issues - such as the handling of the remaining
escrowed oil- for- food money that supported
mynad development projects in the north,
retraining and stipends for former soldiers
and militia members, and food and
agricultural subsidies - before handing them
over to a ft^gile new governing structure.
• The CPA should provide local and provincial
councils with funds to address prionty local
infrastructure needs. Local CPA overseers
could sign-off on use of funds.
• The CPA should formulate plans to link the
local and provincial councils to the central
political and constitutional processes. The
CPA should convene a national conference of
town and provincial councils from all over
Iraq to launch a process of defining their
relationship to the national government and
creating fresh channels of cooperation.
3. Putting People to Worlc and Providing
Basic Services
Rebuilding a functioning Iraqi economy out of
failed statist economic structures is a daunting
task. A host of thorny challenges persist:
difficulty in restarting vital public services,
particularly power and water; out-of-work civil
servants and former soldiers; Iraq's crushing
international debt burden; a plethora of state-
owned industries that are not market competitive;
a literacy rate that has been falling for decades;
infrastructure in need of serious investment;
shortages of gas (for cars and cooking) and other
key supplies; and a population that is
predominantly young.
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Iraq Reconstruction Assessment Mission
June 27 - July 7. 2003
The immediate needs will be providing short-
term employment opportunities to keep people
off the streets and refiirbishing basic services
such as electricity, water, and sanitation, to avoid
exacerbating political and security problems.
Low level economic activity is returning to
normal, and markets are filling up. But there are
long lines of Iraqis waiing for work wherever it
is announced. Many old state-owned enterprises
are not competitive, but they are a major source
of employment and should not be closed dunng
this most unstable time Moreover, a new civil
and commercial code will be needed to attract
regional and international investment in Iraq's
industries.
Recommendations
• Develop a series of work initiatives to keep
Iraqis from being idle, with a particular
emphasis on young, urban populations.
• Get and keep state-owned enterprises up and
running in the short-term to provide
employment, while developing a clear
medium and long-term plan for pnvatizing
those enterprises.
• Start micro-credit programs in all provinces
immediately, placing a special emphasis on
lending to women.
• The CPA should do whatever is necessary to
improve provision of basic services, such as
electricity, water, and sanitation.
• Begin developing follow-on for the oil-for-
food program, as a food shortage caused by
any disruption will cause a national protest.
This must include the transparent handling of
obligated resources under the program.
• The CPA should involve Iraqis personally in
the success of Iraq's oil industry. Personal
bank accounts or trust funds funded by oil
revenues should be developed, to catalyze the
banking system and get cash to the public.
expectations in key areas, at least to some extent
because of severely constrained CPA human
resources at the provincial and local levels.
There is a disconnect between on-the-ground
realities and policy formulation at CPA
headquarters. Decentralization of key CPA
functions will enhance operational speed and
effectiveness and allow maximum empowerment
of Iraqis. Placing significantly more CPA
civilians in the field would help deliver more of
what IS needed on the ground and improve the
general understanding of the reconstruction.
Recommendations
• The CPA must be given adequate resources
and personnel to immediately establish 18
provincial CPA offices, including 18
provincial civil administrators with clear
authorities and appropriately staffed offices
of 20-30 people.* Attaching one political
adviser to each battalion command will not
be sufficient. Each CPA provincial office
will need fiinds for operational support and
flexible funding and authority for quick
impact projects.
• The Department of Defense should establish
a headhunting capacity in the United States to
help identify, recruit, and retain a steady pool
4. Decentralization
The job facing occupation and Iraqi authorities is
too big to be handled by the center.
Implementation is lagging far behind needs and
Based on our informal survey of govemorales wc visited,
there is general consensus that each provincial CPA office
will need between 20-30 people in order to ensure an
effective hand-off from military to civilian lead and give
the CPA the operational capacity it needs to address
priorities.
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Iraq Reconstruction Assessment Mission
June 27 -July 7. 2003
of civilian talent to fill the CPA's needs.
Given the broad nature of the tasks, this
office should have strong interagency
support, from State, USAID, Treasury,
Justice, Agriculture, and other relevant
departments. At the same time, the United
States must internationalize the recruiting
effort for CPA civilians. Potential talent
withm other foreign governments and
international organization officials with
experience in Iraq and the region should be
identified. This effort must break through the
lingering pre-war differences with logical
partners on the civilian front.
S. Changing the Iraqi National Mindset
The CPA must facilitate a profound change in the
Iraqi national frame of mind - from centralized
authority to significant freedoms, from suspicion
to trust, from skepticism to hope. The CPA
needs to effectively communicate its strategy and
vision - what will success look like, what does
the United States intend to provide, and how long
will it stay. This will require an intense and
effective communications and marketing
campaign, not the status quo. Communication -
between the CPA and the Iraqi people and within
the CPA itself - is insufficient so far. The CPA
message is not getting out, either to the Iraqi
people or within the CPA. All potential
constituencies are not being adequately
exploited; every CPA interaction with Iraqis
should be considered a communications
opportunity. Radio and television programming
are the most critical means to getting the message
out. Without seeing or hearing Bremer and
others, disinformation will continue to prevail
over truth on key policy issues, such as U.S.
intentions about Iraq's oil money.
Under the current set-up, the CPA is isolated and
cut off from Iraqis. Most CPA officials we
interviewed confirmed that the CPA does not
know even close to what it needs to know about
the Iraqi people. (This problem is worst in
Baghdad; in other areas, CPA and military
officers are in more regular contact with Iraqis.)
The CPA does receive information from Iraqis at
the local, regional, and national levels, but it does
not have the organizational tools to assess that
information adequately.
Finally, there is a need for enhanced
commimi cations flow within the CPA structure -
both to provide updated, real information to CPA
staff about Iraq news and to enhance
communication on policy matters between the
CPA front office and the rest of the organization,
especially the regional and provincial offices.
Serious time is also being lost because of the
absence of reliable telephone communications
nationwide, which inhibits the transmission of
timely information.
Recommendations
• The CPA should engage in blanket marketing
in every venue it can access, including using
advertising on every channel that feeds into
Iraq and public service messages. Every
interaction with Iraqis should be seen as a
message dissemination opportunity, including
salary distribution centers, oil- for- food
distributions, and town meetings.
• All day programming is needed on a
revamped and upgraded Iraqi Media
Network, with a focus on television
programming. The CPA also should
encourage the establishment of more local
' Based on our interviews, Iraqis are dismissive of the Iraqi
Media Network - the CPA-funded indigenous media outlet
- noting that it does not have good programming and is
only on the air during certain limited times of the day.
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Iraq Reconstruction Assessment Mission
June27-Julv7.2003
TV stations, which have proved more
successful in getting out CPA's messages in
areas such as Karbala and the north. Creating
a "headline news" type of program would
address Iraqis' desire to hear both the CPA
global messages and very practical
information about such pressing issues as
power outages, sensitive arrests, sabotaged
infrastructure, and dismissals of former
Ba'ath party officials.
• The CPA should establish walk- in centers
staffed by Iraqis and use Iraqi "animators" to
give average Iraqis ways to make their views
known to coalition authorities The CPA
should ulilize international players -
particularly the UN specialized agencies -
that have been on the ground in Iraq for years
to boost its capacity to collect information
and views from Iraqis.
• The CPA must create an effective fusion
mechanism into which all information
collected at headquarters and in the field can
be fed, to ensure it is being used to the fullest
extent.
• The CPA headquarters should focus on
engaging and building a community among
all CPA employees. Regular town meetings
featuring Ambassador Bremer and other
senior officials would help. Daily email
briefs containing real, hard information -
including information on the latest attacks
and about basic services - should be provided
to all CPA employees.
• The CPA should convene regular interactive
meetings with its regional and provincial
ofilces, whether in person or by video
conference.
• The CPA should expand current contractor
capacity to encourage the provision of regular
nationwide telephone service immediately.
6. Mobilizing a New Reconstruction
Coalition
Relying on the war coalition will not produce
sufficient resources or capacity. The scope of the
challenges, the financial requirements, and rising
anti- Americanism in parts of Iraq argue for a new
coalition that includes countries and
organizations beyond the original war fighting
coalition. The recent donor discussions at the
United States in late June reflected low
projections for donor financial support, fiirther
highlighting this need. The Council for
International Cooperation (CIC) at the CPA is a
welcome innovation, but it must be dramatically
expanded and supercharged if a new and
inclusive coalition is to be built.
Recommendations
• The United States, working with the G7 and
the World Bank, should oversee the donor
coordination process, including by keeping a
central databank of resource needs and donor
fulfillment of those needs. Donor
coordmation efforts should be broadened
beyond the 15 states that are currently
members of the CIC, and those efforts should
be bolstered by providing the CIC support
staff in Europe and the United States.
• The CPA should reach out broadly to other
countries in its efforts to recruit civilians to
fill its staffing needs, as the U.S. government
will not be able to fill those needs on its own.
• The CPA should take advantage of the UN's
unique capacities in suppiort for constitution
drafting, access to regional and Iraqi legal
expertise, and gender and education issues.
The CPA should utilize the UN's systems,
including the oil- for- food network, as a
valuable means of connecting with Iraqis.
• The CPA should draw on valuable
international expertise to assist the Iraqis in
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Iraq Reconstruction Assessment Mission
June27-Julv7.2003
dealing with war crimes and the legacy of
Saddam Hussein
7. Money and Flexibility
The CPA currently has four sources of revenue:
appropriated funds, oil revenue, vested assets in
the United States, and assets that have been
seized in Iraq. Of these, seized regime assets are
the most flexible and readily available, but these
are finite - and in any case, the overall resources
available are inadequate to the challenges at
hand. It is highly likely that the CPA will need
supplemental appropriations to get through fiscal
year 2004. Oil revenue projections for the next
few years are low - the CPA expects production
to reach 1.5 million barrels per day (bpd) by the
end of 2003 and 2.5 million bpd by the end of
2004. It is currently at around 600,000 bpd. The
CPA expects to earn $5 billion in oil revenue by
the end of 2003, but this projection may decrease
if security problems persist and oil infrastructure
continues to be targeted. Power shortages are
also hampering efforts to restart oil production.
The CPA is badly handicapped by a "business as
usual" approach to the mechanics of government,
such as gettmg permission to spend money or
enter into contracts. This approach is not
reasonable given the urgency of the situation in
Iraq. There also appear lo be unnecessary
limitations in the area of contracts.
Recommendations
• The CPA should be given complete
flexibility to spend money - even
appropriated fiinds and vested assets - as it
views necessary without project-by-project
oversight by Washington. A process should
be established to ensure appropriate
accountability for all spending, through
regular reports from the CPA back to
Washington. Any fiinds appropriated in the
future for Iraq reconstruction needs should
not require prior notification of Congress.
Congress could request quarterly reports
detailing how appropriated fiinds have been
spent on reconstruction activities in Iraq.
• The United States needs to ensire that Iraq's
revenues are not encumbered by past or
future obligations. This will require
resolving the debt issue within the U.S.
government, and pushing Iraq's creditors to
forgive or significantly reduce Iraq's
outstanding debt burden. The United States
should also avoid encumbering ftiture oil
revenues to generate immediate income.
• The relevant United States government
agencies should deploy military and civilian
contracting officers to the theater to
streamline the contracting processes.
• The Department of Defense should create a
strong office in Washington to support the
CPA's needs, including recruiting of
appropriate civilian personnel.
Il will be critical that the CPA handle oil revenues as
transparently as possible. Iraqis we met with spoke of
continuing suspicions about U.S. intentions with respect to
their oil industry.
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Iraq Reconstruction Assessment Mission
June 27 -July 7. 2003
Conclusion
Eleven days in Iraq left indelible images in our
minds. Fathers escorting young girls to school;
young men waiting in long lines everywhere jobs
are announced; young kids flashing the thumbs-
up sign (and swarming around us asking for
money); a rebuilt prison with a newly installed
manager; retrained Iraqi police officers directing
traffic; snaking lines of cars at gas stations; a
festive 4'^ of July party thrown by the Kurds in
the north (and celebrating 4"^ of July at Saddam's
palace in Baghdad); racing through small towns
in heavily armed convoys; 19-year old American
soldiers standing out in 120 degree heat to guard
Iraqi sites, and chatting on street comers with
Iraqi children; the blackness and heat of the night
with power shortages; the pleasure of a shower
after days without running water; the energy,
commitment, and intensity of Iraqis as they
discussed their country's future; the natural
beauty of the mountains in the north and Iraq's
fertile crescent; the pnde and professionalism of
Iraqi members of newly established town
councils; the palpable fear of Iraqis out in the
street after the sun g)es down, and the security
bubble U.S. officials work in; the high
expectations of Iraqis as to what the United
States can provide, and their frustration and anger
over intermittent electricity and water service; the
resourcefulness of U.S. and British troops as they
restart civil society; the sincere efforts of
civilians to forge ahead despite the looming
insecurity; devastated university buildings in
Basra, completely ravaged by looters; the
opulence of Saddam's palaces; and Iraq's ancient
history and cultural richness.
Iraq. Not only is it being led by the United
States, but it is being led by an institution - the
Department of Defense - with relatively untested
capacities. There has been progress to date, but
using a new model heightens the challenges and
requires a new definition of relations and
responsibilities.
The United States will need significant
international assistance - from the United
Nations, other international organizations, and
bilateral donors. Security forces, CIVPOL,
information flows, and ensuring a ready supply
of CPA personnel with relevant capabilities are
just four such areas.
The U.S. government - both the executive branch
and the Congress - must change certain business
as usual practices in order to maximize the CPA's
opportunities to be successful. The CPA needs
more resources, personnel, and flexibility. We
owe it to our people in the field, and to Iraqis, to
provide everything necessary to get this right.
U.S. credibility and national interest depend upon
it.
As we traveled throughout the country, it was
impossible not to be impressed by the character
and drive of the coalition forces, the dedication
and enthusiasm of the CPA. the wearied
endurance of the Iraqi people, and the enormity
of the opportunities, challenges, and risks before
them all.
The U.S. government has chosen to use a
different model for post-confiict reconstruction in
Photos
Cover: Iraqi children in Kifel
Page 3; U.S. military convoy
Page 4: Looting damage in Basra
Page 5: Iraqi town between Hilla and Baghdad
Page 6: Bomb damage in Basra
Page 7: Street market in Baghdad
Page 8: Iraqis near a checkpoint in Baghdad
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Iraq Reconstruction Assessment Mission
June27-Julv7.2003
Assessment Team Biographies
John Hamre is President and CEO of CSIS. Before
joining CSIS, he served as U.S. Deputy Secretary of
Defense (1997-1999) and Under Secretary of Defense
(Comptroller) (1993-1997). As Comptroller, Dr.
Hamre was the Principal Assistant to the Secretary of
Defense for the preparation, presentation, and
execution of the defense budget and management
improvement programs. Before serving in the
Department of Defense, Dr. Hamre worked for ten
years as a professional staff member of the Senate
AriTied Services Committee. From 1978 to 1984, Dr.
Hjtnre served in the Congressional Budget Office,
where he became its Deputy Assistant Director for
national security and international affairs. Dr. Hamre
received his Ph.D. from the School of Advanced
International Studies, Johns Hopkins University and
his B.A. from Augustana College in Sioux Falls,
South Dakota. He also studied as a Rockefeller
Fellow at the Harvard Diviru'ty School.
Frederick Barton currently serves as a Senior
Adviser in the International Security Program and Co-
Director of the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project
at CSIS- Barton co-authored several recent reports on
post-conllict reconstruction in Iraq. Barton is also a
visiting lecturer at the Woodrow Wilson School at
Princeton University, where he was previously the
Fredenck H. Schultz Professor of Economic Policy.
From 1 999-2001, Barion served as UN Deputy High
Commissioner for Refiigees in Geneva. He was the
first Director of the Office of Transition Initiatives at
the U.S. Agency for International Development in
Washington, D.C. (1994-1999), where he helped to
start political development programs in over 20 war-
torn regions, from the Philippines to Rwanda, from
Bosnia to Haiti. A graduate of Harvard College
( 197 1 ), Mr. Barton earned his M.B.A. from Boston
University (1982), with an emphasis on public
management.
Bathsheba Crockens a 2002-03 International
Affairs Fellow for the Council on Foreign Relations.
She IS spending the year at CSIS, where she is
working with CSIS's Post-Conflict Reconstruction
Project. She has co-authored several recent CSIS
reports on post-conflict Iraq Crocker most recently
worked as an attorney-adviser in the Legal Adviser's
Office at the U.S. Department of State, where she
focused on foreign assistance and appropnations law
issues. Pnor to that, Crocker served as the Deputy
U.S. Special Representative for the Southeast Europe
Initiative in Rome, Italy focusing on economic
reconstruction issues. She has previously served as
the executive assistant to the Depur>' National
Security Advisor, and as an attorney-adviser at the
State Department working on economic sanctions
matters. She received a B.A. from Stanford
University, a J.D. from Harvard Law School, and a
Masters in Law and Diplomacy from the Fletcher
School.
Johanna Mendelson-Forman is a Senior Program
Officer at the UN Foundation. Previously, she was
Senior Fellow in the Role of American Military
Power program at the Association of the United
States Army and as a Co-Director of the CSIS/AUSA
Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project She served as
Senior Policy Advisor for the Bureau for
Humanitarian Response at the U.S. Agency for
International Development, and was assigned by
USAID to be a Senior Social Scientist and Attorney at
the World Bank's Post-Conflict Unit. She also served
as Senior Advisor to the Office of Transition
Initiatives at USAID. Mendelson holds a faculty
appointment at The American University's School of
International Service in Washington, D.C. and at
Georgetown University's Center for National Secunty
Studies. Mendelson received a J.D. from Washington
College of Law at The American University, a Ph.D.
in Latin American history from Washington
University, St. Louis, and a M.A. of International
Affairs, with a Certificate of Latin America Studies
from Columbia University in New York.
Robert Orr currently serves as Vice President of the
Council on Foreign Relations and Director of its
program in Washington, D.C. Previously, he served
as a Co-Director of the Post-Conflict Reconstruction
Project at CSIS. He has published numerous articles
on post-conflict reconstruction, including on East
Timor and Afghanistan. Orr served as Deputy to U.S.
Ambassador to the UN, Richard Holbrooke, and as
Director in the Office of Global and Multilateral
Affairs of the National Security Council. He was
Senior Associate at the International Peace Academy,
and has also worked with the U.S. Agency for
International Development in Kenya and CBS News
in China. Dr. Orr received his Ph.D. and M.P.A. from
Princeton University and his Bachelor's degree from
UCLA.
10
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE
RECORD
October 8, 2003
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. HUNTER
The Chairman Early on you had commanders with ready cash who could do
things What mechanisms are in place to keep this program from becoming
bureaucratized to the point where it erodes the local commanders' ability to receive
and spend these funds effectively? What mechanisms are in place to continue this
^'"secretary RODMAN. In June 2003, the coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) estab-
lished and funded the Commander's Emergency Response Program 'CERP) using
seized Iraqi assets (non-appropriated assets). As of 7 November 2003, CPA provided
$145 5 million for CERP. This powerful tool enables commanders to establish posi-
tive interaction with the local population, crating opportunities that help the coali-
tion forces to secure and stabilize Iraq. To avoid any interruption in this effort, the
Department has closely monitored the execution of the CERP funds and has taken
appropriate actions to keep the funds flowing quickly and smoothly to the frontline
commanders. . , ■ t i.u ttv onn/<
The Congress also recognized the need to continue this program, in the t Y ^UU4
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense and for the Reconstmction
of Iraq and Afghanistan (P.L. 108-106), the Congress authorized the Department to
use up to $180 million of the appropriated supplemental resources to fund the
CERP for Iraq and Afghanistan. Due to the appropriated CERP hmitations (i.e. not
authorized for rewards or weapons buy-back programs), the Department plans to
use a mixture of appropriated (for Iraq and Afghanistan) and non-appropnated
funds (for Iraq only). This will preserve the greater flexibility and responsiveness
the Department has maintained with the use of non-appropriated funds for the
original CERP. In keeping with the spirit of the program's purpose, flexibility, and
responsiveness, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) is cur-
rently working closely with the Joint Staff, U.S. Central Command, and Army to
prepare the financial guidance on proper custody and accounting procedures for ap-
propriated CERP funds. .
DOD is committed to ensuring that commanders will continue to have this invalu-
able resource at their disposal as they work to rebuild a free and prosperous Iraq.
(461)
OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM: OUTSIDE PERSPECTIVES
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, Tuesday, October 21, 2003.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 8:01 a.m., in room 2118,
Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Duncan Hunter (chairman of
the committee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DUNCAN HUNTER, A REP-
RESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE
ON ARMED SERVICES
The Chairman. The committee will come to order. I want to wel-
come our witnesses. This morning's hearing is on Operation Iraqi
Freedom (OIF). We are fortunate to have with us some of today's
most respected analysts on the future of warfare and its implica-
tions for U.S. security, and we are joined by Major General Robert
Scales, United States Army, Retired, Former Commandant of the
U.S. Army War College. Thank you. General, for being with us.
Dr. Andrew Krepinevich— and. Doctor, forgive me, I didn't see
you when I came running down there to say hello to everybody—
Executive Director, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assess-
ments, and Dr. Stephen D. Biddle, Associate Research Professor of
National Security Studies, U.S. Army War College.
Gentlemen, thanks for being with us. Even as major combat op-
erations drew to a close in May, the lessons learned from Operation
Iraqi Freedom were beginning. A few weeks ago, this committee
heard from the Commanding General of the Joint Forces Command
(JFCOM), Admiral Giambastiani, whose embedded combat observ-
ers and analysts are refining the joint operational lessons learned
from OIF. The Joint Staff continues its work to distill the strategic
lessons learned while the Services are cataloging their tactical les-
sons from this conflict.
Today we are going to hear outside perspectives on Operation
Iraqi Freedom and implications on U.S. warfare and national pol-
icy. As with any war waged by the U.S., it is critical we engage in
an open and vigorous critique of our actions so that future military
leaders can draw the correct lessons and apply them to the next
conflict. One need only look to the erroneous lessons learned by the
French military following World War I to see the value of a vigor-
ous lessons-learned effort.
The aftermath of Operation Iraqi Freedom raises some serious
questions on the future of warfare. Chief among these is whether
the major combat phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom is the last war
of some former era in warfare or the first war of a new era. Some
believe that speed, precision, and superior knowledge were the rea-
(463)
464
sons for success in Iraq and heralded a new type of warfare. If w .
invest in more high-tech systems that provide perfect knowledge c |
the battlefield and combine them with increasingly capable preci !
sion munitions, we can ensure victory in any future conflict.
To this, I would remind my friends that chess players alway
have perfect knowledge of the board, their pieces always strik
with perfect precision, but this does not always ensure a successfu
game, and I think we saw in Operation Iraqi Freedom really som
of the old and some of the new. I think folks were — there was ;
new validation of the value of heavy armor, for example, along wit]
a renewed validation of the importance and value of precision mu
nitions.
Others have suggested just the opposite, that the major conflic i
phase of OIF holds few lessons for future conflicts. They argue tha
future wars will look more like the current phase of Operatioi
Iraqi Freedom with its current religious and ethnic factions, rival
ries, foreign terrorists, shadowy non-state actors, guerrilla bomb
ings and hidden weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Emerging
nontraditional threats, not conventional land forces, will be the rea
threat. In this environment, more human intelligence, rapidly de
ploying and flexible forces and superior training hold the key tc
victory.
The issues we will discuss here today are much more than a ster-
ile academic class in the nature of future conflict. The lessons we
draw from this and other recent military operations will inform the
committee's decisions regarding how our forces will be sized and
shaped in the years to come. They will also inform us as to the na-
ture, quantity and type of hardware munitions we need to buy for
our men and women in uniform so that they can meet the chal-
lenges of our future battlefield, and, gentlemen, I look forward tc
your testimony on this important subject.
Before we go to our witnesses, I would like to recognize the com-
mittee's ranking Democrat, Mr. Skelton, my partner and the gen-
tleman from Missouri, for any comments he would like to make.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hunter can be found in the Ap-
pendix on page 521.]
STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM MISSOURI, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON
ARMED SERVICES
Mr. Skelton. Thank you. I would like to offer my statement in
total, if I may
The Chairman. Without objection.
Mr. Skelton [continuing]. In light of the fact that we have other
hearings going on, in the interest of time. But let me welcome Gen-
eral Scales, Dr. Krepinevich, and Dr. Biddle. It is very, very impor-
tant that you do what you do, and the chairman correctly pointed
out the values of lessons learned or lessons not learned when he
made reference to the French between the wars, and consequently
they hid behind the national line, much to their military demise.
I hope you will be able to touch on the jointness, as much as pos-
sible. Goldwater-Nichols, I think, is coming into full bloom as a re-
sult of this conflict. I would appreciate that.
465
Otherwise, Mr. Chairman, I just want my statement in total put
Q the record.
Thank you very much. i . i a
[The prepared statement of Mr. Skelton can be found m the Ap-
»endix on page 524.] .
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman, and once agam, thanks
or being with us to our witnesses. The entirety of your statements
dll be entered into the record, without objection. General Scales,
he floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. ROBERT SCALES, JR., USA, RET.,
FORMER COMMANDANT, U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE
General SCALES. Thank you, Congressman Hunter and Congress-
nan Skelton. I appreciate very much the opportunity to be here
ind testify today. I would like to keep my statement very short to
illow most of the time for dialogue with you. As you know, Profes-
;or Williamson Murray and I just finished a study called, "The Iraq
Nar: A Military History", and we wrote it for three reasons. One
s a salute to our military men and women for the incredible job
hey did under very difficult circumstances.
Second, we wrote it to provide context. The American people
lave been better informed about this war perhaps than any war in
listory, but they saw the war through a series of stop action kalei-
ioscopic images, and we sought to put historical context into that
var to tell the American people a little bit more about
The Chairman. General, could you get that microphone a little
closer?
General SCALES. Is that better?
The Chairman. That is perfect.
General Scales [continuing]. About how the war came about and
what the consequences of the war were likely to be and finally, and
I guess the reason I am here today, is we spent the last chapter
talking about lessons learned. What did we learn from the war? As
many of you know, I also wrote the history of the first Gulf War,
"Certain Victory", back in 1992, and I would like to start my state-
ment just by comparing the two.
You can argue that the first Gulf War epitomized the tactical ex-
cellence of American mihtary forces, but it brought forth, I think,
shortcomings at the operational level of war, just as Mr. Skelton
inferred, the ability to combine the air and ground components into
a single melded force. This war, I think, demonstrated again tac-
tical excellence, but I think for the first time in American history
it demonstrated the operational excellence of American forces. For
the first time we put together, to use the Marine Corps term, an
air-ground team of unparalleled sophistication and effectiveness.
In the book we talk about nine different things that made a dif-
ference in this war in terms of its transformational impact on the
future of warfare. The three, Mr. Chairman, you just mentioned—
speed, precision, and knowledge. I will not go into those because
previous speakers have testified to that. I would like to talk about
four very quickly and then conclude with knowledge.
The first thing I think this war demonstrated is convergence.
The one thing that struck us, and again the book is heavily weight-
ed toward the Army and Marine Corps performance in this cam-
466
paign, is how similar ground forces have become in the last decade,
since the fall of the Berlin Wall and particularly since Goldwater-
Nichols.
Obviously each ground component has its own culture, but what
struck me is that the Army component forces that were employed
in this campaign had become lighter, had become faster, had be-
come more agile and adaptable. And Marine Corps forces applied
the lessons of the operational level of war, so that if you look at
the war from a strategic standpoint, what you see is a double en-
velopment, where the left prong was an Army division and the
right prong was a Marine — the equivalent of a Marine Corps corps,
and that is pretty remarkable.
I cannot imagine any time since the First World War where Ma-
rine and Army forces had operated together so seamlessly and per-
formed the same function.
The second issue in the book is what we call ad hockery, and
that is the ability of Army and Marine Corps forces in particular
to play a pickup team. Very interesting that in the first Gulf War,
we were extremely reluctant to put together fighting forces at the
eleventh hour and commit them to combat. In this war, completely
the opposite impulse prevailed. We were putting forces in the field,
Task Force Tarawa comes to mind, that were literally a pickup
team and they fought very effectively, and the reason for that is
because the Army and Marine Corps training systems have allowed
us to create a common cultural bias among units, regardless of
where they are deployed, regardless of what their particular func-
tion is at any one particular time. So if you adhere to a common
cultural concept and you follow similar training and you have com-
manders that are raised as a single generation with this common
cultural view, when you put them together they tend to be able to
fight well together, even though they may not be as tightly bonded
as units in the past.
Third is this idea of heterogeneity. I think this war clearly dem-
onstrates, as you inferred, Mr. Chairman, that — foreground forces,
in particular — in order to be effective in all regions of the world in
all circumstances, you have to build forces that consist of many,
many different components: heavy, light, special forces, conven-
tional forces, firepower centered forces, and so forth; that the days
that the concept that one-size-fits-all, particularly in land warfare,
I think the performance of the Third Infantry Division in particular
put that theory to rest.
And finally, the issue of knowledge. I was in the Army War Col-
lege two weeks ago, and I had a chance to interview one of the sen-
ior tactical commanders in the Third Infantry Division, and I said,
what was your impression of the campaign, and he said something
very interesting. He said, when I crossed the berm, I had near per-
fect situational awareness. He said, what I was lacking was cul-
tural awareness. Very interesting. He said, I knew where virtually
every tank in the 15th Mechanized Division of the Iraqi Army was
around Talil, but that did me very little good because what I con-
fronted when I crossed the berm was fanatical dismounted soldiers
and people mounted in sport utility vehicles (SUV) and pickups at-
tacking me with rocket-propelled grenades (RPG) and
Kalashnikovs, and he said we went across the berms prepared to
467
kill T-72s and BMP infantry combat vehicles and by the time I got
to Baghdad I had plenty of antitank rounds left in my bustle rack,
but I was black on 7.62 at .50 caliber because the enemy that my
soldiers were faced with was different than that enemy that had
been postulated.
And so, what this means to me, at least, and what is a central
theme of this book, is that it is not enough to know your enemy's
capabilities. We do that very well and with our overhead systems
we are able to count tanks and motor pools with great fidelity.
What we need to know in the future is intent and will and what
is in the mind and ears of the enemy. Technological superiority is
no longer enough. Computers, surveillance, bandwidth cannot
make up for familiarity with the environment and the enemy. So
what is needed in the future, we believe in our book, is intent-
based knowledge, understanding the enemy and getting into his de-
cision loop.
Now, we avoided serious problems in this war for three reasons.
Number one, we had great soldiers who were able to innovate and
adapt to a different situation than expected. Second was the inepti-
tude of the enemy, and third was the presence of stable line forces,
forces embedded in cities so that when the maneuver forces arrived
they were able to add a subjective corrective to what they were
able to encounter.
The Chairman. Explain that, General.
General Scales. When
The Chairman. One example.
General SCALES. When 37th Cav first approached some of the
major cities, as they swung around the major cities they were ex-
pecting to do tank-on-tank engagements. Special Forces who were
embedded in these cities and kind of new what the lay of the land
was all about were able to come out of the cities and tell them
those tanks were empty. There is nobody in the those BMPs. Your
problem is going to be the Fedayeen, and these people are failed
Baathist Party members and former police officers and security
forces armed with small forces and RPGs. They have got mines
waiting for you. They are going to try to ambush you in the city.
Of course, the forces waiting in the cities knew that, but it was
the emphasis they put on it and the emphasis they placed on the
minds of the commanders that allowed them to fight so well once
they got into the cities. Had they not had that up-to-the-minute,
fingertip style of intelligence, they probably would have had a
tougher time. And it is unfortunate that we weren't better able to
anticipate this change in the character of the enemy, because if you
look at wars in the region, particularly those fought in the Middle
East, indigenous armies, fighting against Western style armies, are
0 and 7, you could argue since 1948, but in nonconventional war-
fare, sort of irregular warfare, they are 5 and 0. So they have done
well, indigenous armies have, in fighting in an unconventional
manner, in everything from the incursion of Lebanon in 1982
through the ejection of the Soviet Union in 1989.
So the lesson then is, technology will not triumph over the fog
of war; technological monism will not work; technology doesn't tell
intent, measure will and motivation.
468
It is interesting that our doctrine says that when a unit is 30
percent destroyed it becomes combat ineffective, and yet I can re-
member in Vietnam some North Vietnamese Army (NVA) units
suffered 90 percent casualties and were effective, and you can
argue that some of the regular Iraqi units in the North suffered
zero percent casualties and were ineffective. And the Fedayeen,
many of those units suffered near 100 percent casualties and
fought not effectively but fanatically until they died.
So we are in a new era of cultural wars that has several charac-
teristics. First is a focus on the tactical level. One of the interesting
things that I found about this war was that the war was fought at
the top level, at the brigade level, and most of the actions that
were significant were essentially company level actions or company
team level actions. The enemy thinks that our center of gravity is
dead Americans, and part of Saddam Hussein's strategy, flawed
though it was, was not to seek any strategic advantage or to ma-
neuver against us in any way but to cause casualties. So his suc-
cess was measured in his own mind and perhaps still is by the abil-
ity to string together tactical victories that result in American cas-
ualties.
So what this tells us then, as I have said before in other things
that I have written and in this new book, is that this new battle-
field we are facing is going to be different. It is going to be decen-
tralized. It is going to be a battlefield where the enemy and our
forces are dispersed. Battles will be fought in a distributed fashion,
where the critical points will often be tactical instead of operational
and strategic. We will be fighting enemies that are hidden in the
clutter, urban clutter, the clutter of complex terrain, and we will
be fighting enemies who rely on as their principal weapon, decep-
tion, obfuscation, and the ability to operate under — as one Chinese
general I talked to one time said, we want to be able to operate
under precision. Interesting concept, to be able to be free to operate
under superior American firepower and still remain effective on the
battlefield.
So what to do, and I will end it with just a couple of points:
Number one, we need to maintain an emphasis on situational em-
phasis, to be sure, but we also have to shift our emphasis to the
human side of warfare, cultural awareness. We have a hard trans-
formation under way. Perhaps what we need to consider is what
we call in the book a soft transformation.
I asked one division commander by e-mail, what do you need?
What is the one thing that you're short of in this war, and he re-
plied to me, I thought, rather prophetically, I need translators. The
long pole in my tent is my ability to connect with the people in
these cities. He said if I know where the enemy is in the cities, I
can kill it. My problem is I cannot connect with the local popu-
lation.
So, again, with deference to the gentleman on your left, I think
that part of this soft transformation is a continuation of the PME,
professional military educational, reforms that Congressman Ike
Skelton, of course, pioneered for so many years, and I would offer
the following. In order to conduct this soft transformation, the first
thing I would argue is we need to begin earlier the process of edu-
469
eating our officers. We need to include non-commissioned officers
(NCO).
It is very interesting in this process of soft transformation that
the center of gravity in many of these battles were E-7's, where in
the Civil War they were lieutenant generals. So this whole level of
indirect leadership is being pushed further and further down the
operational chain. We need to improve our cognitive situational
abilities for complex and ambiguous circumstances. We need to be
able to train our officers, our younger officers, to see through the
fog of war, to better understand the enemy. We need to create a
sort of cultural court sense, if you will, to build into our young lead-
ers the ability to understand cultures and to quickly adapt in
changing situations they encounter, not so much in weapons the
enemy is armed with, but in his will and his attitude and in his
tenacity, and so forth.
We need to be able to immerse our military forces culturally, and
we need to reward those who have it, and a part of that is to im-
prove the language capability of our young men and women in uni-
form, not necessarily to make every rifleman fluent, but at least to
make them cognizant of where they are fighting, and to understand
a little bit better about the culture that they are dealing with. And
we need to focus on the critical regions of the world, America's
strategic perimeter, those regions of the world where we are most
likely to fight.
And I will end my remarks with a brief war story or historical
analogy to talk about why this is important and why it is very dif-
ficult today to implement it.
At the end of the 19th century, the British Army basically be-
came an army that was too busy, scattered across the globe in
small garrisons, a thin red line that stretched from India to Africa.
It was an arm.y that was too busy to learn. It didn't think much
of education and training. It thought that you learned about wars
by fighting wars rather than studying the art of war, and because
they were too busy to learn and too busy to create this common cul-
tural bias, by 1914 they had prepared for one style of war and were
very good at it, and suddenly they found themselves at Monzin
Lake Hatu fighting an army that did study the art of war and un-
derstood what modern war was about and for the first two or three
years they were outclassed and tens of thousands of British sol-
diers died needlessly.
We face, at least metaphorically speaking, a similar condition
today, where on the one hand we have a military that is very, very
busy, it is scattered around the world and finds itself meeting back
to back deployments, and yet to understand the art of war and to
understand sort of the culture of combat takes education, it takes
reflection, and it takes time to study and so we have two poles pull-
ing apart here, and I think it is very important if we are to be pre-
pared to fight in this new era of cultural wars we need to carve
out time and resources to allow our young men and women to un-
derstand their profession and to study the art of war.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to speak.
[The prepared statement of General Scales can be found in the
Appendix on page 527.]
470
The Chairman. General, thank you and with that last commer-
cial for the educational institutions, we will move on, but good
work and great statements.
Dr. Krepinevich.
STATEMENT OF DR. ANDREW KREPINEVICH, JR., EXECUTIVE
DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND BUDGETARY AS-
SESSMENTS
Dr. Krepinevich. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity
to be here this morning and to share my views with you on the les-
sons of Iraqi Freedom and the implications of our military in the
future.
To begin, I think it is important to recognize that the recent war
was one conflict, won by that point. I think Admiral Clark summed
it up best when he said, "This war ain't like the last war and it
ain't like the next war. This war is like this war."
So I think there is always a danger in tr3dng to overextrapolate
lessons from a particular conflict and paste them onto the future.
So that is one point, and what I have done in my analysis is to try
and look at trends, and, unfortunately, we have a number of recent
datapoints; not only Desert Storm, but also Allied Force and Oper-
ation Enduring Freedom to draw upon.
Second, while Joint Forces Command is certainly hard at work
on defining the lessons of the war, in a sense we put the American
military in the difficult, but not necessarily unwelcome, position of
grading their own homework; and one thing I think that is lacking
and will make it difficult to define lessons is the absence of an
independent lessons learned effort on this war, something analo-
gous to the Gulf War airpower survey that was commissioned after
Desert Storm.
Having said that, let me offer five brief observations for your con-
sideration and a few possible implications for the defense program
and for force structure. The first observation, again looking at
trends, is we find ourselves having gotten into the regime change
business. Since the end of the Cold War, we have on average over-
turned the leadership of a government about once every three
years. Panama, Haiti, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Iraq — that is 5 in
less than 15 years.
With that comes certain moral, political, and security con-
sequences. During the 1990's, we said we could take it or leave it.
We left Haiti after a period, we had exit strategies for places like
Haiti and Somalia.
Now, following 9/11 we find there are certain threats, certain
parts of the world that make it very difficult to depart, whether we
want to or not, the Balkans, Afghanistan, Iraq.
What this means, I think, is that there is a clear lesson in terms
of the trends that we have gotten into, the stability operations
business, and we had better get good at it in a hurry.
My second point is that it seems as though precision warfare,
which was a novelty back in 1991, has really come of age, and in
fact I would argue that if you look at the last three conflicts, in the
Balkans, Afghanistan, and particularly in Iraq, you see that preci-
sion warfare is almost indispensable to the kinds of military oper-
ations we want to conduct.
471
In Afghanistan, in the Balkans, and in Iraq we did not wage war
against a country. We waged war against a despot and his col-
leagues, if you will — against Milosevic, against the Taliban, against
Saddam Hussein and his Baathist leaders. We did not wage war
against the infrastructure of the country, we did not wage war
against the people of that country, and precision enabled that. Pre-
cision enabled us to be very discriminating, along with a different
sense of how ground forces would operate — very fast moving, non-
linear operations, very dispersed, taking risks, in order to move
very quickly and achieve their objectives very quickly.
Again, I think this combination of precision and a different ap-
proach to land warfare, instead of the linear approach, the shift in
the war to nonlinear operations, the willingness to use Special Op-
erations Forces (SOF) really does signal a shift in the different di-
rection and a couple of dimensions of how wars are fought.
Among the key factors, air and information superiority, persist-
ent surveillance, suppressing the engagement cycle and as Admiral
Giambastiani would say, one of the critical problems we have in
this area is battle damage assessment, keeping up with the in-
creasing tempo of military operations, the aggressive use of Special
Operations Forces and nonlinear ground operations, truly joint air/
land operations, and what is remarkable here, I think, is that com-
bination. And here I would differ from Joint Forces Command and
say, to me it is remarkable how few friendly fire casualties we suf-
fered, considering the way we operated in that war. I would be glad
to elaborate on that. And finally, the familiar wheel of precision
weapons that is developed over time, the full force of what we did
not even see in this conflict.
The problem, and I think this is something that you mentioned,
Mr. Chairman, and also Bob Scales, is that the competition contin-
ues. The enemy is seeking offsets or counters. Targets are becom-
ing mobile, they are going deep underground, they are seeking
sanctuary.
The first hundred or so schools that we investigated in Iraq
turned out to be armories, for example, after this war, using
mosques, schools, hospitals as sanctuaries. The discrimination
problem — as Bob says, once they stop becoming regular forces and
move to irregular warfare, no matter how many sensors you have,
it is difficult to distinguish friend from foe, camouflage, cover, and
concealment, and of course, over time adversaries get the ability to
do what we do, even in a small way, which is to hit large, soft fixed
targets at a distance. We are going to have to change the way we
project power, because iron mountains and moving through large
airports and bases is going to become increasingly difficult.
The third point I would mention, and this is in a different sense
to what General Scales mentioned, is that I see continued diver-
gence, not convergence, in terms of U.S. military capability and
those of other armed forces.
What this means is that waging symmetrical warfare against the
American military tank on tank, plane on plane is suicide, and I
think we saw that once again as the Iraqis tried to do it in this
most recent conflict.
The other thing is that the old metrics of warfare, the way we
measure impact power, the way you have to evaluate the defense
472
budgets and the defense program — those metrics are changing, and
what I thought was really interesting was a comment by Major
General Blount, the Commander of the Third Infantry Division
(ID), and as he said, "Our equipment was superior, our training
was superior, our soldiers were superior. The Iraqis had the larger
numbers, but our technology was vastly superior with our situa-
tional awareness, our ability to communicate and our command
and control."
He didn't talk about numbers. He didn't talk about firepower. He
talked about training, he talked about soldiers, he talked about in-
formation, he talked about communication. Those were the things
that he signaled out as really being the difference-makers in this
conflict.
Consequently, since the gap between us and everyone else is
growing, our adversaries are moving to the far ends of the conflict
spectrum — get nuclear weapons, or go terrorist or go irregular war-
fare. That is where the competition is heading. So if we think of
the competition in how we would fight it next time, we are missing
the point because that is not how the competition is going. So I
think that is how you have to view the lessons of Operation Iraqi
Freedom.
Fourth, as remarkable as our military's performance was, we al-
ways have to remember that we need to gauge it in terms of who
are we competing against, who is our enemy, and of course going
up against the Iraqis, General Schwarzkopf had a comment about
how poor General Saddam Hussein was. I think we could say the
same thing around this time, as well.
The Iraqis didn't do the things we worried about most. They
didn't use weapons of mass destruction. They didn't seriously try
to destroy the economic infrastructure. They didn't go after the
Kurds or the Shi'ites. They didn't fight principally in urban areas.
Once again, it was a poorly trained, poorly equipped, poorly led
force that we encountered, and, quite frankly, they were fighting
a very poor version of the old military regime. If the Germans in-
troduced blitzkrieg back in 1940 with planes, tanks and radios and
how you combine them together, the Iraqis had no planes, no ra-
dios, and old tanks, and I dare say that if you could somehow magi-
cally transport the German army of 1940 to 2003 and put them up
against the Iraqis, the Germans would have won handily.
So again, remarkable performance by us, yes, but you have to
consider the adversary, as well, and what I would say is, what we
need to do is look at the essence of Operation Iraqi Freedom in
terms of what they tell us about Korea and the budding anti-access
area denial problem that we see there. How would we fight against
an enemy that would use large numbers of missiles, chemical
weapons to hit ports, to hit our bases, to frustrate our ability to op-
erate?
Pakistan. How would we deal with the situation if Pakistan be-
came a country that was coming apart at the seams? Certainly
something we worried about after 9/11.
What does Operation Iraqi Freedom tell us about the need to se-
cure the weapons of a failed state? Because what we are seeing is
more Third World unstable regimes getting access to nuclear weap-
ons.
473
What does it say about stability operations in a transnational in-
surgency, because that is what we are faced with in parts of the
Islamic world, in parts of Afghanistan and like Iraq. Urban control
operations, something we saw only a smidgen of, and, of course,
homeland defense.
The final point, the fifth point I would like to make is that the
anti-access threat is real and growing, particularly in one aspect,
which is the access to forward bases that we need to project power.
As we saw in this conflict, access is becoming problematic for politi-
cal reasons, and as I mentioned with respect to countries like
North Korea, it is also becoming increasingly problematic because
of the diffusion of missile technologies and weapons of mass de-
struction. And so, our global basic restructuring as we conduct that
review must take this into account, as must our Services own
transformation plans, and I must say in this regard, there are
some disturbing disconnects.
Finally, a few observations for the defense program and our force
structure. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld once said low density,
high demand capabilities were those things we didn't buy enough
of, and I think in some cases we will be looking to buy more of cer-
tain things.
If, as has been fairly unanimous, the support for persistent sur-
veillance as a key enabler of the kind of war we like to fight is im-
portant, then I think more of the same is not necessarily going to
be an answer. I think we are going to need longer-range surveil-
lance capabilities. If you think you are going to come up with an
enemy that has integrated air defenses, there are going to have to
be stealthy surveillance platforms and capabilities, and these quite
frankly are things that are not in the pipeline as of the present.
One of the lessons of the JFCOM study is that while we had
about 80 percent of our aerial surveillance assets in theater, if we
had put all of them in, you would not have gotten a significant in-
crease in our surveillance capability; in other words, we hit the flat
of the curve. More of the same, at least on the scale of an Iraq
problem, is not going to give you a commensurate increase in per-
sistent surveillance.
Second, distributed network ground forces. The payoff achieved
by using Special Operations Forces — for example, the Army is al-
ready moving in this direction. The Army's future, it says, is going
to be in nonlinear warfare, which it practiced in the Gulf, and its
emphasis on see first, understand first, and act first and finish de-
cisively— essentially emphasizing extended range engagements
based upon an information advantage. One of the key bottlenecks
here is going to be bandwidth, and it is going to be interesting to
see how we solve that problem.
Bombers. The Air Force doesn't have a bomber program until
sometime in the 2030's. Yet, in Allied Force bombers flew 1 percent
of the sorties and dropped 11 percent of the precision guided muni-
tions (PGM). In Afghanistan they flew 20 percent of the sorties and
dropped 70 percent of the PGMs. In the recent war, they flew 3
percent of the sorties and dropped 28 percent of the PGMs. Bomb-
ers count.
Tankers. One of the interesting facts I think that comes out of
the U.S. Central Command Air Force (CENTAF) study is that if
474
you use the Gulf War as a baseline, a tank of sorties would double
the ratio they were in the first Gulf War and Allied Force. They
were two-and-a-half times the ratio in the war in Afghanistan.
They were again double the ratio in Iraq. Why? In part because we
are buying short-range systems and in part because it is getting
more difficult to get access to forward bases.
And finally, Stability Operations Forces. This is a business that
we got out of after Vietnam that we are going to have to get back
into.
Finally, some high-density, low-demand capabilities. What are
systems and capabilities that we may be buying too much of? Not
that you can have enough of anything, but if you have to make
tough choices, where might you make the cuts?
There are two particular areas where I think we are victims of
our own success. In Gulf War I, we used roughly 1,600 tactical air-
craft to conduct those military operations. In Gulf War II, we used
640 strike tactical aircraft, about 40 percent that number, and the
reason is that in Gulf War I only 20 percent of our strike aircraft
could handle PGMs. In Gulf War II, nearly all of them could.
Heavy ground formations. We plan to use — the war plans, any-
way, called for several, at least, heavy Army divisions for major
theater operation, and we used one heavy Army division in Iraqi
Freedom, again being a victim of our own success.
Again, I think we have to ask ourselves, who is going to chal-
lenge us to big tank battles in the future? We may need a different
mix of armor. Armor is still going to be relevant, but five to six
heavy divisions may not be what it needs and the Army agrees.
The Army is moving in that direction.
Finally, nonprecision fires. In the first Gulf War, air forces
dropped 210,000 dumb bombs. In the recent conflict they dropped
5,000. Again, I think this speaks volumes about the way we are
fighting now and also, quite frankly, about where the money needs
to go, in terms of do you buy platforms to drop lots of dumb bombs
or fewer numbers of platforms because we are using more and
more precision weapons. And I would say it is going to be interest-
ing to see where this goes in terms of ground forces as the Army
begins to field the Excalibur system for its artillery, which is the
smart artillery round.
I will conclude my remarks with a couple of observations. I would
say, one, beware of people like me. Beware of people who are offer-
ing you hard and fast lessons, because even Admiral Giambastiani
would say his work is not done. We are talking about one
datapoint. We are talking enemies who have enormous incentives
to present us with different kinds of problems in the future. So the
best we can hope for is a qualified discussion of trends.
I think this discussion should be informed about where we think
the competition is going, and finally I would say in my own little
infomercial, Mr. Chairman, that the opportunity to really conduct
an independent survey of what happened in this conflict, as well
as the last two, in Afghanistan and in the Balkans, is really being
passed by, and I think to our great disadvantage.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my remarks and I would be happy
to respond to any questions you have.
475
[The prepared statement of Dr. Krepinevich can be found in the
Appendix on page 539.]
The Chairman. Doctor, thank you very much. Excellent state-
ment.
Doctor Biddle.
STATEMENT OF DR. STEPHEN D. BIDDLE, ASSOCIATE RE-
SEARCH PROFESSOR OF NATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES, U.S.
ARMY WAR COLLEGE
Dr. Biddle. Chairman Hunter, Mr. Skelton, members of the com-
mittee, thank you for the opportunity to be here this morning and
talk about OIF.
My remarks today are based on the preliminary findings of the
War College study on why the campaign to topple Saddam came
out the way it did and what implications we should draw from that
for the future of American defense planning. The study isn't yet
complete. It is undergoing peer review and as a result it is subject
to change, but on the basis of the work completed to date I think
it is possible to sketch the outlines of what the main answers are
likely to be, subject to the proviso that that review process could
still alter the final conclusions if the data or emphasis so indicate.
And I should emphasize the views I am expressing this morning
are my own. They do not necessarily represent the positions of the
Army, the War College, or the Department of Defense.
Now, the key question is why the war came out to be a low cost
victory. Lots of people were afraid that OIF would see an urban
street fight with heavy coalition casualties, the protracted siege of
Baghdad, the scorched earth campaign with extensive Iraqi eco-
nomic and environmental damages or Iraqi use of weapons of mass
destruction.
Of course, none of these things actually happened. Instead, Sad-
dam was overthrown in 21 days of fighting, without scorched earth
or WMD use and without prolonged street fighting in Iraqi cities.
The coalition loss rate of fewer than one in 2,300 troops killed
in action was among the lowest for modern mechanized campaigns
and it compares favorably with those of other recent American
wars that have led lots of people to think that we are in the midst
of an ongoing revolution in military affairs.
How did the coalition avert the perils that so many people feared
beforehand?
Well, I think part of the answer lies in what the Iraqis didn't do
and I think the other part lies in the interaction between their fail-
ures and our strength. The prevention of scorched earth, for exam-
ple, I think was mostly a story of what the Iraqis didn't do rather
than the speed of what we did do. This is because they systemati-
cally failed to make the preparations necessary in order to destroy
their oil fields or other economic infrastructure, and they do not ap-
pear to have been in the process of doing so as the war began.
The survival of Iraq's economic structure is thus attributable
chiefly to their failure to prepare it for prompt demolition, not the
speed of our advance. In fact, the evidence suggests that even a
much slower advance probably would not have changed the out-
come much, whereas proper preparations for demolition would have
476
made it possible for us to preempt them even with the tremendous
speed of the advance that we reaHzed in 2003.
Now, of the 250 oil wells, for example, in the key sections of the
Rumailah oil field in the South, only 22 had actually been prepared
for demolition when the Marines secured the field on March 21. Of
those 22, only nine were actually detonated, causing seven fires.
No gas oil separation plants, no pumping stations and no pipe-
lines were wired for destruction, nor was there any evidence of on-
going efforts of preparing additional wells or additional oil fields for
destruction in the days before the invasion or in the early stages
of the invasion itself.
Even with a very fast moving, very impressive offensive, there
was still more than 48 hours available to the Iraqis between the
beginning of the hostilities and the time the field is actually se-
cured. If Rumailah had been prepared for demolition, the Iraqis
could have had time to complete the job before we stopped them,
but had considerable but unused time for setting additional
charges, for preparing additional facilities for destruction even
after the war began.
In fact, the Kirkuk oil field in the North remained in Iraqi hands
for more than three weeks after the invasion began, yet at no point
in that interval were any oil wells destroyed or any facilities demol-
ished or any fires set. No evidence of preparation for demolition
was discovered when American troops finally took possession of the
field after April 7. In fact, dirt had been piled around a number of
the wells to protect them against accidental destruction in the
fighting.
Even if one were to argue that one would have demolished
Rumailah if only we had given them more time, at Kirkuk they
had the time, by any standard, and yet they did less demolition.
So I do not think our speed was logically necessary for the preser-
vation of these assets. Either Saddam never meant to carry out
this threat or his people refused to follow his orders or his organi-
zation proved unable to implement the plan, but the failure of
scorched earth was less our doing than theirs.
Even a slower or less capable coalition offensive might still have
averted scorched earth, given the Iraqis' apparent unwillingness or
capability to carry out the threat, and even a very capable coalition
would probably have failed to avert scorched earth if the Iraqis had
been able and willing to follow through.
Now, that having been said, much of the explanation for OIF's
relative ease on the other hand lies in the interaction between our
strength and their particular weaknesses; that is, I would argue
that the skilled use of modern coalition technology interacted syn-
ergistically with Iraqi errors to produce unprecedented lethality
and a radically one-sided military confrontation.
Now, in this, no one technology and no one family of tech-
nologies, such as precision strike or information technology, was
really necessary. Practically any of the major advantages of Amer-
ican forces, ranging from the survivability of American armor, the
lethality of American firepower from both the ground and the air,
would have been sufficient given the skill differential between our-
selves and the Iraqis and synergistic nature of the interaction be-
tween skill and technology.
477
With the diverse panoply of sophisticated technologies, there
were lots of possible ways in which a highly skilled military could
exploit hostile mistakes with radical severity, and skill imbalance,
although it is necessary, isn't sufficient either. Comparable imbal-
ances between skill and motivation prior to 1991 had never pro-
duced outcomes as lopsided as either 1991 or 2003. Only together
can a skill imbalance and modern technology explain our abihty to
topple Saddam without heavy cost to lives or environmental dam-
age.
Now, given the synergy, our skill and technology would probably
produce similar results against other enemies as unskilled as the
Iraqis and with friendly forces no larger than 2003. But because
both technology and the major skill imbalance are required, even
the same coahtion skills and technology would probably not
produce comparable results against the more skilled opponent, and,
in particular, the troop level necessary to destroy a skilled force the
size of Saddam's might well have exceeded that available in 2003,
and even so, the losses required to do it could have been higher.
And this is because skilled militaries can survive stand off preci-
sion engagement and compel close combat on terms unfavorable to
us, as al-Qaeda has already demonstrated to us in 2001 and 2002
in Afghanistan, and with close combat, even with modern tech-
nology, it is inherently dangerous and labor intensive.
To survive our standoff precision, however, and compel that kind
of close combat requires very high tactical proficiency and ability
to use complex terrain for cover and concealment.
The Iraqis in 2003 were many things, but they were not highly
proficient tactically. Their poor training and leadership produced a
combination of mistakes, poor marksmanship, flawed dispositions,
that left them fatally exposed to coalition technology, and this in
turn enabled a small coalition force to prevail on a short, relatively
low-cost campaign, but it would be a mistake to assume similar
outcomes against better prepared opponents.
Now, this explanation implies some very different directions for
American defense planning than the views most common today in
the debate over the war. If the Iraqis' errors were necessary pre-
conditions for the 2003 outcome, then it would be risky to assume
similar outcomes against future opponents who may prove better
skilled or motivated, even if our technology improves.
Hence, it would be dangerous to accelerate modernization at the
expense of either mass or training. In skilled hands, today's tech-
nology is already tremendously lethal to unskilled enemies, but
even tomorrow's technology will have difficulty destroying skilled
operation at standoff ranges.
To lose today's skills in the pursuit of overkill would be a bad
bargain, and if better skilled enemies do prove better than the
Iraqis at providing standoff engagement, then losing the mass
needed to destroy enemies at close quarters would be dangerous,
even if we get newer technology in exchange. A transformation
agenda based on trading speed for mass and substituting standoff
precision for close combat capability would thus be a dangerous
prescription and a serious misinterpretation of the events of 2003.
Thank you.
478
[The prepared statement of Dr. Biddle can be found in the Ap-
pendix on page 544.]
The Chairman. Dr. Biddle, thank you very much, and, gentle-
men, you have all given us some outstanding statements and I
think some very provocative statements, and let me just start off
with something, just a general observation.
First, with respect, Dr. Krepinevich, with your assertion, I think
rightfully, that we should take this, the lessons from this, from this
engagement, as well as our last several, and look forward to a po-
tential problem in the Korea theater and other places — we did that
incidentally with this committee early on this year, and we put it
in an initiative for awhile. It was not called the Bomber Fund, we
put 100 million into Deep Strike because there is one school of
thought that goes toward unmanned deep strike systems, as well
as hand, so I believe we do need to start a new bomber program,
but we put a good solid piece of money against Deep Strike. The
appropriators had followed us on that. I think it is very important.
We also plussed up command, central, communications, comput-
ers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR), looking
at the same theater and the same problems that you have seen and
tankers before the tanker battle began to rage. This committee put
a solid slug of money against the tanker requirement because obvi-
ously projecting air power is going to be critical. I think we can
presume that the tactical aircraft (TacAir) bases on the Korean Pe-
ninsula could take a steady diet of gas and engagement, probably
rendering them inoperable.
We put another slug of money against precision munitions, be-
cause if you look at the levels that are classified, it is obvious that
we need a lot more than we have right now.
Having said that, though, I am reminded of a conversation I had
with a young Marine who had been shot up at the Nasiriyah choke
point, and his remarks and how they reflect the combination of sys-
tems that we had in this engagement. He was blown out of his —
the Marine equivalent of the armored personnel carrier (APC), the
light armored vehicle (LAV), and they were taking heavy fire, they
were pinned down, firing up from about 60 to 80 meters away from
the buildings. He said a couple of tanks swung in, they had a cou-
ple of Marine tanks that had been off on the other flank. These
tanks swung in, and they were pinned down, literally, and the
tanks started, as he said, to take down the walls of the buildings.
He said, within ten minutes of taking down these walls, the
Fedayeen, who had had them pinned down, came out with their
hands up.
Now, if you looked at the exchange ratios of dismounted soldiers
having to work door-to-door and stairway-to-stairway in an urban
situation, the casualty rate is extremely high. With the best tech-
nology we have it is still a pretty crude operation, and the U.S. cas-
ualty rate and all of our gains is extremely high. The best way to
take down people who are in a building firing up is to take them
down with long-range fire with heavy artillery or tank fire.
The other factor that I, looking back, think is important is I do
not believe we lost a single person who was in a heavy tank from
gunfire. We had one tank go off a bridge. We had one tank that
was struck at the seam on one of the thunder runs in Baghdad and
479
disabled, but I do not believe the crew was injured, so you have —
you look at the old. The old is heavy armor, and it was combined
with the new, that is precision munitions, and together they did
very well.
Now, we are going to have to live with the RPG from here on
out, and two people can get up on a roadside in a major artery in
the Baghdad theater and blow off RPGs at Humvees going by and
can set them afire and can kill people. Probably the only thing that
can stop that is lots of steel, and you have a number of different
species of RPGs, but the species that they are using right now in
most of these theaters is something that can be stopped by tanks,
by heavy armor, so you have this interesting situation where we
have an enemy — and you have, all three of you have, talked about
the capability of our enemies in conflicts past to devolve down into
small elements, which are able to produce casualties, and they
think casualties are important to Americans and they are right.
And yet one of the defenses, the best defense, the best practical de-
fense against these guerrilla type weapons is the old conventional
weapon with plenty of steel.
So what do you think, first, about the need to balance this force
that we are shaping. And, second, everything you have talked
about — all three of you have stressed, directly or indirectly, the
need to have intelligence as our enemies worked the periphery of
this spectrum of warfighting; that is, they understand that when
they are down in ones and twos and threes, in small groups with
weapons systems, they are able to do us damage.
How do we handle that?
And, so. Dr. Krepinevich, and I guess the threshold question on
that is, do we spend more money on intelligence, because the impli-
cation that you and General Scales have given is there is no sub-
stitute for having somebody in the room when they make the deci-
sion to ambush you or blow a land mine or do something else, and
that seems to be one area where we haven't spent much in terms
of resources.
I think it has been easier for us to engage somebody who has got
a new widget or a new technology than it is to go back and do some
old ham and eggs work in terms of building up a human intel-
ligence apparatus that can work in a theater like Iraq. And I think
we have a very inadequate system obviously in other theaters, like
Korea.
Dr. Krepinevich.
The Chairman. Dr. Krepinevich.
Dr. Krepinevich. I would agree with you in terms of a need for
increased focus on intelligence, and as you point out, Mr. Chair-
man, a different kind of intelligence; much greater emphasis on
human intelligence in terms of education, much greater emphasis
on area studies. We need to get smart about nations such as the
Islamic Nation, certain Arab terrorist groups, the way we got smart
about the Soviets during the Cold War. There are rising great pow-
ers like China that we need to understand, not because they are
our enemies, but because we need to understand how to avoid mak-
ing them our enemies or them becoming our enemies.
In terms of low-end military operations, human intelligence is ex-
tremely important in trying to understand the culture and the dis-
480
position of the population of a country. Our lack of experts, not
only language experts as General Scales mentioned, but just ex-
perts on cultures and peoples is rather pronounced compared to
where we need to be.
In terms of ISR assets, I mentioned that I think in the future,
we are going to need a different mix than we saw in Operation
Iraqi Freedom. If we want to continue that kind of persistent sur-
veillance that keeps enemies from concentrating
The Chairman. Elaborate on that a little bit.
Dr. Krepinevich. Again, if you look at Operation Iraqi Freedom,
a lot of what gave us persistent surveillance were things like sat-
ellites, but also Global Hawk, Predator, U-2 manned aircraft, and,
of course. Special Operations Forces that were operating well in-
side of Iraq, well in advance of our ground forces.
They did so, as Dr. Biddle said, against a very competent enemy,
an enemy that didn't have an integrated air defense or if it did,
didn't use it, and also in an environment where we still had fairly
robust access to forward bases from which to operate.
If you were to fast forward even to Korea a few months down the
road, again, as you pointed out, the ability to operate from forward
bases those assets, whether you are talking about Predators or
Global Hawk or U-2s, could be problematic.
In terms of the insurgence of Special Operations Forces, that
could become more difficult. In terms of the ability to fly, non-
stealthy systems that fly the Lazy 8s to give you persistent surveil-
lance. Global Hawk is not stealthy. Predator is not stealthy. These
systems are going to be vulnerable because of the risk of access to
forward bases and also the risk of operating against integrated air
defenses. And so what you are going to need, I think in those
areas, is to focus on more longer range platforms and also, quite
frankly, stealthy platforms.
Now, again, a lot of the stuff we have may be very good in a be-
nign environment for many years to come, an environment like Af-
ghanistan; but if you are worried about places like Iran or Korea,
over time I think you may need to think more about these kinds
of capabilities.
And then, finally, intelligence about just where some of the
emerging challenges that Secretary Rumsfeld talks about are head-
ed. Where is the challenge, for example, in terms of information
warfare operations? It is shrouded very much in secrecy and uncer-
tainty. We don't really know much about it. To the extent that
countries do see themselves competing in this area, certainly if you
look at the Chinese military literature, they are emphasizing this
area of warfare very heavily, and yet we are at a severe disadvan-
tage. Because when you build new aircraft, when you bid an air-
craft carrier and you have to take them out for tests or sea trials,
there is an indication that a military is moving in a certain direc-
tion.
Here you are talking about primarily human intelligence and
very little in the way of physical evidence that a country may be
moving in this direction. And so, I think we need intelligence in
those kinds of areas, as well.
Final point I will make is that historically speaking — and I think
Congressman Skelton would agree — your comment that typically
481
what you see even in pronounced changes in the form of warfare
is a mix of the new and the old. Aircraft carriers supplant battle-
ships, but they don't supplant cruisers, destroyers, submarines,
tankers. The tanks supplanted the horse cavalry, but they didn't
supplant the infantry, the artillery and the engineers.
And so, I think what we are going to see is a mix of the new and
old. The danger, though, is that we misidentify where the competi-
tion is headed, and so we don't calibrate correctly what that mix
of new and old is.
The Chairman. General Scales.
General SCALES. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. And incidentally. General Scales, I agree with
your comment about Ike Skelton as the father of joint operations,
or at least from this committee's standpoint.
General Scales. A couple of points. First of all, soldiers fight bet-
ter and lose less when they are mounted. In small wars that we
fought since the end of World War II, 80 percent of those soldiers
killed in action in those wars had been light infantrymen, 80 per-
cent. They represent less than 4 percent of the total force, less than
11 percent of the army and the Marine Corps, but 80 percent of
the — now, that is not accidents and disease. Those are people killed
in direct contact with the enemy.
Soldiers killed when they are mounted in anything, whether it
is a Humvee or tank or anything, decrease by an order of mag-
nitude.
So the first lesson, Mr. Chairman, I submit to you is that it is
important that the army develop the materiel to be able whenever
possible to fight matter. It is also interesting to note how thin a
line that is. I mean, all of the infantry soldiers in the American
Army today, if you collect them together, that totality is about the
size of a New York City Police Department. So you have a very
small number of people suffering — or with the possibility of suffer-
ing a higher casualty.
The second point is, if this is such a small number of men in the
close combat arms — by that I would include infantry, armor, spe-
cial forces, the usual suspects — then we need to do all we can to
make that close combat force, those who go eye to eye to the
enemy, so-called warriors, as good as we possibly can. They are su-
perb today, but emphasis on selection, bonding, unit-based rota-
tions, improved leadership training and education and programs
that improve the survivability of soldiers in what you refer to sort
of as the two block war is vitally important.
It is even more important, if you believe what the enemy believes
in us, and that is that our center of gravity is casualties. So if close
combat forces are suffering a disproportionate casualties, then we
need to do all we can to keep those young men alive, particularly
in a close fight.
So there is — people have talked recently about more and more of
the Army becoming more "SOF-like." I would argue that close com-
bat function is increasingly becoming more dispersed and many of
those skills will migrate over into the regular force, but we still —
there is a lot we can learn from the special operating community,
but they really are two separate functions.
482
On Andy's point about intelligence, I agree to a point, but, you
know, in combat even in Iraq today, your best source of actionable
intelligence, intelligence that you use to maneuver against the
enemy, to this — just as it was in World War II — is the eyes of the
soldier on the ground. It is a culturally savvy, tactically proficient,
smart young man or a woman who can sense the environment
around them, determine where the enemy is, report back and build
that body of evidence that you need to make key tactical decisions.
And so, while I think overhead systems are good and the idea of
an unblinking eye is spot-on, I do believe that training in intel-
ligence at the front-line level and dispersing and distributing the
intelligence function further and further down — you know, it
doesn't do any good to have an intelligence function that gives
great briefings in Kuwait. You want to have close-loop actionable
intelligence that gets back to the fighting men very quickly so he
can react to it.
And finally, the point about — and, again, I agree with my col-
league. No army in the history of the world has ever gone to war
as a homogenous force. Armies are made up of different elements
of legacy and cutting-edge systems, and that is a good thing, not
a bad thing.
I will give you one quick example. Sure, you need light forces
that are able — being delivered by air, armored forces to take the
enemy down. It is what we used to call operational maneuver from
the inside out. That is this inkblot approach to maneuver where
aerial delivered forces like Stryker or Future Combat System will
go into an area and — to give an analogy, it would be like having
two or three brigades that could land directly into Baghdad Inter-
national Airport and then start to collapse the Iraqis from the in-
side out.
But, you know, there comes a time when you face an adaptive
enemy who has a will to win, whose object is not to achieve victory,
but to avoid defeat; who will hunker down and go into cities with
complex terrain, and when that happens, then speed and agility
and knowledge give way, as you say, to mass weight-of-shell protec-
tion and the ability to go against the enemy face to face and take
him out into close battle. We have done that very well in the past,
but I will submit to you that with proper emphasis, with issues
that I have just mentioned, we will be able to do it better in the
future with fewer casualties, and I think ultimately that is why we
are all here.
The Chairman. Dr. Biddle.
Dr. Biddle. I think your emphasis on balance is exactly right. I
mean, long-range precision engagement is clearly a very powerful
capability. It is important. We want to have it. We want to modern-
ize it. We don't want to go to war without it.
I think there is a certain tendency, though, in the debate over
the future of warfare toward what might be called "strategic mon-
ism", or such an emphasis on the potential power of new tech-
nologies and especially new technology's ability to kill at standoff,
that people will advocate restructuring the U.S. military in a way
that could make it dependent on standoff precision engagement for
its effectiveness.
483
And I think as the fighting, for example, in Afghanistan sug-
gested, if we were fighting against opponents who are capable of
exploiting complex terrain for cover and concealment, who are ca-
pable of reducing their exposure to surveillance, reconnaissance
and long-range precision strike, we will need more than just long-
range precision in order to prevail, and that balance between an
ability to destroy targets at long standoff and an ability to com-
plement that with the ability to close the close quarters through
maneuver on the ground is what provides the unique strength that
the American military has brought to recent warfare, certainly all
the way back through 1991.
The Chairman. Yeah. The 10th Mountain Division actually killed
a lot of people in their rifle pitch at 10,000 feet elevation at close
range.
Dr. BiDDLE. That's right. Absolutely. And they would not for a
moment have wanted to do that without the kind of standoff fire-
power that the Air Force was providing them, but neither would
the Air Force have been able to do in the Sheepcote Valley what
was done without the 10th Mountain on the ground.
With respect to intelligence, I think again the point is absolutely
right. The intelligence is critical, and we ought to do everything we
can to improve the quality of our intelligence. And I agree with my
copanelists that human intelligence has been underemphasized and
is probably the key to doing better.
I think in that context, it is important to keep in context, though,
both the opportunities and the potential in the improvement of in-
telligence, but also the limits and constraints on what we will ulti-
mately be able to do. I think one of the reasons why balance is so
important is because balance is a hedge against limits on the abil-
ity of our intelligence to provide perfect situation awareness.
Again, I think opponents like Al Qaeda have already shown us
they are capable of reducing their exposure; perfect situation
awareness isn't available now and it isn't coming any time soon,
and balance in our force structure and training in our people is the
central hedge that enables us to prevail even when our situation
awareness is limited by our enemy's ability to exploit complex ter-
rain.
So we need to do better in finding out as much as we can about
our opponents, both the mechanical part of where they are located
and with what they are equipped, and also the cultural element of
how they think and how they are likely to behave. But, by the
same token, we need to keep in mind the constraints on how per-
fect that intelligence can ever get and what the implications of
those inherent imperfections are for the way we structure the mili-
tary.
The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Skelton.
Mr. Skelton. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman who was
first in the room today in honor of the time constraint that we
have.
Mr. Turner.
Mr. Turner of Ohio. Thank you very much, Mr. Skelton, for
yielding, and I appreciate our three witnesses being here today
with us.
484
When we think in terms of preparing for the war on terror, I
think the closing paragraph, General Scales, of your written state-
ment describes for me what I view as the front line of the war on
terror. You said — and I am only reading an excerpt from it — "Only
a soldier can describe the gut-churning fear that accompanies the
moment when the search and clear team kicks in a door to confront
whatever is inside.
"Within the confines of a tiny room, the soldier looks through the
two-dimensional grainy green image of his goggles to determine if
his welcome will come from a Fedayeen fanatic or a child huddled
with its mother in fear. Dripping with sweat, gripped with anxiety
and fear, the soldier has only an instant to determine whether to
shift his finger into the trigger well or reassure the occupants in-
side.
"Today this scene is repeated daily in Afghanistan and Iraq as
well as other places too secret to recount. These young soldiers
man point for a thousand dollars a month in the promise of a trip
home to a nation that hopefully understands and appreciates the
true meaning of sacrifice."
General Scales, it strikes me that that is the kind of warfare that
we are preparing for in the future. That is the warfare that does
not involve heavy bombers, long-range missiles, divisions of sol-
diers on the battlefield, and it seems to me that we have got to get
better about fighting that battle that you described in the closing
paragraph of your statement.
That does seem to involve a new effort that training Special
Forces operators, the importance, as you suggested, of gaining a
cultural awareness of that battlefield and that setting, understand-
ing what it is and what it takes to get into the inside, into the
mind of the enemy.
I just returned from a congressional delegation (CODED with
Chairman Saxton, and we spent two days in Iraq. We had the
chance to visit with a Special Forces team just the night after an
operation very similar to the one you described. It seems that that
is the kind of battle that we need to prepare for better.
To understand the enemy seems to require a much higher degree
of international cooperation and participation in those kind of oper-
ations, and when we visited with some of the Special Forces teams
in Iraq, one of the things that came up over and over again is that
we need more intelligence. They needed to know who was inside of
that house. They needed to know what they were going to — where
they needed to go to root out the enemy.
And so, indeed, we are engaged, I think, in a new warfare. It
seems that in addition to precision-guided missiles, we need to
have precision targeting, and one of the things that I wish you
would address for us — and perhaps this is kind of a thinking out
of the box, but I know in passing it certainly crossed my mind prior
to our invasion to Iraq, and I think it crossed the minds of many
other members, is what would happen if our approach to taking on
the terrorist threat, the bad guys, involved more targeting of that
terrorist threat rather than a massive invasion to change the re-
gime, which we believe to be hiding and harboring those terrorists
in Iraq? Could we perhaps, if we had the capability, have targeted
485
50 leaders and taken them out and achieved a victory over a re-
gime that we thought planned and plotted to do us harm?
It seems to me that that kind of warfare is the kind of warfare
that we are going to have to be prepared to fight in every corner
of the globe, and it is going to require a lot of cooperation, assist-
ance and joint special forces type of operations. So give me your
views on that vision of
General Scales. Well, obviously, Congressman Turner, you are
preaching to the choir here. A couple of points. First of all, it is im-
portant to understand the value of trust. Trust is a — I am talking
about trust between soldiers from other nations and our own. I am
talking about trust between national security elements of our coun-
try and others, particularly in America's security perimeter. Trust
in many ways is like a commodity.
It is like owning — having a checkbook, and you write checks
building trust not just two months before you go into a country
seeking to find bases, but you build trust patiently, methodically,
over time by treating the armies and allies in other nations as
equals, by building a sense of bond and commandeer, a sort of
international band of brothers approach. That then when a conflict
occurs in this region, you can then start writing checks on that.
You can build that — you can begin to draw back the benefits of
that trust.
This is something that takes enormous patience. You simply
can't just set up a policy that directs a series of international sales
or perhaps contact teams to these nations and expect that trust to
be built over time.
Second is the idea of — and I think you said it very, very well, is
the idea that increasingly the center of gravity, the hard part of
this war on terrorism is beginning to devolve to an ever smaller
group of men and women. And I mentioned earlier in my statement
that these forces make up a very small percentage of our total
force, and it is important — and you have seen this yourself — it is
important to understand how hard this really is. It is very, very
hard, and the price of failure is not only your own death but the
death of your buddies.
It is enormously taxing, and it is physically debilitating, but most
importantly — and I think the point I tried to make earlier is criti-
cal to emphasize here. War is an intellectual, a thinking man's
game as well as a — you know, many of the people you saw, I think
you would probably testify, weren't Rambo-like figures. These were
very introspective, pensive, brilliant young men who were — as I
said in that piece — operating for $1,000 a month and serving some-
thing greater than just, you know, their own paycheck.
So my point to you is, yes, you are right, war in the shadows has
to be fought by an elite. All I suggest to you is a couple of points.
Number one is that the lead can be made larger. Right now I think
there is something like 13,000 Special Operating Forces in all of —
ground forces in all of the American military. I think the war on
terror is going to demand that that be expanded, but it has to be
expanded carefully, because as I said, this is sort of like drafting
for the National Football League (NFL), you know. You are draft-
ing a professional team that is made up of very, very exceptional
486
men and women, and it takes years to develop individually and de-
velop collectively.
The second thing I would suggest to you — again, agreeing with
you, is the importance of any time a person is put into harm's way,
they have to go in knowing about what is there. They have to un-
derstand not just the strategic environment, where the buildings
are, where the fences are, you know, where the mine fields are,
they also have to have a sharper exquisite tuning of their ability
to understand their enemy.
Look, there is a big difference between fighting the 5th Corps
around Mosul and fighting the Fedayeen on Najaf. And the dif-
ference isn't the weapons they carry. It isn't the appearance on a
roadside. The difference is what is between their ears and under-
standing your enemy, and having this fingertip-feel for who you are
about to go against is the surest way to save lives.
So, yes, I would agree with you that war in the shadows de-
mands a very patient type of conflict. It demands an immersion in
the culture, long-term association of the building of trust, and then
when the direct action occurs, it has to be done by exquisitely
trained, carefully selected, tightly bonded, superbly well-led young
men and women who play at the NFL level of proficiency in the
future. That is how you save lives.
Mr. Turner of Ohio. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman. And the Chairman of the
committee that oversees Special Operations, Mr. Saxton.
Mr. Saxton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First, let me thank you,
Mr. Chairman, for continuing the effort to look at the recent con-
flicts from as many different perspectives as we have been able to,
and this morning's panel has been very productive in that regard.
So thank you, and thank the panel members for being here this
morning.
As I sat and listened to your presentations, it was, I think, very
instructive for those of us who are — who have the responsibility of
trjdng to figure out what it is we need to do going forward based
on what we have seen in the past and what we see currently. So
thank you for your perspectives. It has been most beneficial.
As I sat and listened to you each, I came to maybe an inevitable
conclusion, or at least I believe that we, looking forward, need to
be very much aware of two kinds of things. One was just pointed
out by my good friend and colleague, Jim Turner, who expressed
a belief that I have as well, that certainly the kinds of enemies that
we face in the future will be the same as enemies that we face in
the past and also much different.
On the one hand, we are going to have to continue, as you have
all pointed out, to face whatever is defined as conventional at the
time, a set of enemies that will develop — continue to develop tech-
nologies and will be nation-states. Korea was — North Korea was
mentioned a couple of times earlier, and certainly the capabilities
to address those types of potential conflicts will remain very impor-
tant for us to keep an eye on. But at the same time, as Mr. Turner
points out, there is a different kind of warfare that has manifest
itself in the last decade or two. And Dr. Krepinevich has noted that
the Iraq war is a datapoint, and it obviously had a conventional
487
element, and it has an asymmetric nonconventional element that
Mr. Turner was talking about.
Another data point is provided by recent experience in Afghani-
stan. Another data point is provided by the Russian experience in
Chechnya. Another datapoint was provided a decade or so ago by
the Soviet Union's experience in Afghanistan. And certainly, those
datapoints point to a trend in warfare that we are experiencing
today.
So I guess my question is this: Given the broad range of potential
threats that we face, I can, at least for myself, divide them into two
categories. One category a conventional kind of a threat that con-
tinues to evolve, and another set of threats that were defined on
a trend line by the datapoints that I just mentioned. And I am
wondering, I guess, what is your advice; what is your guidance to
us on how we keep a balance in meeting those two different sets
of threats?
General Scales. I think. Congressman, you have the right word,
and that word is balance. It is interesting to note that in 1940, the
Germans built one army for one purpose, to fight one enemy in one
theater, and they did it brilliantly, first against the Poles and then
against the French. But then when they went against the Russians
nine, ten months later, suddenly they were fighting in an entirely
different environment against — fighting an opponent who had an
entirely different set of rules and in terrain that was totally dif-
ferent. And they failed. And the lesson from that is that if you are
just a regional power and you are only looking at fighting on a sin-
gle front, then you can afford to take risks and go on a single sort
of model, if you will, of warfare; but if you are a great power as
we are, you have global obligations that run the whole spectrum —
not only the spectrum of the globe, but the spectrum of conflict,
then you have to build a toolbox with many, many different tools
in it.
Another point I would make to you is that I agree with you — you
have to prepare for two different sets of wars, sort of the conven-
tional and the irregular nonconventional war, but particularly what
we are seeing, particularly in Iraq lately, is that even the wars
themselves meld together so that you may find a phase that is very
conventional, and then the ships in the plains all go home and sud-
denly you find yourself in the same war, oftentimes against the
same enemy, who then decides to take a different option and adapt
himself.
The second point I will make to you is you need balance, and you
need adaptability. You know, in many ways, it is like a foot race.
You have an enemy who is starting to get — we have allowed him
now, what, 11 different opportunities to watch the American army
in action since the Second World War, and they are starting to pick
up on it and they are starting to adapt. They are finding ways to
offset our technological advantages by using advantages of their
own.
You know, we have precision, speed and knowledge, and he has
got mass and will. He has got owning the home court, and he has
got proximity to the theater of war. And so, what it comes up to
is sort of a foot race, if you will, between two different opponents,
both of whom want to adapt. And my concern is — not now, but in
488
the years ahead, I hope we have the flexibiUty and the adaptabihty
to change our style of war and to change the way we look at war
to keep up with the pace at which our enemies appear to be adapt-
ing.
And I think it is important to realize that technology can work
for the enemy as well as us, another cautious point. I was in China
a few years ago, and I remember a Chinese general saying to me
that we have our own transformation, and the use of the Internet
and cell phones and modern communications and satellite will
allow us to fight our style of war better, you know, to disperse, to
go to ground, to focus on area control, to win tactical battles, to de-
feat you one soldier at a time.
In many ways, technology works for us just as — so he said, your
ability to see, track, sense and kill us is offset by our ability to use
technology to disperse, to go to ground, to deceive and to fight a
distributed battle.
So just because you have overwhelming technology doesn't nec-
essarily mean that the ball is always in our court. It may very well
mean in the future that our ability to adapt to, go beyond tech-
nology or to use our technology in new and imaginative ways will
allow us to keep up with the enemy's decision loop, which I believe,
and I think all in this room would agree, is becoming increasingly
more tight and more efficient and more threatening.
Dr. Krepinevich. Let me just add to what General Scales said.
Like he, I agree with your point about the need for balance. As I
mentioned earlier, I think, quite frankly, if you look at where the
competition is heading, it doesn't look very much like Gulf War I
or Gulf War II, for the very obvious reason that to oppose us that
way ensures a rather spectacular defeat.
A century ago, we were faced with — at least what we thought at
the time was a similar level of uncertainty about who our next ad-
versary might be, how they might come against us. And at the
time, the American navy developed something called the color
plans. Plan black was for Germany. Plan red was for England. Plan
orange was for Japan and so on. And they looked at different con-
tingencies so as to have a balance, because after all, militaries are
designed to protect us against the threats to our security.
And certainly, if you look at the situation today, I think, again,
there are a number of candidates for what might be a 21st century
set of color plans. There is, as was mentioned by Congressman
Turner, the Global War on Terrorism, which I think is really a mis-
nomer. I think it is a theologically-motivated transnational insur-
gent movement that may have access at some point to weapons of
mass destruction, which is the reason for the strong link to unsta-
ble third world regimes that seem to be acquiring these weapons.
But as I mentioned before, Korea — there is a contingency there.
Taiwan — I was struck by the fact that when the Chinese tested
their missiles off the coast of Taiwan in 1996, they launched them
near the only two ports in Taiwan that are capable of handling oil
and liquefied natural gas (LNG) tankers, and, of course, if Taiwan's
energy sources were held at risk, that would perhaps lead to the
Finlandization of Taiwan.
Indonesia — how would we — as the world's really only blue water
navy, support the movement of commerce through the Indonesian
489
Archipelago if a country like that became unstable, critical to east
Asian economies and perhaps to our own economy, as well.
Pakistan, I talked about the failure of a nuclear state. Iran — we
have run a number of contingencies looking at Iran. One of the
things that was particularly striking at the large field exercise mil-
lennium challenge 2002 was the extraordinary difficulty our mari-
time forces had operating close to the coast against even a third-
rate power armed with high-speed antiship cruise missiles. We lost
over a dozen ships in that exercise, something that hasn't been
very widely publicized.
Stability operations in the Global War on Terrorism. Space — a
number of issues there. Information warfare, homeland defense
against the covert use of weapons of mass destruction. There are
a number of fairly clear problems, I think, for us that we need to
address, and they do involve a balance of forces, because obviously,
as General Scales has said, a homogenous force is not going to be
optimal for this range of challenges that we face. You are going to
need a balance. You are going to need a mix, and the difficult part
of the question, I think, is identifying what that mix is when you
have so many significant threats.
Dr. BiDDLE. To expand very briefly on a couple of the points that
my colleagues have raised, the particular role that we can balance
to play in the future of warfare and this melding of the conven-
tional and the unconventional and the trends we see in threat be-
havior, one of the things I have always found interesting about ir-
regular warfare or, if you like, low-intensity conflict, is that tradi-
tionally it has not involved an attempt to hold ground on the part
of the enemy. They raid, they harass using some combination of
cover and concealments and intermingling and dispersionist tactics.
One of the things I think is most interesting about the recent
fighting in both Afghanistan and in Iraq is we see combatants who
are trying to take and hold ground, who have fairly traditional geo-
graphic objectives, and they are trying to deny them to us or secure
them for themselves; but they do this using some of the tactics of
traditional irregular warriors who weren't trying to hold territory.
Both Al Qaeda and the paramilitaries in Iraq dispersed, sought
cover and concealment with mixed effectiveness, especially in Iraq,
and sought intermingling with civilian populations as a way of con-
cealing themselves from our technological advantages.
If you think that trend is going to continue — and I think there
is good reason to suppose that it will — that then brings us back to
the question of, how should we respond and what kind of balance
are we looking for in doing that, and I think one of the things that
a balanced military provides for you is the capacity, once you dis-
cover what the new problem is, to deepen and strengthen yourself
in a relatively efficient way to get good at the problem you now
face, because you are generally pretty able to do a pretty wide
range of things.
By contrast, if we were to reoptimize the military around some
particular conception of the future threat. The future threat is ter-
rorism or the future threat is WMD, and we are going to design
the military to solve that problem. If we get surprised or if the
trend in the future is different in degree, a melding of the conven-
tional and the unconventional rather than the emergence of the un-
490
conventional to supplant the way we always thought wars would
be fought before, then we end up in a situation where now we are
extraordinarily good at one thing and not real good at much else,
and our ability to shift, once we find out where the future lies and
build on some existing capacity in other areas, could go down.
And, again, I think balance is one of the more important themes
to draw from our recent experience in warfare, and I think one of
the important things it does is it allows you to adapt more readily
once you discover what the future holds.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
Dr. Snyder.
Dr. Snyder. Thank you, gentlemen. Thank you for being here.
Your statements and you comments this morning are, I think, real-
ly overwhelming in terms of the — I guess it is reflecting your years
of experience in thinking about these kinds of issues and pointing
out that this thinking needs to continue to go on.
Mr. Krepinevich — or Dr. Krepinevich, you brought up the point
about leading an independent analysis, and I think, General
Scales, I saw you nodding your head in favor of some kind of inde-
pendent review. I haven't really thought so much about an inde-
pendent analysis. We have had a bit of a skirmish in the Congress
in the committee over Mr. Skelton's efforts to try to get a draft, ap-
parently, of lessons learned from the joint chiefs that was released
to the Washington Times, and yet we can't get it. And I have to —
I will confess here personally; I called the reporter and said, please,
oh please, since, you know, high-ranking members of this commit-
tee can't get that report, would you be interested in sharing with
us? And he said he wouldn't because of concerns that there would
be something in it that could trace the source back.
But, to me, that really brought home — if we needed any kind of
a strong argument about the need for an independent analysis, it
is the fear that whatever was in that report was fairly harsh to-
ward the administration. I give them credit toward looking at, you
know, where weaknesses were in the planning process, but now
you have this fear that that is going to be watered down, and I
think it really makes the point for having an independent group.
But do you all have in mind a specific way of doing that? I mean,
is there a — I hadn't really thought about what that would look like.
Would it be something the military would do to say, here, we need
to have an independent group? Does it need to be done by legisla-
tion? Is it something the President would put together?
Dr. Krepinevich. There are several ways you could do this. Con-
gressman. One would be to follow the model of really the last large
independent review, which was the Gulf War Air Power Survey
back in 1991. At that time it was the Secretary of the Air Force
who set up an independent group. It was headed by Dr. Elliott
Cohen, who is an academic, but there were members of the Air
Force staff who worked with Cohen and his group, along with a
number of prominent civilians. One was Wick Murray, who worked
with Bob Scales on his book. Another was Barry Watts, who re-
cently completed his tour as Director of Program Analysis & Eval-
uation (PA&E) in the Pentagon
Dr. Snyder. So you are saying it doesn't require a statute; it just
requires a commitment
491
Dr. Krepinevich. It required a commitment by a senior Defense
Department leader, but, obviously, Congress back in Gulf War I re-
quired that a lessons-learned study be undertaken. Essentially,
they directed the Pentagon to undertake it. I think you could have
legislation, as you have in the past — for example, I served on the
National Defense Panel back in 1997. It was established by Con-
gress for a particular purpose, and it was done in conjunction with
the Defense Department so that we could draw on people an exper-
tise in information to be provided by the Defense Department as
part of our deliberations, and I think there is the possibility of
going that route, as well.
Dr. Snyder. I think most of us have been impressed with the
joint reviews that are going on.
I want to ask you. Doctor, another question. You mentioned in
your statement, I think in both your oral and written, about — well,
you specifically say, emerging challenges — how might a collapsing
state's weapons of mass destruction be secured before it falls into
the wrong hands?
One of my concerns about what is happening now in Iraq over
the last several months and even ongoing is personnel. I mean, I
am inclined to want to add on to that how might we secure the
weapons of mass destruction and the scientists who made them be-
fore the scientists get in the wrong hands? I mean, if I had to
choose between securing 20 chemical warheads or keeping that sci-
entist from going out of the country and selling his services to
someone else, I think I would take a chance on securing the sci-
entists and take my chance on the 20 warheads not falling into the
wrong hands, because the brain power behind the weapons can be
more dangerous than the weapons themselves.
Do you have any comments about that? Should that be part of
our thinking as we go into this?
Dr. Krepinevich. I think, quite frankly, you have to look at both.
At the end of the Cold War, Congress and the administration began
to focus very intently on scientists in the former Soviet Union and
tr5ring to identify ways to make sure that they continued to be em-
ployed, because, again, the Soviet economy was collapsing, to make
sure that you didn't have that brain drain going to the wrong coun-
tries to help on projects that would be injurious to our own secu-
rity.
I think one of the problems is — and I think it was former De-
fense Secretary Schlesinger testifying before this committee that
once said, if you have the knowledge to run a baby formula factory,
you probably have the knowledge and the capability to fabricate
chemical weapons. And if you have the knowledge and the ability
to run a microbrewery, you can probably fabricate biological weap-
ons.
So one of the problems is that this knowledge is becoming ubiq-
uitous, that many of the secrets are out of the box. And when it
becomes — I think in the case of nuclear weapons, it is getting the
fissile material and then getting the manufacturing process so that
you can fabricate a workable weapon.
And, again, I think it is those areas that we need to focus on,
and quite frankly, I don't think it is an either-or issue. You get the
weapons or do you get the scientists. I think you have to work both
492
ends of the problem. And that gets back to, I think, what a number
of members on this committee have alluded to, which is the critical
importance of intelligence, not only in terms of identifying coun-
tries that have them and don't, but where they might have them.
And that is an awfully demanding proposition, I think.
Dr. Snyder. Thank you. My time is up, but Dr. Biddle, your com-
ments about speed — I suspect you did a true-false question for
Members of Congress about speed being the key to avoiding the oil
fields being detonated and all the bad things happening. I think
most of us would say yes, that is what it was and that would shape
our behavior on the future. So I think those comments will develop
as you study this more. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Saxton [presiding]. Mr. Schrock.
Mr. Schrock. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you the
three of you for being here. I am just sorry that more of my col-
leagues aren't here to hear what you have to say, because this is
very important information that they need to have.
The discussion we were having on intelligence — and the last time
I was in Iraq, every single general, every commanding general
made it very clear that what he needed most was intelligence and
Special Operations Forces. That is when the debate was going on
whether we need hundreds and thousands of more troops
Mr. Saxton. Mr. Schrock, could you give that microphone
Mr. Schrock. Usually I can be heard. I am sorry. When the sub-
ject was going on whether we needed hundreds of thousands of
more troops on the ground, commanders over there were saying, in-
telligence people and Special Operations Forces. So I agree with
that.
General Scales, I have not read your book. I probably need to
read your book. But I am wondering in there if you talked about
the issue that seems to be cropping its head more and more every
day, and that is the Reserve and the National Guard. In the last
couple of days we have heard some — we have seen some rather
compelling stories on the nightly news.
In fact, I saw one twice this morning on the Fox News about —
first of all, the length of tours; second, disturbing story out of Fort
Stewart, where many, many of the Reservists are going after they
leave Iraq with injuries, and they showed some today in casts and
on crutches and that we are so told they are not getting the treat-
ment that they should be getting down there.
And then I would like to ask. Dr. Krepinevich, Dr. Snyder took
the one question — I was going to ask that one — but you mentioned
that there is a serious disconnect in transformation. I am fas-
cinated by that, and I would of course — with the transformation
command, Giambastiani, being in the district I represent, I am
very interested in what — if you could expand on that. But General
Scales.
General Scales. Well, Congressman, I think you are spot-on. I
don't think that in the mid 1970's, when General Abrams built the
formulation of how the Army National — or the National Guard and
the Reserves would play in a future campaign, had any idea that
by 2003 they would have become so committed — and I use the word
maybe so professionalized — that we are at a point now in our his-
tory where when you go into a theater and you walk around a
493
headquarters or a field unit, there is literally no difference between
either the performance or the job description or the qualifications
between, you know, regular soldiers and Reservists and National
Guardsmen.
And so what that means is you have taken a part of the Re-
serves, not all but a part of them, and you have sort of — in many
ways over a period of time you have professionalized them.
Well, if you are going to professionalize a force like this and put
them into long-term deployments, then the traditional means of —
fill in the blank — family support, training, equipping leaders in
leader development — all those different things probably will have
to go through some review in order to accommodate these new re-
alities. You can't take a mid 19th century concept of what the re-
serves should be in our country, this militia tradition, and apply
it to 2003 whole cloth without making some serious accommoda-
tions. xAjid I think what you have seen and what you have men-
tioned to us is nothing more than perhaps just some indicators that
this sort of thing needs to be reviewed.
And then finally, I guess I would say that, you know, if you are
a part-time soldier, the word is part-time, and if you are going to
ask that soldier to do something that is full-time for an extended
period of time, that has enormous implications to his family, to his
business, to his well-being, to his professional development and so
forth. So many out there somewhere is a middle ground, but I abso-
lutely believe, sir, that we must take a look at it, we must study
it to make sure we don't just continue as we have in the past.
Mr. SCHROCK. I think this is probably the first war where it has
really been — my son and my chief of staff are both reservists. They
understood when they raised their hands what the commitment
was, but as you said, it was part-time, and some of the reservists
now I know are going out — there was a story on NBC the other
night — I don't usually watch NBC news. It was a fluke, but I
watched it anyhow. And they had a family on from Westerville,
Ohio. He was a 45-year old reservist and he would been there for
7 or 8 or 9 months. He got there actually in March, was going to
be there till April next year.
He wasn't complaining, but they are going to go under financially
because they are independent business owners, and I don't believe
the active duty folks are doing that. The reservists were told when
they went there they would probably be there six months. I don't
know why anybody told them that.
When I went to Vietnam, I knew it was 13 months, period, and
I think that is probably part of the problem.
General Scales. Two weeks ago, I went to visit one of my colo-
nels. When I was a brigade commander. His son, Shawn Kelley,
was a reservist who lost his right leg below the knee. Look, if that
is not — if that is not professional sacrifice, I don't know what is,
and he was in the civil affairs battalion and is a great, great kid
who was going to college at the time. So you are absolutely right.
Mr. SCHROCK. And you are right; at the time I was in Afghani-
stan, both times in Iraq, active duty and reserve, you couldn't tell
them apart.
I know my time is up, but I would love to hear Dr. Krepinevich's
comment on the transformation disconnect.
494
Dr. Krepinevich. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I, Hke you, am an
admirer of Admiral Giambastiani and the efforts of Joint Forces
Command.
By way of giving you a fairly brief answer, let me allude to some-
thing that was conducted shortly before he arrived to take com-
mand last year, which was the exercise Millennium Challenge
2002, and it was designed against a low-end — that is, second, third-
tier military power adversary — within an anti-access area denial
environment. And it showed up the things that a good field exer-
cise should show up. It showed up areas of advantage and also
problem areas that we need to address.
For example, they deployed some Stryker units to a forward op-
erating base. Well, the forward operating base was at risk of attack
by regular forces and also regular forces using, potentially, chemi-
cal weapons. That was one area identified.
It would have been under threat of missile attack, quite likely,
unless one assumes that the Strykers, which are supposed to be
able to deploy a brigade in 96 hours, were going to deploy after the
Air Force after only 96 hours had destroyed all the mobile ballistic
and cruise missile forces that might have held that base at risk.
The Strykers deploy with three to seven days' worth of supplies.
When the maritime forces began to move aggressively into littoral,
they were attacked by coastal vessels masquerading as commercial
ships, but which were armed with high-speed anticruise ship mis-
siles. And following the exercise, a number of people in the Navy
said, if that is the problem, we are going to start at the edge of
the littoral, which is 200 nautical miles out and begin to work our
way in.
So what do you do with that Stryker unit that deploys with three
to seven days' worth of supplies? How do you get supplies to that
unit?
So what I am saying is, we are in the initial period of trying to
work our way through those challenges, and I think what we are
seeing is that there are a number of disconnects. There are things,
for example, that the Army is assuming that its sister services, the
Air Force and the Navy can do, to enable its transformation vision,
but there are things they may not be able to do or may not be able
to do them along the time lines that are envisioned by the Army.
And I think this is an effort that needs to continue. I think it is
going to have to continue with the prompting of the Congress, be-
cause we wouldn't have Joint Forces Command and there wouldn't
have been the Millennium Challenge 2002 exercise without pres-
sure from the Hill.
Mr. SCHROCK. There was an interesting scenario with the
afteraction report with a particular three star Marine Corps gen-
eral who had fascinating
Dr. Krepinevich. Paul VanRiper.
Mr. SCHROCK. Paul VanRiper. And to this day, I am not sure ex-
actly if he was right or if he was wrong, but it is something we cer-
tainly need to look at, that is for sure.
Dr. Krepinevich. Absolutely.
Mr. ScHROCK. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Schrock, and thank you for
bringing up the subject of lessons learned with regard to the Re-
495
serves. There are some good lessons that we have learned, some
things that we need to do, and the Secretary of Defense is focusing
on one of them, and that is the length of time necessary for mobili-
zation and whether we are resourcing the Reserve component cor-
rectly in preparing them for mobilization and how long we can
cut — how we can squeeze down the period necessary for mobiliza-
tion by resourcing perhaps differently. It is a big subject and some-
thing that we need to pay a lot of attention to.
If a guy is going to get called up, and we are going to tell him
that he has got to put his boots on the ground for some number
of months, but he has to spend 45 days getting ready for that, it
is not really some number of months he is going to be away from
his family and his job. It is going to be some number of months
both on the ground plus the mobilization period which makes it
that much tougher.
Mr. Larsen.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First question is for Dr.
Krepinevich, and you talked about the U.S. being in the regime
change business, based on the last 15 years, and I think you are
probably right, but I want to ask a question about that. The regime
policy seems to be a military policy alone as opposed to a national
security policy, and I want to explain that a little bit.
We had a hearing earlier this year on worldwide military com-
mitments, and the basic conclusion of that hearing was, we have
enough people in our military for our military commitments, but
what we didn't focus on was our post-military commitments. That
is, we have enough people to do what we want militarily, but it
seems that Iraq — Operation Iraqi Freedom or post-Operation Iraqi
Freedom, has shown that we may not have the people in our active
duty military to do what we need to do after we take a military
action. And the implications that has for doing something else
somewhere else as well.
You quickly mentioned post — I think you called it stability oper-
ations or post-stability operations. Could you talk about that —
about stability operations, what you mean by that, the implication
for our post-military action commitments and, as well, what that
means for our future military — you know, not proposed, but theo-
rized, I guess, theorized military actions in the future?
Dr. Krepinevich. Certainly. What I mean by stability operations
is, when you depose a regime, unless there is a regime that is from
that country that is ready to take charge — we haven't seen that
yet — what you are left with is essentially an induced failed state,
and you need to impose order. And whatever new regime is going
to be put into place — I think particularly this holds true in places
like Afghanistan and Iraq — you are still fighting against the rem-
nants of the old regime, whether it is the Taliban or the Ba'athists
or Islamic terrorists. And in that case, you are, in a sense, left with
operations that are designed to provide some level of stability. And
what you are hoping, over the long-term, as part of a traditional
counterinsurgency, is that you will win over the hearts and minds
of the people, which is to say that the people will voluntarily agree
that they like the outcome that you propose, that they like the new
order that you propose to put into effect.
496
And then winning their minds is convincing them that, in fact,
you can succeed, that you are, in fact, going to prevail, because
even if they Hke your agenda, if they feel you are, over the long-
term, going to lose and can't provide them with physical security,
then they are going to be much more reluctant to support your ef-
forts.
What this means traditionally for the United States is it is typi-
cally a very land power-intensive operation. I am not one for rules
of thumb, but the traditional rule of thumb is 3-to-l advantage to
conduct offensive operations in a conventional war and a 10- or 15—
to— 1 advantage in force levels to conduct counterinsurgency oper-
ations effectively. This is a light infantry war, and these kinds of
conflicts tend to be protracted, because it takes quite some time for
people to build up confidence to the point where they are willing
to provide you — this is often the critical element of intelligence
when the population of a country actually begins to point out who
the leadership is in terms of the insurgence, where their infrastruc-
ture is and who comprises it.
If we are going to be in this business and if, in fact, we can't
withdraw precipitously or over a few years as we did in places like
Haiti or Somalia, then this gets to the problem that General Scales
was just talking about — the fact that you have to deploy fairly siz-
able numbers of forces over a protracted period. And right now we
only have 33 active brigades in the Army, and in order to recruit
and retain people, the Army says you need about a 4-to-l rotation
base, which leaves about eight brigades available for these kinds
of operations; but we have 16 in Iraq, 2 in Afghanistan, and 2 con-
ducting unaccompanied tours in Korea. That is 20.
A 4-to-l ratio would give you an 80-brigade Army. Obviously we
are not going to see an 80-brigade Army. So we are going to have
to find some way of dealing with this problem, and I think, quite
frankly, there are three possible solutions. One is the importance
of allies. Allies, not so much in a traditional sense that we need
them to win the big battles as you point out; but rather, we need
allies to help legitimize our operations in the international commu-
nity and also allies to provide support for the operations that follow
major combat.
Second, training indigenous forces. And I think, quite frankly,
this is where the administration is placing a lot of its effort right
now to train up indigenous Iraqi forces that are loyal to the people
we want to support so that they can begin to provide for their own
security.
And third, of course, is to — the Army uses the word reroll, but
essentially to restructure our forces so that they are more effective
in these kinds of operations, so that they are more oriented for this
kind of conflict.
And in the future, I think, quite frankly, that we are going to
have to rely on all three of those elements if we are going to be
in this business, as I said. And given the administration's advance-
ment of preemption as a possible course of action, and given that
the Global War on Terrorism is likely to be protracted, and given
continued concerns about the proliferation of nuclear weapons, I
think that this trend is likely to continue for the foreseeable future.
And so we will have to make a greater effort in this area.
497
Mr. Larsen. So we are not there yet?
Dr. Krepinevich. Not hardly.
Mr. Larsen. Anybody else?
General Scales. One quick caution. History has shown that if
you — if an Army devotes itself to constabulary — type of missions,
whether it is counterinsurgency or stability operations — whatever
you call it — over time the fighting fiber of that organization will at-
rophy and suffer. So the idea of rerolling or rebuilding an army or
parts of an army strictly for the purpose of constabulary missions,
in the long term, ultimately will work to the detriment of the serv-
ice. They use as an example, of course, the two divisions that were
in Japan, 1946 to 1950, and I think it was the first cavalry division
and the 24th division. The Korean War breaks out, they go to
Korea. Task Force Smith. And they perform in combat like a con-
stabulary division. It is just a warning.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Franks.
Mr. Franks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, gentle-
men. You know. General Scales, I have to say to you, when you
first opened this meeting without any flattery whatsoever, I was
very impressed with what I saw to be a profound insight. You
know, most of the time when a general speaks, people consider
their expertise in battlefield tactics and military strategies, but you
spoke of the enemy's intent, their will, their motivation and their
mindset, and I would just suggest to you that that is a profound
insight that I think is critically important to this entire debate.
Mr. Franks. Because indeed, you know, it's the mindset, the in-
tensity of conviction, if you will, that is really at the heart of terror-
ism, because people who are willing to do almost anything at great
risk to themselves outside the canon of generalized ethics in the
world — you know, to change into asymmetric tactics that would be
considered completely outside, military generality. Indeed, that is
the great challenge that we face, because you know, I suppose any
terrorist out there today of any noteworthiness could find a, say,
50-caliber quad machine gun.
That is no longer a big deal with us, but yet 200 years ago that
could have ruled the world in a properly equipped 50-caliber quad
machine gun, a Quad 50; and I will suggest to you that the day
will come when terrorists will be able to access nuclear weapons or
weapons of profound capability that will take and change this para-
digm so profoundly that it will compel all of us to consider what
you are saying in terms of the mindset, in terms of being able to
win the war of ideals.
You know, our terrorist opponents here have considered this a
holy war; in other words, their religious conviction is what has mo-
tivated some of them, and sometimes that is difficult for us in the
political environment to really face directly, but I think it is impor-
tant.
You know, Osama bin Laden has made this statement that ob-
taining nuclear weapons is a religious duty, and that is great moti-
vation; that is great mindset; that has great intensity, and is some-
thing we need to be extremely aware of.
General Scales. Yes.
498
Mr. Franks. And I would suggest to you that the miUtary forces
at the end of World War II recognized that they had to deal with
some of these religious factions and they, after letting the politi-
cians of the day try to encourage the people of Japan or the leaders
of Japan to write a constitution with a religious freedom clause in
it that would turn some of these expressions of religiosity internal
to where we debated them with words, rather than with bombs.
General Scales. They understood the importance of that, and fi-
nally it was General McCarthy and people like that, really your
predecessors, that said to the world, we need to, if necessary, im-
pose some constitutional provisions that require religious freedom
so that these outgrowths, or these expressions of religious fervor,
can be turned in toward debate rather than war, rather than flying
airplanes into ships or flying airplanes into buildings today.
And I think it is pretty profound and I ask you a difficult ques-
tion: Will there be any effort on your part or your contemporaries'
here to begin to encourage the political leaders to make sure that
we have a religious freedom clause in the coming Iraqi constitu-
tion?
There's an article in today's Washington Times, Bruce Fein — I
hope everyone reads that — the difficulty of that, but also the criti-
cal nature. And I just believe that, number one, the military forces
that are losing men and women on the battlefield have the greatest
motivation to do that, because if we fail to have that, I am con-
vinced that we will be fighting the same thing 20 or 30 years from
now; and it may be, rather than having to deal with the asymmet-
ric RPGs or something along those lines, that we will be dealing
with weapons of much greater destruction.
Now, I almost made a statement, more than a question, here,
and I apologize for that, but I wanted to try to, first of all, recog-
nize that I think that you were on the right track, sir — and I would
hope that the rest of the panel could comment, as well — but do you
think that this religious freedom clause in the new constitution is
important? I mean, I would like to think that the conversations we
have had in this committee have played — and I believe they have —
a significant role in making sure that which was required in our
last supplemental.
General Scales. Well, two questions here: First of all, a 19th
century military philosopher said, war is ultimately a test of will.
And when someone asks me about asymmetric warfare, how do you
define asymmetric warfare?
In my view, asymmetric warfare is essentially an asymmetry of
will; and the surest way we can win this war in the long-term, in
my mind, is to convince our enemies who believe we have no will,
who believe that their great strength on the war on terrorism isn't
RPGs or Kalashnikovs, but it is this willingness to die, this issue
of will.
There are two things we need to do to win it in the long term:
One is to demonstrate a solid will on the part of the people, not
just of the people in uniform, but the population in general to pre-
vail; and second, to take the offensive. If you do not demonstrate
your will to prevail, you know, after 18 casualties you remove your-
self from Somalia, that has long, long-term implications in the
499
judgments of the people we wish to defeat about our tenacity and
our wilUngness to fight.
And, to your point, spot on.
If you are fighting an enemy who is, in essence, grounded in the-
ocracy— in other words, the essence of his will is iDased on religious
fanaticism — the more you can — the more you can do to deflate that,
to remove religion from the equation of war that becomes, in a way,
often a weapon in itself; it becomes a weapon. To factor out religion
as a testimony to our will ultimately, I think, attacks his center of
gravity, which is that his will is greater than ours.
I think you are spot on.
Mr. Saxton would any other members of the panel
Dr. Krepinevich. Just what General Scales said about religious
tolerance, certainly. And you are probably starting out a bit ahead
of the game in Iraq, which is a more secular society than some of
the others in the Middle East, but you do have different faiths
there, different versions there.
If you can institutionalize that, certainly I think that would go
a long way toward addressing some of the root causes of the prob-
lems that are associated with Islamic radicalism.
Similarly, you mentioned Japan after World War II. One of the
remarkable things that was done after General MacArthur's lead-
ership was giving women the vote in Japan, and certainly women
remain a great untapped resource in much of the Islamic world,
much of the Arab world, those sorts of things; and I think if you
could bring them about, it would be extremely helpful. The prob-
lem, or the challenge perhaps, for us is, of course, we are still in
Japan nearly 60 years after the end of that war.
We are very fortunate in this country that we see our security
in terms of institutions, our government, our courts, and so on.
In Iraq, those people for many years see their security in terms
of arms, in terms of arms strength. And I think for us to be able
to help them along to the point where they do see their secure in-
stitutions is going to require a very long military presence; and I
think we are kidding ourselves if we do not face up to that.
Mr. Saxton. Thank you very much, Mr. Franks.
Mr. Biddle, do you want to?
Dr. Biddle. I would just add the thought that your point high-
lights again the changing nature of the intelligence challenge.
Whether it was ever a good idea in the Cold War to focus our intel-
ligence on how many tanks, how many missiles, it is clearly not
sufficient, now.
One of the more salient features of the debate after Vietnam was
the degree to which, however well or badly we understood military
problems per se, we had failed to understand the society we were
fighting against and their culture; and that posed military prob-
lems for us in an environment, in an era now where we are fight-
ing increasing culture in and against cultures that are terribly dif-
ferent from our own.
It is terribly important that we understand them deeply.
Mr. Saxton. Mr. Cooper.
Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
To follow up on that cultural point, what are we doing now to
train our E-7s and others to be more aware, including our top Pen-
500
tagon officials? We talk a good game, but we are doing almost noth-
ing.
General SCALES. If I could answer that, I sat on a promotion
board in 1991 to select officers to the grade of colonel, and there
were 19 prospective FAO, foreign area officers, who were up for
promotion. And they were 0 for 19; we selected none of them for
promotion because they hadn't followed the — you know, the normal
progression.
Boy, if we could just have some of them back right now, particu-
larly those with Middle Eastern specialties, people who had lived
in the region for decades in some cases, spoke the language, but
most importantly, knew people in power and understood their
structures and were familiar with them. Think what a difference
that would have made.
Or another analogy: What if we would have had a few good FAOs
in Iraq in July or August of 1990? Perhaps that may have gone dif-
ferently because the war was precipitated in a large measure be-
cause of a misunderstanding on both sides about intent — back to
my point on intent.
I really believe, sir, that if we are going to find ourselves in a
new era of cultural wars, if the center of gravity of the enemy is
focused on culture, rather than technology, then we really need to
focus — in addition to improving our technology, improving our
knowledge and our ability to apply that knowledge to warfare. And
I agree with you, with your hypothesis, which is, we are not doing
enough right now.
My fear is that as we increase the need for knowledge and be-
come more culturally attuned to the theater, we are also becoming
busier, which then presumes that there is less opportunity to do
this type of learning, which is essential to be successful in the first
instance. So I just see it as something in the future that we have
to address, and I think, if I could recommend anything to the com-
mittee, it would be to take a good, hard look at that and make sure
we are doing all we can to make sure that we are intellectually,
as well as physically, prepared to fight a war.
Mr. Cooper. If you could supply the committee — any of the wit-
nesses, with cultural, sort of "benchmarks" that we can try to be
looking for, because we are good at buying weapons systems here,
but we are not necessarily good at promoting the right sort of offi-
cers and training them — and enlisted personnel as well — so they
can be culturally aware.
General Scales. I would be glad to do that.
Mr. Cooper. I believe a noted historian, Bernard Lewis, has said
that democracy is going to be very difficult to transplant to the
Middle East, and yet so many of the speeches we hear around here
is about bringing constitutions and democracy to those countries.
If one of the greatest living scholars of the region says it is nearly
impossible, you wonder, you know, if we have perhaps set ourselves
a goal that is a little ambitious. Some sort of, you know, represent-
ative government might be appropriate, but not necessarily a fully
fledged democracy. If Bernard Lewis is to be believed.
But I wanted to ask a more military question: In the early stages
of the war, what the American people heard most about was "shock
and awe."
501
Can you gentlemen describe — did shock and awe work? Did it
work as planned? What lessons can we draw from that?
General Scales. As one who was on television commenting on
shock and awe as it was going on, I will tell you that increasingly —
back to our point about cultural wars, increasingly as the motiva-
tion for fighting a war is more and more embedded in the popu-
lation and more and more intrinsically a motive of the culturally
elite, then simply using explosive power to change attitudes be-
comes more and more difficult just because of the nature of your
enemy.
If you could have — if we perhaps could have decapitated the re-
gime early on, that may have made a difference, but you know,
looking back, I don't think so.
So oftentimes you reach a tipping point, don't you, where the
damage that you do by strategic bombing gets to the point where
your efforts to decapitate or to demoralize shift over into the realm
of resentment; and what you have to do is, again, you know, target-
ing. Right now, targeting is a scientific function; it is, pick the
building you want to strike and select the weapon, the munition,
the pilot, the system, to attack that target.
Really, as part of this process of cultural transformation, maybe
what we ought to be doing is taking a good, hard look at the softer
implications of a bombing campaign and what that means for our
ability to leverage precision killing power to the long-term benefit
of our mission, rather than simply striking a series of palaces and
putting on a demonstration.
Oftentimes it had the opposite effect where the man standing on
the street corner said, they are not going to harm me, they are
going to bomb palaces only; these people have no will, no resolve.
Interesting isn't it?
Mr. Cooper. Doctor.
Dr. Krepinevich. To an extent, shock and awe is the latest man-
ifestation of what began in the early 1920's with the dawn of air
power, with the hope that you could, by striking a certain set of
targets, induce collapse of either the enemies' capability and/or his
will to resist; and the latest iteration of this is through the use of
precision weapons or precision aerial bombardment.
There are a number of terms for this effects-based operation,
rapid, decisive operation. General Dave DiTolla of the Air Force,
one of their leading thinkers on strategic bombardment, has spoken
to this. But, essentially, the idea is, very early in a conflict if you
can strike targets on a massive scale and precision weapons enable
you to do that, you do not need massive planes; because you have
these precision weapons, you can somehow hit targets that will in-
duce an enemy to collapse.
And I think that — for better or for worse, I think shock and awe's
moment has come and gone. We discovered in Iraqi Freedom we
didn't have the intelligence. We thought we knew where Saddam
was a couple of times, but we couldn't get there fast enough or the
intelligence wasn't good enough.
One of the problems you run into is, if you want to induce this
kind of parallel warfare-nervous breakdown of a society and a lead-
ership, you have to expand the targets. I think that is a fairly obvi-
ous point.
502
Well, if you are trying to not alienate the population and pre-
serve a country's economic infrastructure, to facilitate the rebuild-
ing of the country after the conflict, there is a real tension here be-
tween what you go after to destroy to induce a collapse and what
you try and preserve to enable a recovery; and I think there was
some conflict between the air power enthusiasts and senior com-
manders about where that line was.
Third is, I think myself and my colleagues have mentioned the
enemy developed offsets. Going deep underground is one of them.
You know where the target is, you may want to hit it, but it may
be very difficult to hit.
Fourth, if you want someone to quit, your chances of getting
them to yield, to abandon their goal, is probably a lot easier if the
war is limited.
Well, this war was not limited. To get Saddam Hussein to quit,
it seems to me, would have taken an awful lot; in fact, as far as
we know, he is still out there fighting, even though he has lost his
country. So, essentially, when you are asking a despot to sort of
leave himself to the tender mercies of either you or the inter-
national community or his people, it seems to me there is almost
no amount of shock and awe that would convince him to do that.
And finally, again, adversaries are coming up with antidotes, and
the North Korean antidote, and seemingly the one the Iranians are
headed toward, is, get nuclear weapons as a trump to shock and
awe or this kind of bombardment. And I think, again, despite the
allure and the attraction of this kind of warfare, it is still beyond
our reach and is likely going to remain beyond our reach.
General Scales. So one of the ironies may be: Do A, turning over
in his grave, but ultimately shock and awe in the future may be
directed at armies and not at societies, and that's a complete con-
volution of the old tenets; in other words, if the center of gravity
is Saddam's army and not Saddam himself, then maybe the real
way to cause shock and awe is to destroy his military force first,
which is a complete convolution of the traditional theories of air
power.
Dr. BiDDLE. Yeah, when we are fighting a war, when the stated
objective is regime change, we've created maximum stakes for our
opponent, and the idea we are going to coerce someone into giving
up maximum stakes by something less than the maximum effort on
our part, I think, is unrealistic, unless we get lucky and happen to
drop a bomb on the autocrat's head. We haven't proven to be very
good at that in repeated attempts in the last couple of decades, and
I do not know that we are going to get radically better at it soon.
Barring that kind of lucky strike, for this sort of approach of
warfare to work requires truly exquisite understandings of the re-
lationships between objects that we can destroy and the decision-
making processes of autocrats embedded in very different kinds of
political regimes and very different kinds of cultures.
Speaking as a political scientist on behalf of the discipline that
purports to be able to understand cause and effect and political de-
cision-making in other countries, we cannot even figure out why it
is that democracies do not go to war with each other. You know,
I doubt that you could get any randomly selected group of ten polit-
ical scientists to agree that our knowledge of foreign politics is any-
503
where remotely close enough for us to be able to specify that if you
hit this building, that power station and this road junction, Sad-
dam Hussein will throw up his hands and say, "You got me; I sur-
render."
I think the knowledge in doing this outstrips certainly anything
that modern scholarship has to offer that I am aware of at this
point.
Mr. Skelton. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. Cooper. Delighted.
Mr. Skelton. I think the best example of a bombing campaign
resulting in the determination to stick it out was the September
1940 blitz of London, which, horrible as it was, I think caused the
British people, the English people, particularly those that lived in
London, to resolve to win this thing. And those were very, very
dark days, but probably one of the worst things that Hitler did was
to bomb London as massively as he did.
General SCALES. That is true, very true.
You know, oftentimes fire power, destruction of that sort, coa-
lesces a people around their leaders. You can even make the same
argument, Mr. Skelton, that the same thing happened in Germany.
Mr. Skelton. I think that is correct. This is borne out by a book
you may have read: 19 Weeks.
General Scales. Yes, sir.
Mr. Skelton. It talks about both England and Germany. It
caused the Germans to have basically the same reaction, because
roughly the same time there was a lot of bombing of Berlin, the
other cities.
Mr. Saxton. Thank you very much.
Mrs. Davis.
Ms. Davis of California. Thank you very much.
Thank you all for being here and for waiting while we are coming
back and forth during your discussion.
I certainly enjoyed all that you had to say; I mean, I think that
it is very instructive for the future. We had been asking questions
about the cultural sensitivities during this war and prior to, and
I have to say, I think generally I would feel — I do not know if my
colleagues would agree — that it has been somewhat dismissed; and
so, I appreciate that, and I guess I would ask whether you have
a sense of its being received as an academic exercise or whether
you feel people are actually listening.
General Scales. Oh, would you
Ms. Davis of California. We are.
General SCALES. Soldiers, as a general rule, are technicians.
Their object is to — is to apply established doctrine and to achieve
or to accomplish a task; and in this modern era of technologically
centered warfare, that is where they put their focus; I mean, that
is how they were trained.
The old saying, you are what you were when, and that is how
they were raised; and it is — a good juxtaposition is the certainty
with which the first part of this war was prosecuted with the ap-
parent uncertainty with which this part of the war is prosecuted.
On the one hand, you had a technological warfare, very com-
fortable with that; on the other hand, you have culturally — it seems
504
to me, at least, to be a cultural war, and there is no longer that
sense of certainty in how this is being prosecuted.
So I agree with you, but that doesn't remove the necessity of get-
ting on with what I sort of suggested earlier on, which is to put
the instruments in place to begin to change those attitudes. And
it is not anything that is going to happen overnight. But we are
a country — just as we talk about the American society needing to
be better accepted in various parts of the world, which is a common
mantra we hear today, I would argue there is an equal if not great-
er need for the American military to be equally accepted — if not ac-
cepted, at least trusted — in various parts of the world. And again,
that is a soft science, that is art, not science; and that is the ability
to — it is the ability to form relationships as well as it is to be able
to pick targets and destroy them.
Ms. Davis of California. Yeah. I think one way that we cer-
tainly would measure our priorities in this regard is through the
budget, and while our systems are going to be more costly in many
ways, I guess it would be helpful — and I think my colleague asked
for this as well, what measures we might see or propose in the
budget that would make a real difference in providing the linguistic
capability, et cetera.
General Scales. The great sea change in how America fights its
wars is Goldwater-Nichols. That changed the cultural society.
Maybe what we need is a training, perhaps an educational Gold-
water-Nichols. Maybe we need to step back and go to the next step.
We achieved jointness to a degree unparalleled in the history of
warfare because of Goldwater-Nichols and because of the profes-
sional military education (PME) reforms that we have initiated.
Perhaps now we need to have another Goldwater-Nichols where we
take a good, hard look at our educational processes and how we
raise our officers. Not how we educate our officers at the War Col-
lege in their 22nd year, but how we educate them as 2nd lieuten-
ants in their first or second year, or how we educate and culturally
acclimate our younger soldiers. This is something I think we need
to take a look at, and to my knowledge, it's been a while since
we've done that.
Ms. Davis of California. Thank you. I appreciate that, and I
hope that we can do that. I hope that we can perhaps have more
discussions and really understand better how to get there.
My other question — and you may have addressed this, and per-
haps it is also a sensitive question, but the discussion of two addi-
tional divisions that wouldn't necessarily be needed to fight the
war. But to make the peace, it is part of the transition and, in
many ways, part of our greater cultural sensitivity to being on the
ground with people and trying to again understand where some of
the opposition after the war might have come from.
Would you like to comment on that? Is that part of the peace or
is that really only seen in a militaristic
General Scales. Let me start, and I will hand it off to Andy
since he is sort of the expert in structure.
Clearly, ground forces in particular are overstretched. I remem-
ber in Vietnam you had a six-month command time in a year, and
you were in Vietnam a year and you left, and nothing was left be-
hind, if you know what I mean. In other words, you went into a
505
hostile foreign environment, you hoped to survive a year, then you
went home to your family.
What we are talking about now is long-term engagement, and
this is what I mentioned earlier, this process of building trust. That
is not done over a weekend, it is not done in a year; and that
takes — and, as Andy said, this is a manpower-intensive task. It's
not anything that you can — technology might be able to help to
some degree, but ultimately it comes down to people and their abil-
ity to immerse themselves.
The military structure that we have today, that does that func-
tion, principally ground power, is stretched to the limit; and my
great fear, having lived through the last time that we had a hollow
Army, was the fact that we may face that again in our effort to fix
the problem that you just mentioned.
Remember now, you are aware of hollowness often six-months to
a year after the hollowness happens, and my concern is that in our
effort to do too much, and with the realization that we need to stay
longer, ultimately we are going to find ourselves a year from now
with a hollow force.
Are more forces needed? Yeah, I think so. Are different types of
forces needed? I don't know. Maybe it is divisions. Maybe it is other
types of forces.
My only caution is: Be careful when you build a ground power
organization that is specifically tailored for constabulary noncom-
bat duties, because that affects the whole organization. You have
to be careful about that.
Dr. Krepinevich. Again, if you look at the metrics that the Army
is looking at — 16 brigades in Iraq, 2 in Afghanistan, 2 in Korea —
discounting what is going on in the Balkans, that is 20 brigades
that are in deployment right now.
According to the Army's discussion with the Marine Corps, their
experience with the rotation base, you need to maintain four units,
in order to keep one deployed at all times, which means for soldiers
you are away six months out of every two years, and they argue
that that is what you need to provide for sufficient recruitment and
retention, so that people will join and stay in the Army.
If that is the case, then again you would need an 80-brigade
Army. We have 33 brigades in the Active force. According to a Con-
gressional Budget Office (CBO) study, you may be able to draw on
a number of brigades from the Reserves. The sense is that you
might be able to keep 8 Active brigades — 33 divided by 4 is 8 and
a fraction — and if you look at the Reserves, the argument there,
the ratio is closer to 7 to 1, or 8 to 1 which would give you maybe
another 2 brigades; so that is 10 brigades when you need 20.
If you increased the size of the Army by 2 divisions, that would
give you 6 brigades; a 4 to 1 rotation rate would only give you a
brigade and a half, so that would get you up to between 11 and
12 according to CBO. Also it would take a couple of years to raise
2 new divisions, and we will reach the crisis point with this deploy-
ment level long before 2 years, I think.
The final point is, where are the additional funds, because it will
cost money to stand up these units, billions of dollars to stand
them up, and then additional billions to keep them sustained. I
think that is probably the least attractive option. It can be part of
506
the option, but I think we shouldn't kid ourselves about the fact
that it is not a panacea.
Ms. Davis of California. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Saxton. Mr. Wilson.
Mr. Wilson of South Carolina. Thank you all for being here
this morning and giving us a perspective on Operation Iraqi Free-
dom. I had the extraordinary opportunity to be asked to accompany
Congressman Skelton to Iraq last month, and I was so impressed
by what I saw, particularly the lack of damage that I saw.
The precision bombing was stunning to me. As I show pictures
to family and friends, that was the first point they brought up as
they saw the bustling cities, the traffic, the bridges intact, and
minimal damage.
Additionally, I was just so proud of our troops, thanks to Con-
gressman Skelton for arranging for the trip.
I had a special interest. I just retired after 31 years from the Na-
tional Guard in July, and I was pleased to see my fellow Judge Ad-
vocate General (JAG) officers playing a big role. And then I have
two sons in the Army National Guard and another son in the Navy,
so I have a continuing interest, aside from the great opportunities
we have here to serve on the Armed Services Committee.
I want to apologize that I have been going in and out today, but
it actually relates to a point that was made, and that is that we
are in a long-term struggle; in fact, I just left the House floor, tell-
ing about how the Agency for International Development has dis-
tributed 1.5 million book bags to the children of Iraq, for the
schools that have been reopened, with pens and pencils and note-
books without propaganda — and calculators; and I am just really
proud of the military's role in that.
The Coalition Provisional Authority — it is amazing what is being
done, but unfortunately, the media, I think, is covering a police
spotter mentality of that which goes wrong and missing out on 1.5
million book bags being distributed. And so I do not want to dupli-
cate questions, but I understand that the Department of Defense
has described Operation Iraqi Freedom as an effects-based oper-
ation, with military objectives based on regime targets, rather than
strictly on Iraqi military.
And I know there was a reference a few minutes ago to London
and how that was impacted. Would you please comment on how
this type of operation enabled our forces to accelerate the collapse
of the Saddam Hussein dictatorship and whether this conduct en-
gendered goodwill among the Iraqi people?
General Scales. Want me to take that?
Dr. Krepinevich. You can start, if you want.
General Scales. Let me start off.
I do think that effects-based operations work to some degree. I
do think that we are better able now to define those — what I guess,
to use the phrase, "critical nodes" — those things which you must
strike, that if you strike them will cause the local collapse of a par-
ticular entity, in this case, I think, the Republican Guard Divisions
and to a lesser extent the Fedayeen units. And so — but the concern
that I have is that the object of the effects changed once the war
began, and so the supposition or the hypotheses that planners put
507
forward as to what the necessary effects were, those began to
change as the enemy changed and adapted his tactics to accommo-
date what he saw as our effects-based operations.
So it is a concept that is soUd. It is the old — it comes from the
old artillery term focusing on the terminal end of the trajectory.
You do not care where the gun is. What you care about is where
the explosion goes off; and that is sort of what we are talking
about.
It seems to me, as we move into this new era of warfare, we have
to go through this filter full or another degree of the refinement of
the calculus to be able to do effects-based operations more effec-
tively. We have to look not only at primary effects, but we have to
look at second and, in some cases, third effects, good and bad. In
other words, to use Andy's hypothesis, dropping a bridge across the
Euphrates in Karbala would have been the right thing to do to pre-
vent a counterattack by the Republican Division, which was the
Medina Division which was there.
In truth, the Medina Division had been abandoned, and had we
bombed that bridge, all we would have done would be to deny the
citizens of Karbala and of Baghdad their livelihood, because that
is the only bridge within 40 miles. So that is what I mean by this
new sense of awareness about what effects-based operations really
portray.
Yeah, sure, primary effects, absolutely important, but as part of
the process, you have to consider secondary and tertiary effects;
and you have to think of it not in terms of just winning the tactical
fight, but also in terms of winning the campaign, equally impor-
tant.
Dr. BiDDLE. Effects-based operations can mean many different
things in many countries. It can mean anything from the focus of
your objective, meaning the effect you are trjdng to go after all the
way down to; it can mean a focus on a particular kind of warfare,
heavy emphasis on standoff precision against leadership targets to
coerce an opponent, rather than destroying their military.
One of the things I find striking about Operation Iraqi Freedom
is that the regime in many senses didn't collapse until, in fact,
there were American soldiers in Baghdad. We had hoped, and I
think it was a reasonable aspiration, something that made sense
to try, to bring the regime down through very carefully delineated
destruction of leadership targets; and that didn't work that way.
Hearkening back to one of the earlier themes of the hearings, one
that balance provides, is an ability to give it a shot, try effects-
based leadership targeting; but if that doesn't do it, still have the
capacity to bring about our national objectives by other means if
we are forced to. And to hearken back to another theme from the
hearing, the whole question of understanding culture and political
systems in the context of effects-based operations in particular.
One of the things I find striking about why it ultimately took
American soldiers in Baghdad to really collapse the regime is the
degree to which the Ba'athist security and control apparatus had
Iraqi society and the degree to which the average Iraqi was afraid
that the person sitting next to them on a congressional panel may
very well have been an informant and, thus, you dare not act
against the regime or you dare not even welcome the Americans
508
until and unless you are positive that this regime is gone and that
they will not be back to hurt you and that the unknown security
apparatus of secret agents that you have assumed throughout your
life is all around you is no longer operating.
It is very difficult to get that level of persuasion across that large
a society that has been brutalized that long with discrete targeting
of a few key assets from afar.
What ultimately persuaded most Iraqis that the Ba'athists were
gone was whether there were American soldiers in visible range,
that they could see around and have some confidence that, in fact,
this means a new day has dawned and the intelligence officers
aren't going to come and get me if I do not toe the line. And again,
what that requires is a mix of capabilities, an ability to do close
combat if necessary and an ability to try, through standoff warfare,
to do that with less if you can.
Dr. Krepinevich. As Dr. Biddle said, one of the problems associ-
ated with effects-based operations is, there seem to be multiple
definitions of what these operations are exactly. If you take Gen-
eral Scales' description, which I think is helpful, which is, it is not
a direct effect, it is an indirect effect, it is the second-order effect
that essentially you are looking for, then I think we have tried in
a number of ways to pursue effects-based operations. One is shock
and awe; the other was attacks on the Iraqi command and control
so that you rendered them less capable of coordinating their mili-
tary forces effectively.
Perhaps one interesting effects-based operation would be the ef-
forts made leading up to the war to try and turn some senior Iraqi
commanders — sort of say, you know, it would be a good idea to sit
this one out, but again it is not clear. You would have to go inter-
view these people, I would suppose, and they would have to be hon-
est with you. Did they sit it out because they were convinced by
the Americans, or did they sit it out because they were afraid their
troops would turn on them?
And so I think it is — we are still in sort of a very nebulous world
when we are talking about these kinds of operations, and while
they are attractive, and certainly I think you ought to pursue them
where you think it is productive, I do not think you can take too
much confidence in them, at least at this point.
General SCALES. It is interesting.
A quick war story: Dave Perkins, the commander of the 2nd Bri-
gade Combat Team (BCT), on his first thunder run, stopped a
BMW, and out popped a brigadier general in the Republican Guard
carrying a briefcase, and he was on his way to work.
I am talking about the effects of al-Jazeera and local media on
the effects of effects-based and shock and awe.
And he said — and they hauled him off and put him in the back
of a BMP or in the back of a Bradley. He said, I thought you were
all the way down in Basra. What are you doing in Baghdad? So he
was not necessarily shocked nor was he awed until someone threw
him into the back of a Bradley.
Mr. Wilson of South Carolina. Well, thank you very much.
Mr. Saxton. Mr. Taylor.
Mr. Taylor. I thank the gentlemen for coming and for staying
around so long.
509
I have read all of your statements and I appreciate what you
have said about what has happened. I would like to know what is
happening now and where you think things will be 180 days from
now. I guess my first question is: Do you see any signs of a coordi-
nated effort with the ambushes, or do you think it is a small pocket
here of people, a small group there?
I mean, would you venture to guess as to whether or not Hussein
has seen Blackhawk Down and whether that scenario is something
they would be hoping for.
I guess my last question would be, I would like your opinions as
to what happens if the Americans leave before Hussein is either
killed or captured, as to whether or not he rises literally from the
ashes and makes a comeback.
General Scales. I can answer those very quickly.
Is there a coordinated effort? Not yet. I would call it a sponta-
neous effort, that it looks more like an insurrection that has
some — a loose hand on it, rather than having someone calling the
shots from a central authority. But that doesn't necessarily mean
that wouldn't morph into that over time if this is allowed to
progress without being, you know, interrupted.
Did Saddam see Blackhawk Down? Yes, he did and, in fact, he
liked the movie so much that he even went so far as to equip
Fedayeen units with white SUVs and white pickups, trying to
mimic the technicals that he thought were the reasons why the
American forces left.
What happens if Saddam is still in place? It will never be — in my
opinion now, I do not believe the country will ever be stable as long
as the ghost of that man is there in Iraq.
Will progress be made? Of course, it will be made.
And stability come? To a great degree, it will, but there will al-
ways be in the back of everyone's mind the image, the shadow, the
illusion of this man out waiting in the wings to turn things back
to the way they were. So I would view that ultimately as a condi-
tion for withdrawal of American troops.
Mr. Taylor. In your opinion, to what extent do these prolonged
hostilities end with his death or capture?
General Scales. I think it will have an influence. Clearly, it will
deflate this spontaneous sense among the disaffected, particularly
in the Sunni Triangle and in Baghdad, and will cause it to deflate,
and perhaps even turn it into a very, very low-key insurgency.
Will it go away completely? I do not think so, because many of
those who are committing the worst atrocities over there now
aren't even Iraqis, and they still view the triangle as a battle-
ground and a means of taking on Americans. And so, even if Sad-
dam is gone, I think there will still be something there, but no-
where to the degree that it is now.
Dr. Krepinevich. I think you were looking at essentially two
threats. One is the residual Ba'athist threat. The other is Jihadist,
coming in from other parts of the world, elements perhaps from al-
Qaeda, from Hezbollah, Hamas and so on. They are looking at this
as an opportunity to continue their struggle against the United
States.
I think one challenge we have is tr5ang to convince the Sunnis
that somehow it is in their interest for us to succeed. If you look
510
at a precipitous withdrawal of American forces, I think the Sunnis
see that as a real danger to their security. I do not think they have
much confidence in the ability of institutions to provide for their
security.
I think they see themselves being left perhaps at the mercy of
the Shi'ites, so one important point is, how can we convince the
Sunni Arabs in that country that it is in their interest; and quite
frankly, part of that may be, ironically, a protracted presence of
U.S. forces in that country, to ensure that they do not become the
new persecuted group, just as they persecuted the Kurds and the
Shi'ites under Saddam Hussein.
It would appear right now that the majority of the population is
at least on the sidelines or passively supporting the United States.
In a recent public opinion poll in Baghdad, which is in Sunni coun-
try, nearly 70 percent of the population said they liked the fact
that the Americans were there.
Certainly, I think the costs we have incurred so far — people like
to make the comparison to Vietnam — are, quite frankly, trivial
compared to what we bore in Vietnam. And quite frankly, consider-
ing the stakes of what happened on 9/11 and the perception, as
General Scales said, that you send when you withdraw from a
place like Somalia, it appears that you are being kicked out of
town, I think the stakes are perceived as being quite a bit higher
if we leave this time around.
I think there is certainly a concern or a danger that the — to the
extent that groups that are hostile to the Israelis, like Hamas,
Hezbollah and so on, that are supported by countries like Iran and
Syria, begin to infiltrate into Iraq and begin to engage in oper-
ations against us, particularly on the side of some of the Arab
world. The possibility that these two different conflicts will begin
to seem as one conflict is something we should be concerned about.
And finally, I guess the point I would make is that we have been
sending, quite frankly, mixed signals. We are going to stay there
as long as we need to stay there, but we are certainly touting the
problems with maintaining an adequate troop presence; and I think
at the end of the day, if you're going to convince the people of Iraq
that you are going to stay the course, that you are going to prevail,
you have to, as General Scales said, make some clear commitment
that you have the will to persist for as long as it is going to take
in order to succeed. And I think right now we are sending quite a
few mixed signals about that.
Mr. Taylor. I thank you again for sticking around.
Mr. SCHROCK [presiding]. I agree it would be wonderful to find
Saddam Hussein. Psychologically, I think it would do everybody
much good. But they have not, in my mind, found Adolf Hitler and
things were going pretty well in Germany for a long time. But
frankly, if they could find this guy, the better.
Mr. Meek.
Mr. Meek. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank the witnesses for being here. A lot of conflicting
meetings going on since we are only in town for 24 hours a week,
but that is another meeting.
I guess one of my concerns, especially — I was excited about the
fact that thinkers and educators were coming before us today, as
511
relates to our future efforts and what we should do as we go
through this series of lessons learned. One of my major concerns,
and I want to say Dr. Andrew, because I am not going to attempt
to try to say your last name, is your description of our soldier bri-
gade resources that are around. And I must say that I am some-
what concerned because I know, as it relates to air superiority, we
do not even need to go down that track of where we stand in the
world, as relates to that.
And one of my major concerns in even going into Iraq was the
guerrilla hand-to-hand, door-to-door, with what they call a search
warrant kind of policing and warfighting.
And, General Scales, I see in your statement that you talked
about the fact that we have to go to a smaller — smaller, leaner bri-
gade-size unit to deploy more quickly and fight independently. I
think, as we look at that and as we look at the effort against ter-
rorism, in my opinion, we are not fighting — or our future is not
fighting state-sponsored terrorism, and I think these are the kind
of individuals that kind of leap at our ankles. These are individuals
who do not have nuclear capabilities.
In the future, I am wondering how we are going to be able to
deal with this because, honestly, as the independent member on
this committee, I do not feel we have the necessary resources eco-
nomically to have such a big effort, effort of terrorism, in focusing
on mouth-to-mouth or face-to-face intelligence that will help us
weed these individuals out.
Eighty-seven billion dollars, $90 billion, $50 billion in supple-
mental appropriations, or what have you; that is fine. We can build
those schools, we can do those things, and I think we should do
those things to a certain extent as relates to our efforts and our,
hopefully, being in the light of goodwill in the world. But I think
it is also important for us to realize that we are going to need the
help of others, that we are going to have to train others. We have
trained them in the past, and I think that it would hurt recruit-
ment as relates to our Armed Forces if we continue to send red-
blooded men and women into foreign lands where we do not nec-
essarily understand a lot of the culture.
Are there any — is there any thinking on the outside, in the edu-
cation field, in the future field, of looking at training other forces,
getting them to put together some sort of task force against terror-
ism for hand-to-hand combat, for that leaner force that you talk
about. General.
I am more interested in that. I know that our troops are ready,
set, go; but we talked about Blackhaivk Down. We have talked
about many things here since I have been on this committee. But
I think it is important that we understand, the American people
may not understand how long we need to be there, what we have
to do, and be willing to pay the price; and I think it's going to hurt
our recruitment in the long-run.
Any comments?
Dr. Krepinevich. I think you hit the nail on the head on two
issues. Congressman. One, which I think is what the Pentagon is
trying to do right now, is to train indigenous Iraqis to help provide
for their own security. We enjoyed a certain amount of success in
this in the past, in a few cases in Vietnam. In the Balkan war in
512
the late-1990's, we actually subcontracted to former military offi-
cers and people in this country to train Croat, the Croat army, up
to a good standard of effectiveness and proficiency.
So I think that is, quite frankly, the track that needs to be pur-
sued most aggressively right now. I think that is our best chance
of achieving the kind of ends that you are looking to achieve.
The other, quite frankly, is the point you made about intel-
ligence, which is to say, this is not a formidable adversary we face
in terms of numbers or in terms of military capabilities. We could
smash this resistance if we only knew who they were and where
they were, and that is where intelligence comes into play. And I
think — as General Scales has said, one of our problems is the fact
that we have allowed a lot of these human intelligence skills to
erode over time. They are not only in the military, they are also
in the intelligence community; and that is a problem.
As Dr. Biddle said, in order to give people, the people of Iraq who
have good intelligence about who some of these people are, the con-
fidence to come to us and provide that kind of information is prob-
ably going to require a fairly prolonged presence. They are going
to have to be convinced that the terror that they lived under for
the — at least the last 20 years is not going to be revisited by
them — upon them, excuse me — and that takes a lot of courage and
that takes a certain level of confidence that, in fact, the Americans
are going to prevail.
Mr. Meek. Terrorism is, Mr. Chairman, if I may just make a
closing comment here, and you do not have to respond to my opin-
ion: Terrorism is a minority function. Iraqi, 70, 80, 90 percent can
say, I am glad that Americans are there, ho-hum; but when it
comes down to the final analysis, you still have individuals, be they
Iraqis or Sjrrians, whatever the case may be, that are still shooting
upon the troops and continuing to prey upon them one and two and
three at a time, seven a day average being injured.
Culturally, I am just trying to figure out — not culturally, but the
culture of terrorism; put it that way — I am just trying to figure out,
and I do not know what thinking has gone into this or if there are
publications going on, something at the War College, what have
you, to really look at how we are going to find our way safely in
this effort of dealing with terrorism.
Lives will be lost and they are preying upon individuals every
day, Coalition fighters. And I understand that war is not pretty. I
understand that, too; but I think that it is very, very important
that we work on that intelligence end.
I do not think that we can occupy ourself out of this, because we
are fighting an institution that really doesn't have a capital or a
place where it resides; or — like you said, finding the enemy, where
do we destroy; destroying the power plant — what does that mean —
these sort of things.
So I think it is important that we look at that and understand
that terrorism is a minority effort in any population. It is almost
like crime; I mean, you see a community. There are very few indi-
viduals; five, four percent that are preying upon the masses, and
that is making the community a bad place to live; and I think that
is what we find over in Iraq, and I think that is something that
513
definitely we are going to have to look into as relates to our efforts
in the future.
But I appreciate all of you staying for so long, and thank you so
much for coming before this committee.
General Scales. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. ScHROCK. We will conclude our questioning today with ques-
tioning of the ranking member from Missouri, Mr. Skelton.
Mr. Skelton. First, I must tell you that this is one of the most
interesting hearings that we have had, and I thank each of you for
this. I have no crystal ball or prophetic powers, but I did send a
letter to the President September 4 of last year and again on
March 18 this year, predicting the problems of the aftermath of
conflict, so let me look ahead in this fuzzy crystal ball that we just
placed up here.
To ensure defeat in our next conflict, wherever it may be, we will
have a stretched or hollow Army which will be, second, more
geared toward constabulary efforts than battlefield efforts, and
third, that we have no cultural awareness of our enemy. Those are
three areas we must avoid, and the Congress can help do that.
I was intrigued by your comments on educational Goldwater-
Nichols, and I mention to you that our panel on military education
back in 1988, created the phase one, phase two of the joint edu-
cation and the various intermediate and senior War Colleges.
I would appreciate, General Scales, your thoughts in a different
time expanding on that and going down to the second lieutenant
level, if you wouldn't mind doing that.
General SCALES. Yes, sir.
Mr. Skelton. Cultural awareness, I think, is something that is
inherent in our Nation — or cultural unawareness is inherent in our
Nation, and I think that that has to be addressed. And how we sus-
tain it, I do not know, but I agree with you.
All of the questions that I could ask have been asked, but I do
have one. There is a recent book; I think it is entitled Road to
Rainbow. Are you familiar with it. Road to Rainbow? The Associa-
tion of the United States Army printed it.
General Scales. Yeah. Yes, sir.
Mr. Skelton. And it reflects the fact that the Army War College
was studying, beginning in 1934
General Scales. That's right.
Mr. Skelton [continuing]. Fighting the Nazis.
General Scales. That is true.
Mr. Skelton. And, Dr. Krepinevich, you mentioned that the
Navy War College had a series of colored plans, the most promi-
nent being that of the orange plan.
Are we doing that today, is my question. Or are we just looking
at the past and hoping the students can apply it? Or are we sitting
down in the War Colleges in a very classified manner, as they
started in 1934, and thinking of the potential enemies 5, 10, 15, 20
years out? Are we?
General Scales. Could I address that, sir?
Mr. Skelton. Yes, sir. You were there.
General Scales. Boy, you are really hitting close to my heart,
Mr. Skelton.
514
The answer is yes, to some degree, but nowhere near hke we
should. And let me explain this.
Mr. Skelton. Or nowhere near where we did.
General Scales. Or where we did.
Here is the issue to my mind. Understanding warfare and get-
ting a perspective on the future course of warfare is — requires a
certain chemistry for the people who do it. There is nothing wrong
with think tanks around the people who are inside the Beltway for
doing that, and they do a wonderful job, and it is fine that they
do that, but they are at least one generation removed from actually
doing it, and there is no real equity in it for them. There are few
consequences in getting another study from another think tank.
The people in the field can't do it. They are too busy. They are
focused on, you know, the next major inspection or the next patrol
in Baghdad. You can't really rely on them to do it. So really it
comes down to institutions like the War College that have that bal-
ance. First of all, they have recent combat experience, recent expe-
rience in the field, and they have equities in it. There is something
in it for them when they come to their conclusions and they publish
their results.
And the other side is you have an institution that allows time
for reflection. You know, it is one thing to have an after-action re-
port, as we mentioned earlier, but it is something else to have an
after-action report that is filtered through a disciplined academic
mind, someone who has a bit of a soldier and a bit of a scholar
built in that is able not only to put intellectual rigor into what they
see, but also to be able to provide the perspective of a soldier, and
then to have a dog in the hunt. If you are at the War College, and
you are a student or a faculty member, your next assignment may
very well be going out to implement some of the recommendations
that you just made, perhaps even with people shooting at you.
So having said all of that, I really believe that increasingly the
War Colleges need to be centers of excellence that allow measured,
introspective research and study to be done, but at the same time
study and research that is directed toward the art of war, and that
is one of the reasons, as I think you know, that I started the so-
called ASAP program, the Advanced Strategic Arts Program at the
War College, in an effort, on my part at least, to build some aco-
lytes, to build some — to build disciples who would be able to im-
merse themselves in the study of the art of war and to be held ac-
countable for the quality of their study, and then immediately after
that to be sent out to be able to apply it.
So it is this whole idea of application and introspective study,
having — so I really think there is more that War Colleges can do,
sir, and I don't think, frankly, that we do enough. My opinion, of
course.
Mr. Skelton. Thank you.
Anyone else have a comment on that?
Dr. BiDDLE. I have a completely unbiased observer opinion.
When you look across the intellectual community, and you ask
where can the kind of serious, rigorous, scholarly studies of cause
and effect and the use of force that the Nation needs to make good
policy, where can that work be done, there are very few places. I
came to the War College from civilian academia at the University
515
of North Carolina, and civilian academia is moving further and fur-
ther away from
Mr. Skelton. You are obviously very well educated under Dr.
Richard Cohen.
Dr. BiDDLE. Quite so. Absolutely.
The think tank world, where I also spent some time, has some
advantages in working in the subject area, because, I mean, rel-
ative to civilian academia, they are more comfortable working on
questions involving the use of force and defense policy and military
affairs. They find it difficult because of their structure to do under-
lying cause and effect research as opposed to short-term decision
analysis, 10 divisions versus 8 divisions, C-5 versus C-17. That is
what they are good at.
The number of places in the United States and an enormous in-
tellectual community and an enormous defense anal3^tic community
like we have that have the capacity to do searching analysis of un-
derlying cause and effect relationships, the kind of thing on which
defense policy ultimately has to be built, are very few in number,
and I think one of the very few places where that can be done is
the War College system, and potentially to some extent the service
academies, because you are allowed
Mr. Skelton. I don't think you are going to get it there.
Dr. BiDDLE. Not in the near term certainly.
General Scales. One point, it is an interesting point that Dr.
Biddle makes. I am a student of civilian academic training, as well,
but the civilian academic community has walked away from the
study of war. Even those who write dissertations
Mr. Skelton. From North Carolina.
General Scales. Yeah, but I went to Duke, big basketball rival
of this guy over here; but even at Duke, if you look at the papers
that are written, the dissertations that are produced by people in
the military studies program, for the most part they don't really
deal with fighting wars. They deal oftentimes with social issues or
political issues or economic issues related to the military. Rarely do
you get anyone who tries to peel the onion back on what goes on
on the battlefield, and, you know, Mr. Skelton, that is
something
Mr. Skelton. Do you feel at some future date we will pay a huge
penalty for that?
General Scales. Oh, I think maybe we are all — maybe we are at
the cusp of doing that already, Mr. Skelton.
Mr. Skelton. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Mr. SCHROCK. Thank you, Mr. Skelton.
Let me identify myself with one comment Mr. Skelton said, and
that is this hearing — in my three short years here, this has prob-
ably been one of the finest and probably most informative that I
have experienced, and I thank you for that.
Of all the things that were said, let me comment on one thing.
One thing that is going to stick with me is when General Scales
talked about the nonselect for the 19 FAOs. We have been doing
all the — I was in the Navy for a career, and all the services do that,
and we need to focus people in one arena and let them stay there.
I notice there is a public affairs officer here who is wearing
wings, and I think, would she rather be flying, or would she rather
516
be doing the PAO thing? We all have to go through the wickets to
get to the point where we become flags, and I am not sure that is
a good thing, and I think the services are going to start addressing
that in a more realistic way, and that is probably a good thing.
Again, thank you all for being here. We really appreciate your
time. Thank you. This hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:05 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]
APPENDIX
October 21, 2003
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
October 21, 2003
OPENING REMARKS OF CHAIRMAN DUNCAN HUNTER
Hearing on Operation Iraqi Freedom: Outside Perspectives
Tuesday, October 21, 2003
Even as major combat operations drew to a close last May,
the battle over the lessons learned from Operation Iraqi Freedom
was beginning. A few weeks ago, this committee heard from the
commanding general of Joint Forces Command, Admiral
Giambastiani, whose embedded combat observers and analysts are
refining the joint operational lessons learned from OIF. The Joint
Staff continues its work to distill the strategic lessons learned,
while the services are cataloguing their tactical lessons from this
conflict.
Today, we will hear outside perspectives on Operation Iraqi
Freedom and implications for future warfare and U.S. national
security policy. As with any war waged by the United States, it is
critical that we engage in an open and vigorous critique of our
actions so that future military leaders can draw the correct lessons
and apply them to the next conflict. One need only look at the
erroneous lessons learned by the French military following World
War I to see the value of a rigorous lessons-learned effort.
(521)
522
The aftermath of OIF raises some serious questions on the
future of warfare. Chief among these is whether the major combat
phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom is the last war of some former
era in warfare, or the first war of a new era. Some observers
believe that speed, precision and superior knowledge were the
reasons for success in Iraq and herald a new type of warfare. If we
invest in more high-tech systems that provide perfect knowledge of
the battlefield, and combine them with increasingly capable
precision weapons, we can ensure victory in any future conflict. To
this, I would remind my friends that chess players always have
perfect knowledge of the board, and their pieces always strike with
perfect precision - but this does not always ensure a successful
game.
Others have suggested just the opposite - that the major
conflict phase of OIF holds few lessons for future conflicts. They
argue that future wars will look more like the current phase of Iraqi
Freedom, with its various religious and ethnic factions and
rivalries, foreign terrorists, shadowy non-state actors, guerilla
bombings, and hidden weapons of mass destruction. Emerging
non-traditional threats, not conventional land forces, will be the
523
real threat. In this environment, more human intelHgence, rapidly
deployable and flexible forces and superior training hold the key to
victory.
The issues we will discuss here today are much more than a
sterile academic class on the nature of future conflict. The lessons
we draw from this and other recent military operations will inform
this committee's decisions regarding how our forces will be sized
and shaped in the years to come. They will also inform us as to the
nature, quantity and type of hardware and munitions we need to
buy for our men and women in uniform so that they can meet the
challenges of the future battlefield.
524
Opening Statement for The Honorable Ike Skelton (D-MO),
Ranking Member, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of
Representatives
Full Committee Hearing on Lessons Learned from Operation Iraqi
Freedom
October 21, 2003
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Fist of all, I'd like to thank you for
holding today's hearing. Several weeks ago we had Admiral
Giambastiani testify on Joint Forces Command's lessons learned
from Operation Iraqi Freedom. The committee will benefit as well
from the expertise of these three distinguished witnesses in adding to
those insights. I'd first like to welcome Major General Bob Scales;
it's wonderful to have you back before the committee. I'd also like
to welcome Dr. Krepinevich and Dr. Biddle — thank you both for
being with us, especially at such an early hour.
My recent trip to Iraq confirmed to me what we already
knew — that the heart of this critical recent operation is the amazing
American soldier. Each soldier, sailor, airman, and Marine —
operating more jointly in this conflict than ever before — enabled the
1
525
United States to quickly achieve a stunning military victory. These
great troops are currently serving as valiantly to try to win the
peace.
The military victory in Operation Iraqi Freedom is a testament
to the efforts of those of us who fought for the Goldwater-Nichols
legislation. It is a testament too to the many officers who
understand how much joint operations enhance our military
capability on the battlefield and have worked to implement the law.
It also shows the quality of the education and training system of the
American military — from our basic schools through the war
colleges.
The education of the war colleges I believe enabled the
superior war plan of General Franks' team and the agility with
which our troops adapted on the battlefield. Certainly there are
many other lessons to be drawn as well — about how the enemy
fought, about the critical role of special operations forces on the
526
battlefield, and about how technology can further enhance
American excellence on the battlefield.
But, Mr. Chairman, these lessons learned at the operational
level must be matched by lessons at the strategic level as well. I
won't recount Lord Tennyson's The Charge of the Light Brigade as I
did to Secretary Wolfowitz several weeks ago, but it is clear to me
that there were blunders in our post-war planning. The success of
future American operations will rely as heavily on our ability to
learn from strategic blunders as from our mistakes and great
successes on the battlefield. I look forward to the witnesses'
thoughts on this important subject.
General Scales, Dr. Krepinevich, Dr. Biddle, thank you all for
being here. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
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Statement for the Record
MG (Ret) Robert H. Scales Jr.
The fall of Baghdad presaged the beginning of a new phase of the war in Iraq. The first
was conventional war: the superiority of American weapons created a killing machine that the
Iraqis could never hope to match. But the ghost of Carl von Clausewiiz returned after the fall of
Baghdad to teach a timeless lesson. No matter how unmatched opponents may be, wars are
always two-sided affairs, where the object is to break the psychological will of the other side by
striking at his vital center of gravity, Saddam's center was his ruling elite, the Baathist regime
that was built spiritually and physically around the unholy trinity of Saddam and his two sons.
After the fall of Baghdad, that center was shaken to its foundations, but it did not completely
collapse.
Watching the retreat from Mogadishu in 1994, Saddam had learned that the American
center of gravity was dead soldiers. Spontaneously and with seemingly little direction, the
Baathists who survived the Coalition's drive on Baghdad adapted. Failing to win the
conventional war, they began an unconventional war focused on dueling cultures. If they could
kill enough Americans in the name of religion, then perhaps they would regain the support of the
Iraqi people and others in the Islamic world, while the Americans would become discouraged by
the human cost and withdraw.
Technology is useful in unconventional warfare. But machines alone will never be
decisive. This new phase is a struggle for the allegiance of the Iraqi people, who must choose
between two conflicting sides; one represented by the promise of freedom and democracy
imposed by an occupying infidel, the other represented by a return to the tyranny and terror of
the old regime imposed by fellow Iraqis and Muslims. The tools most useful in this new war are
low-tech and manpower-intensive. Instead of JSTARS, JDAMS, ATACMS, and Global Hawk,
the American command will employ night raids, ambushes, roving patrols mounted and
dismounted, as well as reconstruction, civic action, and medical contact teams. The enemy will
be located not by satellites and UAVs but by patient intelligence work, back alley payoffs,
collected information from captured documents, and threats of one-way vacations to Cuba.
The Centcom commander. General John Abazaid, now must match the enemy's ability to
adapt with adaptation of his own. Small units trained for urban offensive tactics like those used
to kill Saddam's sons have replaced the armored fighting formations of the machine phase. The
hunt is no longer focused on the remnants of the old regime's leadership but on the fedayeen
middle management, the violent and fanatical believers who are doing the most harm to
Americans. Success in this new war will not be gauged by how many Republican Guard tanks
are destroyed but by the less tangible and quantifiable measurement of people's acceptance of
new Iraqi leaders soon to appear. Attitudes will be influenced less by demonstrations of fighting
strength than by the emotional security that comes from safe streets, employment, electricity, and
fresh water. In a sense, this phase of the conflict reminds us all that the nature of war is
immutable. Technology may alter how wars are fought, but it will never change the fact that
wars are fought by human beings for political ends.
528
The Unchanging Nature of War
Thucydides, the great historian of war, and Carl von Clausewitz, the great theorist of war,
understood that some factors in the conduct of war will never change, no matter how much the
political landscape alters and technologies advance. What, then, can history, particularly our
experience in Iraq, teach us today about war in the twenty-first century?
Surveying twenty-five hundred years of recorded history, Clausewitz used the concept of
"general friction" to explain why "everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is
difficult. The difficulties accumulate and end by producing a kind of friction that is
inconceivable unless one has experienced war." General friction "more or less corresponds to the
factors that distinguish real war from war on paper" — uncertainty, ambiguity, miscalculations,
incompetence, and above all chance. Friction was a fact of life— and death— in Iraq, as it has been
in military conflicts since the beginning of recorded time.
U.S. forces in Iraq brought twenty-first-century technology to the battlefield and achieved
"information dominance," but they never escaped the dangerous reality that their enemies were
trying to kill them. To quote Clausewitz again: "In the dreadful presence of suffering and danger,
emotion can easily overwhelm intellectual conviction, and in this psychological fog it is ... hard
to form clear and complete insights... It is the exceptional man [or woman] who keeps his powers
of quick decision intact" under the conditions of combat. The danger of combat was
accompanied by extreme physical exertion and fatigue. A recurring theme in soldiers' and
marines' accounts of their experiences in the Iraq War was the bone-shattering weariness of day-
after-day tension during the movement forward to contact the enemy. Fatigue and fear, along
with sleep deprivation, hunger, no ability to wash or shave, MREs that provided calories but
nothing more, a fierce and unforgiving climate, an alien landscape, and the terrifying sight of the
dead and the wounded, inevitably led to miscalculations, mistakes in judgment, and accidents.
In Iraq, those in command (including civilian leaders) had to make decisions of life and
death under split-second pressure and an unprecedented barrage of information that was often
ambiguous, uncertain, or contradictory. Added to this information overload were unremitting
demands from Washmgton for answers to simple, difficult, and inappropnate questions.
Commanders and their staffs in the Gulf were expected to participate in video-teleconferencing
sessions with civilian and military leaders half a world away who were operating on an entirely
different time schedule. They also had to feed the insatiable appetite of twenty-four-hour news
networks, all seeking up-to-the-minute combat information. In the midst of those pressures,
commanders had to run a war. They had to make strategic decisions around the clock, thinking as
much in terms of what was going to happen as what was actually happening.
Today's commanders possess surveillance advantages never dreamed of in past times,
and more often than not they see their forces and those of the enemy with extraordinary clarity.
But in an information-rich environment, what one needs to know is often buried in a blanket of
white noise, and individuals at every level reach limits in what they can absorb and pass along.
Many factors of critical importance become inaccessible due to lack of patience or
discrimination, no matter what the reach of sensors and the power of computers. Being human,
commanders often seize on that fraction of information that agrees with their own preconceived
ideas.
Some futurists claim that new information and computing technologies will allow U.S.
military forces to "lift the fog of war." According to this view, a vast array of sensors and
529
computers, tied together, can work symbiotically to see and comprehend the entire battle space
and remove ambiguity, uncertainty, and contradiction from the military equation, or at least
reduce these factors to manageable and controllable levels. Technology will triumph over the
general friction of war, they claim. This view leads to the belief that all the American military
needs to do to remain preeminent is to focus on acquiring more sophisticated technology. The
arguments in support of technological monism echo down the halls of the Pentagon, precisely
because they involve the expenditure of huge sums of money to defense contractors. In some
cases law makers may reduce spending on relatively inexpensive but critical items such as body
armor, believing that technology has precluded its use. Such policies, however, rest on a
profound ahistoricism that entirely misses the lessons of the past, much less even a reasonable
examination of recent events.
Crucial to the success of combat is an understanding of one's potential opponent as he is,
rather than as Americans would like him to be. This is intelligence in the largest sense. It does
not rest on satellites, UAVs, reconnaissance aircraft, and electronic surveillance that record every
radio transmission. Since the Vietnam War, U.S. intelligence agencies have increasingly
depended on such technological means, and the information gathered in this way has been of
considerable use, particularly to commanders engaged in combat. But it provides little that is of
value in understanding the enemy's intentions, his motivation to fight, and the strength of his
will — the factors that matter most in war.
Buried in an avalanche of information, commanders still confront the problem of trying
to understand the enemy's intention and his will to fight. It is well to talk about destroying the
enemy's combat power by 50 percent in order to precipitate his collapse, but those with
experience in 'Vietnam know that in some cases attrition of 90 percent was not sufficient to stop a
unit from fighting as a cohesive, effective force. Iraqi regular units in the north at nearly full
strength fought not at all while some fedeyeen fought until their strength was nearly zero. At the
level of command and control, where political as well as strategic decisions occur, good
intelligence gathered by thinking human beings can make the difference in victory or defeat.
Raw information is not intelligence. The problem over the past sixty-five years has not
been a lack of data. Rather, the problem has been erroneous interpretation of that data. Since
World War 11, intelligence organizations, both civilian and military, have proved to be all too
willmg to interpret information in light of preconceived political prejudices or expectations. For
example, numerous bits and pieces of intelligence over the spring and early summer of 1990
suggested that Saddam Hussein was prepanng to move against Kuwait. Even a basic
understanding of Baath ideology would have suggested that possibility. But few in the
intelligence community or among regional experts were sufficiently steeped in that ideology to
understand its implications. Similarly, few realized the extent of Saddam's own megalomaniac
aims. Thus, only one or two individuals in Washington predicted what was about to happen in
Kuwait. Clearly, all our statistical data did not help us.
In this recent war, many senior leaders expected the opening moves of the Coalition's air
and ground offensive to cause Saddam's regime to collapse from within. Thus, for the second
straight war against Iraq, the revealed wisdom in Washington was that the Baath regime rested
on a weak political foundation and that the Iraqi people would quickly rally to their liberators.
Nothing could have been further from the truth. The great majority of Iraqis, especially the
Kurds and Shiites, despised the Baath, but after wimessing Amencan perfidy m the spring of
1991, few people in Iraq, no matter how much they hated Saddam, were going to act against the
530
Baath until it was clear that Saddam was gone and the Coalition was there to stay. Greater
awareness of Iraqis past and present might have constrained such unwarranted optimism.
Senior British and American officers were greatly surprised by the degree of control the
Baath Party was able to exercise over Iraq's civilians during the war. Yet, given what Coalition
planners should have known about the thirty-five years of indoctrination the party imposed on
Iraq's population, this reality ought not to have come as a surprise. The guerilla tactics the
military has faced since the fall of Baghdad reflect that prewar indoctrination — and yet this too
seems to have come as a shock to planners for the postwar period.
Such flawed pohtical intelligence had little impact on the conventional phase of the Iraq
War. But in Vietnam, political and strategic misjudgments resulted in military disaster. This was
a clear warning that applies to future conflicts. Intelligence is not just about collecting and
processing great amounts of information. It is about understanding the enemy as he is and then
tailoring strategic and operational approaches that turn his political framework to one's own
advantager Without this kind of political knowledge, which requires immersion in the language,
culture, and history of a region, the data gathered by technological means can serve only to
reinforce preconceived, erroneous, sometimes disastrous notions.
Like it or not, the political context within which wars always occur will demand that the
United States — at times not necessarily of its own choosing — commit military forces to achieve
its aims. And for political reasons, those forces will not be able to use all of their sophisticated
capabilities even against significant targets. Under many such circumstances, a "decisive"
military outcome will be difficult to achieve. If Americans wish to gain political results from
their military actions in the future, they must pay particular attention to how their low-tech
enemies define victory and defeat. That calculus may prove very different from their own.
The Changing Military Environment
Interdependence
The inability to perform adequately as a joint force in Grenada sparked major reforms in the
American military that are still reverberating through the force structure. The Iraq War
underlines how much progress has occurred, despite the continued existence of interservice
rivalries. In recent years, combined arms have expanded from integration of ground forces —
infantry, armor, artillery — to the incorporation of direct and indirect air power. Beginning in
Afghanistan and even more so in Iraq, close air support with precision weapons has brought a
new lethality to combined arms. In Kosovo, where NATO did not deploy ground forces, the
Serbs were able to keep their army dispersed and hidden, so air strikes did very little damage
against Serbian armor. In the Iraq War, however, the Coalition's speedy advance forced the
Iraqis to react by bringing the best units out of hiding, thus providing ideal targets for precision
air power. At the Karbala Gap, 3/7 Cavalry Squadron maneuvered deliberately to draw out Iraqi
armor so that aerial firepower could destroy them.
The degree that the American military has achieved interdependence between ground and
air forces was eloquently described by a senior ground commander who confessed that in the
heat of battle he had no idea of the source of the destructive power in front of him. "It could have
been air force, navy, or marine. All I cared about was that the stuff was killing the enemy." But
the fighting in Iraq also suggests that America's land forces need to tailor and combine the
various combat branches at lower levels of organization than is currently the practice. What the
531
United States needs in the future arc smaller, leaner, brigade-sized units that can deploy more
quickly and fight mdependently.
Convergence
The end of the Cold War simplified the roles and functions of all the services, and the experience
in Iraq suggests that the respective roles of the ground forces are beginning to converge. Neither
the air force nor the navy confront an enemy with technologically sophisticated forces at sea or
in the air. Consequently, the function of those services is now mostly to project and deliver
ground forces to a particular theater and then support those forces with precision killing power.
As the army has succeeded to some degree in sheddmg its Cold War impedimenta to become
more strategically transportable and expeditionary (a traditional role for the marine corps), the
marines have begun to employ larger, heavier formations capable of taking on enemy armor.
This is not to say that the two services possess similar missions and cultures, but the convergence
suggests that they need to work more closely in the future.
Ad Hocery
In the Iraq War, army and marine units set up ad hoc formations on the basis of the tactical
context and the demands of combat. Their success suggests that such an approach (in many
ways similar to the German Kampfgruppe of World War II) needs to be regularized in training
and procedures. Light infantry, mechanized infantry, armor, and artillery should all train more
regularly together in tactical scenarios that test the adaptability and flexibility of commanders as
well as troops. Here the marines have a considerable advantage, because the organization of
MEUs is such that combined arms must work at the lowest levels of organization.
What died on the battlefields of Iraq was the vision held by many of a homogenized
army — one in which units would largely resemble one another. Instead, the army of the future
will require a large kit bag of capabilities that it can deploy and fit together, sometimes in the
middle of battle, to meet the many exigencies of this new era in warfare. For example, in the
open battlefield, lighter forces equipped with new information systems proved highly effective at
engaging and destroying the Iraqis. But speed and information superiority became less decisive
when combat occurred at closer range, as in the complex urban terrain of Basra and Baghdad.
There, older weapons systems such as the Abrams and Bradley, with their advantages in
protection, mass, and explosive power, proved to be of considerable utility. This traditional
machine-age equipment is likely to remain a part of ground forces in the future.
Special Operations
Drawing on the experiences of Afghanistan, the Coalition made extraordinarily effective use of
special operations forces. Here the contrast could not be more different from the use of special
forces in the Gulf War. Moreover, the combination of special forces with conventional forces
proved devastating. In the south, special forces were able to grab the oil wells before the Iraqis
could blow up more than a few, while the amval of conventional forces ensured that regular
Iraqi units could not regain control of the area. In the western deserts, SOF isolated Iraq from
Syria and Jordan and closed down the possibility that Saddam could fire Scuds at Israel. And
finally in northern Iraq, fewer than a conventional brigade's worth of soldiers under a colonel's
command succeeded in building a surrogate army that defeated three Iraqi corps and secured
Kirkuk and Mosul. All of these expenences reinforce the lessons of Afghanistan: special
532
operations forces will play an increasingly important role in the projection of American military
power against the nation's enemies, while the operations of those forces will be ever more
closely integrated with those of conventional forces.
Also, the unconventional warfare phase of the campaign highlights the truism that regular
army and marine infantry units are increasingly finding themselves in close combat situations
that resemble those of their special operations colleagues. Regular infantry units have much to
learn from them and should begin soon to adopt many of their techniques for selection, training
and leader development.
Speed
In war, speed kills, especially if military forces move fast enough to disturb the enemy's ability
to make decisions. Franks and his planners maintained the speed of movement by making the tip
of the spear as supple, mobile, and flexible as possible. He had clearly learned the lesson of the
Gulf War that a fundamental law of Newtonian physics applies also to military maneuver: one
can achieve overwhelming force by substituting velocity for mass. In this campaign. Coalition
ground forces moved with such swiftness that virtually every decision the Iraqi high command
made was already overtaken by events. Pressure from marine and army commanders at every
level to maintain the pace of the offensive ensured that the Iraqis would never recover. The
unexpected appearance of Coalition forces far in advance of where the Iraqis expected them to
be simply overwhelmed the capacity of the enemy to respond.
Speed of movement resulted from a willingness to adapt to the actual conditions of the
battlefield. Franks and his immediate subordinate commanders, McKieman, Conway, and
Wallace, encouraged their officers to take risks. Throughout the campaign the Coalition focused
on getting to Baghdad as fast as possible, even if it caused some dislocations in the logistic flow.
Subordinates willingly bypassed enemy defenses with the assurance that speed, supporting
firepower, and the competence of follow-on forces would protect rear areas. Air power reduced
the risks by addressing threats as they arose, amplifying and extending the impact of ground
maneuver. Speed of ground movement flushed the enemy. Air power killed him while he was
exposed, massed and in the open.
Still, in the short term there were costs. As a number of accounts of the fighting make
clear, Coalition forces were at times caught in ambushes. The more fluid and fast-moving the
situation, the more vulnerable the rear echelon will be to attack; only training will ensure
survival. The army needs to be far more vigorous in training rear area troops to defend
themselves in close combat. As American ground forces move to a more distributed rather than
linear use of the battle space, close combat training for service troops will become even more
crucial.
The speed of the Coalition's military advance may have had a political downside in the
war's aftermath. The very swiftness and efficiency of the victory may have led many Iraqis to
believe that they had not been defeated — the traitorous forces of the Iraqi army had simply
folded. Survivors among the Baath Party faithful will likely offer that explanation as they pursue
the guerrilla phase of this conflict. And for many ordinary civilians, the lack of extensive damage
and suffering as a direct result of the war may make the Coalition's claim of victory seem to be
no more than a passing fantasy. In contrast to the war of movement, the stabilization effort
appears to be proceeding slowly. In planning for future wars and their, aftermath, civilian and
533
military leaders should make greater efforts to balance the speed of postwar stabilization with the
speed of military conquest.
Knowledge
Coalition forces would never have been able to achieve the tempo of their operations without the
confidence drawn from a deep understanding of Iraqi military forces. Particularly important was
knowledge gained from having watched the Iraqis operate in the penod between the two Gulf
wars. Once operations began, commanders and decision makers in the field were able to take
advantage of surveillance technologies that allowed them to adapt and modify their plans and
movements in accordance with the developing situation, while at the same time denying the
enemy any sense of what was happening.
Yet the campaign also reinforced the lessons learned repeatedly and consistently in
previous wars: no matter how sophisticated the technical means of information-gathenng, a real
picture does not begin to emerge until there are human eyes on the target. Counting vehicles
from the air does not tell a commander what the enemy intends to do with them. Time and again,
army and marine scouts and special forces' reconnaissance units were able to spot, track, and
anticipate Iraqi movements and to turn raw intelligence into what soldiers call "ground truth" — a
real picture of what was occumng on the battlefield.
Precision
The conflict in Iraq was the third in which U.S. forces leveraged their overwhelming superiority
in precision killing power. As in Afghanistan, this campaign highlighted the extent to which
precision capabilities had improved over the course of the last decade. Likewise, advances in the
ability (and willingness) of the air force to connect with ground forces and concentrate its
precision killing power on Iraqi army targets had a dramatic impact on the ability of Coalition
ground forces to close with and destroy the enemy.
However, the campaign served to elicit the same cautions that had occurred in Kosovo
and Afghanistan: precision of weapons alone is not enough to ensure precision of effects against
the enemy. Precision killing comes only with the ability to locate the target with precision, to hit
the right target and avoid accidentally stnking friendly troops, .-^nd the speed of the targeting
process must be fast enough to strike before the enemy moves. The fedayeen suqjrise also
provides the caution that as the American weapons become more precise, the enemy finds ways
to become harder to hit and kill. Putting together information about where the enemy is and
discovering what the really important targets are still represent daunting challenges in a complex,
ambiguous environment. And assessing with precision the damage caused by precision weapons
remains an intractable and almost insoluble problem for both air and ground forces.
The Iraq conflict also underlined that at present only aerial systems possess a full
complement of precision weapons. With few exceptions, ground munitions, particularly artillery
systems, are still area-fire weapons incapable of attacking point targets. This was particularly a
problem in close combat, where the explosive radius of precision bombs made them too
dangerous to drop immediately in front of friendly troops, while the imprecision of artillery and
mortars limited their effectiveness close-in. The lesson is clear: in the future the U.S. military
needs more precision in weapons designed for the close fight and these weapons must be
proliferated and made available to every maneuver unit on the battlefield.'
534
Simultaneity
The war plan developed by Centcom adopted the principle of simultaneity first practiced so
successfully during the invasion of Panama. In both cases, the secret to winning quickly was to
strike the enemy across the entire extent of his territory in many dimensions — air, land, and
sea — in the shortest period of time. The object of simultaneity was as much psychological as
physical. The pattern of assaults against the Iraqis aimed at paralyzing a command structure that
moved at a glacial pace in the best of times, given Saddam's penchant for total control. Coalition
air and ground forces may not have achieved real simultaneity in every instance, but the evidence
is clear that the Iraqi high command perceived that from the beginning they were under attack
everywhere.
Dispersion
The battle for Iraq has again reinforced the observation that the modem battlefield continues to
empty and to expand. Future enemies will seek — as did the Iraqis, albeit ineffectively — to
disperse, dig in, and go to ground to avoid the impact of American precision weapons. At the
same time, American forces will disperse over greater distances as the battlefield becomes more
opaque and as the range of weapons increases. But as we have seen in this campaign, an empty
battlefield is a lonely place where a soldier's instinct is to take counsel of his fears. Soldiers and
their leaders must be superbly trained and psychologically prepared for such frightening
circumstances.
Adaptability
This war, like all those fought by the United States since the end of the Cold War, demonstrated
dramatically the truism that competent militaries are those capable of adapting rapidly to the
unexpected. Great military organizations fight the enemy, not the plan. Speed of decision making
and the ability to move within the enemy's decision cycle ultimately help determine who will
win or lose. Quick thinking allows commanders to make up for deficiencies in planning and to
react to the unexpected. What was particularly impressive in this conflict was the ability of
soldiers and marines to cobble together ad hoc units to meet unforeseen circumstances and for
even the smallest units to be creative tactically and to act against the enemy without seeking
perrrussion. Equally impressive was the ability of ground units to change behavior as the
character of the war changed from open mechanized warfare to stability operations centered in
towns and cities. Only soldiers who are well trained and used to dealing with uncertainty and
change could have adapted to such radically different circumstances so quickly and effectively.
Quality
The Iraqi campaign reinforced the lessons of Afghanistan and other campaigns that quality
trumps quantity on most modem battlefields. From the Civil War through Vietnam, the
American military relied primarily on mass and industrial might to smother its enemies in men
and materiel. Since then, largely influenced by an all-volunteer military, the services have
increasingly relied on smaller, higher quality aggregations of men armed with sophisticated
weapons. Limited wars fought for limited strategic ends in this new American age of warfare
have forced commanders to win with fewer casualties. The emphasis on precision firepower and
535
sophisticated weapons has resulted in fewer soldiers having to be placed in harm's way to
achieve intended results.
But smaller numbers on the battlefield place a premium on leadership. Small-unit leaders
now have to assume responsibilities that were once the pur\'iew of officers of higher grade and
maturity. Close combat soldiers and marines will invariably find themselves involved in fast-
paced operations that demand rapid decision making in circumstances where the wrong decision
might well result in an incident with global media exposure and international repercussions. The
requirements for initiative and leadership have now moved down to the lowest levels of
command, which has enormous implications for how junior officers and NCOs are recruited,
trained, and selected for command.
Training, Leadership, and Education
In March and Apnl of 2003, both Coalition and Iraqi forces lived in an environment where fear,
ambiguity, uncertainty, danger, and chance inhibited their ability to fight. Yet such factors had a
much greater impact on the Iraqis. The essential difference lay in the willingness of the
Coalition's men and women to train long and hard in preparing for combat.
Good human material turns into outstanding marines, soldiers, and airmen only through
realistic, tough training. Much of the exceptional performance of ground forces in Iraq resulted
from three decades of experiences at training centers in California, Germany, Nevada, and
Louisiana. But training is expensive. It uses up considerable resources. It places enormous strain
on officers and NCOs as well as the individual soldier and his family. Scientists can predict with
some precision how technological improvements in weaponry will pay off on the battlefield. The
payback for training cannot be predicted; it can be accurately measured only in combat. In both
Gulf wars, the Iraqis possessed modem weapons. They simply did not know how to employ
them. Technology will do little for the badly trained. In the end, technology is a tool. Training
allows the soldier to use this tool effectively.
The American military should not forget that its worst defeat resulted largely from a
military and civilian leadership that prized technology over the lessons of the past. Vietnam-era
senior leaders were not only often contemptuous of the enemy but largely ignorant of his
motivations, culture, and ideology. Thus, it was the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese who were
willing to "pay any pnce, bear any burden,"and who understood their Amencan enemy far better
than Americans understood them. If the U.S. military does not desire to repeat the mistakes of
the past, then it needs to create a learning culture, where intellectual preparation is pnzed as
highly as tactical preparation.
The performance of America's military institutions from 1991 to the recently completed
war with Iraq represents the inumph of a systematic approach to training and education that the
services put in place dunng the Cold War. Yet the strategic environment today is far more
ambiguous, uncertain, complex, and culturally distant than it was only a generation ago. Soldiers
today must not only understand technology but they must understand the cultural environment in
which that technology will be employed. Officers in particular must study their profession to
understand the nature of modem war.
Key leaders in this campaign came from many different backgrounds and services but
vinually all of them shared a common characteristic: a commitment to the study of their
profession and a desire to understanding the nature and character of human conflict. But this new
era of warfare demands much more of a soldier. Constant deployments and the pressures of
536
practical service might in time diminish opportunities for our young leaders to study and renect
on their profession. All of the personnel systems of the services by their nature will slight
education and study in favor of endless back-to-back deployments unless the policies are put into
place that will force them to give officers time to gain the intellectual and qualities of thought
that went so far to enhance the muddy boot operational talent that these men demonstrated so
effectively on the battlefields of Iraq.
The Changing Political Environment
In the end, the Iraq War of 2003 was not just about oil or the stability of the Middle East, though
these were important factors to be sure. Nor was it primarily about the liberation of the Iraqi
people or even about the need to rid the world of weapons of mass destruction. Rather, like the
operation in Afghanistan, the Iraq War was a clear demonstration to the entire world that the
United States, in the wake of September 11, has the capacity and the will to defeat rogue states
and confront those who threaten the vital interests of the American people.
Yet. the conflict that began in mid-March has not ended. Conventional operations came
to a halt shortly after soldiers and marines stormed Baghdad and occupied Saddam's hometown
of Tiknt. But attacks on American soldiers and marines continue, particularly in Iraq's "Sunni
triangle" — the region where the Baathists drew their deepest support. These attacks have been
precipitated by criminal gangs, Baath Party members, foreign fedayeen not only from Arab
countries but from Chechnya, Yemen, Syria, and Jordan — and in one case even a twelve-year-
old girl. The number of Americans killed in Iraq has surpassed the number killed in the Gulf
War, and the end is not yet in sight. Whether such violence represents the death throes of an evil
and pernicious regime or the first phase of a protracted guerrilla insurgence is impossible to say.
At a Pentagon briefing in July, Centcom commander General John Abizaid said of the situation
in central Iraq, "Guerrilla tactics is a proper way to describe it in strictly military terms."
The current U.S. administration and its military advisers could have been better prepared
to handle the intractable problems raised by victory. To a great extent, that failure reflected a
reluctance to involve America's military in nation building and peacekeeping. Insistence on this
point closely mirrored the inclination of some in the military services to believe that they should
avoid the messy business that lies beyond clear-cut, decisive mihtary Of)erations.
The United States' record of nation building has not been a high point of military or
civilian competence over the past forty years. General William Westmoreland, commander in
Vietnam from 1964 to 1968, neglected the tasks that lay beyond defeating the Viet Cong and the
North Vietnamese in battle. His successor. General Creighton Abrams. did care, but by the time
he took over it was too late to win the war, much less the peace. With the end of the Cold War,
when the Clinton administration voiced the intention of using the U.S. military to bring stability
to some of the world's trouble spots, members of Congress, Democratic as well as Republican,
were rarely supportive. Clinton himself did not want to pay the political price that the inevitable
casualties would demand.
Thus, in Somalia, despite "mission creep" from humanitarian aid to nation building
without any clear analysis of the political and economic realities, a handful of deaths was
sufficient to end the peace-keeping effort there. Even in Bosnia, politicians would commit troops
only after extracting the promise that they would be there for only one year. Yet. the troops are
still there, and it is likely they will stay for the foreseeable future.
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537
The argument that the American people are unwilling to suffer casualties misses a larger
point. Whenever political leaders have taken the trouble to explain in clear, honest terms why
military commitments were essential to the nation's interests and ideals, Americans, throughout
their history, have willingly and consistently paid the price. The greatest benefit that a
commander-in-chief can bequeath to soldiers engaged in combat is clarity in defining the
mission and resolve to see it through. The events of September 11 profoundly altered the view
that the United States is immune from the troubles besetting the rest of the world. American
operations in Afghanistan represented a realization that both air and ground forces must be
enlisted in the fight — a depanure from the "distant punishment" approach of the Clinton
administration, with its reliance on precision attacks and its antipathy to placing American men
and women in harm's way.
While it was all very fine to overthrow the Taliban and clean out the nest of Al Qaeda
terrorists, the question then arose: what were U.S. forces to do in Afghanistan once they had
accomplished their purely military mission? The United States could not simply leave the
country and risk a resurgence of the Taliban. Something had to be put in its place, and like it or
not that something required a commitment to nation building, A failed effort in Afghanistan
would not have had an enormous impact on the delicate balance among the nuclear powers India
and Pakistan and the soon-to-be-nuclear power Iran. In Iraq, by contrast, an American failure to
provide something substantially better than Saddam's regime could well have a catastrophic
impact on the continued flow of the world's oil supply, the activities of international terrorists,
and the chances for an end to hostilities between warring factions throughout the region. Postwar
failure in Iraq would suggest to much of the Islamic worid that their only viable path to the future
must lie with the fundamentalists rather than with those who wish to bring stability and
modernity to the region.
Some senior officials seem to have believed that the Iraqis, relishing their liberation,
would shift smoothly into a workable democracy. Even a quick glance at America's own history,
where the colonists — united by a common war effort, language, and political culture — still took
nearly a decade to sort out their affairs, would have suggested that the establishment of a stable
political system in Iraq would be a long-term venture.
Moreover, unlike the United States of 1783, Iraq is divided into three distinct and hostile
groups separated along religious and ethnic faultlines. Iraq's people have lived for the past thirty-
five years under a fearsome tyranny, the pnnciples of which are entirely foreign to American
sensibilities. Trust in the fairness, transparency, and effectiveness of government was nonexistent
in Iraq. The regime and its supporters could strike anyone at any moment, and rebellion in any
form was sure to meet with the most draconian penalties, including death by unimaginable
torture. Such a political system is difficult for those who live in the comfort of liberal
democracies to visualize, much less understand.
Hard as it may be to believe. Saddam's regime can claim some genuinely devoted
supporters, some of whom have gone on to participate in organized guerrilla attacks against
American soldiers after the war. While a portion of Saddam's followers were simply hangers on,
loyal to the regime because of what it could do for them, others were true believers in the Baath
ideology who now seem willing to do everything in their power to prevent consolidation of the
Coalition's hold over what they regard as their country alone. Members of the Sunni Arab tribes
in Iraq's center, who have dominated the Kurds and Shiites since 1932, do not view the kind of
democracy promised by the Coalition as being necessarily to their advantage. Added to these
internal pressures are foreign complexities. The Turks strongly oppose -independence for Iraqi
11
538
Kurds, while the Iranian clerics already are meddling among the Shia in southern Iraq. Baathists
in Syria and fundamentalists in Iran support like-minded groups in Iraq.
These cultural and geopolitical complexities will make the securing of Iraq far more of a
challenge than virtually anyone in this had foreseen before the conflict began. And this task will
as always fall on the military to accomplish. The great justification for the resources that
America lavishes on its military forces lies in the ability of those forces not just to smash and
destroy the enemies of the United States but to participate in rebuilding shattered and broken
societies. The United States cannot deal with every failed state in the twenty-first century, but it
can, under certain circumstances where morality and self-interest converge, make a difference,
through combined military and stability operations.
The strategic circumstances in Iraq today reflect the fact that the gods of war have a sense
of irony. For the most part the ships have sailed back to port and the bombers and fighters are
secure at home bases. Much of the steel phalanx that roiled over the Iraqi military has been
evacuated out of theater or sits idled in motor pools. The 4"" Infantry Division, the army's most
technologically sophisticated unit now has responsibility for searching the streets and alleyways
of Tikrit for Saddam Hussein. Today these mechanized "laptop warriors" are foot soldiers
performing grunt tasks no different from the British Army in Palestine in the 1930"s and
Northern Ireland in the 1970's or for that matter the Roman Army in first century Judea. While
the stability mission in Iraq is manpower intensive the forces responsible for performing this
mission form a very thin line indeed. Infantrymen bear most of the burden. Yet army and marine
grunts make up less than four percent of America's military, a force only slightly larger than the
New York City Police Department.
The tasks these soldiers perform are timeless to be sure — and dangerous. By day Iraqi
streets bustle with commerce much as they did before Saddam. But at night inside the Sunni
Triangle these same streets turn into free fire zones where the thugs, criminals and foreign
fanatics come out to kill Americans. Those who have seen war first hand and close up know the
debilitation that comes with facing the constant fear of violent death. Unlike firemen and cops on
the beat a soldier goes out on patrol every night expecting to kill.
In the afternoon they undergo the necessary routine of briefings, inspections and
rehearsals. At dusk they don heavy body armor, helmets, weapons, night vision devices, radios
and all the other impedimenta that makes up a soldier's burden. At dark they move out into a
miserably hot, humid and dusty night to do the job. Only a soldier can describe the gut churning
fear that accompanies the moment when the "search and clear" team kicks in a door to confront
whatever is inside. Within the confines of a tiny room the soldier looks through the two
dimensional, grainy-green image of his goggles to determine if his welcome will come from a
fedeyeen fanatic or a child huddling with its mother in fear. Dripping with sweat, gripped with
anxiety and fear the soldier has only an instant to determine whether to shift his finger into the
trigger well of reassure the occupants inside.
Today this scene is repeated daily in Afghanistan and Iraq as well as other places too
secret to recount. These young soldiers man point for a thousand dollars a month and the promise
of a trip home to a nation that hopefully understands and appreciates the true meaning of
sacrifice.
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539
Center for Strategic
AND Budgetary Assessments
Testimony before the House Committee on
Armed Services
October 21 , 2003
Operation Iraqi Freedom;
A First Blush Assessment
Dr. Andrew R Krepinevich, Jr.
Executive Director
540
Mr Chairman and members of the committee, it is a great honor to have the opportunity to appear
before you today to assess the war to topple Saddam Hussein and the lessons that can be derived from
the recent conflict for future strategic planning, transformation and force structure.
These prepared remarks offer a first-blush assessment of the coalition campaign against Saddam
Hussein's regime that began on March 19, 2003, and was declared completed by President George W.
Bush on May 1, 2003. Given the lack of comprehensive data on coalition operations and the tentative
nature of much of the data thus far made public, many of the "lessons" or implications that follow must
be regarded as preliminary. I cannot emphasize enough how important a thorough independent
assessment of the conflict is, similar to the Gulf War Air Power Survey commissioned by the US Air
Force after Operation Desert Storm. Moreover, any assessment of Operation Iraqi Freedom should
focus on how the experience of this war will influence future military competitions. The following are
among the war's potential implications for US military planners:
Strategic Implications
The United States is in the Regime-Change Business
If there ever was any doubt that the United States is in the regime-change business, the Second Gulf
War should dispel il. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the United States has, directly or indirectly,
deposed the regime of a foreign state roughly once every three years. But those who practice regime
change incur certain responsibilities as well as moral and political consequences. The United States
must stabilize Iraq, lest it incur a significant setback in us efforts to make progress in the war against
hostile Islamic regimes and radical Islamic terrorist movements. Success, however, will likely involve
a protracted occupation of Islamic states (i.e., Afghanistan and Iraq) and exact substantial human and
material costs. This means the US military's preference to do what it does best — defeat enemy forces in
the field and then quickly depart — must be overcome. The practice of crafting quick exit strategies
must yield to a willingness to develop a comprehensive strategy for winning both the war and the
postconfllct period that follows. In shon, the American military — the Army, in particular — must create
a significant capability for conducting stability operations.
Divergence, Not Convergence
Although it comes as no surprise to most military observers. Operation Iraqi Freedom again
demonstrated the wide — and expanding — gap between the US and all the world's other militaries in
conventional of>erations. The implications for those who consider themselves actual or potential
enemies of the United States are clear: they must avoid taking on the American military in
conventional war. Rather, they must move to the extremes along the spectrum of conflict. For rogue
states such as Iran and North Korea, this means acquiring nuclear weapons or pursuing more
ambiguous forms of aggression through support of terrorist organizations. A third option is to develop
anti-access and area-denial capabilities.
The Anti-Access Challenge Is Real and Growing
Operation Iraqi Freedom provided a clear lesson for what has been a growing trend: denying US access
to overseas bases. Moreover, the Bush Administration's increased emphasis on preventive strike and
preventive war could make it even more difficult to secure forward base access. Foreign governments
would be more likely to grant access in response to an act of aggression than when the United States is
contemplating initiating military operations. This fact highlights the need for the United Stales to
develop and field military forces capable of conducting large-scale power-projection operations
independent of access to forward bases.
541
Precision Warfare Comes of Age
The Second Gulf War found coalition forces in the position of trying to protect the people of Iraq and
the nation's infrastructure from the regime in Baghdad. In recent years the United Slates has v-aged war
against regimes, not nations. Consequently, the US military had the mission of defeating the enemy
regime without alienating the population, so as to facilitate postwar reconstruction and stability
operations. Key to achieving this objective was limiting noncombaiant casualties and damage to the
target state's infrastructure. To do this, the US-led coalition had to strike with discnmination and move
with great speed. Advanced intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities proved cntical to
identifying military targets. The widespread use of precision guided munitions (PGMs) enabled
discriminate strikes, minimizing the loss of noncombatant lives and sparing much of Iraq's economic
infrastructure.
Compressing the Engagement Cycle
Time is becoming an increasingly precious asset on the modem battlefield. To offset the remarkable
accuracy of PGMs, adversaries can become mobile, compressing the time US forces have between
identifying and striking a target. The US military's ability to compress the engagement cycle dunng
Operation Iraqi Freedom represents an important step forward in the transition to a new age of
precision warfare.
Precision Strike
The Second Gulf War witnessed the widespread use of precision bombardment on an unsurpassed
scale and intensity. Of great imponance was the fact that these munitions enabled the US military to
wage a campaign that was both ferocious and discnminate.
Joint integration
The close integration of precision air strikes and ground combat operations — known in military
parlance as "joint" operations — proved essential to another critical element of the campaign: the need
for ground forces to move quickly to seize Iraq before Saddam could destroy it. Air and ground forces,
which had fought essentially separate wars in Operation Desert Storm in 1991, were integrated to a
higher degree than ever before.
Friendly Fire
The maturing of precision warfare may reduce substantially the percentage of casualties inflicted by
friendly forces upon one another. Preliniinary data show that US forces made progress in the ability to
minimize mistakenly attacking each other, a phenomenon known as "friendly fire" or "blue-on-blue"
engagements. During Operation Desert Storm, 25.6 percent of those killed in action died as a result of
blue-on-blue engagements, versus only 6.5 percent dunng Operation Iraqi Freedom.
The Battle over the Lessons of Iraq
The battle for Iraq is over. The battle among the Services for pride of place and budget share has
begun. This report offers some preliminary observations on these issues.
Persistent Surveillance: UAVs and SOF
The US military's unmanned aenal vehicles (UAVs) continued to grow in innportance, and their role
seems certain to expand in the future. However, if and when enemy air defense systems become more
formidable and the anti-access threat matures, the US military will likely require a significant number
of stealthy, extended-range UAVs to maintain the kind of persistent surveillance it found so valuable in
542
Operation Iraqi Freedom. On the basis of early reports, it appears that special operations forces (SOF)
played an important role in enabling the persistent surveillance that made it so difficult for Iraqi forces
to move without being detected and engaged. The role of SOF may increase if the anti-access/arca-
denial threat precludes the rapid movement of ground forces into a threatened region.
Bombers
Bombers have performed impressively in all major recent US military operations, and the Seeond Gulf
War proved no exception. Operation Iraqi Freedom saw bombers accounting for less than 3 percent of
the strike sorties, but dropping approximately 28 percent of all munitions. The Air Force was able to
orbit bombers overhead to provide on-call precision firepower. Operating this way assumes an
environment in which enemy air defenses have been neutralized. While this proved to be the case in
Afghanistan and Iraq, it may not always hold true. As the anti-access threat grows, the need for
extended-range, stealthy strike platforms — be they bombers or Unmanned Combat Aenal Vehicles
(UCAVs) — seems certain to increase.
Tankers
Just as the difficulties in securing forward base access increased the US military's reliance on bombers,
the need to operate short-range tactical aircraft at more distant bases increased the need for tanker
aircraft to extend their range. The tanker-io-total-sortie ratio in the Second Gulf War was double that of
Operation Desert Storm. The Air Force's tanker fleet, however, is showing its age. Clearly, the tanker
fleet must be modernized. The argument is only made stronger by the Air Force's expanding emphasis
on short-range strike aircraft. Yet tanker modernization has not achieved the necessary priority in the
Service's budget.
Ground Forces: Conventional and Stability Operations
Operation Iraqi Freedom was undertaken with just one heavy Army division, and it is difficult to
imagine what prospective adversary would seek to challenge US supremacy in armored warfare. One
clear lesson that has emerged from the coalition operation in Iraq is that stability operations are likely
to prove more challenging for the US military than the war itself. Given the number and scale of
stability operations in which the Army is involved, the protracted nature of these operations, and the
Service's other commitments, the support of allied forces will likely prove more crucial in this decade
than in the last.
Tactical Aircraft
The maturation of the US military's precision strike capabilities threatens to make tactical strike
aircraft a victim of their own success. Over the past twelve years, the US military's aggressive fielding
of PGMs, and the modification of nearly every strike aircraft to employ them, have greatly enhanced
the strike force's effectiveness. Thus, while Operation Desert Storm employed some 1,600 American
tactical strike aircraft. Operation Iraqi Freedom required less than half that number. The reduced
reliance on tactical aircraft can also be attributed to the difficulty in obtaining access to forward air
bases. Yet more than 2,000 new tactical strike aircraft are scheduled to be procured, with the
over^vhelming majority requiring fixed, forward-base access.
Meeting Tomorrow's Challenges
Familiar Threats
Genuine transformation of militaries transcends merely becoming more effective in the existing
warfare regime; rather, it entails progress toward competing effectively in an emerging warfare regime
543
that promises to be quite different from previous experience. Yet the remarkable US-led coalition
campaign in the Second Gulf War was essentially waged against an Iraqi force whose composition
would have been familiar to the German Army that introduced blitzkrieg to the world more than sixty
years ago Indeed, the Iraqi military might not have been a match for the Wehrmacht circa 1940, let
alone the American military of 2003.
Emerging Challenges
A measure of just how far the US military has yet to go in terms of transforming to meet emerging
threats can be seen in the changing face of conflict. The proliferation of ballistic and cruise missile
technology will eventually enable even small states to hold at nsk the forward air bases and the major
ports used to resupply US troops. US power-projection forces increasingly run the risk of confronting
adversaries with land-based military forces such as missiles and aircraft and coastal forces such as
advanced antiship mines, submarines and small combatants (perhaps masquerading as commercia!
vessels) equipped with very lethal high-speed antiship cruise missiles. Americans are all too aware of
the threat of catastrophic terrorism to the homeland. Access to space is becoming ubiquitous. How will
the US military deny an enemy access to space capabilities in the event of crisis or conflict? Nuclear
weapons are proliferating. How might a collapsing state's weapons of mass destruction (W?vID) be
secured before ii falls into the wrong hands? The United States has the world's most advanced
information infrastructure and, by some accounts, apparently one of the most vulnerable. How will it
be defended? Operation Iraqi Freedom offers few clues as to how to prepare for these emerging
challenges.
Recent conflicts like the Second Gulf War offer some tantalizing hints about where the US military
could be headed along its transformation path. Yet the war in Iraq appears more reflective of old threats
than new challenges. Remarkable as the recent developments in US military capabilities have been,
they do not suffice to dominate the very different kinds of threats that are emergmg. Despite its recent
successes, the Pentagon's motto must be, "You ain't seen nothing yet."
Thank you for your attention. I welcome the opportunity to answer any questions you may have.
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STATEMENT BY
DR. STEPHEN BIDDLE
ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF NATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
FIRST SESSION, 108TH CONGRESS
ON
OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM: OUTSIDE PERSPECTIVES
21 OCTOBER 2003
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNTIL RELEASED
BY THE COMMITTEE ON
ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
545
Statement By
Dr. Stephen Biddle
associate professor of national security studies
U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies institute
On Operation Iraqi Freedom
The views and opinions expressed are those of the author and are not necessarily those of the
Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government.
Chairman Hunter, Mr. Skelton, members of the Committee, it is a pleasure to appear
before you to discuss Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). My remarks today are based on the
preliminary findings of a War College study of why the campaign to topple Saddam came out the
way it did, and what implications should be drawn from this for American defense policy. This
study is not yet complete; it is undergoing peer review and is thus subject to change. But on the
basis of the work completed to date, it is possible to sketch the outlines of what I think the main
answers are likely to be, subject to the proviso that the review process could still alter the study's
final conclusions if new data or evidence so indicate.
The key question for the study is why the war came out to be a low cost victory. After all,
before the war, many feared that OiF would see an urban street fight with heavy Coalition
casualties, a protracted siege of Baghdad, a scorched earth campaign with extensive Iraqi
economic and environmental damage, or Iraqi use of WMD (Weapons of Mass Destruction). Of
course, none of these things actually occurred. Instead, Saddam was overthrown in just 21 days
' This study is based on evidence collected in a series of 176 interviews with American. British, and Iraqi
participants in the conflict, together with primary source documentation on the conduct of the war, and the results
of direct physical mspection of several of the war's key battlefields. This evidence was collected partly in theater
at Baghdad, Hillah, Basra, and Camp Bucca, Iraq, and Camp Doha, Kuwait; and partly with returnees at Ft.
Carson, Colorado, Fallon Naval Air Station, Nevada, the Pentagon, and Czirlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. The
interviewees ranged in rank from E-5 to 0-8, and include participants from the conventional U.S. Army, Air
Force, Navy, and Marine Corps; the British Army; American Special Forces; and the Iraqi Regular Army and
Republican Guard. Audiotapes of these interviews, together with other primary source documentary material
collected for the study, have been deposited at the US. Army's Military History Institute archive in Carlisle.
Pennsylvania, and constitute the MHI Strategic Studies Institute OIF Research Collection, henceforth MHl.
546
of fighting, without scorched earth or WMD use, and without prolonged street fighting in Iraqi
cities. The Coalition loss rate of fewer than one in 2300 troops killed in action was among the
lowest ever for major mechanized campaigns, and resembles those of the other recent American
wars that have led many to see an ongoing revolution in military affairs.
How did the Coalition avert the perils so many had feared beforehand? Many now credit
some combination of speed, precision, and situation awareness, which are held to have destroyed
much of Iraq's combat power before it could be brought to bear, and prevented the rest from
responding meaningfully to Coalition movements.' In this view, the speed of those movements
demoralized Iraq's forces, and preempted Saddam's attempts to torch Iraqi oil fields, destroy
Iraqi ports, or employ chemical weapons. Taken together, speed, precision, and situation
awareness can substitute for mass, it is argued - in fact, many now see mass as antithetical to the
speed on which we increasingly rely to keep losses down and limit damage to the societies in
which we operate.
If so, the implications for American defense planning are potentially sweeping. If speed
and mass trade off, and if speed is essential, then mass has become unnecessary at best and
counterproductive at worst. This in turn suggests a declining role for conventional ground forces
optimized for close combat in major warfare; an increasing demand for information
' See, e.g., Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense Hearing on FY2004 Appropriations, FDCH
Transcripts, May 14, 2003, p. 3; Paul Wolfowitz, Testimony on Iraq Reconstruction, Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, Thursday May 22, 2003, pp. 2, 7; idem.. Testimony on US Military Presence in Iraq; Implications for
Global Defense Posture, House Armed Services Committee, Wednesday June 18, 2003, pp. 4-6, Tom Bowman,
"Rumsfeld Taunting but Naysayers Persist," Baltimore Sun, May 18 2003; Sonni Efron, "Pentagon Officials
Defend Iraq Battle Strategy," Los Angeles Times, May 23, 2003; Esther Schrader. "Official Ties Iraq's Troubles to
U.S. Success," Los Angeles Times, July 9, 2003; Jim Mannion, "Rumsfeld Rejects Case for Boosting Size of
Army," Washington Times, August 6, 2003; Rowan Scarborough, "Decisive Force Now Measured by Speed,"
Washington Times, May 7, 2003; Usha Lee McFarling, "The Eyes and Ears of War," Los Angeles Times, 24 April
2003; Terry McCarthy, "What ever happended to the Republican Guard?" Time, 12 May 2003; Max Bool, "The
New American Way of War," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 82, No. 4 (July/August 2003), pp. 41-58; Andrew
Krepinevich, Operation Iraqi Freedom: A First-Blush Assessment (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and
Budgetary Assessments, 2003), pp. 13-24, 28, 30-3 1 (which also emphasizes the importance of Iraqi
shortcomings; see analysis below for a more extended discussion of this factor and its role in OIF).
547
infrastructure and standoff precision engagement capability; and (in light of reconstruction
demands in Iraq and elsewhere) a reorientation of whatever ground forces as may remain to
make them more suitable for peacekeeping and stabilization duties rather than conventional
operations in major warfare.
Assessing Speed, Precision, and Situation Awareness in OIF
Is this view of the war sound, and do these implications thus follow? In fact, neither speed,
precision nor situation awareness per se played as strong a causal role as is often claimed.
In spite of their limited situation awareness, for example, the Iraqis nonetheless interposed
more than enough combatants in our path to have caused much heavier losses if those
combatants had fought well once there - speed and superior information did not so outmaneuver
the Iraqis as to leave them incapable of hurting us. Elements of four Iraqi divisions (the
Hammurabi, Medina, Adnan, and Nebuchadnezzar) redeployed across the V Corps axis of
advance after D-day, and arrived in plenty of time to prepare their positions for combat. Some
10,000 paramilitary reinforcements were moved south from Baghdad to stiffen Iraqi defenses at
Nasiriyah and Najaf once those cities became key battlefields.'^ Perhaps most important, major
concentrations of paramilitaries and Special Republican Guards were predeployed in Baghdad
and other key cities long before they were reached by Coalition forces, and remained there until
defeated by close combat in the urban centers.^ It took no special situation awareness to
' MHI: Tape 062503alsb LTC B int; 050203plsb COL Perkins et a), int.; Tape 050403plio LTC Sterling int.;
Memorandum for the record, LTC Rodgers. LTC Marcoz int., 22 April 2003, CFLCC HQ, Camp Doha Kuwait;
Memorandum for the record, MG Blount et al. int., 4 May 2003, 3"* Infantry Division HQ, Baghdad International
Airport, Iraq.
■* MHL Memorandum for the record, MAJ Colligan et al. int.. 26 April 2003. CFLCC HQ, Camp Doha Kuwait;
Tape 042903plsb COL Brown et al. int.; Tape 050303alsb COL Allyn et al int.; Tape 050l03p2sb MAJ Walter
int.; Tape 043003p2io COL Johnson int.
' MHI; Tape 050203plsb COL Perkins et al. int.; Tape 050303alsb COL Allyn et al. int.; Memorandum for the
record, MAJ Colligan et al. int., 26 April 2003, CFLCC HQ, Camp Doha Kuwait; Tapes 050203alio and
548
recognize that Baghdad, for example, would be a critical objective and that Iraqis deployed there
would get their chance to kill Americans: no amount of speed or bold maneuver could prevent
h-aqi fighters who had been predeployed there from blocking key terrain and compelling close
combat, as indeed they did.
Nor were the defenders of Baghdad, Basra, or Iraq's other major cities too demoralized by
our precision or speed to resist once we arrived. When 3'*^ Infantry Division's 2"" brigade made
its initial "Thunder Run" into Baghdad on April 5, for example, every vehicle in the brigade
column was hit by RPG and small arms fire. When the unit made its second foray into the city on
April 7, it again took heavy fire from all directions. Iraqis reoccupied destroyed positions after
American units drove by, engaging follow on elements in turn. An emergency resupply convoy
had to fight its way through to the brigade's advance positions on the Tigris after nightfall; in a
series of bitter firefights it lost one ammunition and two fuel trucks, suffering two soldiers killed
and 30 wounded en route." This is not indicative of an enemy whose will to fight had been
crippled by standoff precision or the speed with which we reached Baghdad; nor had our
maneuver left them too maldeployed to have hurt us. Many Iraqis were killed by air attack or
made to flee from fear of it, but many others were not. Thousands of Iraqi combatants survived
standoff engagement, were deployed astride key Coalition objectives (especially Baghdad and
other major cities) and tried to resist - sometimes fanatically - when attacked by Coalition
ground forces. If these surviving, actively resisting Iraqis had inflicted the kind of per capita
losses typical of major warfare in earlier eras, our casualties would have been radically higher in
spite of our sf)eed and precision. Street fighting in Baghdad and elsewhere posed perhaps the
050203a2sb, LTC Bayer et al. int.; Tape 050103p2sb MAJ Robert Walter int.; Tape 050203plsb LTC Schwanz et
al. int.
' MHl: Tape 050203plsb COL Perkins et al. int.; Tape 050103p2sb MAJ Robert Walter int.; Tapes O50203alio antJ
050203a2sb, LTC Bayer et al. int.
549
single most important threat of heavy casualties in OIF; this possibility was not precluded by
speed, precision, or situation awareness in 2003.
What about scorched earth or WMD use? Did our speed prevent the Iraqis from destroying
their oil fields, blowing their bridges, sabotaging the port at Urn Qasr, flooding the Karbala gap,
or using chemical weapons? As for WMD, none have yet been found anywhere in Iraq. They
may yet be found. The difficulty of locating them, however, suggests that it would probably have
taken considerable time to make these weapons ready for use during the campaign. At a
minimum, no WMD have been found in any reasonable proximity to an intact delivery system,
or near any form of transportation that could move them to a delivery system with any dispatch.
If WMD exist in Iraq, they exist in deep cover - and possibly buried and/or disassembled. If so,
then it is hard to see how a slower Coalition advance would have enabled these to have been
recovered, reconstituted, and employed without being detected and either destroyed from the air
or overrun by even a much slower ground force advance in the meantime. Without direct
evidence of their status it is difficult to reach authoritative conclusions, but at a minimum there is
no current evidence to suggest that the Iraqis had WMD close enough to employment for the
speed of the Coalition advance to have made any difference in their use. Conversely, it is at least
consistent with the available evidence to hypothesize that the Iraqis could not have used WMD
soon enough to head off overrun by even a much slower-moving Coalition advance.
Nor is there strong evidence to suggest that speed was the central factor in preventing
scorched earth. The Iraqis had neither prepared their infrastructure for destruction on more than a
token scale nor were they in the process of doing so, either before the war or during the fighting.
They may never have intended to carry out the threat of scorched earth: the evidence is
consistent with a hypothesis that this was merely a bluff for deterrent purposes. But either way.
550
their lack of preparations left them unable to destroy infrastructure on any wholesale basis, and
their failure to destroy even facilities left in their possession for weeks after the fighting began
suggests that it was not our speed of advance that caused this.
Consider, for example, the issue of oil field destruction. Of 250 wells in the key sections of
the Rumaila oil field, only 22 had actually been prepared for demolition when the Marines
secured the field on March 21. Of these 22, only 9 were actually detonated, causing just 7 fires.
No gas-oil separation plants (GOSPs), pumping stations, or pipelines were wired for destruction.
Nor was there any evidence of ongoing efforts at preparing additional wells or other oil field
facilities for destruction in the days before the invasion or the early stages of the invasion itself
Even with a very fast-moving offensive, there was still more than 48 hours available to the Iraqis
between the begiiuiing of hostilities and the time the field was actually secured - if Rumaila had
been prepared for demolition the Iraqis would have had more than ample time to complete the
job before we could have stopped them, and they had considerable (but unused) time for setting
additional charges or preparing additional facilities for destruction even after the war began.
In fact, the Kirkuk oil field in the north remained in Iraqi hands for more than three weeks
after the invasion began. Yet at no point in that interval were any oil wells destroyed, or any
facilities demolished, or any fires set. No evidence of preparation for demolition was discovered
when American troops finally took possession of the field after April 7; in fact, dirt had been
piled around a number of wells to protect them from accidental destruction in the fighting. Even
if one were to argue that the Iraqis would have demolished Rumaila if we had only given them
more time, at Kirkuk they had the time - by any standard. Yet they did less demolition at Kirkuk
than at Rumaila.
' MHI: Memorandum for the record, CW4 Crowder int., 12 May 2003, CFLCC HQ, Camp Doha Kuwait.
' MHI: Tape 062403plsb LTC K int ; Tape O501O3p2sb MAJ Robed Walter int.; Memorandum for the record, CW4
Crowder int., 12 May 2003, CFLCC HQ, Camp Doha Kuwait.
551
There are many possible explanations for the Iraqis' lack of preparation, ranging from
disobedience by oil field worlcers to organizational incompetence in the Iraqi military to a lack of
intent at the highest levels: perhaps the threat of scorched earth was merely a bluff to deter us
from attacking. Either way, though, none of these possibilities are consistent with a claim that
only a fast-moving advance prevented mass destruction of the Iraqi oil industry. None implies a
process which would have yielded significantly wider destruction if the campaign had lasted
weeks or even months longer than it did. If time were all the Iraqis needed, then at a minimum,
Kirkuk should have been razed. Yet it was not.
Iraqi bridges, port facilities, and inundation follow a similar pattern. The Coalition advance
was obviously premised on its ability to use a series of key bridges over the Euphrates River. The
towns at these crossings were in fact major battlefields in the war, as the Iraqis apparently
understood their importance and sought to contest the bridge sites. Yet few of these bridges were
wired for demolition, and even fewer were actually destroyed. At Nasiriyah, the Iraqis fought a
week-long battle for a city whose militar>' importance turned on its bridges - yet the Iraqis made
no systematic effort to destroy them.^ Of the five bridges surrounding Basra, only one was wired,
and none were actually destroyed.'" At Objective Peaches south of Baghdad, the key bridge was
found wired for demolition, but undestroyed." The key port of Um Qasr, critical to the potential
prosperity of postwar Iraq, was undamaged in the war and captured intact by Coalition forces,
even though the Iraqis held the port and its facilities for days prior to its capture and could have
' For example by targeting them for artillery or mortar tire after losing them to American control, let alone by
effective pre-capture demolition MHl; Tape 042903p2sb LTC Kerl et al. int.; Tape 043003p2io COL Johnson int.
'° MHl; Tape 050803a2sb MAJ Longman el al. int.
" One span was dropped, but the bridge remained trafficable. MHl: Tape 050203alio LTC Bayer et al, int ; Tape
050103p2sb MAJ Robert Walter int. On the survival of most Iraqi bridges, see Memorandum for the record, MAJ
Stephenson int., 30 April 2003. 1 MEF HQ, Hillah, Iraq.
552
done extensive damage had they used this time to do so.'^ American commanders had worried
that the Iraqis would flood the Karbala Gap, a key choke point on the road to Baghdad and a
potentially promising target for Iraqi WMD use against stalled Coalition ground forces. Yet
nothing of the kind happened - the closest the Iraqis came to deliberate flooding was some
small-scale tactical inundation in the Subiyat Depression near Nasiriyah.' In all, there is little
evidence that speed made the difference in the prevention of scorched earth.
Skill-Technology Synergy in OIF
But if speed, precision, and situation awareness were less important for low cost victory
than often assumed, then to what should this outcome be attributed? Part of the answer lies in
idiosyncratic features of Ba'athist Iraq: the Iraqis' failure to destroy oilfields and other economic
infrastructure, for example, was ultimately their choice. Either Saddam never meant to carry out
this threat, or his people refiised to follow his orders, or his organization proved unable to
implement his plan. But the failure of scorched earth was less our doing than theirs - even a
different or less capable Coalition military might still have averted scorched earth given the
Iraqis' apparent unwillingness to carry out their threat, and even a very capable Coalition would
have failed if the Iraqis had been able and willing to follow through.
Much of the answer, however, lies in the interaction between our strengths and their
particular weaknesses. That is, we argue that skilled use of modem Coalition technology
interacted synergistically with Iraqi errors to produce unprecedented lethality and a radically
one-sided military confrontation. In this, no one technology, or even family of technologies (such
'" The authors inspected the port facilities on April 25, 2003 and found no evidence of damage. Captured Iraqi
officers maintain that orders to destroy the port would not have been followed - the commanders at the scene
viewed the facilities as the patrimony of the Iraqi people and not as tools for defending for Saddam: MHl: Tape
042403a Isb LTC Ham id int.
" MHl: Tape 042803plsb MG Marks, COL Rotkoff int.
553
as precision strike or information processing) was necessary. Practically any of the major
advantages of American forces, ranging from the survivability of American armor to the lethality
of American firepower, would have been sufficient given the skill differential between ourselves
and the Iraqis, and the synergistic nature of the interaction between skill and technology. With a
diverse panoply of sophisticated technology, there were many possible ways in which a skilled
military could exploit hostile mistakes with radical severity. And skill imbalance, though
necessary, was not by itself sufficient: comparable imbalances in skill or motivation prior to
1991 had never produced outcomes as lopsided as either 2003 or 1991. Only together can a skill
imbalance and modem technology explain our ability to topple Saddam without heavy cost in
lives or environmental damage.
Given this synergy, our skill and technology would probably produce similar results
against other enemies as unskilled as the Iraqis, and with friendly forces no larger than 2003 's.
But because both technology and a major skill imbalance are required, even the same Coalition
skills and equipment would probably not produce comparable results against a more skilled
opponent. In particular, the troop level required to destroy a skilled force the size of Saddam's
military could well have exceeded that available in 2003, and even so, the losses required could
well have been significantly higher.
This is because skilled militaries can survive standoff precision engagement and compel
close combat on terms unfavorable to us, and because such close combat, even with modem
technology, is inherently dangerous and labor intensive. To survive standoff precision
engagement and set the terms of battle, however, requires high tactical proficiency and an ability
to exploit complex terrain for cover and concealment. The Iraqis in 2003 were anything but
highly proficient tactically. Their poor training and leadership produced a combination of
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mistakes, ill-prepared fighting positions, poor marksmanship, and flawed dispositions that left
them fatally exposed to Coalition technology. This in turn enabled a relatively small Coalition
force to prevail in a short, relatively low-cost campaign - but it would be a mistake to assume
similar outcomes against better prepared opponents.
Iraqi Ineptitude
To see why, it is useful to review some of the more serious of the Iraqis' many military
shortcomings, and how these interacted with particular Coalition strengths in 2003. To begin
with, Iraqi training was radically substandard in important respects, and especially in weapon
employment. Most Iraqi fighters had fired little or no live ammunition in the year prior to the
war; some had never fired their weapons at all. The 2"** division of the Iraqi Regular Army, for
example, had no live fire training in the twelve months prior to the war.'* The 3"^ division held a
single live fire exercise in which each soldier fired four rounds of ammunition.'^ None of the
soldiers in the 1 1* division's 3^*^ battalion had fired their weapons in the past year.'* Even the
Baghdad Republican Guard division held only a single live fire exercise with just ten rounds for
every soldier in the year leading up to the war. By contrast, a typical U.S. infantry unit might
fire 2,500 rounds or more of ammunition per soldier in an average year; for units preparing to
enter combat that figure would be much higher. ' The typical American infantryman thus had
over 250 times as much target practice as even the best Iraqis.
MHI; Col Mohammed Al Jboori int., 4/24 PM, interviewed by Metz, Kidder, and Filiberti.
" MHI; Lt Col Ayad Hasam Aldemi int., 4/23 PM, interviewed by Metz, Kidder, and Filiberti
" MHI: Tape 042403a2sb Staff Colonel Alzadi int.
" MHI: SSGT Ahmed Al Samarl, Baghdad Division of Republican Guard int., 4/25 AM, interviewed by Metz,
Kidder, and Filiberti. For similar examples from other units, see MHI: Tape 042403a2sb MAJ Al Tamimi int.;
Tape 042303p2sb Staff Brigadier Raid Sajid int.; Tape 042403alsb LTC Hamid int.; Tape 042403plsb Staff LTC
Alaragi int.; Tape 042503a Isb COL Alzanabi int.; Major Mohammed Abad int., 4/24 interviewed by Metz,
Kidder, and Filiberti; Captain Amer Taleb Alseltane int., 4/23 AM, interviewed by Metz, Kidder, and Filiberti; Lt
Col Kassim Alajeel int., 4/25 AM, interviewed by Metz, Kidder, and Filiberti.
" DA PAM 350-38 I (STRAC) Standards in Weapons Training, October 2002, ch. 5.
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Unsurprisingly, Iraqi marksmanship was thus very poor. Against the 3"^ Infantry's 3"*
Brigade in Baghdad, Iraqi paramilitaries attained a hit rate of under ten percent for rocket
propelled grenades (RPGs) fired at ranges of under 500 meters.'' At Objective Montgomery
west of Baghdad, an elite Republican Guard tank battalion fired at least 16 T-72 main gun
rounds at ranges of as little as 800-1000 meters at the fiilly exposed flanks of the U.S. 3-7
Cavalry's tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles - with zero hits at what amounted to pointblank
range for weapons of this caliber. In fact, the nearest miss fell fully 25 meters short of the lead
American troop commander's tank. ° Similar results are reported from American and British
combatants throughout the theater of war, and across all Iraqi weapon types employed in OIF.^'
Iraqi tactics could charitably be described as self-defeating. Much of the close combat in
OIF took the form of Iraqi paramilitaries charging Coalition armored vehicles on the outskirts of
Iraqi cities using civilian sport utility vehicles, pickup trucks, minivans, and even bicycles. These
were typically simple frontal assaults, fully exposed, with no apparent attempt to coordinate
movement with suppressive fire, use terrain for cover, or employ smoke or other obscurants.''^
Moreover, they were usually directed at Coalition heavy armored units; Iraqi paramilitaries
" MHl; Tape 050303alsb COL Allyn et al, int.
^° MHl; Tape 050303p2sb, LTC Ferrell et al. int.; Memorandum for the Record, Objective Montgomi kv
Battlefield Inspection, 4 May 2003.
^' See, e.g., MHl: Tape 050203plsb LTC Schwartz et al int.; Tape 050303plsb, LTC Pease int.; Tape 050303pl io
MAJ Walter et al. int.; Tape 043003a 1 io COL Toolan et al. int.; Tape 043003p2io COL Johnson int.; Tape
062503plsb MAJ P. int.; Tape 050203plsb COL Perkins et al. int.. Tape 050803a2sb MAJ Longman et al. int.;
042903plsb COL Brown et al.
-^ MHl: Tape 050203 p I sb LTC Schwartz etal int.; Tape 050303a Isb COL Allyn et al. int.; Tape 050303plsb, LTC
Pease int.; Tape 050303plio MAJ Walter etal. int.; Tape 050303p2sb, LTC Ferrell et al. int.; Memorandum for
the record, MAJ Colligan et al int., 26 April 2003, CFLCC HQ, Camp Doha Kuwait; Tape 050l03p2sb MAJ
Robert Walter int.; Tape 050203plsb COL Perkins et al. int.; Tape 050803alsb MAJ Maciejewski int.; Tape
050803a2sb MAJ Longman et al. int.
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556
appear to have systematically avoided softer-skinned command or logistical elements in order to
seek out Coalition tanks and infantry fighting vehicles.
Iraqi position preparation was systematically inadequate. After their losses to American air
power in 1 991 , the Iraqis understood that survival against air attack would be vital in 2003. They
thus made an attempt to protect their ground forces from Coalition air power.^'* This attempt fell
far short, however. They were able to provide some concealment for some units. But they were
much less successfiil in creating adequate cover. And they were systematically unable to
combine cover, concealment, and an adequate field of fire for their own weapons.
Figure 1: Iraqi BMP position, south of Baghdad
Figures 1 -5 illustrate this problem with a series of photographs of representative Iraqi
fighting positions from OIF. Figure I shows one of a formation of BMPs deployed under foliage
concealment south of Baghdad. Large numbers of such positions were encoimtered by elements
of the U.S. 3"* Infantry division as it advanced north of the Karbala Gap. The combination of
' MHI: Tape 050203plsb COL Perkins et al. int.; Tape 050303alsb COL Allyn et al. inL; Memorandum for the
record, MAJ Colligan et al. int., 26 April 2003, CFLCC HQ, Camp Doha Kuwait; Tape 050203alio LTC Bayer et
al. int.
^ See, e.g., MHI: Tape 042403a2sb MAJ Al Tamimi int.; Tape 042403a2sb Staff Colonel Alzadi int.; Tape
042403plsb Staff LTC Alaragi int.
13
557
dense deciduous foliage and palm fronds here conceals the vehicle from overhead surveillance.
Were the vehicle to be discovered, however, it is without any cover against fire, either from the
ground or from overhead, and any advancing ground force would eventually discover such
positions, as did the 3"* Infantry photographer who took the picture. Moreover, the same foliage
that conceals the BMP from American observation also blinds its crew: the field of view for the
vehicle's weapons is extremely restricted. The position has some value as a hide location, but its
lack of cover or offensive field of fire makes it nearly useless as a fighting position.
Figure 2 shows an Iraqi command vehicle found on the outskirts of Baghdad. Parked under
a highway overpass, it enjoys some concealment from overhead imagery. Observers not directly
overhead, however, have a clear line of sight into the position, which offers no cover against fire
from any direction other than straight down.
Figure 2: Iraqi command vehicle, outskirts of Baghdad
Figure 3 shows a Republican Guard T-72 from the Objective Montgomery battlefield
west of Baghdad. The tank is parked behind a three-sided, horseshoe-shaped berm of loose sand
pushed up by dozer blades. Such positions are extremely common throughout Iraq - literally
thousands of them dot the landscape from Basra to Baghdad and beyond. Most are unoccupied;
14
558
some contain wreckage or refuse presumably placed there to deceive sensors. Others, however,
were used by Iraqi forces in combat, as here. Yet such positions offer no concealment - whether
from overhead or ground level: they are distinctive features of the landscape, and plainly visible
both from the air and fi-om great distances on the groimd in all directions. Unlike the BMP
position in Figure 1, they do offer a wide field of fire: the berm creates a hull defilade position
with both optics and armament above the mask. They do not, however, offer much meaningfiil
cover. Not only is the position completely exposed to overhead engagement by Coalition aircraft,
but a loose sand berm cannot stop 1 20 mm depleted uranium main gun rounds from Ml tanks on
the ground. In fact, it barely slows them down. There are reports fi-om Ml crews in the 1991
Gulf War who watched 1 20 mm rounds entering such berms, exiting the berm, entering the
armored vehicles behind them, passing all the way through the target, and vanishing over the
horizon.^* All the berm really does against such opposition is to advertise a potential fighting
position's location to Coalition observers - it offers little in the way of useable protection.
Figure 3: Iraqi T-72, Objective MONTGOMERY
' See, e.g., Jesse Orlansky and Col. Jack Thorpe, eds., 73 Easting: Lessons Learned from Desert Storm via
Advanced Distributed Simulation Technology (Mexandna, Va: Institute for Etefense Analyses, 1992), IDA D-
1 1 10, p. 1-54; Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services, United
S/a/es Sewfe (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991), S. Hrg. 102-326, p. 115.
IS
559
Perhaps the most serious Iraqi shortcoming was their systematic failure to exploit the
military potential of urban terrain. Cities offer a natural source of cover and concealment, they
canalize attacks, they facilitate barrier construction, they pose difficult problems of intermingling
and collateral damage avoidance, and they make effective employment of standoff precision
weapons much harder. In fact the most plausible prewar scenario for heavy Coalition casualties
was the prospect of prolonged urban battles in the streets of Baghdad, Tikrit, Najaf, Nasiriyah,
Samawah, Basra, Mosul, or Kirkuk.
Yet the Republican Guard and Iraqi Regular Army systematically avoided major cities,
deploying instead in rural areas and suburban outskirts. They appear to have been deliberately
denied access to major city centers by the Iraqi high command.
Figure 4: Iraqi fighting position, Baghdad
The great majority of the true urban combat in OIF was against lightly armed irregular
paramilitaries, who fought mostly on the tactical offensive, sallying out into the open to charge
" MHI: Tape 042303p2sb Staff Brigadier Sajid int.. Tape 050403plio LTC Sterling int.; Memorandum for the
record, MAJ Colligan et al. int., 26 April 2003, CFLCC HQ, Camp Doha Kuwait; Tape 05OI03p2sb MAJ Robert
Walter int.
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560
Coalition armored vehicles. Not only did the paramilitaries lack the heavy weapons or armor
protection of Iraq's large mechanized formations, they also forfeited the tactical potential of
urban terrain by taking the offensive in exposed, unprepared frontal assaults.
More-conventional Special Republican Guard (SRG) units deployed some heavy weapons,
especially in Baghdad, but these were a tiny fraction of the total available to the Iraqi military.
And even the SRG failed systematically to make effective use of urban terrain for their
employment. The SRG's prepared positions were almost entirely outdoors, typically in shallow
foxholes dug along the roadside or in simple sandbag emplacements on building roofs or at
intersections (a typical example from downtown Baghdad is illustrated in Figure 4). SRG tanks
were often simply parked in the open at major intersections, with no effort at cover or
concealment (see, for example, the T-72 in Figure 5). Practically no buildings received the
interior preparations that would be normal for urban warfare in Western practice, such as interior
barricades, wall reinforcement, loophole construction, or wire entanglements. Outdoor obstacles,
barriers, or minefields were almost completely absent.
As with Iraqi marksmanship, their failings in urban tactics have roots in poor training. The
Republican Guard and Iraqi Regular Army received no training whatsoever in urban warfare in
the years leading up to the war.^' In fact. Guard and Army commanders found the entire concept
of city fighting unthinkable. As one Iraqi colonel put it: "Why would anyone want to fight in a
" MHI: Tape 050203plsb LTC Schwartz et al. int.; Tape 050303alsb COL Allyn et al. int.; Tape 050303plsb, LTC
Pease int.; Tape O50303plio MAJ Walter et al. int.; Tape 050303p2sb, LTC Ferrell et al. int.; Memorandum for
the record, MAJ Colligan et al. int., 26 April 2003, CFLCC HQ, Camp Doha Kuwait; Tape 050103p2sb MAJ
Robert Walter int.; Tape 050203plsb COL Perkins et al. int.; Tape 050803alsb MAJ Maciejewski int.; Tape
050803a2sb MAJ Longman et al. int.
" MHI: Tape 050203plsb LTC Schwartz et al int.; Tape 050303alsb COL Allyn et al. int.; Tape 050303plsb, LTC
Pease ml ; Tape 050303plio MAJ Walter et al. int.; Tape 050303p2sb, LTC Ferrell et al. int.; Tape 0429O3p2sb
LTC Kerl el al. int.; Tape 043003al io COL Toolan et al. int.; Tape 043003p2io COL Johnson int., Memorandum
for the record, MAJ Colligan et al. int., 26 April 2003, CFLCC HQ, Camp Doha Kuwait; Tape 050l03p2sb MAJ
Robert Waller int.; Tape 050203a2sb LTC Bayer int.; Tape 050203plsb COL Perkins et al. int.; Tape 050803a2sb
MAJ Longman et al. int.
" MHI: Tape 042303p2sb Staff Brigadier Sajid int.
17
561
city?" His troops "couldn't defend themselves in cities."^" Only the Special Republican Guard
was given any systematic training in conventional urban warfare, and even this was poor quality.
The paramilitaries who shouldered much of the burden of actual city fighting in 2003 received
no sustained conventional military training of any kind.^'
' ' Figure 5: Iraqi T-72, Baghdad
Some Iraqi difficulties stemmed from political, rather than strictly military sources. The
unpopularity of the Ba'athist regime, for example, made human intelligence (HUMFNT)
available on the locations of nominally concealed urban positions such as paramilitary command
centers or ammunition caches in civilian buildings. Many Iraqi civilians hated the Ba'athist
regime, and were at least initially sympathetic to Coalition forces. Civilians with knowledge of
hidden assets' whereabouts were thus potentially available to provide targeting information. Of
course, a major function of the Ba'athist paramilitaries was to deter such cooperation by the
threat of violence if collaboration was discovered; as a result, HUMFNT cooperation often
developed slowly. Once the Ba'athists' vulnerability became apparent, however, and as it
'" MHI: Tape 042403a2sb St. COL al Saadi int.
" MHI: Tape 042403alsb LTC Hamid int.; Memorandum for the record, MAJ Coiligan et al. int., 26 April 2003,
CFLCC HQ, Camp Doha Kuwait.
18
562
became clearer that they would be unable to hold their positions for long given their staggering
loss rates in near-suicidal attacks on Coalition forces, Iraqi civilians gradually came forward with
targeting information. This targeting information proved instrumental in attacking paramilitary
command and communication nodes within major cities. Without this HUMFNT from
sympathetic civilians disaffected from Saddam's regime, locating often-austere urban command
posts for standoff attack would have been very difficult. The illegitimacy of Ba'athist
govemance thus made targeting intelligence available that would be largely out of reach for
urban offensives against more popular regimes.
Interactions Between Iraqi Ineptitude, Coalition Technology, and Coalition Skill
The Iraqis' shortcomings left them extremely vulnerable to the Coalition's technological
advantages. For example, the Regular Army, Republican Guard, or Special Republican Guard's
inability to exploit complex terrain for cover and concealment left them exposed to the ftill
weight of Coalition standoff precision strike. Coalition air forces were capable of delivering
thousands of precision guided bombs and missiles a day, and could concentrate hundreds against
a single point. Cruise and surface-to-surface missiles added still more precision firepower.
Against such an armada, failure to secure cover and concealment can be lethal to hundreds of
combatants in just minutes; the Iraqis' exposure enabled the Coalition to slaughter whole
formations at safe distances, and persuaded many Iraqis to abandon crew-served weapons lest
they suffer the same fate.
But while precision weapons are tremendously lethal against exposed targets, they are
much less so against opponents who exploit complex terrain for cover and concealment. As
recently as 2001-2 in Afghanistan, for example, al Qaeda defenders successfully used the
" MHI: Tape 050303alsb COL Allyn el al. int.; Tape 050203p!sb COL Perkins et al. int.; Tape OS0803a2sb MAJ
Longman et al. int.; Memorandum for the record, LTC C int., 12 May 2003, CFLCC HQ, Camp Doha Kuwait;
MAJ Curtis int.
19
563
complex terrain of the Dar-ye Suf and Shah-i-Kot valleys to reduce their exposure to American
surveillance and reduce their vulnerability to standoff precision engagement. At Bai Beche and
Operation Anaconda, al Qaeda fighters withstood long range bombing in sufficient numbers to
compel sometimes bloody close quarters assaults by American and allied ground forces. Fewer
than half the defenders of the Shah-I-Kot valley were either found or killed by standoff precision
engagement prior to the arrival of Western ground forces in close combat in Operation
Anaconda. In Kandahar province, al Qaeda defenders using local terrain for cover eluded
preliminary air strikes and thwarted advances by friendly ground forces; al Qaeda
counterattackers found sufficient cover to reach close quarters with American and allied forces
before being driven back in hard fighting at point blank range." In the 1999 Kosovo war,
Serbian ground forces used wooded tenain and urban intermingling to thwart efforts by Western
aircraft to find and destroy them with precision weapons.^'*
Standoff precision is valuable against any target, and any defender can expect to suffer
against it. But it is far more lethal against massed targets in the open than it is against covered,
concealed targets in complex terrain. And whereas al Qaeda and the Serbs largely denied us such
easy targets, the Iraqi Regular Army, Republican Guard and Special Republican Guard did not. '
The Iraqis' failures to reduce their exposure thus played into the strengths of the Coalition's
" For detailed accounts, see Stephen Biddle, Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare Implications for Army and
Defense /'o/icy (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies institute, 2002), pp. 15-16, 26-43. Note
that the indigenous Afghan Taliban (by contrast with the better-trained al Qaeda foreigners) were much less adept
at exploiting cover and concealment, and suffered much more heavily under Western air anack: ibid
" See, e.g., Benjamin S Lambeth, NATO's Air War for Kosovo (Santa Monica: RAND. 2001), pp. 120-136;
Stephen T Hosmer, Why Milose\-ic Decided to Settle When He Did (Santa Monica: RAND, 2001), pp. 77-90; Ivo
H Daalder and Michael E. O'Hanlon, Winning Ugly NATO's War to Save Kosovo (Washington, DC; Brookings,
2000), pp. 120-124, 153-155.
" And where they were able to conceal themselves from Coalition surveillance, they were typically unable to
provide cover from fire or meaningful fields of fire for their own weapons (see above) - unlike al Qaeda in
Afghanistan.
20
564
technology, and enabled us to destroy Iraqi combat power from safe distances at a much higher
rate than we could have done had they been better prepared.
Even so, some Iraqis survived standoff precision. Some hid in concealed but impractical
locations, as did the BMP depicted in Figure 1 . A few odiers managed to mount limited
counterattacks, as did elements of the Hammurabi division at Objective Peach. And some
survived long enough to defend prepared positions against direct ground attack, as did the 17"'
battalion of the Hammurabi's 1 T"" brigade at Objective MONTGOMERY.-"^
Here, too, however, the Iraqis' military shortcomings interacted with Coalition
technological sophistication to produce extremely one-sided outcomes. The Ml tank's ability to
fire on the move, hit targets on the first shot at ranges of multiple kilometers, and penetrate both
sand berms and T72 frontal armor at the same distances made deathtraps out of the simple
horseshoe revetments used the by Iraqis at Objective Montgomery. Together with highly
skilled U.S. crews, this technology allowed a single cavalry troop to devastate an entire battalion
of dug-in defenders in less than 10 minutes of firing.
Had the Iraqis been better skilled, however, the same technological match up could have
produced a much costlier outcome. The Ml is an extremely survivable tank, but no tank has
equally resistant armor on all surfaces, and like all tanks, the Mi's flank armor is much thinner
than its frontal arc. In Operation Desert Storm, Mis were killed by T72 or BMP fire that struck
them from the flank or rear; in OIF, even RPGs sometimes penetrated Mis when hit from the
proper direction. ' And six of the 3-7 Cavalry Apache troop's 13 armored vehicles at Objective
Montgomery were Bradley Fighting Vehicles without even the Mi's level of flank armor
" MHt: Tape 050303p2sb, LTC Ferrell et al. int.; Memorandum for the Record, Objective Montgomery
Battlefield Inspection, 4 May 2003, with attached maps and photographs.
" See, e.g., Robert H. Scales, Jr., Certain Victory. The United States Army in the Gulf War (Washington, DC:
Office of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army. 1993), pp. 267-70; MAJ Jeffrey R. Voigt ei al., V Corps Battle Damage
Assessment (BDA) Out Brief, US Army Acquisition Corps, 28 April 2003.
21
565
protection. At Montgomery, the Iraqi position afforded flank shots by most Iraqi combatants
against all of Apache troop's tanks and Bradleys - at ranges of as little as 800-1000 meters.^* A
well-trained tank battalion would expect to hit with nearly every shot at such ranges; the 16 or
more shots fired by the Iraqis at Objective Montgomery could thus easily have wiped out
Apache troop if fired by crews with skills anything like their American attackers.
The most important source of close combat in OIF, however, was urban warfare.
Paramilitaries in civilian clothes and intermingled with the population offered poor targets for air
attack; many thus survived to engage Coalition ground forces at close quarters in Iraqi cities.
Even without standoff precision engagement, however, other Coalition technologies still
interacted with Iraqi ineptitude and Coalition skill to yield slaughter. In particular, the modem
armor technology of the Ml and Challenger tanks offer extraordinary protection, and their fire
suppression, blast localization, and crew escape systems often make it possible to survive even a
large-caliber penetration of the armor envelope. The ability of Bradley Fighting Vehicles as well
as Abrams tanks to shoot on the move with both accuracy and tremendous volumes of fire makes
them lethal even to hostile armored vehicles, much less paramilitary foot soldiers. For the latter
to launch themselves in frontal assaults at such well-protected, highly lethal targets with nothing
more than civilian pickup trucks and RPGs was clearly suicidal. Even where the paramilitaries
fought on the tactical defense, as in their resistance to 2"** Brigade's "thunder runs" in Baghdad,
the combination of the paramilitaries" shortcomings and the Americans' lethality meant that
tremendous numbers of Iraqis would be mowed down: without adequate cover or concealment
once firing had given them away, Iraqi paramilitaries were dangerously exposed. And whereas
MHI: Tape 050303p2sb, LTC Ferrell et al. int.; Memorandum for the Record, Objective Montgomery
Banlefield Inspection, 4 May 2003.
22
566
the Iraqis' fire often missed. Coalition return fire was both voluminous and deadly accurate -
exposed paramilitaries thus rarely survived to fire again.
Yet here, too, better trained Iraqis could have produced a very different outcome even with
exactly the same equipment on both sides. The light weapons wielded by Iraqi irregulars can
penetrate Ml tanks - in fact, nine Mis were penetrated by RPG fire in OIF.^^ If the hundreds of
RPGs fired at 2 BCT in the two thunder runs alone had been fired accurately, the penetration rate
could have been dramatically higher. And if the shooters had been firing from covered,
concealed positions, they could reasonably have expected to survive their first shot at a much
higher rate, enabling them to shoot again and thus increasing the hit rate even further. Most
important, though, a skilled urban defender could not have been broken by an all-mounted
assault of the sort waged in Baghdad and Basra. In 2003, the Iraqis were exposed and could thus
often be slaughtered in the open even within the city center without the attacker dismounting
fi-om its armored vehicles. By contrast, a defender who exploited the natural potential of urban
terrain by remaining in cover to fire from within buildings; who prepared those buildings for
maximum cover and concealment; who used baniers and obstacles to canalize attacks into
prepared ambushes; and who used covered retreat routes to slip away for subsequent
engagements a couple of blocks away would have been a much tougher target. Historically, it
has been impossible to destroy such urban defenders without supporting armored advances with
dismounted infantry who can enter building interiors to clear rooms, kill concealed defenders,
and hold the building interiors to prevent their reoccupation by defenders. Mounted vehicle
crews simply cannot find properly-concealed defenders in building interiors. And unless such
defenders are cleared before the armored vehicles advance, the vehicles' weaker roof, rear, and
' MAJ Jeffrey R. Voigt et al., V Corps Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) Out Brief, U.S. Army Acquisition Corps,
28 April 2003.
23
567
flank armor surfaces risk easy penetration from bypassed but unseen defenders. Working
together, skilled dismounted infantry and supporting armor can clear urban terrain, but they
cannot do so cheaply if the defender makes the most of that terrain: even with skilled attackers,
and even with armored support, dismounted building clearance against skilled defenders has
typically been very costly. Recent analyses by the U.S. Marine Corps have concluded that
against skilled urban defenders, even the best-trained attackers can expect no better than a 1:1
loss exchange ratio (LER); a 1 : 1 LER against multiple thousands of Iraqi urban defenders would
have produced thousands of friendly casualties and a fundamentally different outcome for OIF,
even given the technological advantages of the Abrams and the Challenger.
Conclusions and Implications
So both advanced technology and a major skill differential are necessary to explain OIF's
low casualties; to explain the failure of scorched earth requires Iraqi cooperation, whether
deliberate (in the form of disobedience or lack of intent) or inadvertent (via organizational
incapacity). Given Iraqi idiosyncrasies, a major skill differential, and modem technology, the
OIF outcome would probably have obtained even without the speed of the Coalition advance or
our precision or situation awareness per se; our technology was advanced enough and diverse
enough that any of a wide variety of capabilities could have sufficed to punish Iraqi error very
harshly. Inter alia, precision and situation awareness might have been sufficient, but neither were
necessary as such; speed was probably neither necessary nor sufficient, A major skill
differential, by contrast was necessary - as was some source of the modern lethality and
protection needed to exploit Iraq's mistakes. Given this, the causal importance of speed,
precision and situation awareness has often been overestimated in the public debate on the war;
the causal role of the skill differential between ourselves and our enemies has probably been
24
568
underestimated. And the variety of ways in which technology can exploit that differential has
been underestimated in the postwar focus on precision and situation awareness per se.
This is not to say that speed was a bad idea, or that either precision or situation awareness
were unhelpful. Hindsight suggests that the Iraqis would not have torched their oil fields or used
WMD with more time, but this was less clear beforehand. A rapid advance made sense given the
credible possibility that Saddam might carry out such threats. And both precision and situation
awareness were important contributors to the aggregate technological sophistication we needed
to exploit the Iraqis' mistakes.
But to say that speed was a sensible choice, or that precision and situation awareness were
valuable, is not to find that their role was as important as often claimed. And the difference
matters. Views of past wars shape future policies, and views on the relative importance of
contributing causes can have serious postwar policy implications.
In particular, underestimating the skill differential's importance could have a variety of
dangerous consequences. First, it could lead to an assumption that precision and situation
awareness can produce OIF-like results against other opponents with better skills than the Iraqis'.
Even with skilled forces of our own, this is a dangerous assumption. In 2003, our technology
could operate at near-proving-ground efTectiveness against exposed, ill-prepared opponents.
Enemies who do a better job of exploiting the natural complexity of the eanh's surface for cover
and concealment could pose much tougher targets - as we have already seen in the performance
of al Qaeda fighters in Afghanistan. Our technology's performance is strongly affected by the
nature of its targets, and our targets were extremely permissive in OIF. If we overlook this, we
could thus exaggerate our technology's potential against better skilled enemies elsewhere.
25
569
Second, an imprecise analysis of OIF could lead to an assumption that modernization can
be accelerated at the expense of training. If standoff precision and situation awareness either
destroyed or bypassed the Iraqi military, then why spend the huge sums needed to maintain
perishable close combat skills across a large American ground force? Why not divert some of
that into faster improvement in the standoff capabilities that render such close combat
unnecessary? The answer, of course, is that we did not destroy or bypass enough of the Iraqi
military to preclude heavy casualties - while many opponents were negated at standoff, others
could only be destroyed in close combat. It was our superiority in close combat capability that
averted such casualties - and this was a product of both advanced technology and a major skill
differential. If technology and skill interact synergistically. then perforce they will be poor
substitutes for one another. Hence it will be difficult to buy enough modernization acceleration
to compensate for the loss of skill that buys it.
Third, misunderstanding causation in OIF could lead to an assumption that speed can
substitute for mass, and that standoff precision can substitute for close combat capability. If
speed were sufficient for the OIF outcome (either alone or in conjunction with precision), and if
speed and mass are antithetical, then reducing mass to enable greater speed would make sense.
But if speed was not sufficient, and if a major skill differential was necessary for speed to
succeed, then to trade speed for mass in U.S. force structure would be a dangerous bargain.
Against enemies like Iraq, small, fast-moving ground forces with massive standoff firepower and
excellent situation awareness may well succeed again - in fact, against such foes this could well
be the optimum solution. But if future warfare pits us against better-skilled opponents, and if a
skill differential played the role identified above in OIF. then a small but agile U.S. ground force
26
570
could find itself unable to cope with concealed, covered enemies in numbers too great to
overcome without mass of our own.
Of course, it is always possible that the fiiture could differ from the past, and there is only
so much one can learn from an analysis of a concluded campaign. But it is always a mistake to
misunderstand the past, and to draw lessons for the future from a mistaken impression of the past
is always dangerous. The analysis above suggests that OIF, at least, does not provide evidence
that it would be wise to trade speed for mass, to shift too far away from close combat capability
toward greater emphasis on standoff precision, or to accelerate modemization at the cost of
training for close combat. Some important causes of the OIF outcome lie beyond our control, in
the idiosyncrasies of Saddam's Iraq. But others are products of our own choices. And we must be
careful to ensure that those choices are informed by the fullest possible appreciation of the war
we just fought.
27
IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION AND STABILITY OPERATIONS:
THE WAY FORWARD
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, October 29, 2003.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m., in room
2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Duncan Hunter (chair-
man of the committee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DUNCAN HUNTER, A REP-
RESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE
ON ARMED SERVICES
The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
This is the eighth full committee hearing since the war started
at which we will review the conduct and implications of Operation
Iraqi Freedom. It won't be the last, as there are several aspects of
the war and ongoing operations that will continue to interest us.
Today we are fortunate to hear several different perspectives as-
sessing the situation on the ground and the best way of moving for-
ward.
We are fortunate to have as our witnesses today Karl
Zinsmeister at the American Enterprise Institute — and Karl, thank
you for being with us; Michael O'Hanlon of the Brookings Insti-
tute— sir, we appreciate you being with us; and Marina Ottaway,
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace — and thank you, Ms.
Ottaway, for your attendance today — or Dr. Ottaway.
Each of our witnesses brings a unique perspective to the task of
stabilizing and reconstructing Iraq; and, clearly, there is a vast
range of opinions about what our next steps should be. They are
not necessarily ideologically consistent. Some analysts, from both
the left and right, argue that we should accelerate the transfer of
sovereignty to the Iraqi people. Others, from both ends of the spec-
trum, want to delay that transfer until we are confident that the
Iraqi people are prepared for representative government. In truth,
you can pick almost any issue associated with reconstruction and
stability operations in Iraq and find two or three or four or five or
perhaps a dozen extremely well-informed, intelligent, and experi-
enced people who will disagree on it.
Nevertheless, at the end of the day, the administration and this
Congress have to make decisions amid conflicting interpretations of
what is happening on the ground and opposing recommendations
about the way forward. In that kind of environment, our best
course is to set priorities and adjust to continual changes in the sit-
uation while learning from past experience.
(571)
572
The administration is working toward that end and constantly
reassessing the right course of action in Iraq. This means that
some poHcies which were appropriate yesterday may not be the
right answer tomorrow. Anyone looking for events to unfold in Iraq
exactly according to some preconceived master plan is going to be
disappointed. That is not how government — or warfare against a
terrorist enemy works — as most of us in Congress will be quick to
admit. We should all keep that in mind as we offer our suggestions
about the future course of action in Iraq.
We are fortunate to have before us three very thoughtful wit-
nesses who bring a range of perspectives to the problem of recon-
struction in Iraq, and I want to thank you again for your appear-
ances before the committee this morning.
Before we recognize our witnesses, let me recognize the commit-
tee's ranking Democrat, the distinguished gentleman from Mis-
souri, for any remarks he might want to make.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hunter can be found in the Ap-
pendix on page 615.]
STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM MISSOURI, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON
ARMED SERVICES
Mr. Skelton. Mr. Chairman, thank you; and I thank you for
calling this hearing. It is very important that we continue to do our
homework in this very important subject.
Mr. Chairman, we again fmd ourselves in this hearing room dis-
cussing the critical question of Iraq's future. The linchpin of that
future remains security. The series of deadly attacks of last week
brought the violence to a new level in terms of numbers killed and
injured and in the level of coordination. Over the weekend, I re-
ceived word that another young soldier from the district I represent
was killed by an improvised explosive device in Iraq.
Certainly we would expect losses in any stability operation, but
when we consider the way this operation was undertaken, many of
these losses in my opinion were preventable. The administration
was warned, and they did not heed the warnings they received. I
myself sent two letters to the President before the war began warn-
ing of the failures of insufficiently planning in advance for the
aftermath.
The Institute for National Security Studies at National Defense
University here in Washington held a workshop on November 20
and November 21, 2002, where they basically war-gamed post-Sad-
dam Iraq. Their number one finding was the following:
Given the potential for internal disorder and conflict, the pri-
mary post-intervention focus of U.S. military operations must be on
establishing and maintaining a secure environment in which all
other post-intervention activities can operate. They understood that
security was primarily the requirement and recommended a broad
multinational force because they knew it would take many troops
on the ground to achieve this.
Our own military commanders recognized this, too. General
Shinseki told Congress it could take 200,000 troops to stabilize
Iraq, and he has been proved right. General Zinni's war plans
when he was commander of the Central Command differed from
573
General Franks not in the number of combat troops to win the war,
but in the two additional divisions of troops he believed it would
take to secure the peace.
We had all these warnings and all this advice about how to do
it right, and things are going badly. We have to do it right now or
go home. And going home is not an option. There is too much at
stake. We have to win this.
We have to win this or these young soldiers who have been killed
will have died for nothing. We have to win this or American secu-
rity will be jeopardized at home and the Iraqi people will not re-
gain security for their nation. We have to win this or American
leadership will be damaged throughout the Middle East and
throughout the world. We can win this, but we have to heed some
of the lessons and quickly. I hope the witnesses will share their
thoughts on this.
But I was struck by the article by Tom Donnelly and Gary
Schmidt in this Sunday's Washington Post that reminds us that
the United States knows how to fight wars like Iraq. We even have
a how-to guide in the Marine Corps' Small Wars Manual from
1940, and I will ask the Colonel to hold it up. We have it right
here.
I think we need to refocus and redouble our efforts, recognizing
the counter-insurgency type battle in which we find ourselves. The
worst thing we could do is what I fear that some in the administra-
tion might be considering, and that is quickly withdrawing U.S.
troops. We must have a well-thought-out strategy that recognizes
the type of battle in which we find ourselves. We must focus on in-
telligence. We must put more troops on the ground, if that is what
it takes to sweep through problem areas, that we should use the
right types of dismounted infantry troops that could best accom-
plish this.
I might point out in the article by Tom Donnelly and Gary
Schmidt, they say this: The fact remains that unless the security
situation in Iraq is brought under control and the insurgency there
decisively defeated, those successes can never be made permanent,
and the President's larger hopes for a stable, democratic Iraq will
never be fulfilled.
Mr. Chairman, we have put American lives, American money,
American credibility as well as the future of Iraqi people at stake.
The stakes couldn't be higher. We have to do this right, and we
have to do so quickly, and I hope the witnesses will share their
thoughts with us on that current situation today.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Skelton can be found in the Ap-
pendix on page 619.]
The Chairman. I thank the distinguished gentleman.
Mr. Zinsmeister, the floor is yours, sir; and, without objection, all
written statements will be taken into the record.
STATEMENT OF KARL ZINSMEISTER, J.B. FUQUA FELLOW,
AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE
Mr. Zinsmeister. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Skelton, and
members of the committee. I have exactly ten minutes of remarks
condensed from my written statement.
574
I want to talk to you today about ordinary Iraqis.
Skilled politicians like the men and women in this room know
very well about the so-called silent majority syndrome. It is the
massive and often silent middle of the Iraqi opinion that I have
concentrated on as I have followed developments in the country;
and I would like to offer you my judgment today that there is much
to be encouraged about in the recent evolution of Iraqi views, par-
ticularly among the Shiite majority that is the rising faction in
Iraq.
I was an embedded reporter during the hot war phase, have writ-
ten a book about the subject, and upon my return from Iraq in the
spring became very concerned that the sort of anecdotal tempera-
ture-takings that the country was relying on to understand what
was happening in Iraq were incomplete and misleading. So in
search of some more methodical, harder, more reliable evidence, I
eventually commissioned and wrote what turned out to be the first
scientific public opinion poll that has ever been conducted in Iraq.
We did it in concert with Zogby International. We were in the field
in August, we were in four different cities in Iraq, and we have
good information.
Before I talk to you about some of the specifics of our research,
I would like to point out there have actually now been four dif-
ferent substantial polls conducted in Iraq. In addition to the Amer-
ican Enterprise Poll, there is one by Gallup in September, there is
one by a well-thought-of British firm for the Spectator of London,
and there was one by an Iraqi academic. These were very different
polls done in different ways in different geographical regions. They
are reassuringly congruent, however, in their findings.
In all of them, the Iraqi public turns out to be surprisingly opti-
mistic, unambiguously glad to be free of Saddam and quite willing
to have U.S. troops in their country for another year or more in
order to help them get launched on a new footing. Again, this is
the big mass of the public. This is not extremes at the different
ends. This is the big middle that we don't hear so much about.
For instance, two-thirds of Iraqis say that getting rid of Saddam
has been worth any of the hardships that have resulted. Fully 61
percent have a favorable view of the Governing Council today, and
by 50 percent to 14 percent they say it is doing a better job than
it was 2 months ago. Just this last week, I think 3 or 4 days ago,
the New York Times published a very informal street poll that —
as the reporter did, and as the Times puts it, quote: This poll
showed that about 85 percent of Baghdadies felt that safety had in-
creased in the last 2 months, and 60 percent felt that the Ameri-
cans were doing a good job.
The Chairman. Sir, could you go over those statistics one more
time so we could take a note of them? You went through them pret-
ty quick.
Mr. ZiNSMEISTER. Sure. These are all, again, in my written testi-
mony. But — I don't know how far back you want me to go. There
is more to come.
Let me just repeat that paragraph. Two-thirds of Iraqis say that
getting rid of Saddam was worth any of the troubles that have re-
sulted in the interim period. Sixty-one percent have a favorable
view of the Iraqi Governing Council; and, perhaps more important,
575
by 50 percent to 14 percent they say the Council is doing a better
job than it was 2 months ago.
Then the New York Times street poll — which is a very informal
street poll, but I take it as interesting because of the source — the
Times found that 85 percent of those informally polled on the street
felt that safety had increased in the last 2 months. And these are
Baghdadies, mind you. This is not people in Mosul or Kirkuk or the
quiet parts of the country. This is the maelstrom or the worst in-
stability today. Eighty-five percent of the Baghdadies felt that safe-
ty had increased in the last 2 months, and 60 percent felt that
Americans were doing a good job.
Now, what does all this tell us? It tells us that we are doing a
much better job of winning the hearts and minds of everyday Iraqis
than many of us realize.
My own survey's research — my own magazine's survey research
found that Iraqis are not nearly so fanatical, not nearly so seething
or disgusted with the United States as perhaps the extremists
would have us believe.
Perhaps most interestingly, our evidence suggests that none of
the three what I would call nightmare scenarios for Iraq seem very
likely to come to pass. First of all, there is not going to be a Baath
party revival in Iraq. I won't get into the details. The data is very
clear; it is in my paper, that Saddam is extremely unpopular and
his associates in the country.
The second nightmare scenario that many of us wony about is
that, instead, an al Qaeda-style organization would proliferate in
the new Iraq. But our poll found that, for instance, Osama bin
Laden is viewed unfavorably by 57 percent of Iraqis. And mind
you, as foreign jihadists murder increasing numbers of Iraqi civil-
ians, Iraqi police, and very popular Iraqi figures like Ayatollah
Hakim, those foreign jihadists are going to become even more un-
popular in the months ahead, I expect.
The third nightmare scenario for Iraq would be a sort of Iranian-
style theocracy. This, again, I judge to be unlikely to take hold in
Iraq. Perhaps not fully appreciated, Iraqis are quite secular. Our
poll asked Iraqis when the last time they had attended Friday
prayer was — this is sort of a weekly highlight of the Islamic reli-
gious calendar — and 43 percent of Iraqis in our four cities had not
been to Friday prayer even once in the previous month.
We also asked folks directly whether they would like an Islamic
government, and the Iraqis told us no by 60 percent to 33 percent.
Now, interestingly — and I want to get into a little detail here —
on all of those questions, the majority Shiites consistently fell on
the more moderate side. For instance, Shiites are much less likely
than other Iraqis to want a theocratic government. They are more
favorable toward democracy. They are more likely to pick the U.S.
as a best model for a government, and they are much more unfa-
vorable toward Osama bin Laden.
I would remind you, Shiites — you know, there has not been a
good census in this country in decades, so we don't know for sure.
But Shiites are, our best estimate, 60 to 65 percent of the popu-
lation. These are the folks who are going to run the country under
any democratic regime.
576
I have been further encouraged by very recent signs of maturity
and moderation amongst both the leadership and the rank and file
of Iraqi Shiites. The first big test, in my mind, came at the funeral
of Ayatollah Hakim. Here he was, you know, murdered along with
scores of innocent bystanders while coming out of a mosque, one of
the holiest mosques in Islam in fact, last month. More than
300,000 mourners showed up for the funeral. This could have very
quickly become a very ugly rampage, and scapegoating of all sorts
could have been done. Instead, the Shiite faithful showed a willing-
ness to patiently await the official investigation into the crime. I
was quite struck by that.
More recently, specifically last week — again, this is quite new.
American forces and Iraqi police, as many of you know, clamped
down on Moktada Sadr, who is a radical Shiite who was calling for
active resistance against the government. Sadr's militiamen had
killed a number of Iraqi policemen and some American soldiers.
They had forcibly seized some mosques and some government
buildings. But the coalition forces that I am in contact with had
moved very gingerly against him because they just weren't sure
what sort of popular following they had, and they were being very
cautious. As I say, last week they finally took action.
As it turns out, the disarming of Sadr's acolytes last week turned
out to be extremely popular with other Shiites. It was cheered loud-
ly by both the Shiite leadership and everyday Shiites who openly
repudiated Sadr's radicalism. In addition, Sadr had threatened that
there was going to be mass protests and people in the street if you
do this. It completely fizzled out.
Then the third very latest bit of evidence of Shiite moderation
and willingness to help Iraq that I have noticed came just a couple
days ago, when one of the Shiite members of the Governing Council
reacted to the bombing of the Red Cross headquarters. There was
no railing, no flailing, no second-guessing. To the contrary, what he
did was he said — he called in the United States to speed up the
training — the American training of Iraqis soldiers and police offi-
cers, and he urged that U.S. troops be unleashed to really crush
the insurgency that is taking place in the Sunni Triangle today.
The relatively small number of extremists who are conducting
murder and sabotage in that Sunni Triangle have no chance of
willing militarily. I think we need to keep that in mind.
Much more than outsiders realize, Iraq is really beginning to
bubble. The streets are full, the markets are busy, all sorts of
things are happening. I spelled some of this out in some of my
other writing.
Keep in mind, also, there are now 25,000 non-U. S. troops in the
country from third-party countries. There are 60,000 Iraqi security
personnel at work and a lot more in the pipeline. I want you to re-
member that, even today, just a few months after the new regime,
it is already Iraqis who are taking most of the casualties in these
attacks; and I want to assure you that, as that pattern continues,
the Iraqi public is going to notice; and it will increasingly put the
attackers on the wrong side of everyday, average public opinion in
Iraq.
The only accomplishment of the insurgents, and it is a big one,
is to create chaos. They are strictly a negative force who can only
577
hope to slow down the steady progress that is being made in Iraq.
Finding that they usually die when they attack American forces,
they have recently decided to stop doing that in general, no frontal
assaults. Instead, they are bombing humanitarian agencies and
mosques and Red Cross shelters and so forth. That is a desperate
and retrograde military strategy. It will not be popular with the
Iraqi public.
These insurgents have no platform. They have no winning mes-
sage. They have no identifiable leaders. There is no evidence that
they represent a popular movement or that they enjoy any wide-
spread support. They are — what are they? They are simply well-
armed, comparatively wealthy fringe fanatics. They can make a lot
of trouble, but they are nothing more than that. Many of them are
foreign. All of them are leftovers of earlier, older Arab power
blocks. They are feared by Iraqis. They are, however, not broadly
respected or trusted or liked. In short, they are political criminals.
Everyday Iraqis, you know, understand this; and I think it is going
to be increasingly hard for the guerrillas to find water to hide in
and swim in as time passes.
Think of it this way: There is a psychological contest. On the one
side you have remnants of an unpopular regime reinforced by un-
popular foreigners who merely wreck and kill in ugly ways, espe-
cially, keep in mind, in religious sites, at humanitarian sites, fre-
quently on holy days, as the Red Cross attack was, as the Hakim
murder was, with most of the victims being innocent Iraqi. Okay?
That is on one side.
On the other side, you have American forces who have, on the
whole, been quite gentle and forbearing throughout the course of
this war. That is one of the themes of the book I have written
about. The Hot War. Any day now we all earnestly hope there will
be a large infusion of cash, thanks to this Congress, into the thea-
ter, which will make it even more possible for the soldiers and
American administrators to demonstrate very clearly to Iraqis who
is on the side of progress and prosperity and modernity and human
decency and who is not. And you know what? That is a pretty good
position to be in if you have to fight a guerrilla war, which is what
we are doing today.
No guerrilla war is easy, but I want to point out there is no Ho
Chi Minh Trail pumping poison into Iraq. There can be none. And
with each passing season, there will be fewer weapons and fewer
guerrillas and fewer money — less money to finance those oper-
ations.
Meanwhile, on the other side of the spectrum, you have new eco-
nomic and political freedoms unfolding across the country every
single day. You know, today it is cell phones; tomorrow it is open
elections. Those innovations will cumulatively amount to a revolu-
tion— capital R — revolution, and a revolution that will make the
blood-feuding insurgents look more and more unattractive to nor-
mal Iraqis.
Again, let us think about normal Iraqis this morning and with
each passing week. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Zinsmeister can be found in the
Appendix on page 623.]
578
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Doctor. I appreciate your
comments.
Dr. O'Hanlon.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL O'HANLON, SENIOR FELLOW,
BROOKINGS INSTITUTION
Dr. O'Hanlon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member,
and members of the committee. It is an honor to be here talking
about this important issue.
I guess I would like to say I share some of Congressman Skel-
ton's critiques of Bush policy, but I also share most of Mr.
Zinsmeister's optimism about Iraq, and I want to make that clear
going in, which backs up, Mr. Chairman, your opening statement
that there are indeed people on both sides of this debate, both sides
of the aisle, who have the same opinions and, of course, different
opinions.
There are just two things I want to do in my brief remarks to
get things started before discussion. One is to go through some of
the statistics we have been trying to track at Brookings, and very
briefly. Mr. Zinsmeister has done a nice job with some of his public
opinion stats. I just want to give more information on security
trends, economic trends in Iraq. We are all trying to follow these.
I don't need to acquaint you with most of the basics, but we are
trying to do a systematic job of tracking this at Brookings. We are
going to try to keep doing that in the future; and I want to point
out a couple of indicators that are on the positive side of the ledger
but also, unfortunately, on the negative side of the ledger in terms
of trends in Iraq today. So a few statistics which are summarized
in my testimony in the tables at the back, and which I will con-
tinue, as I say, to update at Brookings.
The second thing is just to put a couple of these statistics in per-
spective using a broader construct of counterinsurgency warfare
similar to what Schmidt and Donnelly did in their Washington
Post op-ed, Mr. Skelton. And I agree with most of the thrust of
their argument. Just make a couple of points about that, as well.
In terms of statistics and trends in Iraq, let me mention a few
bad trends and a larger number of good trends. Now, unfortu-
nately, the bad trends are in pretty important areas. But, fortu-
nately, the good trends, I think, are more numerous and tend to
outnumber and tend to bode well for the future again, as Mr.
Zinsmeister has just indicated.
The bad trends. First of all, homicide rates, crime rates im Bagh-
dad are still quite high. They are a little bit lower to the extent
you trust the statistics and really believe they can be this accurate,
a little lower than they were in the summer, but still quite high.
Homicide rate in Baghdad is still five or six times, let us say, what
it is in Washington. Now, obviously, you would expect a fair
amount of turmoil in a country that had just been at war where
Saddam had just let the criminals out of his prisons only a few
months before the conflict. But the homicide rates are still high;
and they do, unfortunately, run somewhat counter to the general
positive trends that Mr. Zinsmeister was discussing. They are mak-
ing Iraqis still worry about their security.
579
We all know the U.S. casualty rates are stubbornly persistent. I
would not call them high by standards of counterinsurgency war-
fare. Again, make no mistake, we are still at war; and I think the
Bush administration deserves criticism for not having properly con-
veyed this message to the country in the weeks just before and just
after the fall of Saddam. But, by the context of war, by the stand-
ards of war, things are going pretty well. But, nonetheless, the cas-
ualty levels for U.S. troops are stubbornly persistent. They are not
going down.
We had a little bit of progress in August and September. Unfor-
tunately, October has been a very bloody month, comparably bloody
for American troops to the worst month we experienced back in
July, almost that serious, almost that bad; and, of course, it is not
even over.
In terms of a couple of more statistics that are on the bad side,
obviously, unemployment levels are still very high in Iraq. I agree
again with Mr. Zinsmeister's point about market energy returning.
In my short trip to Iraq last month, I didn't have a chance to see
a lot of that. I wasn't spending a lot of time in the markets. I was
spending more time with American troops and commanders. I know
many of you have been over, as well.
But I would still say that the statistics we have are troublesome.
The Iraqis are not yet sufficiently engaged in their own economy;
and to the extent we apply an external stimulus with the $87 bil-
lion, which I fully support myself, or at least I support the broad
thrust of that, there still is the danger of any big foreign aid pro-
gram, that you introduce an artificial stimulus that may or may
not build up a strong economy from the grassroots level up. So, un-
employment is still too high.
There is still too much unsecured ammunition; and this does, un-
fortunately, challenge a little bit one of the conclusions of Mr.
Zinsmeister that I generally agree with about the trends and secu-
rity being positive. There is no Ho Chi Minh Trail. Unfortunately,
there are many complexes measuring several square miles where
enormous amounts of ammunition are still found in Iraq, many of
which are not being sufficiently secured by Coalition Armed Forces.
And put me down as a skeptic that we really have the absolutely
correct number of troops in Iraq. I have talked to — I mean, all the
commanders that I talk to in Iraq say we have enough; people on
the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) say we have enough. I am still a lit-
tle skeptical when I see reports of large unsecured ammunition de-
pots; and it also strikes me as something useful that maybe some
of our foreign friends could help with even if the Iraqis don't want
all of them always right in the midst of their population centers.
I am thinking, of course, of countries like Turkey.
Finally — and you all are very familiar with this — U.S. oper-
ational tempo rates, deployment rates are way too high to be sus-
tainable. When you start thinking about the second and third rota-
tion of troops into Iraq, it doesn't look very promising for keeping
the health of the U.S. Army. I am a supporter of troop increases,
at least at the modest level of 10 to 20,000. I am a supporter of
getting more Marines involved in this mission and also think we
have to consider bolder steps to bring in the United Nations (U.N.)
politically, as long as we can have an American as the Special Rep-
580
resentative of the U.N. in Iraq, because I think we need to find
ways to eUcit more foreign troop contribution.
That is the bad news. Let me go through a lot of the statistics
on the good news; and, again, you are famihar with this. I don't
need to spend a lot of time on this.
But, four biggies to start with: schools, hospitals, courts, and
banks. These are basically all open, and they are all functioning in
Iraq. Basically, everything that was there before the war is again
functioning and probably at least as well, in some cases better;
and, again, I won't go through the details. Certainly Mr. Rumsfeld
and Mr. Wolfowitz do a better job than I of dramatizing the good
trends and have all the statistics at their disposal. But, I think one
has to acknowledge these are four big categories where we have
quickly gotten things back up and running.
Electricity levels are finally looking pretty good — not yet high
enough in Baghdad, not yet to prewar levels in Baghdad, but ap-
parently above prewar levels as best we can tell, taken country-
wide. And the Baghdad numbers are starting to come up. This is
finally looking good. I still worry about sabotage, I still worry about
that potential, and I don't think any number of troops could real-
istically prevent all possible sabotage acts. But, still, the trends are
finally looking better after a very frustrating summer when we
couldn't get power levels up as much as we needed to.
The Iraqi security forces — Mr. Zinsmeister mentioned how many
of these have now been trained. One can question the competence
and the skill levels of some of these units. But certainly for basic
patrolling and policing, they are going to be increasingly capable
and let us, I think, pull back into the background. I would envision
within a year we will be primarily essentially a backup force, pre-
venting civil war between Shiite and Sunni and Kurds, helping
with some of the raids against Baathist remnants, but allowing the
Iraqis to do more and more of the patrolling and policing on their
own.
The latest numbers I have seen are the Iraqis now have some-
thing like 55,000 police, 20,000 infrastructure protection guards,
and another 10,000 in border patrol and other smaller units. So
this is now about 85,000 heading up toward 200,000, a very small
army so far but, nonetheless, a pretty strong policing capability.
Again, you have to recognize the limitations on their quality. They
are not all as competent as they need to be, but their numbers are
starting to look pretty good.
A couple more points, and then I will start to wrap up and just
conclude with my general comments on the nature of
counterinsurgency.
The number of Iraqis from the Most Wanted List is down to 15
out of 55. That is pretty good. Obviously, we are all frustrated we
can't get Saddam, and the number 15 has stayed at 15 for a while.
We haven't had much progress on the top 55, but still we have got-
ten almost three-fourths of them either killed or arrested.
And now my briefings I got in Tikrit from General Odierno sug-
gests that we have really started to do well at the second-tier list
of mid-level Baathists. We are making considerable progress at
eliminating this group from open circulation in Iraq. I would like
581
to see more numbers on that. I haven't seen as many statistics as
I would Hke.
Again, you don't want to obviously distill all this down into sta-
tistics, but they can be informative at some level. I have not seen
enough about that issue, but I do see progress, and we were as-
sured by General Odierno they are picking people up in this cat-
egory every day, virtually.
The overall number of Baathists who are probably still out there
as general purpose foot soldiers for this movement is probably not
very large. It is the Fedayeen, the Special Republican Guard, some
other palace guards. It is probably 20,000, 30,000 people, of which
we have probably arrested or killed 10,000 in the 6 months since
the war ended. So we are making pretty good progress, and I don't
believe these Baathists have enough of an appealing ideology that
they can regenerate their own ranks.
No one knows how many foreign jihadists, foreign terrorists are
inside of Iraq. We are all following the debate on this. We are all
concerned, I know, about the S5rrians involved in this week's at-
tacks. But, overall, I am relatively reassured that, by a combina-
tion of pressure on Syria, pressure on Iran, and improvement in
the border-securing efforts of U.S. forces and Iraqi forces, we can
limit that number of foreign jihadists. So, again, that looks pretty
good, as well.
Finally, let me just say that, perhaps as importantly as anything
else, the number of Iraqi civilians who have been accidentally
killed by American troops is small. We read about it all the time
because we have very good reporters on the scene who are doing
excellent investigative reporting, and they bring home and make
very personal the individual losses that occur — for example, the ac-
cidental killing of about ten Iraqi police officers last month. But by
the standards of counterinsurgency warfare, we are doing a very
good job at applying force in a discriminating, selective, careful
way; and I don't think we are likely to be embittering a large fac-
tion of the Iraqi population with the way in which we use force.
The Iraqi population may become embittered by the unemployment
rate, it may become embittered the fact that we can't stop the
Baathist remnants from attacking Iraqis, but I don't think it is
going to become embittered because of how many innocents we are
killing. I think that number is quite modest.
Okay. So I have put all these statistics on the table. You all are
familiar with many of them already. All I need to do is wrap up
by saying that when you look at the most important ones, in terms
of security we have a small resistance that is unlikely to grow, and
we are using force against it in a selective, discriminating, and rel-
atively effective way. That is a very good trend on the security side.
Another good trend on the security side is the improvement in
Iraqi forces that we are training and gradually equipping. Those
trends are both very positive.
The economic front has a more mixed message. There is elec-
tricity that is doing better, oil production is doing better, but unem-
ployment is still very high. So there you have tension, there you
have ongoing reason for nervousness.
Then, finally, on the politics of Iraq, this is perhaps the biggest
question mark of all. Do we really think that we can build a democ-
582
racy in this region of the world in a short period of time? Frankly,
I am not so worried about democracy, but I am worried about sta-
bility. And I am not sure we can even guarantee that because of
the Sunni Arabs being so embittered at their loss of relative influ-
ence in Iraq and, of course, because of Shiite — even though trends
seem relatively favorable now — still have a lot of internal schism
and tension within their ranks.
So that is the big question for the longer term, and that is why
I don't think we can bring forces out of Iraq any time in the next
two to three years. I think we are stuck with at least several tens
of thousands of Americans into — well into 2005, 2006 to prevent
civil warfare. But as long as we keep those forces in place for that
period of time, I think we will be able to keep a lid on any potential
for civil warfare.
So you put it all together, I am still nervous, but I am guardedly
optimistic.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Dr. O'Hanlon, thank you very much for your
statement.
[The prepared statement of Mr. O'Hanlon can be found in the
Appendix on page 643.]
The Chairman. Dr. Ottaway.
STATEMENT OF MARINA S. OTTAWAY, SENIOR ASSOCIATE,
CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE
Dr. Ottaway. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am going
to pick up from the last point that my colleague made, that it is
the problem of the political situation and the political reconstruc-
tion.
I think the United States is facing a complicated problem, but I
don't think it is a problem that cannot be solved if we think seri-
ously about the process that needs to be undertaken.
The United States at this point is committed to transferring full
sovereignty only when there is an elected Iraqi government in
place. That puts a lot of pressure on the United States to put in
place that Iraqi government quite fast, both because of what is
happening in Iraq itself — it would be tremendously helpful to have
a credible Iraqi government — and also because of the U.S.'s own do-
mestic necessity to show progress on that side. Even as late as last
week. Secretary of State Powell expressed some degree of optimism
that it may be possible to have a constitution in six months and
to have elections not really long afterwards, despite the fact that
they — an Iraqi committee, a committee of the Governing Council
that was formed to discuss how that process could be put in place,
came back last — a few weeks ago sajdng to take much longer than
they took to get to a constitution.
So, in my opinion, moving, trying to force the pace of a constitu-
tion writing and election, which certainly could be done with a lot
of technical assistance — I think if we put — you know, a constitution
can be pulled off the shelf, can be written by outsiders. It has been
done many times, and a lot of technical assistance probably could
solve the problem of how to organize elections despite the lack of
security.
I
583
I think politically this probably would not lead to positive results.
The work we have done at Carnegie on the problem of post-conflict
transitions tend to show that there is nothing more dangerous than
hurried elections in the aftermath of a conflict.
We have seen it, for example, in Bosnia, where the international
community insisted on very early elections after the detente agree-
ment. I think everybody at this point who was involved in that sit-
uation agrees that that was a mistake. Because what very often
happens — and we have seen it not only in Bosnia, but we have seen
examples in other countries — the first groups to get organized are
the radicals. I agree with my colleague about the fact that there
seems to be no indication that the majority of public opinion in Iraq
supports radical groups. The problem is that the radical groups
tend to be the first ones organized and to be the best organized;
and I think there is a real possibility that, as it happened in many
countries, a very quick election would lead to the victory of the
groups that we, very frankly, would much prefer not to gain a
prominent position.
At the same time, I think it is not realistic to say there we
should postpone the elections for a long time, because I don't think
that is sustainable in terms of both domestically in the United
States and in terms of the Iraqi public opinion.
I think one solution that should be seriously taken under consid-
eration is that of encouraging Iraqis to undertake a two-stage proc-
ess rather than a single-stage process. In other words, to encourage
Iraqis to simply enact an interim constitution, which would be a
fairly simple document. I think there is a possibility that some of
the Middle Eastern constitution or perhaps some of the earlier
Iraqi constitution might serve as a template, with some modifica-
tions for the transition of election, and use the interim constitution
simply to elect a constituent assembly and the government of na-
tional reconciliation.
What that could mean is postponing, but not burying under Iraq,
essentially a lot of the difficult problems that are involved in writ-
ing that constitution that are likely to delay the process for a long
time.
Let me give you an example of some of the problems that need
to be faced when Iraqis write a permanent constitution.
There is a lot of agreement among Iraqis — not universal, but
there is a strong agreement among all Iraqi factions that probably
a Federal system would be best for Iraq. To start talking to people
and seeing really what they are saying, each group is saying some-
thing quite different when they talk of a Federal system. For exam-
ple, the Kurds have prepared a draft constitution — it is up on the
Internet — for a Federal Iraq that says that Iraq will be a federation
composed of an Arab state and a Kurdish state. I don't think that
concept of federation is acceptable to any of the other groups. There
are other groups that want a federation based on sort of boundaries
based on ethnicity and confessional lines. That is totally unaccept-
able to the more secular groups in the country.
So what is clear is that, like all constitutions, in the current situ-
ation negotiating an agreement among all the groups is going to
take time. It is not something which can be done in six months.
Probably — I am not even sure it is something that can be done in
584
a year's time. So that I think it — but, at the same time, we cannot
wait for those problems to be solved before an elected government
is put in place.
A two-stage process might provide the time — buy the time to
both — allowing us to both have an elected government in place, and
I think it would be extremely important for that first government
elected under an interim constitution to be a government of na-
tional reconciliation with the participation of all the major groups
in the country.
It is an example that has been used in other countries. The
United States very successfully encouraged Italy in the aftermath
of World War II — we hear a lot about the reconstruction of Ger-
many, but there was an interesting process in Italy which I think
needs to be taken into consideration in view of what is happening
in Iraq. There, the process was, first, election for a constituent as-
sembly and a government of national reconciliation, and only three
years later, after a new constitution was enacted, an election for a
real government, where the majority took over.
So I think this is — you know, the decision, of course, is not com-
pletely in the hands of the United States at this point, but I think
the Iraqis need to be encouraged to move in the direction of a two-
stage process.
Let me just make one final comment, that the experience of other
countries that have gone through to the — that have gone through
to a staged process — I mentioned Italy, but much more recently we
have seen the example of South Africa — has in general been quite
positive. On the other hand, we have seen many examples of seri-
ous problems arising in the aftermath of very quickly organized
post-conflict elections.
The Cambodian elections, for example, you know, although the
periodic organization took almost two years for the United Nations
to organize those elections and despite the fact that the elections
were well-conducted from a technical point of view, the results
were reversed because the elections results did not correspond to
the distribution of the power on the ground, particularly the fact
that one group was still armed and they did not win the election,
and of course they won afterwards through a military coup d'etat.
So I think given the number of the bar codes that we have wit-
nessed in the case of post-conflict elections that would organize too
speedily and the relative success of two-stage processes, I think it
is something that should be considered. Thank you.
The Chairman. Dr. Ottaway, thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Ottaway can be found in the Ap-
pendix on page 659. J
The Chairman. To all three of our panelists, thank you for very
instructive statements.
The gentleman from Missouri.
Mr. Skelton. I yield five minutes to the gentleman who is an
early arriver. Dr. Snyder.
Dr. Snyder. Well, thank you, Mr. Skelton.
Dr. Ottaway, I thought you said such an important thing, and it
is a view I haven't read much about. But I think you said that
there is nothing more dangerous than hurried elections, and I
think in your paper you outline a way to get out of that. In fact,
585
the United States — we had our Articles of Confederation. In a way,
we had our interim government while we tried to figure things out
and then came back with what is our real constitution.
My question is, is anyone listening to you in the administration?
Is this view — is your view that this should be a two-step process —
is it getting any hearing within the administration, to your knowl-
edge?
Dr. Ottaway. We have not had any direct discussions at this
point.
Let me also add that the policy brief where we outlined these
ideas has not been out for very long.
Dr. Snyder. I understand. And I guess, as you said, the United
States has a lot of control over this, but the Iraqis — Mr. Bremer —
Ambassador Bremer has been very clear that this constitution is
going to be one written by the Iraqis. So I suppose the Iraqis could
come back and say, we choose to do an interim process. They could
make that decision if that idea is one that has a lot of play. So
thank you for your paper. Thank you for being here.
Dr. O'Hanlon, I have used the phrase "cautiously optimistic," and
you just said "guardedly optimistic." Now, I am trying to evaluate,
does that mean you are a little more optimistic than me? But I
share — I have some cautious optimism. I like what you say in your
paper about the debate of the factoids, and it is really frustrating,
I think, to see that on these — kind of the factoid conflict. To me,
it is not two stories — there is a good news story and a bad news
story — it is one complicated story of good things occurring in a dif-
ficult by our very good people who put their lives at risk to do it,
as well as the Iraqis who step forward.
You make the comment in your paper — you say: We have gotten
fairly good at counterinsurgency and nation building. Ironically,
this is a legacy the Clinton bequeathed the Bush administration
that is helping the latter enormously right now.
I heard someone else — I don't recall right now who it was — talk
about how Somalia was a disaster, nation building in Haiti was
better than Somalia, Bosnia was better than Haiti, Kosovo was bet-
ter than Bosnia, and now we are where we are at today. Two or
three questions:
First of all, one of the concerns, though, is that the people who
learned as we went along the trail were not the ones who were put
in charge of the Nation building, that this is where you are getting
this conflict within the administration about who should be in
charge, do you have any comments about that?
Second, is there too much emphasis — and maybe you don't know
about this. Is there too much emphasis within the reconstruction
now on building stuff rather than repair? We had the anecdote
from the factoid, if you will, from, I think, Mosul, where it was
going to be $15 million to build a cement factory; it was $80,000
to Iraqis to repair it and get it up and running.
And, third, are we putting too much emphasis on systems, new
systems, dramatically new systems like a cell phone system that in
fact is more compatible with what we do than what is in the re-
gion?
Do you have any comments about any of those?
Dr. O'Hanlon. Thank you, Congressman.
586
On the issue of the people we have in place, as you well know,
the military officers are those who really learned a lot in the Bal-
kans in the 1990's — General Petraeus, General Odierno — and you
can see it. You can see these people are pros at the complex oper-
ations they are now running. I know I am not the first to sing the
praises of these individuals, and I don't do it just to wrap myself
in the flag at a time of national crisis. What they are doing is
amazing, from what I have seen at least.
I have a special pride in General Petraeus because he and I went
to graduate school together. Of course, it took me six years to get
my PhD. It took him about two and a half. That is probably about
an accurate reflection of our relative abilities. If anything, he is
even better than those kind of numbers show. He is just fantastic,
and Odierno is no worse. So I am very impressed by how well they
are doing on the ground.
On the civilian side, it has been a little bit more turbulent, per-
haps, but, you know, we are not as well set up as a government.
We don't have the same kinds of structures as nation builders in
the State Department or the U.S. Agency for International Devel-
opment (USAID) that we do in the military, and maybe that is
something we need to reevaluate. So I don't want to
I am a big admirer of Ambassador Bremer. I would, you know,
like all of us, question some decisions and support others, but, in
general, I am very impressed by the effort he is putting in. But he
doesn't have a lot of institutional support behind him. So in that
sense I share some of your concerns, but especially on the civilian
side and not for the fault of the civilians individually.
On the issue of building new things versus repairing old things,
I generally agree with you; and that is why I caught myself earlier
and tried to avoid saying that I support every detail of the $87 bil-
lion reconstruction bid. I admire the work that Congress is doing
to go over many of the specifics of that kind of a proposal, but I
am also glad that Congress is doing it quickly. Because, at a mini-
mum, we need to inject a large amount of resources into Iraq
quickly. We need to win the hearts and minds of the Iraqi people
without conveying a sense of indecisiveness or a sense of excessive
patience back here. So I hope the Congress continues to scrutinize.
I think one could make an argument that — let us provide the
first $10 billion chunk quickly and then spend more time in the
winter hearing season going over the second $10 billion. I think
those kind of arguments are perfectly legitimate for the sorts of
reasons that you raise, because I do have the impression we are
putting a little too much into new systems and not quite enough
into repair.
On the other hand, I think we do need to do some big dramatic
things. So I would like to see a mix of big new projects and repair
of old projects.
Finally, on your last point, say, for example, the cell phone sys-
tem. I guess that is an example of a big project I would support,
because it seems to me Iraq is trying to cultivate a sense of unity,
a sense of interconnectedness among different ethnic groups and
different political figures, and they need to be able to communicate
easily and rapidly to do that. So that one particular example,
maybe that is the kind of big new project I would support. But the
587
other example you raised of, let us say, the cement factory, is the
sort of thing where repairing and going on a smaller scale and a
more economical scale may be the right way to go.
Dr. Snyder. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Skelton.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Hefley.
Mr. Hefley. Thank you very much.
You know, I measure these hearings, Mr. Chairman, based upon,
do I learn anything? I learned considerably this morning, and I ap-
preciate all of our witnesses for sharing their knowledge with us.
It is my sense that the radicals in that part of the world des-
perately don't want this to succeed. They want us to fall flat on our
face and go out with our tail between our legs and don't want us
to succeed.
Are we seeing a — we know there are some foreign radicals com-
ing into the country. Are they coming in in droves, or are they com-
ing in in ones and twos and threes? Is that not nearly as big a fac-
tor as we think it might be?
Mr. ZiNSMElSTER. You know, I really don't think anyone knows
that. I know the military commanders tell me they don't know. I
also point out to you that there were radicals in the country during
the hot war phase. I saw lots of Syrians and Iranians and others
back in March fighting. They were often picked up at that point.
So this is not a new phenomenon.
The numbers are not large. The numbers are, you know, limited.
But, as you know, it only takes a small number of folks to do some
ugly things in this particular case.
Mr. Hefley. Well, Dr. Zinsmeister, or any of you, if we take
April or May or whenever the major war part was over and we call
that zero and we want to get to ten in order to move our troops
out of there, you have some wonderful statistics you gave us and
polls and so forth, and we have obviously come a long ways. Where
would you say we have come on that scale of one to ten? And can
you use those statistics, any of you, to project, based on how far
we have come, how long it will take to have something that we
would consider a stable Iraq — at least stable by that part of the
world's standards?
Mr. Zinsmeister. You are trying to pin me down on numbers
here. Tricky. You know, I personally — I mean, I am a student of
revolution. That is what I studied in college, as well. And I am very
impressed how fast things have moved.
I have sort of an historical view. If you look at Japan, the recon-
struction was years and years, really, to get to this point. Germany,
as we know, was slow. Those were much more modern nations.
Those were, at least in the case of Germany, nations with a tradi-
tion of democracy already in place. We didn't have that in Iraq. We
are starting from zero there. And I am quite impressed with some
of the progress that has been made. I think if we look back 20
years from now, people will say this is actually surprising.
As an example, I talked to a lot of the soldiers. A lot of these sol-
diers— and I want to second Dr. O'Hanlon's remark. These soldiers
are the princes of Iraq today. I mean, with all due respect, the Coa-
lition Provisional Authority (CPA) is not really running the coun-
try, the soldiers are. They learned lots of valuable things in the
588
Balkans and in earlier experiences; and he is quite right, they are
appl5ring them beautifully.
The only thing I would add is, it is not just the generals. I know
lots of sergeants and captains who learned those same lessons, and
they are the ones who are going out to these little democracy coun-
cils in the precinct or at the tribal meetings or at the meetings
with the local clerics and who are really getting the gears of civili-
zation grinding again and, again, quite skillfully.
The soldiers are quite excited about these little democracy coun-
cils that they are setting up. They tell me these stories about in
the beginning it was four and a half hours and the people didn't
even have a concept of a vote, didn't have a clue what they meant,
and when the village big guy came into the room, everyone went
quiet. They had to teach them; you know, you have to speak up for
yourself. You have a right, you have a vote, you have an opinion
as good as anyone else's.
From those very frustrating early summer experiences, they are
now quite impressed at the ability of these little meetings to con-
vene, to take place in a reasonable amount of time and to make de-
cisions that need to be made.
So, again, I use the word revolution. I don't think it is the wrong
word. This is a place that has no tradition of this. It is an entire
region that has no tradition of this sort of progress. And I think,
as a historian, it is very fast. Now, as a political figure, it is not
fast. I understand that difference. But, you know, I am loathe to
give you how many years until we are out of there kind of thing.
But the progress has been much better than any other analogous
war I can think of anywhere by anybody.
Mr. Hefley. Dr. — I am sorry. Go ahead.
Dr. O'Hanlon. I will just throw out; I will score it about a 4,
Congressman; and I will predict that in a year we have, let us say,
60,000 American forces to 70,000 come election time 2004, here in
this country, with some of the progress Ms. Ottaway has been de-
scribing in Iraqi politics, but a long ways to go, and that we will
have still, let us say, 30,000 forces there in 2006. But that kind of
a trajectory, I think, we can live with.
Mr. Hefley. Dr. Ottaway, you spoke about some of the problems
of getting the electoral process going and so forth. And this is a
tribal society. Are you optimistic that we can actually get some
kind of a democratic system going there, considering the hatreds
between the Kurds and the Shiites and the Sunnis and so forth?
I know there are other tribal societies that work in a democracy.
England is one if you go back, that kind of a tribal society. What
do you think?
Dr. Ottaway. Well, we certainly can get an electoral system
going, I think. What I would be more concerned in the early stages
is not so much about can we set up a system which is clearly demo-
cratic, but more can we encourage a process of reconciliation among
all these different groups. Because what is missing at this point is
a clear sense of how all the component parts of Iraq, of Iraqi soci-
ety can live together.
Let me point out that there is no historical precedence of that
country staying together except under the strong arm of a dictator.
It is the only times that Iraq has been at peace domestically. So,
589
essentially, there is going to be a need for a long process of negotia-
tion and bargaining and so on; and that is why time is so impor-
tant.
If I can add something. What we see in the country is a patch-
work quilt at this point, but there are some interesting experi-
ments at the local level. That is, when we look at these local coun-
cils that have been set up, which are not elected council for the ma-
jority, they are — there has been a selection process, there has been
a consultative process. Certainly there have been no elections, but
certainly at the local level there are organizations that work rel-
atively well. They don't have much power, mostly because of the
way the budget structure of the country is. They don't have money
to spend. I mean, you have local councils, but all the expenditure
is controlled by the line ministries. But there certainly has been a
fair amount of progress at the local level.
Mr. Hefley. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chair]\ian. I thank the gentleman.
I just wanted to ask the committee's indulgence just to weigh in
on what you responded back to Mr. Hefley. You know, a lot of
members of this committee have been to Iraq. I am very proud of
the fact that our members. Democrat and Republican, have been
over there in good numbers. When we left, I remember walking out
of the Fourth Infantry Division Commander's headquarters there,
Ray Odierno, and I don't know who I was with — Mr. Abercrombie
and Mr. McHugh and Terry Everett and a number of our other
good members — and one of us said, we hope this guy doesn't run
in our districts. Because there is a myth in this city that somehow
the people that are the diplomats in the State Department are the
diplomats and, by gosh, the military folks are on the other side of
the river and they will do the fighting and we will do the diplo-
macy, thank you very much.
Wlien you watch these folks — and I agree with you that it is not
just guys with stars on their shoulders. But when you watch mili-
tary leaders, you realize they are diplomats, they are ambassadors,
they have good leadership skills.
We sat there and got briefed by General Ordierno that the last
several days he had taken from a pool of 300 Iraqi leaders and
Iraqis of all types in Kirkuk and he had put together an elected
council with five Kurds, five Turks, five Syrians, five Arabs and
five independents; and I don't know what the independents were.
He had met with a bunch of clerics and gotten their requests and
was tr3dng to act on those. He had just engaged in a full firefight
with Baath party loyalists, and he had his people busily cleaning
up the water supply.
When we drove down through that town, people came out of their
homes and cheered as the Americans came by. And they didn't
cheer because they saw Members of Congress. They didn't know
who we were. They cheered because they saw those uniforms. And
you saw that leadership and that diplomacy manifested down
through the ranks. And I thought, especially if we keep getting
money, the small pieces of money, to the military leaders where
they can go out and fix that water line in the east suburb or put
the — patch up an electric line, they are doing a couple of things.
590
They are not only showing the goodness of this country and our
sincerity, but they are also empowering the leaders that are stand-
ing up, this new crop of Iraqi leaders and these councils. I mean,
the councilman who can get your street paved is the guy that you
tend to support; and the guy that can get your water turned on and
your electricity line patched up is the one you support.
I think I would like to comment on your folks in terms of these
small unit monies that we are putting in this supplemental that
hopefully will empower these military leaders.
The Chairman. So if you could, if you are up or down on that
idea of getting them money, because there has been a lot of criti-
cism that somehow this money doesn't go through this scrub where
you have got a fairly stiff bureaucracy looking at every penny be-
fore it releases it. I have had some calls from the press saying, boy,
you really don't want this initiative fund where these military guys
are going to have this money that they can disburse themselves.
I think that is good for our effort, not bad, but what is your take
on that?
Dr. O'Hanlon. Just very quickly, I agree with you, Chairman.
And, in fact, I could paraphrase General Petraeus. I asked him,
what is the one thing that can go wrong in Mosul and up north?
And he said, if they cut off my money. If I can't hire Iraqis to fix
things, to train to become security forces.
He wanted the money in small bits and pieces that he was able
to dish out by the hundreds of thousands, by the tens of thousands,
by the thousands. For him, that was the single most important
thing to sustain and the one thing that, if taken away from him,
he thought could lead to the failure of his mission.
Dr. Ottaway. I think it is very important that money for small
local projects be there. Whether in the long run it is better for that
money to be controlled by the military or to be passed through, the
way much of it is now, through non-government organizations
(NGO)s that are over government agencies that are working on
construction at the local level, I think is open to debate.
The Research Triangle Institute, which is working on providing
technical support to the local — to the local councils, and the Office
of Transition Initiative within US AID give a lot of grants. Whether,
for a country has had too much military government, it is better
at this point to perpetuate, in a sense, that image that it is the
military that fixes things; or whether it is better to go through the
civilian, through civilian institutions, I think should be debated
very carefully.
The Chairman. That is one thing that we have mentioned to our
Department of Defense (DOD) leadership, the aspect, as we stand
up this brand-new generation of Iraqi leaders, is to stand up — I
think we should stand some of them up in utility districts — that is,
water districts, power districts.
In California, where water is king, our water districts in many
cases are more powerful politically than the city councils and su-
pervisors, et cetera, because they bring that critical asset, water,
to the communities. And I thought that if we stood up in these
towns utility districts, where you have the practical person, the
practical Iraqi who is an engineering type, who says. Let's figure
out how we get potable water to the east neighborhood, he is going
591
to be — that is going to be the type of political leader who may come
up from what I would call the "farm team," to a national level at
some point.
This could be a good training ground, if you will, for a new gen-
eration of Iraqi leadership to have a power district where the citi-
zens come in; they say, we want to hook up the east suburb. They
put together a proposal. An American engineer with his Iraqi coun-
terpart make the call on that. It is funded — whether the money has
come originally from the military or through a civilian mechanism,
they would get to the utility district; and we would start — we
would start building, opening trenches and installing pipe and
doing what is necessary and show the Iraqi people real progress,
but at the same time stand up a new generation of Iraqi local lead-
ers— that is, people who serve on the boards of these utility dis-
tricts.
Does that make any sense?
Mr. ZiNSMEISTER. It does. I would agree with you very much, and
add that, not only does it make political sense, but it makes prac-
tical sense.
I want to point out the Iraqis are a very enterprising people.
There are lots of engineers, lots of doctors that want to start clin-
ics, lots of well-educated people in Iraq who are quite capable of
doing the work of reconstruction; and they don't need gigantic
grants, they need these little micro grants.
So I am very attracted to this idea of decentralizing a significant
chunk of our aid, rather than funneling it through a big agency.
As far as NGOs and so forth, I want to point out, there are none
in Iraq right now. I am a little frustrated about this, actually. So
I think we have no alternative but to funnel it through the mili-
tary, because the NGOs have not shown up; the Europeans, in par-
ticular, have not shown up. There is no alternate mechanism, so
I think we need to trust it to these military commanders.
I suggest that it will be in most cases very cleanly, very spar-
ingly used, very carefully doled out. And I think we need to tolerate
some mistakes and a little bit of risk-taking, too.
Many of these groups are unknown. The leadership is not clear.
We can't be too — we can't have a zero defect standard here. It is
not going to work. For example. General Petraeus has been criti-
cized for this trans-Syrian border trade that he set up. It was very
important for his region to get that happening, so that there would
be vegetables and foodstuffs and fuel and so forth available to ev-
eryday citizens.
The State Department didn't like that. They viewed that as sort
of extracurricular diplomacy at work. I think we have to have a lit-
tle more tolerance for that than we might otherwise have under
these special circumstances.
The Chairman. Okay.
Dr. Ottaway. Be sure that there are no NGOs in Iraq. There are
plenty of civilian organizations that are involved. First of all, there
are major contracts that have gone out to consulting agencies — the
Research Triangle Institute; whether you want to consider it, you
know, profit or nonprofit, it is kind of borderline, but certainly it
is there.
592
There are other organizations Hke Development Alternatives that
are very involved working sometimes with the civil affairs, the
military civilian affairs teams in the reconstruction projects. And
they are the ones that are administering most of these grants.
Second, there are large contracts for community action programs
that are completely channeled through the — through a group of five
NGOs. It is a large USAID contract on sort of a try to develop local
projects, which is channelled completely through NGOs.
So certainly there are not as many as we would like. Partly the
danger is that we see fewer because of — after the attack on the Red
Cross, because of the lack of security. But there are a lot of organi-
zations out there, whether they are NGOs or consulting groups,
that are doing very important work.
The Chairman. Okay. Thank you very much. And I am going to
have to leave real briefly, because we have another problem in
California, that is, our fires; and I need to go check on some things
here, Mr. Cooper, and I will ask Mr. McHugh to take over the
chair.
Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Before you leave, I
would like to thank you for this hearing. I look forward to the hear-
ing with former Central Command (CENTCOM) commanders and
also, ideally, to a hearing from regular, real soldiers, the boots on
the ground, because we have yet to hear from them.
We all want to win this war. We have got to be careful how we
define "victory." the Rumsfeld memo last week was pretty shatter-
ing. He had just testified to Congress the evening before. It was
disclosed in USA Today, and he was in a classified briefing, and
he gave us nothing like what we read in the paper the next day
in the memo.
Not only did he say it was going to be a long, hard slog in the
memo, he also questioned whether we were winning the war on
terror, and asked for new metrics so that we could better define
"progress." A number of you have given us metrics, particularly Dr.
O'Hanlon. I presume Secretary Rumsfeld already had access to
those metrics, and he deemed them insufficient.
Well, what are sufficient metrics? I have asked Secretary Rums-
feld, and he dodged the question, whether we had a poll of our own
troops. It is one thing to poll the Iraqis. How about our own people?
Presumably they are easier to poll. He dodged the question.
That is just one small piece of the puzzle. What are the proper
metrics for evaluating our progress not only in Iraq, but in the
larger war on terror? Anybody.
Dr. O'Hanlon. I will start, Congressman.
I agree with your concern. As I read the memo, what strikes me
is that Mr. Rumsfeld is least certain about the broader Global War
on Terror. I think that he is "guardedly confident" — whatever term
we want to use — about Iraq. He talks about "a long, hard slog we
can probably win" or "almost certainly win." I forget the exact
wording.
His greater — and I think partly because these sorts of metrics,
in the broader sense that politically we are doing the right thing,
even if it is taking a while, that suggests we should ultimately pre-
vail there. I think that he is right to underscore, however, that
globally we are in trouble to the extent we can't shut down the
593
madrasas in Pakistan and other parts of the Arab world, to the ex-
tent that we keep seeing more terrorists trained and recruited in
places like Saudi Arabia and Pakistan than we are able to arrest
or kill in our broader global campaign.
That is where I think — so I think the real question is, how do
you encourage political reform in the Islamic world and how do you
improve U.S. relations with the Islamic world? To some extent,
Iraq is part of that, but Iraq, in a way, is almost the easier piece.
Mr. Cooper. If I can interrupt just a second, it is not that we
can't shut down the madrasas; we don't have the U.S. policy to try,
do we? And when one of our generals makes inflammatory state-
ments, you know, regarding whether this is a religious war or not,
there is no real U.S. policy regarding him. So it seems like there
are a number of omissions here, to put it kindly. So how do we fill
these gaps? What should we be doing?
I was worried about Dr. Ottaway's testimony. As I recall, the
noted scholar Bernard Lewis said. Democracy may be impossible in
Iraq. They are not used to it. They have different ways of achieving
consensus, through family or tribal mechanisms. And we may be
totally biased as Westerners to impose a constitution and democ-
racy on them unless it incorporates these more localized features.
There are a lot of Americans out there who are thinking we are
going to have free and fair elections sometime in the near future,
and if we define victory that way, we could be waiting a long time.
So it worries me with a number of loose statements that we are
not, in fact, coming closer to victory. We may be putting it further
away from us.
Mr. ZiNSMElSTER. You know, I — I think — you talk about, how do
we measure progress? I think we need to think about the war on
terror very carefully. I think we need to think of it sort of like we
thought about the Cold War. This is not something that is going
to be done with finality anytime soon. It is going to be a long proc-
ess. And as we sort of assess how we are doing, I think we have
to look at things like, for instance, I will give you one very hard,
cold fact.
Since American troops flooded Iraq, the number of soldiers,
American soldiers killed in the country is slightly less than the
number of police officers killed in this country this year policing
our streets domestically. That is maybe something we are going to
have to live with. Maybe that is what we are going to have to sort
of look at for the near future is that kind of a — it takes a very
steely calculus to accept that, but that is maybe what we are going
to have to live with as we kind of wrestle with this amorphous foe.
Mr. Cooper. If that is true, someone in the White House, pref-
erably the President, needs to level with the American people and
get the expectations right, because the mere number of $87 billion
did more to shock the American people than anything the White
House has said. That is just a portion of the truth. So somehow we
need clear and direct and honest communication with the American
people so they can get their expectations right.
The question of Turkish troops. That may seem convenient for
us, but what will that do to the internal affairs of the country to
have former colonizers in there in large numbers just because it is
594
convenient for us in our press releases to say, well, a Muslim na-
tion is contributing troops.
You know, we can be adding gasoline to the fire.
Mr. McHuGH [presiding]. The gentleman's time has expired.
The gentleman fi:'om Virginia, Mr. Schrock.
Mr. Schrock. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me identify myself
with the comments that my friend from Colorado, Mr. Hefley, made
that we have all learned a lot here today, probably more than we
have in many hearings. The ironic part of it is, none of you work
at the Pentagon. So I appreciate your comments.
I am going to ask three different questions, and then I am — be-
cause I know time runs out fast. If I ask them, I know the chair-
man will allow you to answer them.
In some of the materials we got prior to this hearing, I am going
to read two or three sentences here. Critics of the administration
approach make two opposing arguments, that is, winning the
peace.
The first is that the establishment of an Iraqi Government and
transfer of sovereignty are proceeding too slowly. Proponents of
this view argue that a more rapid transfer of power would provide
Iraqis with a sense of ownership in the reconstruction and demo-
cratic process. I would like you to comment on that.
Dr. O'Hanlon, you said Ambassador Bremer doesn't have the in-
stitutional support behind him. I would appreciate it if you would
elaborate on that, because I think that was a fascinating comment.
And for all three of you, some of these statistics you have given —
and Mr. Zinsmeister, with your permission, I want to use those to-
morrow in a radio feed I do every Thursday morning — it is amazing
that the American public doesn't hear all that. Help me understand
why the news media — I know, the poor news media gets bashed all
of the time.
But why are we not getting that message from them? This isn't
a classified briefing. If it was, nobody else would be allowed in here
except the three of you and us. So why — if you have got those fig-
ures, why do you have them and why isn't the media giving those
to the American people?
Yes, bad news is always good. I know that good news is no news;
I understand that. It is important that we understand that we are
losing folks over there. That makes the war very real. But by the
same token, a lot of good things are happening in this, based on
the statistics you all have given us. I just don't understand that.
So if you could comment on those two things, and Dr. O'Hanlon
on the other statement.
Dr. Ottaway. Concerning the greater speed in the transition, I
think that they would give the Iraqis a greater sense of ownership
having an elected government. That said, I think we have to be
very careful about speed, because speed can always lead to a deba-
cle. That is why I was suggesting to try to encourage a two-stage
process there in terms of the — in terms of the transition.
So I think if — in addition to the speed of setting up a govern-
ment, whether it is elected; but you know speeding the transition,
there is also the problem of making that transition more predict-
able. That is something that we should start to do right away.
595
Let me give you — explain what I mean here. In the case of Af-
ghanistan, from the day of the Bonn Agreement, the people of Af-
ghanistan knew what was coming. They knew what process was
going to take place. And although elections and the formation of a
permanent government were still 2-1/2 years away, they knew
what the process was and what was coming.
In the case of Iraq, the United States has never made clear to
Iraqis what they can expect. They have been told many times the
U.S. will not stay there one day longer or one day shorter than nec-
essary. That is not a road map. That is not a timetable. And I
think it is important, no matter what is the speed of the transition,
that the U.S. makes it very clear to the Iraqis what is the process
and what is, you know, at least an approximate timetable.
Mr. SCHROCK. Your argument is so logical that I don't under-
stand why the White House doesn't adopt that and start saying
that. So I agree with you.
Dr. O'Hanlon.
Dr. O'Hanlon. Thank you, Congressman.
On the question about Mr. Bremer and his institutional backup,
I am not necessarily distressed that the military provide the engi-
neering units and the electricity repair units and so forth because,
of course, they have those organic to their logistics support.
I guess I am more nervous about a couple of things. For example,
in this new Polish-led sector, where we have a multinational force,
a very diverse and disparate and somewhat unorganized collection
of small units in an area that has had its difficulties and could
again, I am not sure we have a Dave Petraeus or Ray Odierno
equivalent or a Jack Dempsey equivalent to run the show from the
military point of view. That is where I think CPA needs to be able
to do more with people on the ground, figuring out which projects
need to be funded, interacting with the Iraqis, getting to know
them, staying for longer than these 90-day rotations that are often
the longest that many people stay.
That is — I don't have a complete answer to your question, but
that is a snapshot of the answer I think that has to be there. I am
not convinced we have the institutional backup in that region
where I think we really need it.
On the point about the media, of course this is a big question.
I will give you my take, and I do it in my written testimony a little.
With apologies to the administration, I still blame the adminis-
tration most for this, because the administration — we don't have to
go through the whole litany, but clearly the whole aircraft carrier
landing and the "Mission Accomplished" banner — whoever you
think actually wrote it or hoisted it — that conveyed a very clear
message to the country that the war was over. I mean, I am sorry;
it did. And, you know, it is pretty hard to walk yourself back from
that.
I still think the overall accomplishments have been fairly impres-
sive. But the expectations gap has been very stark. And the media
is good at at least two things, reporting on individual news, indi-
vidual bad news, because that is the more dramatic and revealing
where an administration's words are inconsistent with its actions
or with the reality on the ground. The media is good at those two
things. It is better at those two things than doing detailed military
596
analysis or detailed assessments of nation building; that is where
you get the Dr. Ottaways and the Mr. Zinsmeisters to provide the
expertise.
So the media, in a sense, is doing predictably what the media
does well, not doing things it doesn't tend to do well, and we
shouldn't be surprised. And the administration is primarily to
blame for the perceptions gap that it created.
Mr. McHuGH. If I may interrupt. We have a number of members
who need to go. I would ask if the gentleman could respond very,
very briefly.
Mr. ZiNSMElSTER. Let me just address what he asked me about
the media question. I am a working reporter, so I can be a little
tougher maybe than Dr. O'Hanlon.
I lived in Ireland in the late 1970's and early 1980's, right in the
middle of the so-called "troubles" with the IRA, and my Irish
friends used to ask me all the time, how come all Americans think
that the whole country is in flames and ready to blow up, when it
is really much more localized and much less of a problem than
Americans think.
You know, it is a media reporting problem. I am afraid to say
a lot of reporters are lazy. They lack the imagination to go out and
write the deeper, longer-term stories that are necessary. Something
on fire is an obvious story; these more glacial, deeper stories about
successful pilgrimages or schools in session or economy beginning
to bubble are trickier to write. And I think that explains some of
it.
But it is a real problem. I am a little bit concerned about the Tet
Offensive syndrome, where we could win the battle and lose the
public opinion war today. And it is something we need to look at
very closely.
Mr. SCHROCK. Thank you all.
Mr. McHuGH. The gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Marshall.
Mr. Marshall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize to you all
to begin with. I had a mark-up in the Agriculture Committee, and
I had to go to that and vote on the different bills; and I got back
after you had finished your remarks. So what I bring up may be
something that you have already answered; if it is, I apologize.
I gave a talk at SAIS, the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced
International Studies, on Monday — went on for quite some time; I
won't do that now.
I spent time in Vietnam, ground combat, recon platoon sergeant.
I did go to Iraq about five or six weeks ago, and I have gotten an
awful lot of observations that are consistent with what I have read
in your testimony — and I just scanned your testimony. I think
things on the ground in Iraq are actually a whole lot better than
perceived here in the United States, so I have written a few things
about that.
At Johns Hopkins, the last question that was asked of me was,
why is Iraq not Vietnam? You hear a lot of voices in the U.S. now
suggesting that in Iraq we are struggling with the same kinds of
problems that we struggled with in Vietnam, and ultimately Viet-
nam proved to be a disaster for us.
You can argue that it is a "necessary war." Somebody wrote a
book recently, in fact, that was entitled, Vietnam: The Necessary
597
War. I apologize; I can't remember the name of the guy that wrote
the book.
My response is, Vietnam was a proxy war, a rubbing point. In
the Cold War, you had not only North Vietnam, which probably
wasn't significant in supporting South Vietnam, something we
could have dealt with, but also China and Russia; and that greatly
limited what we could do militarily and at the same time provided
the insurgency in the south with the kind of supplies that it really
needed in order to prevail in a situation where we did have com-
petent, indigenous assistance, the South Vietnamese army — some-
thing that is critically important, in my mind, in Iraq. If we don't
have that, we are not going to be able to prevail. We have got to
have the Iraqis doing this with us.
Could you comment about why, if in fact it is your opinion that
this is not Vietnam and ought not to be analogized as likely to end
in the kind of quagmire that Vietnam ended in, why it is not?
Dr. O'Hanlon. I will start. Congressman. Thank you. I have
been admiring your writings.
I just wanted to say, first, that I don't think the Iraqis have the
ability to generate a large insurgency movement based on any ide-
ology they now have at their disposal. There is always the possibil-
ity anti-Americanism could become that rallying ideology if we do
a lot of things wrong or are seen by the population as failing to pro-
tect them and improve their lives. But overall, even though there
is some reason for nervousness there, I think we have a good
enough exit strategy and we have a good enough reconstruction
strategy that we are unlikely to see that same dynamic. So I think
the guerilla force is going to stay relatively small.
Second, I think, with great admiration for those of you who
fought in Vietnam — and we can have a long discussion about this —
I think today's military in many ways is even better trained and
even more capable of proper counterinsurgency techniques than the
force we had in the Vietnam period.
So I think we are using firepower more selectively. We have
learned some lessons. Maybe it is more at the level of command.
Maybe the troops were just as good in Vietnam, but I think we
have learned not to use as much indiscriminate firepower. That is
very important to prevailing in a guerilla war.
And maybe there are other things to say, but I will leave it at
those two points which, to me, are the most central.
Mr. Marshall. Does anybody else have a comment? No?
Dr. Ottaway. No.
Mr. Marshall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. McHuGH. Thank the gentleman.
The gentleman from Minnesota, Mr. Kline.
Mr. Kline. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank all of you for
being here today. I know these hearings get to be long and our
questions sometimes a little repetitive. I will try to be very suc-
cinct— unusual for us, I understand.
I have got a quote here from the Minneapolis Star Tribune, a let-
ter to the editor that says, in part, "but reporters actually living
among the Iraqis overwhelmingly paint a picture of suspicion, im-
patience and outrage at the growing lack of security in the coun-
try."
598
I think we ought to start with Mr. Zinsmeister. And is that true
to your knowledge, that reporters there are consistently painting
this picture of outrage?
Mr. Zinsmeister. I think it is self-evidently untrue. I mean, I
quoted in my testimony this New York Times story from last week.
They said really the opposite. And my own experience is, which I
can speak about a little more authoritatively, was quite the oppo-
site.
I spent most of my time in southern Iraq, among the Shiites, and
found that most of the people I ran into who I was capable of talk-
ing with, were thrilled to have Saddam gone, where very cognizant
of who it was that got him out of there, and were very grateful to
the American soldiers and the United States in general for that.
So I do not agree with that statement at all. I think there are
localized areas, the people whose ox is being gored, the people who
lost their whip hand are kicking and screaming right now, but it
is a relatively small universe.
Mr. Kline. You are saying, it is your judgment that the majority
of Iraqis are not outraged. Is it true that the majority of reporters
are outraged at the lack of progress in security?
Mr. Zinsmeister. Reporters are a kind of congenitally outraged
lot. That is what they do. They are looking for trouble; they are
looking for criticism. That is what makes reporting zing. So, you
know, it is
Mr. Kline. Fair enough.
Mr. Zinsmeister. Don't get me started.
Mr. Kline. It just struck a nerve with me, also.
Another thing that struck a chord with me. Dr. O'Hanlon, was
your suggestion that we ought to have more Marines involved. Be-
cause of my background, that just automatically sets the tuning
forks tuning.
What did you have in mind?
Dr. O'Hanlon. That is the big question. But I think, Mr. Con-
gressman, that, for example, we need to consider whether we can't
reduce the number of Marines on Okinawa temporarily, possibly
backfill with a couple of squadrons of fighter jets so North Korea
doesn't get the wrong idea, and use some of that deployment in
Iraq.
I just think the situation is that serious for the U.S. Army, that
we need to rethink patterns of deployment that have been habitual
for a long time, because I really think the Army is going to be at
risk of being broken by this mission. I think within a few months
we are going to start — I don't want to predict which units will be
sent back to Iraq for the second time first, but units like the 3rd
Infantry Division (ID), you know, maybe in the course of 2004 will
be notified they are going back. And I just don't see how that kind
of thing is consistent with an all-volunteer force staying as healthy
and as excellent as it has been.
Mr. Kline. So you are looking at it purely in terms of relief for
the opstempo of the Army, not so much a configuration of the right
mix of forces, you know, 4th ID versus, you know, the 1st Marine
Division.
599
Dr. O'Hanlon. That is right, although I think the Marines prob-
ably are better configured than the average Army unit. But that
is not my major motivation.
Mr. Kline. Okay. Thank you.
And Dr. Ottaway, for you, please. We have just come back, a
number of us, including Mr. McHugh, from a trip to not only to
Iraq, but to countries in the region. There was a discussion
among — while we were visiting one of the neighboring countries,
about a timetable. And your paper indicates some interest in how
fast we move for a constitution, and you, perhaps, are suggesting
two steps. But the plea from the neighboring countries and cer-
tainly the press in that part of the world is, there ought to be a
timetable; and a timetable establishes when there will be full sov-
ereignty for the Iraqi people, for example.
But in our discussions, there was an interesting side discussion,
if you will. It was pointed out that in that part of the world, a time-
table has not the same meaning that we have here, and — that is,
it was suggested that if you set a date for a constitution or an elec-
tion and you slip by a month or two or six, or maybe a year or two
years, that wasn't so important. The important thing was that you
had a timetable.
And my comment to that was, that may be true in that part of
the world, but in the United States, in the United Kingdom and
some of the Western European countries, a timetable is timetable.
If you fail to hold an election in accordance with that timetable or
have a constitution in accordance with that timetable, it will be
seen as a failure.
And so, with that sort of definitional problem, how do we get
around that?
Dr. Ottaway. Well, first of all, you need to make a distinction
between a timetable and a road map. In other words, you can have,
you know — we will do such and such by such a date. But you can
also have a looser road map saying, this is the first step, this is
the second step, and give, you know, a range of times when this
could happen.
The timetable on Afghanistan — and that was not addressed; we
had not addressed a road map, but also a timetable — is slipping a
little, not so far by much — is slipping a little, and I don't think that
is causing excessive problems. If the elections were postponed by
two years, I think that would become very problematic. If elections,
instead of being held in June, are held in July, I don't think that
is going to cause a lot of problems.
So I think what is important is to try to make the situation more
predictable, and not perhaps predictable to the day, but to tell the
Iraqis and the people in regions what is coming, what is the next
step. Because the problem now is that it is easy for people who are
not terribly happy about the American occupation to think that it
is all left to the whim of whoever is in charge, whether it is Paul
Bremer or somebody else; and that is the issue that needs to be
corrected.
Mr. Kline. Thank you.
Mr. McHuGH. The time of the gentleman has expired.
The gentlelady from Guam, Ms. Bordallo.
600 J
1
Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to
say that I am very impressed with our witnesses today. And having
been in Iraq just a couple of weeks ago, I must agree with most
of your assessments.
I, in particular, wanted to say to Dr. O'Hanlon that I did meet
and see and witness the work that General Petraeus has done in
Mosul, and he truly has done an extraordinary job putting together \
a civilian election, empowering the troops to go out and train the
Iraqis to do the jobs that they have to do to rebuild their country.
One of the things that really concerned me was unemployment.
I hear different — 40 percent, 50 percent, 60 percent; and I feel we
must fix this.
Now, while I was there, I know the big corporations are coming
into Iraq. I think we visited a PX. We found one of the corporations
was running the PX, and they are employing people from outside
the country. What is your feeling on that? Certainly if unemploy-
ment is that high, they should be looking at the Iraqi people to
place them in jobs.
And the second question I want to ask is, are the American peo-
ple, in your opinion, ready to support an extended stay in Iraq to
finish the job?
Any one of you can answer that.
Dr. O'Hanlon. Thank you, Congresswoman. On the question
about the PX, that is an interesting idea. I guess I will just chew
that one for a while. It seems you do have to worry about security
when you are talking about support within the ranks of American
forces. On the other hand, your point seems pretty compelling. We
do need to find more ways to employ Iraqis.
So on the issue — your question about more the politics of — can
you repeat the second question, please?
Ms. BoRDALLO. Yes. Do you feel the American people would be
willing to support an extended stay in Iraq? Because we have done
it in other countries, such as the Philippines, where we kept our
troops there for quite some time.
Dr. O'Hanlon. My impression of American politics is, the answer
is yes, that the American people will support this. They may not
reward Mr. Bush for it. I can easily imagine a situation where he
loses the election next year and we stay an)rway; that he loses the
election in part because of the Iraq issue, and we stay anyhow. I
think that is more likely than to see an American hasty retreat.
So I still think Americans will say, we have no real choice but
to stay; and as long as there is a plausible strategy for victory,
even if it is hard to get to that end point, I believe the American
people will stay behind it.
But I think it is important for them to get honest talk from their
public officials. I think Mr. Bush has had a bad week in describing
the state of affairs in Iraq. He shouldn't say that a big new wave
of attacks represents the desperation of the resistance. This doesn't
ring true with most people, and when you start hearing that kind
of rhetoric, I think it actually erodes the public's willingness to sus-
tain the operation.
Dr. Ottaway. On the issue of unemployment, I think what you
are saying is true, and it is very important that you take steps
there. In that respect, I think the small grants that are made avail-
601
able through the local councils are extremely important, because
they mostly go for, you know, pick-and-shovel jobs, clean up things,
to use a lot of manpower.
We need to think about the issue of employment very clearly also
when we decide how to explain the construction money, because,
the thing is, we talked a little earlier about the larger projects ver-
sus fixing up what is there. And I think one of the issues that
needs to be considered in making those decisions in terms of what
kind of infrastructure, how much is the big, new project and so on
is, what is going to be the impact of that on unemployment? Be-
cause unless we can cut down the unemployment, we are not going
to win over too many hearts and minds for too long because people
will lose support.
Ms. BORDALLO. Any other? I have to agree with you, Doctor. Un-
less we employ these people, there will always be unrest. Thank
you very much.
Mr. McHuGH. The gentlelady yields back.
The gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Taylor.
Mr. Taylor. Thank you. I want to thank all three of you for
being here today. Probably, like each of my colleagues, the subject
of the $87 billion has been a favorite at my town meetings. In my
town meetings I quoted General Petraeus — like just about every-
body on the committee, I have had a chance to visit with him —
where he says that money is ammunition, and every Iraqi that is
out working during the week is probably not shooting at his GIs.
And the folks in the room, even though they really didn't want to
hear it, kind of backed off when they heard that.
But something that really struck me as interesting is, after the
meeting, one of my constituents very politely came up to me, and
he says, I was in Vietnam during the Tet Offensive, and I didn't
want to argue with you publicly, but in our camp we killed seven
Vietnamese. Four of them were our employees, including the guy
who cut my hair, during the Tet Offensive, who were — it turns out
they were Viet Cong.
I really didn't know what to say to the guy. But I would like your
thoughts on that as to whether or not it really, in the long run, will
make a difference?
Mr. ZiNSMElSTER. I mean, I don't have any ambiguity in my mind
about this. These are not popular forces; they are residual forces.
They are leftovers of a previous regime, and they are trying to
draw in malcontents of various sorts. As I think both of the other
witnesses have said nicely today, if we were stupid enough and
dropped the ball, various forms of discontent with our management
could be folded into some of this resistance.
But at the — in general, at the moment, we have pretty good evi-
dence that there is not broad support for this kind of resistance.
As I say, my own guess is that the flow of public opinion will be
in our direction, because as I mentioned, it is mostly Iraqis who are
being killed by those bombs, not Americans. Most of the damage
is being done to their homes and their neighborhoods.
I really don't think that they have a winning psychological strat-
egy. So I don't worry much about that part of it.
I think there are lots of practical things that are going to be dif-
ficult to fix. The politics is going to be difficult, and money has to
602
be spent to fix a lot of broken infi:'astructure. But I think the gen-
eral flow of public support is on our side already, and going to be
in our direction in the future.
Mr. Taylor. Could you — since I guess everyone in this room is
fairly familiar with polls; and we all know that there are some
neighborhoods I would love to have polled "favorable" toward me,
and there are those that I would just as soon not have polled as
to "favorable" or "unfavorable."
How did you conduct your poll?
Mr. ZiNSMEISTER. Well, you know, you can't do a perfect poll in
Iraq today. The way it is done in this country, you do random tele-
phone dialing. There is no telephone system. You cannot go to peo-
ple's houses and get good answers, because there are security
issues; there is ambiguity, there is fear of being identified posi-
tively as a certain answerer. So you have to approximate.
I don't pretend that our poll or any of those others are perfect.
But we did it again in collaboration with very well-respected poll-
sters who have done this in our places like Pakistan, like Iran.
Zogby has polled in Saudi Arabia. So they know a lot of the tricks.
We worked very hard on our translations to make sure that we
didn't have misunderstandings. In the beginning of the poll we
said, your results will be kept confidential. That is a standard dis-
claimer. But this, translated into Arabic to a word that meant
"your results will be kept secret," and that would be the kiss of
death. If there is any feeling that this is a cabal or a conspiracy,
people wouldn't give you honest answers — little things we tried to
pay good attention to.
Again, I won't pretend that our poll was perfect. We were in four
different cities. We had a broad spectrum of ethnic and religious
groups represented. What is most encouraging to me, sir, is that
there have been a handful of polls, not just ours — also by Gallup,
also by a very well respected firm.
Mr. Taylor. Again, was it a telephone poll, man on the street?
Mr. ZiNSMEISTER. Face-to-face. We would go to public places,
gathering spots, markets, places where people would be found, and
would approach them on the street. And the duration of the ques-
tioning period was intentionally short to prevent people from get-
ting qualms.
I will tell you the first thing that I did when I set up this poll:
I called a bunch of Eastern European pollsters, and I said, when
you went in there in 1991 and talked to people who were not used
to being honest in public, for whom that could cause real prob-
lems— in fact, they were not used to expressing opinions — how did
you do it? I got a lot of tips about anon3anity, brevity, third-person
questioning, that sort of thing.
Again, there are precedents that we tried to follow here. And I
am most reassured that these various polls done in very different
ways in very different places are all finding about the same things,
which indicates that there is a bedrock underneath that we are
stumbling our way into.
Mr. Taylor. Do you agree with the condition that there will be
60,000 Americans in Iraq a year from today which — I would like
to hear from the other two analysts. Give me an idea of what you
think it will look like.
603
Mr. ZiNSMElSTER. He is much braver than I was. I thought it was
a good estimate. I don't know what the exact numbers will be, but
I think there will be less and less need. I tell you what the com-
manders and the soldiers are talking about right now. They are
pushing Iraqification. They never had any interest in the foreign
troop question that was debated so heavily in the last month.
You know, the simple military record of foreign troops in these
kind of conditions, in the Balkans, in Somalia, is that they are use-
less. They often have to be rescued by other troops. They do not
have a particular sterling record as peacekeepers in dangerous sit-
uations, and the soldiers know that and they never had much in-
terest in that. What they have a great interest in is accelerating
the speed of training of Iraqi soldiers and policemen.
We are beginning to see some very valiant behavior by some of
those Iraqi men who are beginning to provide security for their
own homes. We need to speed that. And I think as we do so, it will
be possible to draw down our troops relatively predictably.
Mr. Skelton. Will the gentleman yield?
Mr. Taylor. It really comes up to the chairman's goodwill, be-
cause I see the red light.
Mr. McHuGH. I would be delighted to yield to the ranking mem-
ber, I am sure.
Mr. Skelton. By telegraphing the drawdown, which you are
doing today, or which might be done by the administration in the
days and months ahead, what is to keep the insurgents from biding
their time when there are fewer American forces to seek them out,
just bide their time and wait, and then cause a lot of destruction
after our forces are down to half?
Dr. O'Hanlon. I have two answers to that important question,
Congressman. One, if they bide their time, that is good. Because
it gives us a year or two to help restore normal life to the economy
and to the Iraqi people. We could make good use of that year.
And, second, if and when we reduce to the numbers I have sug-
gested, the Iraqis will be capable of doing more on their own. By
late next year, I believe we will have most of the Iraqi police force
up to the size we envision. So most of the drawdown will be sub-
stituted for by Iraqis. And, of course, we have the flexibility not to
go down to — 60,000 is a somewhat optimistic estimate. I should
probably give a range.
Probably 60- to 90,0000 by next fall, but— I would still say there
is a good chance it will be 60, but only if the Iraqis can do the po-
licing and the patrolling by that point largely on their own.
Mr. Taylor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. McHuGH. Thank you.
The gentlelady from California, Ms. Davis.
Ms. Davis of California. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank
you to all of you for being here. I am sorry that I have missed some
of the questions and just a portion of your testimony.
If I could. Dr. Ottaway, one of the issues that I raised when I
was in Iraq was the involvement of women in draft ing the con-
stitution. In fact, that request really came to me in a very compel-
ling plea from one of the ministers.
I am wondering where you see this, whether you think that the —
selecting an informal group, or a predrafting constitutional group
604
is going to be successful in engaging women, what is needed to do
that, and whether there is some backlash also involved, because I
have heard that that could also be an issue.
Dr. Ottaway. Well, of course, the involvement of women depends
on if — you know, how the committee that prepares the constitution
is tapped. It would be easier to make sure that women are included
if this is an appointed committee; it is more difficult if it is an
elected assembly. Then the issue becomes more complicated.
I don't think, in terms of the second part of your question, that
the presence of women on the constitutional committee or on a con-
stituent assembly would create a backlash in and of itself. And I
don't even think that the inclusion of — you know, of at least basic
provisions — certainly not the right to vote for women; that has long
existed. The elections were not very good, but women voted as
badly as the men did in situations of Iraq. I don't think those
issues would create a backlash.
Where I think it is extremely important for the United States not
to — you know, not to step into are the issues of family law and, you
know, the sort of more — the social issues that involve the position
of women in the society, because that is a good way to create a
backlash.
And I think it has been the experience of all of the colonizing
powers of all — you know, in many, many situations that you do not
touch those issues.
Ms. Davis of California. When you say "family law," are you
talking about women's rights, per se, as they relate to the family?
Dr. Ottaway. Women's political rights are one thing. Start talk-
ing about the — you know, the divorce laws, talking about laws
about child custody, for example, and things of that sort; those are
very, very dangerous areas for foreigners to become involved in,
certainly in the short run.
There is nothing wrong with supporting women's organizations
that will lobby for change in those areas. And we see a lot of
change in some Arab countries taking place on that. But it is not
something that the United States, in my opinion, should be seen
as taking a direct involvement in.
Ms. Davis of California. Do you think that we are doing
enough to create the capacity of women to engage in that way? I
mean, I know that many, many women are very well-educated, but
haven't had experience with democracy and perhaps are not posi-
tioned really to have the kind of experience that would really give
them comfort or some confidence in doing that.
Dr. Ottaway. There is a lot of work which is being done as part
of the Middle East Partnership Initiative on setting up programs
to educate women to political participation in the Arab world in
general. I don't think any of those projects are undergoing — you
know, have started in Iraq at the present time, but there is a lot
of work being done on this issue as part of the initiative. So I am
confident that that will happen when the conditions allow it, those
programs.
Ms. Davis of California. I am wondering, too — to the rest of
you, Dr. O'Hanlon and others — would women's involvement be any
kind of a benchmark to you to say that democracy is in a position
that it can grow and to flourish? I mean, how important do you
605
think that is in trying to evaluate the extent to which the Iraqis
would be able to embrace a democratic model?
Dr. O'Hanlon. a couple of things, Congresswoman. I am de-
lighted you are emphasizing it; I hope very much it happens. But
to my mind, if Iraq is even halfway to where Turkey is today with-
in a decade, I will consider it a major success. I don't know the fig-
ures on Turkey, but my guess is, they are not super high; they are
probably in the ten percent range for female legislators.
I would personally say that we have to be realistic in our short-
term expectations, but I am glad that your aspirations are ambi-
tious.
Ms. Davis of California. Mr. Zinsmeister, did you want to com-
ment on that?
Just one quick question also as it relates — while I am on the sub-
ject of women, to what extent were they involved in polls? And
what is your take on that in terms of the engagement of women
to help build a democracy, since I think we all believe that that is
going to be essential.
Mr. Zinsmeister. Women were half of the respondents that we
polled, by choice.
And let me say that, just from our own point of view, I think it
would be very healthy to get more women involved. Women showed
up in the poll as much more skeptical of al-Qaeda-style organiza-
tions than men. I think they would be, in general, a force for liber-
ality in the Iraqi Government, and one that we should encourage
and welcome. I believe, however, as my colleagues have stated, that
it is very important that we not force this.
The next issue in my magazine is a very interesting interview
with a gentleman who has argued that the very best antidote for
terrorism today is bringing in connections — global connections,
globalization, modernity in general; that is how you really snuff it
out in the long run. But he points out, it is very important in that
process of bringing global modernity to a country not to have kind
of a pollutive effect. You don't want pornography to show up in Is-
lamic countries, you don't want to push the family law things and
push the traditional structures in ways which will create a back-
lash, or you can do damage to the whole concept of modernity. This
isn't something that we want after all.
I think if we kind of don't get too aggressive about this, good
things will happen. Iraq, as you have stated, is a very well-edu-
cated nation. There are lots of very competent women physicians
and all sorts of other things in the country.
When I was in Kuwait, I was very struck by the difference in Ku-
wait these days. A majority of the college students in Kuwait now
are female. I think 60 percent of Kuwaiti women are working. You
see them all over the place. It is a new world that is opening up
in the Persian Gulf, and I think Iraq can very easily be part of
that.
Mr. McHUGH. The gentlelady's time has expired.
The gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. Larson.
Mr. Larson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I thank Mr.
Hunter and Mr. Skelton, as well, for arranging to have these hear-
ings; and I thank the panel for their testimony today. I have three
606
questions. They are — I will direct one to each of you. But you can
please feel free to chime in on any one of them.
My first question is to Mr. Zinsmeister. That is, with regard to —
I think the polling data and the information that you have is pretty
astounding. And having been to Iraq myself, and I know that there
is always a danger when Members of Congress fly in and fly out,
and become immediate authorities, but nonetheless, it did provide
a lot of opportunity for our observation and candid conversation
with the troops.
One of things I am concerned of overall and why all of us, I
think, want to embrace the notion intuitively that the blessings of
bestowing a democracy on these people are going to just break out
all throughout the Middle East and create stability — overnight
painful, difficult, but with the persistence of the United States, this
all can be achieved.
And yet the backdrop for what is taking place — and when you
look at what Al-Jezeera is saying and when you look at what is
happening not only in the Middle East, but around the rest of the
globe — is that this is a clash between civilizations, between Chris-
tianity and Muslims. And while that is in many respects an over-
statement, it certainly is playing out as, if not clearly, a clash be-
tween Muslims and Christianity in the eyes of the terrorists, clear-
ly a clash between the new world orders festering in Iraq.
I was particularly interested in your comments about, we can't
take this to an extreme, that we need — and bestowing on Iraq the
benefits of democracy and globalization, that it can't be too over-
whelming, that the Iraqis aren't going to embrace Mirimax and
Madonna in the same breath that they look at perhaps the con-
stitution.
How do we reconcile all of that with respect to the timetable of
standing up a democracy within a year that is more or less the
timetable that will correspond to the reelection of a President here
in the United States, with the need for us to do the painstaking
care and diplomatic work that is going to be necessary if we hope
to succeed. That was my question for you.
Now, my question for Dr. O'Hanlon is, I couldn't agree with you
more about the problem that the Army is in, specifically as it re-
lates to the Reservists and the Guards, when we can't even level
with our own troops back home here and their families about when
they can be expected to return, what their rotation might be, and
upon returning, when will they be asked to go back again. And I
think your suggestion about bringing in the Marines probably is an
appropriate one.
But how do we get the administration, again, who insists that we
have enough troops there already and that we don't need to do
this — how do we get them to reconcile or come up with a means
by which — because we all understand, whether you are for or
against the war, we are there, and our troops are at risk. How do
we best work our way out of this, and how do we level with these
people without — I think as you have said very eloquently — without
ultimately bringing about the ruination of the Army itself?
And to Mrs. Ottaway, with regard to those elections that you
write about, how do you see that playing out, and can we accom-
plish those goals in this very short period of time? I know to write
I
607
our own Constitution, it took more than a six-month period and a
lot longer debate.
And I realize we have far more mass communication than we
had back in 1887 through 1889, but nonetheless, I would be inter-
ested in your comments there.
Mr. ZiNSMElSTER. I think you are quite right. It is very important
that we have realistic expectations on this blossoming-of-democracy
question. I am not planning to take my children to vacation in Iraq
anytime soon, for sure.
I think what we should aim for is basic stability. I would be very
pleased if we had, sort of, like a Balkans situation, which are not
stellar democracies by any means today — but they are basically
stable places where people are not killing each other and where
local blood feuds are not boiling over to the point where they be-
come global problems capable of burning us.
And if we have that sort of limited, reasonable expectation, I
think it is very likely that we will be satisfied in the near future.
And this is where I am kind of a conservative with a lower-case
"c".
I am a historian by training. Most human beings over the course
of history have muddled through in not particularly impressive so-
cieties. I don't think you should ever promise that we are going to
have American-style liberties in Iraq anytime soon. I think that is
just a silly mistake. But I also think if we have some patience and
give it a little bit of time, we might be surprised how positive the
picture looks.
As I mentioned just a minute ago, I am very impressed with
what is happening in some of the Gulf States. Kuwait is not a pure
democracy, it is not a fully free market, but it has got good news-
papers you can read. It is possible to have dissent. It is a multicul-
tural country with lots and lots of people on the streets. Women are
beginning to get involved in the process.
Qatar and other Gulf States are again moving much more rap-
idly than I expected five years ago, ten years ago, toward being the
kinds of places that we can live very easily with.
That is what we have to expect. Can we just live with these folks
and have basic stability?
Dr. O'Hanlon. Just a quick word on that question. We have to
stay in Iraq until at least the second election. This is a concept that
I have learned about from people like Dr. Ottaway. But that is cru-
cial. They have to get to that transition and see that it really works
and that it takes hold. So I am thinking three, four, five years at
a minimum, and quite possibly as long as we have been in Bosnia.
Dr. O'Hanlon. But that is just a quick comment.
On the issue of troop adequacy, I think even if we do have
enough troops in Iraq today — and, again, I am somewhat skeptical,
but I don't think we need to increase by tens of thousands. But
even if we are at about the right number, the question is, how do
you sustain 130,000 in the short term, 100,000 next summer,
80,000 next fall, 60,000 next winter, and so on, and maybe 2 divi-
sions for 5 more years? I have to think you have to do everything,
because the problem is just too serious.
I think the administration needs to have its feet held to the fire
on this. And just as this committee so admirably kept the readiness
608
issue in the limelight politically in the late 1990's and kept pres-
sure on the Clinton administration to think through readiness
issues, I think this committee and others have to put pressure on
the Bush administration, because right now, in my opinion, they do
not have a policy that will sustain the quality of the active duty
Army. They are at risk of breaking it.
They are far too patient about dealing with the problem. They
think that some privatizations can provide more troops; they think
that troop requirements in Iraq will drop off very quickly. They
just are Pollyanna-ish about this subject, and I think they need to
be held accountable.
I think this committee, for example, can underscore what the
troop rotation policies are going to have to be if we keep to the kind
of troop schedule that I outlined and how you are going to have to
send the 3rd ID back by early 2005 or maybe send the 4th ID back
by mid-2005, and they are not even home yet. And I think this
committee can put that kind of pressure on the administration and
say, what is your plan to prevent that? You know, how do you get
more Marines involved, how do you get more foreign troops in-
volved, and how do you consider increasing the size of the Active
and Reserve military? I just don't see the administration taking
this problem seriously enough yet.
Mr. McHuGH. I am going to have to — you are a minute and a
half over, with a vote coming up here and several members who
have not yet had the opportunity to ask, including your Ranking
Member. So I apologize.
And, Doctor, that is not meant as any disrespect toward you, but
rather one of necessity. And certainly I would encourage you to
convey your thoughts in another manner. And I appreciate your
understanding.
With that, I would yield to the Ranking Member, the gentleman
from Missouri.
Mr. Skelton. I will just ask one question. And you hit upon the
subject that has concerned me for a number of weeks. You said
that the administration is at risk of breaking the Army. That really
disturbs me. If you had a magic wand, how would you fix this prob-
lem?
Dr. O'Hanlon. I would try to do three things. Congressman Skel-
ton. And I admit, none of them are going to be complete solutions;
I am not even sure all three together would be.
I would definitely try to get the Marines heavily involved in Iraq
proportionate to the size of their end strength, even at the price of
curtailing their Okinawa deployment, in particular. I would try
right now to increase Active Duty and Reserve component end
strength. I think Mr. Rumsfeld wants to push the Defense Trans-
formation Act. He wants to delay this debate until next year. But
you know as well as I, it takes a couple of years to recruit, train,
and form up
Mr. Skelton. Let me interrupt you right there. There are sev-
eral of us here, including the gentleman in the chair, who have
been advocating this very same thing, and we have met with a
great deal of resistance there.
What about number three?
Dr. O'Hanlon. What about? I am sorry, the last question?
609
Mr. Skelton. You gave three, and only said two.
Dr. O'Hanlon. And the third issue, I really believe we should
put the U.N. in formal political control of Iraq, as long as we can
have an American or a Brit as the U.N. Special Representative in
Iraq — sort of the Bosnia model or the East Timor model. And I
think we can retain enough primary influence even under those
auspices that it is worth the trade-off.
Mr. Skelton. Well, the trouble is, we are only getting a pit-
tance— getting a lot of countries, but only a pittance from each of
these countries, except maybe Great Britain, willing to help. We
see that the Turks would not be welcome. And we saw — a couple
other countries have — Bangladesh and one other, I forget, which
have said no. So what do you do?
Dr. O'Hanlon. Well, I think that if there were formal U.N. con-
trol over the mission, we would have greater control over that ef-
fort. And I was just in East Asia last week, and the Koreans, as
you know, are interested, but they are wavering.
Mr. Skelton. I think that was the second country, yes.
Dr. O'Hanlon. But in general, I think even the French and the
Germans, if we do what they are asking or some of what they are
asking, the reasonable part of what they are asking, and then they
still refuse troops, I think we can really say, listen, this is a test
of the alliance, and we have gone out of our way to try to accommo-
date your concerns; now it is time to help us, because our Army
is at risk and Iraq stability is important to you.
I think that argument will work with at least some of our Euro-
pean allies, maybe with the Indians, maybe with the South Kore-
ans. I think we will get a few more thousand troops and maybe
even a couple tens of thousands more if we go that route.
Mr. Skelton. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. McHUGH. I thank the gentleman.
I am now yielding to myself, because I am the only person who
has not yet spoken. So I want to yield to Dr. Ottaway to respond
to Mr. Larson's question, if you still recall it.
Dr. Ottaway. Thank you very much.
The issue was of the elections and what we can achieve essen-
tially. I think it is important not to confuse elections and democ-
racy. I think we can have elections, I think we can have — given
sufficient time. I am not sure we can do that nine months from
now. But given sufficient time, I think we can have technical and
credible elections, because assistance goes a long way in setting up
the — creating the conditions for those elections to be credible.
Once we have an elected government, we are still very far from
having a democracy. And that is a matter of — you know, of many
years if you are optimistic. I mean, people who work on these
issues of democratic transitions will tell you that the consolidation
of a democracy takes many, many years, and there is no guarantee
that it will succeed. But elections are definite.
Mr. McHuGH. I thank the gentlelady.
We are scheduled to have a vote here momentarily. I suspect,
given that we have had the opportunity for those members who are
smart enough to show up and fortunate enough to hear your re-
sponses, it probably creates a good artificial deadline.
610
We want to thank you, all three of you, both for spending a con-
siderable amount of time with us here this morning, but also for
the work that you did and the responses that you gave.
Some of the members have been gracious enough to mention my
name. I have been to Iraq twice now in the past, I believe, seven
weeks. And my friend from Colorado said in his comments he
comes to learn. I came, pleased to find out I had learned so much,
because much of what you said I found to be absolutely on point
with respect to my visit. So I want to thank you for your insights.
I don't have enough time for a question, but maybe if you would
be so gracious, I could forward on a question or two that came up
during your comments.
Mr. McHuGH. But with great appreciation for your being here
today and for your positive engagement, we will adjourn the com-
mittee. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
APPENDIX
October 29, 2003
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
October 29, 2003
OPENING REMARKS OF CHAIRMAN HUNTER
Iraq Reconstruction and Stability Operations:
The Way Forward
October 29, 2003
The committee will come to order.
This is the 8th full committee hearing since the war started at
which we will review the conduct and implications of Operation
Iraqi Freedom. It will not be the last, as there are several aspects
of the war and ongoing operations that will continue to interest us.
Today, we are fortunate to hear several different perspectives
assessing the situation on the ground and the best way of moving
forward.
We are fortunate to have as our witnesses today:
Karl Zinsmeister
American Enterprise Institute
Michael O'Hanlon
Brookings Institution
Marina Ottaway
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
(615)
616
Each of our witnesses brings a unique perspective to the task
of stabiHzing and reconstructing Iraq. And clearly, there is a vast
range of different opinions about what our next steps in Iraq should
be. They aren't necessarily ideologically consistent. Some
analysts— from both the left and right— argue that we should
accelerate the transfer of sovereignty to the Iraqi people. Others,
from both ends of the ideological spectrum, want to delay that
transfer until we're confident that the Iraqi people are prepared for
representative government. In truth, you can pick almost any issue
associated with reconstruction and stability operations in Iraq and
find two, or three, or four, or five, or perhaps a dozen extremely
well-informed, intelligent, and experienced people who will
disagree on it.
Nevertheless, at the end of the day, the Administration and
this Congress have to make decisions amid conflicting
interpretations of what's happening on the ground and opposing
recommendations about the way forward. In that kind of
environment, our best course is to set priorities and adjust to
2
617
continual changes in the situation while learning from past
experience.
The Administration is working towards that end and
constantly reassessing the right course of action in Iraq. This
means that some policies which were appropriate yesterday may
not be the right answer tomorrow. Anyone looking for events to
unfold in Iraq exactly according to some pre-conceived master
plan is going to be disappointed. That's not how government — or
warfare against a terrorist enemy— works, as most of us in
Congress will be quick to admit. We should all keep that in mind
as we offer our suggestions about the future course of action in
Iraq.
We are fortunate to have before us three very thoughtful
witnesses who bring a range of perspectives to the problem of
reconstruction in Iraq. I want to thank you for your appearances
before the Committee this morning.
Let me now recognize the committee's ranking Democrat,
Mr. Skelton, for any remarks he may wish to make.
3
618
[Following Mr. Skelton's remarks]
The entirety of our witnesses' prepared statements will be
entered into the record.
Mr. Zinsmeister, the floor is yours.
619
Opening Statement for The Honorable Ike Skelton (D-MO),
Ranking Member, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of
Representatives
Full Committee Hearing on Iraq Reconstruction and Stability
Operations: The Way Ahead
October 29, 2003
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to join you in
welcoming all of our witnesses here today.
Mr. Chairman, we again find ourselves in this hearing room
discussing the critical question of Iraq's future. And the lynchpin of
that future remains security. The series of deadly attacks of the last
week brought the violence to a new level, in terms of the numbers
killed and injured and in the level of coordination. Over the
weekend, I received word that another young soldier from my
district was killed by an improvised explosive device in Iraq.
Certainly, we would expect losses in any stability operation,
but if we consider the way that this operation was undertaken, many
of these losses were preventable. The administration was warned
and they did not heed the warnings they received. I myself sent two
620
letters to the President before the war began warning of the failures
of insufficiently planning in advance for the aftermath.
The Institute for National Strategic Studies at National Defense
University held a workshop back in November 2002 where they
basically wargamed post-Saddam Iraq. Their number one finding
was the following: ''Given the potential for internal disorder and
conflict, the primary post-intervention focus of U.S. military
operations must be on establishing and maintaining a secure
environment in which all other post-intervention activities can
operate." They understood that security was the primary
requirement and recommended a broad multinational force because
they knew it would take many troops on the ground to achieve this.
Our own military commanders recognized this too. General
Shinseki told Congress it could take 200,000 troops to stabilize Iraq
and he has been proved right. General Zinnias warplans when he
was Commander of Central Command differed from General
Franks* not in the number of combat troops to win the war, but in
621
the two additional divisions of troops he believed it would take to
secure the peace.
We had ail these warnings and all this advice about how to do
it right. And things are going badly. We have to do it right now or
go home and going home is NOT an option. There is too much at
stake.
We have to win this. We have to win this or all these kids who
have been killed will have died for nothing. We have to win this or
American security will be jeopardized at home and the Iraqi people
will not regain security for their nation. We have to win this or
American leadership will be damaged throughout the Middle East
and throughout the world.
We CAN win this but we have to heed some lessons and
quickly. I hope the witnesses will share their thoughts with us. But
I was struck by the article by Tom Donnelly and Gary Schmitt in
this Sunday's Washington Post that reminds us that the United
States knows how to fight wars like Iraq. We even have a how-to
guide in the Marine Corps' Small Wars' Manual from 1940.
622
I think we need to refocus and redouble our efforts —
recognizing the counter-insurgency type battle in which we find
ourselves. The worst thing that we could do is what I fear that
some in the administration may be considering — quickly
withdrawing U.S. forces. We must have a well-thought out strategy
that recognizes the type of battle in which we find ourselves. We
must focus on intelligence. We must put more troops on the ground
if that is what It takes to sweep through problem areas and we
should use the right types of dismounted infantry troops that can
best accomplish the mission.
We have put American lives, money, and credibility, as well as
the future of the Iraqi people, on the line here. The stakes couldn't
be higher. We have to do this right and we have to do so quickly. I
hope the witnesses will share their thoughts with us about how we
do that. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
623
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
Iraq Reconstruction and Stability Operations:
The Way Forward
Wednesday, October 29
10:00 a.m.
2118Rayburn
"Encouraging Developments Among
Iraq's Rising Majority"
testimony of
Karl Zinsmeister
J. B. Fuqua Fellow
American Enterprise Institute
624
Thank you Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee.
Let me open by stating that the remarks I have for you this morning are built on several bodies of evidence.
I am the J.B. Fuqua Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. I was an embedded reporter during the hot
war in Iraq, and have written the first book about the war from an embed, entitled Boots on the Ground: A
Month with the 82nd Airborne in the Battle for Iraq. I remain in close touch with U.S. soldiers and civilians
in Iraq who are temporarily the princes of that land as well as its military guardians. I commissioned and
wrote the first scientific poll of ordinary Iraqis, which the magazine I edit carried out during the month of
August in concert with Zogby International.
And I want to talk to you today about ordinary Iraqis.
Every politician is acutely aware of the silent majority syndrome. The many skilled elected officials in this
room know that mass opinion cannot be accurately judged by listening to squeaky wheels alone. One must
look beneath the surface, behind the headlines, at the more glacial forces that underlay the roil of daily
events.
Those deeper facts are what I am tracking most closely as I observe developments in Iraq. And today I
would like to offer my judgment that there is much to be encouraged about in the recent evolution of Iraqi
views — particularly the views of the rising Shiite majority.
THE DECEPTIVENESS OF ANECDOTAL TEMPERATURE-TAKINGS
There hasn't been a proper census in Iraq for decades, but according to the best estimates from the CIA, 60-
65 percent of all Iraqis are Shiites. Under Saddam Hussein they were horribly treated and politically
marginalized, but under a democratic process the Shia are essentially going to run Iraq. (Very likely in
collaboration with the Kurds, who comprise 20-25 percent of the population and are overtly pro- American.)
The portrayal of the Shiites in the U.S. media has not been very positive. I'll give you a concrete example:
Just days after I returned from Iraq this spring, the historic million-person Shiite pilgrimraage to Karbala
and Najaf — long suppressed by Saddam Hussein — took place. The imagery of this event presented in U.S.
reporting was pretty scary; Many of you will remember the much-repeated photographs and video of a
number of pilgrims cutting themselves with swords as they walked the route, making a bloody mess. The
strong impression of the news coverage was that the Shiites were both religious extremists and unfriendly
to American ideals and interests.
625
I had spent most of my time in Iraq among the Shia, and in my experience neither of those negative
charactenzations were accurate. The Shiites I observed were generally thrilled to be free of Saddam
Hussein's yoke, and appreciative of the Americans who had made that happen.
It so happens that the security for this Shiite pilgrimraage was provided by troopers from the 82nd Airborne
whom I know well. Their camp had been right beside the road that the pilgrims trod. So 1 called up one of
the officers on the scene— a smart, frank captain and helicopter pilot named Robm Brown — and asked,
"Robin, we're getting all this reporting on fanatical, restive, anti-American Shiites. Did something change
dramatically in the few days after I left, or what's going on?"
Somewhat stunned, she reported that the pilgrimmage not only came off without conflict, but had actually
turned out to be one of the humanitarian highlights of her lime in Iraq. "For three solid days there was this
constant river of people." she told me, "and they were singing, honking horns, celebrating. We would
watch over the low wall separating our compound firom the road, and people would wave to us, laugh, and
smile. It was an amazingly festive, peaceftil, joyful experience."
HARD EVIDENCE OF IRAQI MODERATION
This reinforced my concern that the anecdotal temperature-takuigs that most Americans were relying on for
their assessments of Iraq might be incomplete and misleading. It was in search of more reliable hard
information on the true state of Iraqi opinion that the magazine I edit carried out survey research in four
different Iraqi cities this summer. It was not easy, but the data are extremely instructive. (Results can be
found in graphical form, with extensive commentary, in the December 2003 issue of The American
Enterprise magazine, or as full tabulations at www.TAEmag.com/issues/articleID.17694/article_detail.asp.)
I'd like to point out thai there have now been four substantial polls conducted in Iraq. In addition to our
own The American Enterprise/Zoghy poll there was one by Gallup in September, one by the well-
established British firm YouGOV, and one by an Iraqi academic. Though these efforts varied widely in
methodology and geographical coverage, their results arc reassuringly congruent. In all of them, the Iraqi
public turns out to be surprisingly optimistic, unambiguously glad to be free of Saddam, and quite willing
to have U.S. troops stay in their country for a year or more to help them get launched on a new footing.
An overwhelming two thirds of Iraqis say getting rid of Saddam has been worth any hardships that have
resulted. Fully 61 percent have a favorable view of the Governing Council, and by 50 to 14 percent they
say it is doing a better job than it was two months ago. An informal New York Times street poll of Baghdad
residents taken last week "showed that about 85 percent felt that safety had increased in the last two
months, and 60 percent felt that the Americans were doing a good job." In other words; We are doing a
much better of winning Iraqi hearts and minds than many of us realize.
626
My publication's survey research reveals that the Iraqi public is not nearly so fanatical, seething, or
disgusted with the United States as local extremists would have us believe. Not only is the population more
sensible, stable, and moderate than commonly portrayed, but none of the three common nightmare
scenarios for Iraq seem very likely to come to fruition.
First of all, there will be no Baathist revival. Saddam and his cronies are enormously unpopular in the
country. Asked by The American Enterprise whether Baath Party officials who committed cnmes should be
punished or whether it would be better to put the past behind us, Iraqis opmed vehemently (74 percent to 18
percent) that the Baathists should be punished.
Second, al-Qaeda-style organizations have little natural base in Iraq. For instance, it's not widely
understood by Americans that al-Jazeera, the Arab TV network that often serves as a mouthpiece for al-
Qaeda leaders, is not popular with Iraqis (who resent its apologism for Saddam's regime). In our poll,
Osama bin Laden is viewed unfavorably by 57 percent of Iraqis, with fiiUy 41 percent of those respondents
saying their view is VERY unfavorable. As foreign jihadists murder increasing numbers of Iraqi civilians,
Iraqi police, and Iraqi popular figures like AyatoUah Hakim, I expect resentment toward a!-Qaeda-styIe
groups will grow even wider in the months ahead.
Third, an Iranian-style theocracy is not likely to take hold in Iraq. Iraqis are quite secular — 43 percent told
us they had not attended Friday prayer even once within the previous month. And when we asked directly
whether they would like to have an Islamic government, Iraqis told us "no" by 60 percent to 33 percent.
Interestingly, on all of these questions Shiites fell on the more moderate side. For instance, they arc much
less likely than other Iraqis to want a theocratic government, are more favorable toward democracy, are
more likely to pick the U.S. as the best model for a government, and they are much more unfavorable
toward Osama bin Laden.
RECENT INDICATIONS OF SHIITE MODERATION
I've been encouraged by recent signs of maturity and moderation among both the leadership and the rank-
and-file of Iraqi Shiites. The first big test came after the murder (by al-Qaeda operatives, according to the
Iraqi police) of Ayatollah Baki Hakim and scores of innocent bystanders as they exited one of Islam's
holiest mosques in Najaf More than 300,000 mourners attended the fimeral, which could easily have
turned into a rampage against other Iraqis or American troops. Instead, the Shiite faithful showed a
willingness to patiently await the official investigation into the crime.
627
More recently, American forces and Iraqi police clamped down on Moktada Sadr, a radical Shiite calling
for active resistance against Iraq's existing authorities. Sadr's militiamen had killed Iraqi policemen and
American soldiers and forcibly seized government and religious buildings. Coalition forces moved gingerly
against him because of uncertainty as to his popular following. As it turns out, last week's disarming and
arrest of Sadr acolytes was cheered loudly by other Shines, who openly repudiated Sadr's radicalism. And
the street demonstrations and popular revolt the cleric threatened in response fizzled completely.
The very latest bit of evidence of Shiite forbearance and determination to help remake Iraq was the
composed reaction of Mouwafak Rabii, a Shiite member of the Iraqi Governing Council, to the bombing of
the Red Cross headquarters in Baghdad. He urged the United Stales to employ fiercer measures to crush the
Sunni Triangle insurgency, and to speed up American training of Iraqi police and soldiers. "There is no
doubt about it that we need to change the rules of engagement [which] now are too lenient," he said, urging
that U.S. soldiers be unleashed for more ruthless action against the insurgents.
THE MANAGEABLE REALITY OF A WAR AGAINST GUERILLA TERRORISTS
The relatively small number of extremists conducting murder and sabotage in the Sunni Triangle have no
chance of winning militarily. Much more than outsiders realize, Iraq's economy and society are beginning
to hum. Markets are full, traffic clogs streets, almost all services already exceed their pre-war level, 170
newspapers are being published, schools are well-attended, oil production is approaching 2 million barrels
a day, the local democracy councils are functioning surprisingly well and are proving popular. The
pouncing raids launched m recent months by American soldiers have hurt the guerillas (the bounty paid to
induce attacks on U.S. soldiers has reportedly had to be raised from $ 1 ,000 to S5,000 to find takers).
And there are now 25,000 soldiers from other countries, plus a healthy 60,000 Iraqi security personnel
helping American troops police the country, with many more Iraqi police and soldiers in the pipeline. Even
today, just months into a new regime, it is already Iraqis who are bearing most of the casualties involved in
guarding and stabilizing the country. That will increasingly put the attackers on the wrong side of Iraqi
opinion.
The insurgents' only accomplishment is to create chaos. They are strictly a negative force, who can only
hope to slow Iraq's steady climb toward recovery. Finding that they usually die when they fight American
soldiers, they have taken to preying mostly on weak and innocent targets like Red Cross buildings,
mosques, and humanitarian agencies. This is a desperate and retrograde military strategy that will win them
no friends.
628
My reading of Iraqi events and Iraqi temperament is that the insurgents also have little chance of winning
by non-military means. There is no evidence that they represent a popular movement, or that they enjoy any
widespread support. They have no platform, no winning message, no identifiable leaders.
They are, instead, simply well armed and comparatively wealthy fringe fanatics. Many of ihem are foreign.
All of them are leftovers of old Arab power blocs. They are feared by many Iraqis, but not broadly
respected, trusted, or liked.
In short, they are political cnminals. Everyday Iraqis remember 1991, when America disappeared before
the job was done, and many citizens remain wary about acting against political criminals in ways that could
put their own lives at risk. But 1 believe that, increasingly, the guerillas will find it hard to swim and hide
among the Iraqi public. They already do find it hard outside the Sunni Triangle.
ON THE SIDE OF THE ANGELS
A psychological contest is under way for Iraqi loyalties. On one side are renmants of an unpopular regime,
reinforced by unpopular foreigners, who merely wreck and kill in ugly ways, especially at religious and
humanitarian sites, fi-equently on holy days, with most of the victims being innocent Iraqis.
On the other side are American forces who have, on the whole, been quite gentle and forbearing. If
anything, everyday Iraqis are now more likely to criticize the Americans for being insufficiently ruthless in
dealing with the insurgents. And any day now, we hope, those American forces will get a multi-billion
dollar infusion of funds — thanks to the U.S. Congress and some of our overseas allies — which will allow
them to demonstrate even more clearly to the Iraqis who is on the side of progress, modernity, prosperity,
and human decency. That's a pretty good position from which to prosecute a war against minority guerillas.
No guerilla war is easy. We will need to strike hard, and to spend money. Improving our intelligence, and
training more and more Iraqi compatriots who will fight next to us, and increasingly instead of us, should
be high priorities. But there is no Ho Chi Minh trail pumping fresh poison into Iraq, and with each passing
season there will be fewer weapons in the hands of fewer guerillas with less and less money to spend.
Meanwhile new economic and political freedoms will be unfolding across the coimtryside— cell phones
today, open elections tomorrow. These innovations will cumulatively amount to a social, economic, and
political revolution, and make the blood-feuders look more unattractive to normal Iraqis with each passing
day.
THE FLY IN THE OINTMENT
The one factor that could derail Iraq's gradual rise would be American panic. The Baghdad bombers are
not so much trying to influence Iraqis, as to cow the U.S. public and stampede our leaders. If we will be
I
629
long-sighted and steely, we will realize that there is no reason for alarm. The number of our soldiers killed
in combat since U.S. forces swept across Iraq in May is less than the number of pohce officers killed in the
U.S. this year guarding our own streets. All of those men are heroes to their country, but their numbers are
blessedly miniscule compared to almost any earlier war, never mind one of this historical significance.
I can tell you that the view of the American soldiers in Iraq who I know well is that this job needs to be
finished bravely and without waffling. As one soldier in the 82nd Airborne wrote me this very week: "We
are doing great worL We must show the world that we have the stomach for the ugly realities of a
righteous war. I believe with all my heart that this effort is critical to the survival of this region, the position
of the U.S. as a world leader, and the spirit of our fighting forces in the fiiture. The only way we can lose
this war is if we lose our resolve. SPC Babin, who remains hospitalized with brain and internal damage,
SPC Bermanis, who has lost three limbs, or SPC Ross, who lost his eyesight and leg saving a young Iraqi,
would never forgive us for giving anything less than our all from now on."
Iraq is not a cesspool. It is a manageable challenge. The mass of citizens living along the Tigris-Euphrates
valley show clear signs thai they will make sensible use of their new freedom if we will help them by
gradually eliminating the small number of militants conducting murder and sabotage in their midst. We are
making headway in one of the most benighted parts of the globe. If we will only continue, fiiture
generations will marvel at the American men and women who showed the wit and stamina to pull off this
rare feat.
630
ABOUT THE AUTHOR: KARL ZINSMEISTER is Editor-in-Chief of The American Enterprise, a
national magazine of politics, business and culture. His book Boots on the Ground: A Month with the 82nd
Airborne in the Battle for Iraq, based on his experiences as an embedded journalist during the second Iraq
war, has just been published by St. Martin's Press. Zinsmeister is also the J. B. Fuqua Fellow at the
American Enterprise Institute, a major Washington, D.C. research institute. His research and writing have
covered a wide range of topics, ranging from demographics and social and cultural trends to defense,
business, and economics. He has been published in many places including The American Enterprise, The
Atlantic Monthly. Reader's Digest. The Wilson Quarterly, The Public Interest, National Review, and The
Times Literary Supplement, as well as national newspapers like the Wall Street Journal, Chicago Tribune.
Washington Post, and Christian Science Monitor. Zinsmeister is a graduate of Yale University and did
further studies at Trinity College Dublin in Ireland. During college he also won national rowing
championships in both the U.S. and Ireland. He was an assistant to U.S. Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan,
has been an advisor to many research and policy groups, and has testified before Congressional committees
and Presidential commissions numerous times. He originated a weekly radio commentary on social and
economic trends syndicated nationally to 100 stations, and has written newspaper columns for the United
Feature Syndicate. He has appeared often on television and radio programs including CNN's Crossfire,
Hardball with Chris Matthews, ABC's Politically Incorrect, C-SPAN's Washington Journal, PBS's Think
Tank, BBC World Service, and many others. His work has won several national prizes, and his writing has
been published abroad in Japanese, German, Spanish, French, Arabic, Swedish, Polish, Chinese and other
languages. A sixth generation resident of his home region, Zinsmeister lives with his wife and three
children in rural central New York.
APPENDIX 1:
Published in the October 20, 2003 edition of the Christian Science Monitor
PROGRESS EXCEEDS PROGNOSTICATION IN IRAQ
There is basic peace, economic bubbling, and majority Iraqi support for the path the US has cleared
By Karl Zinsmeister
FORT BRAGG, N.C. - This may not be Vietnam, but boy, it sure smells like it," said Sen. Tom Harkin
recently. The Iowa Democrat is but one of a host of critics in Washington politics and the media who claim
that US troops and administrators are "bogged down" in Iraq.
(
631
Having covered the war as an embedded reporter, having conducted the first national poll of the Iraqi
people (in concert with Zogby International), and having remained in close touch with the military men and
women who are temporarily the princes running the land of the Tigris and Euphrates, 1 believe this gloomy
view is incomplete and inaccurate.
Let's start by remembering the traumas that never befell us in Iraq.
Not only was the war itself vastly less bloody and difficult than some predicted, but its aftermath has also
been quieter. We were told by prewar prognosticators to expect a refugee flood, a food crisis, destruction of
the oil fields, and public-health disasters. We were warned that Iraq's multifarious ethnic and religious
groups would be at one another's throats. Environmental catastrophes, chemical poisonings, and dam
breaks were predicted. It was said Turkey might occupy the north, that Israel could strike from the south,
that the Arab "street" was likely to resist.
None of these things happened. Nor have other predicted troubles materialized. When 300,000 mourners
gathered for the funeral of assassinated Shiite spiritual leader Bakr al Hakim, they didn't rampage, or call
for vengeance against Sunnis, or lash out against the US authorities. They and their leaders showed the
political maturity to let the official investigation into the leader's murder proceed.
Whatever the setbacks, we must remember that much of this war has been a case of the dog that didn't bark.
That is not to whitewash the fact that painful low-intensity conflict is still smoldering, producing casualties
equivalent to the hot-war phase.
The man I photographed in combat for the cover of my new book about the Iraq vrar, an 82nd Airborne
Ranger named Sean Shields, has been bombed in his Humvee twice in a month. Localized resistance in the
Sunni triangle is real. But Sean isn't discouraged: He believes he's doing historic work to stabilize one of
the most dangerous spots on our planet. He and other soldiers I hear from believe they're making great
progress in setting Iraq on the path of a more normal, decent nation.
Here are some signs they're right:
• Stores are bustling, traffic is busy, and most services have now exceeded their prewar levels. A new
currency went into circulation last week.
632
• Large cities, home to millions - like Basra, Mosul, and Kirkuk - and vast swaths of countryside in the
north and south, are stable, basically peaceful, beginning to bubble economically, and grateful to coalition
forces who've set them on a new path.
• More than 170 newspapers are being published in Iraq, and broadcast media proliferate.
• The Iraqi Governing Council has been well received by the country's many factions and ethno-religious
groups. Sixty-one percent of Iraqis polled by Gallup in September view the council favorably. And by 50 to
14 percent they say it is doing a better, rather than worse, job than it was two months ago.
• For the first time, localities have their own town councils. A working court system has been set up. And a
constitution is being hashed out.
• In addition to the 140,000 US troops providing security, there are about 25,000 soldiers from other
countries, and 60,000 Iraqi police and guards on the job - with many thousands more in the training
pipeline.
• Nearly all schools and universities are open; hundreds have been rehabbed into their best shape in years
by soldiers.
• Iraq's interim economic leaders recently committed the country to a wide-open, investment-friendly
market economy. The prosj>erity and global connectivity this should bring will be the ultimate guarantee of
Iraq's modernity and moderation.
• Oil production has passed 1 million barrelsper day, and is heading toward 2 million,
• Iraqi public opinion is more moderate than suggested by the anecdotal temperature-takings in press
reports. Four entirely different polls have been conducted in Iraq, and their remarkably congruent results
show that the majority of Iraqis are optimistic about their future, and believe ousting Saddam Hussein was
worth any hardships that have resulted.
The four-city survey in August by The American Enterprise, a magazine I edit, suggests that the three
nightmare scenarios for Iraq - a Baathist revival, an Iran-style theocracy, and a swing toward Al Qaeda -
are very unlikely, given current Iraqi views. And contrary to media reports of boiling public resentment, all
of these polls show that two-thirds of Iraqis want US troops to stay for at least another year.
633
• Meanwhile, the pouncing raids that US forces initiated two months ago have hurt the guerrillas. More
than 1 ,000 fighters have been arrested and tnany others killed. The bounr>' paid by ex-Baathists toinduce
attacks on American soldiers has had to be increased from SI, 000 to S5,000 to find takers.
• Most critically, the US is now on offense, rather than defense, in the war on terror. With a shock being
applied to the seedbeds of Middle Eastern violence, the US homeland has been blessedly quiet for two
years.
My friend Christopher Hitchens - who like me, numerous congressmen, and other recent visitors to Iraq
witnessed what he calls "ecstatic displays" toward Americans by grateful Iraqis - characterizes what is
taking place in Iraq today as "a social and political revolution."
That's no overstatement. Maj. Pete Wilhelm, with the 82nd Airborne in Baghdad, recently described how
US forces are nurturing the first shoots of democracy in the Fertile Crescent: "We set up a Neighborhood
Advisory Council representative of each neighborhood, and they voted on a leader who attends the city
advisory council. Early on, the meetings would last four hours, and it would seem as though no progress
was being made. The whole concept of a 'vote' came hard and slow. We have gradually transitioned the
burden of the agenda into the hands of the representatives, renovated the meeting hall with AC, and pushed
the autopilot button. The meetings are down to an hour and a half, and we just keep the ball in play and act
as referees. We are making great strides at grass-roots democracy."
After a recent trip to the country, Mr. Hitchens agrees, saying, "I saw persuasive evidence of the unleashing
of real politics in Iraq, and of the highly positive effect of same."
All of this has been accomplished in less than six months from the fall of Baghdad. Keep in mind that
Germany - a much more advanced nation that already had a democratic tradition - didn't hold elections until
four years after World War II ended. Gen. Douglas MacArthur progressed less rapidly in Japan.
Certainly, there remains an enormous amount to fix in Iraq. But there is something unseemly about the
impatience of today's pundits, their insistence on instant recovery, and what my colleague Michael Barone
calls the media's "zero defect standard."
US soldiers and administrators are turning a tide of history and culture in the Middle East. If Americans
show some patience, they'll gaze upon many heartening transformations in Iraq a few months and years
from now.
634
• Karl Zinsmeisler. editor in chief of The American Enterprise magazine, is the author of the new book.
Boots on the Ground: A Month with the 82nd Airborne in the Battle for Iraq.
APPENDIX 2:
Published in the Wall Street Journal, Wednesday September 10, 2003.
WHAT IRAQIS REALLY THINK
By Karl Zinsmeister
Since we became responsible for setting a new course in Iraq after removing Saddam Hussein in April
(and, actually, even before then), America has been hobbled in setting its policies toward Iraq by not
knowing much about what everyday Iraqis really think. Are they on the side of the radical Islamists? What
kind of government would they like for themselves? What is their attitude toward the U.S.? Do the Shiites
hate us or love us? Could Iraq become another Iran under the ayatoUahs? Are the people in the Sunni
triangle the real problem?
Up to now we've only been able to guess. We've relied on anecdotal temperature-takings of the Iraqi
public, and have particularly been at the mercy of images presented to us by the press. We all know that
journalists have a bad news bias (10,000 schools being rehabbed is not news, one school blowing up is a
weeklong feeding frenzy). And some of us who have spent time recently in Iraq (I was an embedded
reporter during the war this spring) have been puzzled by the post-war news since then. The imagery being
transmitted by the media this summer was gloomier than our own experiences in country seemed to merit,
and more negative than what many individuals involved in reconstructing the nation have been showing
and telling us since.
Well, finally we have some evidence as to where the truth may lie.
Working with Zogby International survey researchers. The American Enterprise magazine, which I edit,
has just conducted the first scientific poll of the Iraqi public Given the state of the country, this was not
easy. Security problems delayed our intrepid fieldworkers several times. We labored at careful translations,
regional samplings, and survey methods to make sure our results would accurately reflect the views of
Iraq's multifarious, long-suffering people. We consulted with Eastern European pollsters about the best
methods for eliciting honest answers from people long conditioned to repressing their true sentiments.
635
Conducted in August, our survey was necessarily limited in scope, but it reflects a nationally representative
sample of Iraqi views, as captured in four disparate cities; Basra (Iraq's second largest, home to 1 .7 million
people, in the far south), Mosel (third largest, far north), Kirkuk (Kurdish-influenced oil city, fourth
largest), and Ramadi (a resistance hotbed in the Surini triangle). The results show that the Iraq public is
more sensible, stable, and moderate than commonly portrayed, that the country is not so fanatical, seething,
or disgusted with the United States after all.
* Iraqis are optimistic. Seven out often say they expect both their country and their personal lives will be
better five years from now. On both fronts, 32 percent say things will become MUCH better.
* The toughest part of reconstructing their nation, Iraqis say by three to one, will be politics, not
economics. They are nervous about democracy. Asked which is closer to their own view: "Democracy can
work well in Iraq," or "Democracy is a Western way of doing things," five out often said democracy is
Western and won't work in Iraq. One out often weren't sure. And four out often said democracy can work
in Iraq.
There were interesting divergences. Sunnis were negative on democracy by more than 2;1, but, critically,
the majority Shiites were as likely to say democracy would work for Iraqis as not People age 18-29 are
much more rosy about democracy than other Iraqis, and women are significantly more positive than men.
* Asked to name one country they would most like Iraq to model its new government on, after being
offered five possibilities — neighbor and fellow Baathist republic Syria, neighbor and Islamic monarchy
Saudi Arabia, neighbor and Islamist republic Iran, Arab lodestar Egypt, or the U.S. — the most popular
model by far was the U.S. The U.S. was preferred as a model by 37 percent of Iraqis selecting from those
five — more than neighboring Syria plus neighboring Iran plus Egypt, all put together. Saudi Arabia was in
second place at 28 percent.
Again, there were important demographic splits. Younger adults are especially favorable toward the U.S.,
and Shiites are more admiring than Sunnis. Interestingly, Iraqi Shiites, who are co-religionists with
Iranians, do not admire Iran's Islamist govenmient; the U.S. is six times more popular with them as a
model for governance.
* Our mterviewers inquired whether Iraq should have an Islamic government, or instead let all people
practice their own religion. Only 33 percent want an Islamic government, a solid 60 percent say no. A vital
detail: Shiites (whom Western reporters frequently portray as self-flagellating ayatollah-maniacs-in-
waiting) are least receptive to the idea of an Islamic government, saying "No" by 66 to 27 percent. It is
636
only among the minority Sunnis that there is interest in a religious state (they are split evenly on the
question).
* Perhaps the strongest indication that an Islamic government won't be part of Iraq's future: The nation is
thoroughly secularized. We asked how often our respondents had attended the Friday prayer over the
previous month. Fully 43 percent said "Never." It's time to scratch Khomeini II from the Iraq critics' list of
morbid fears.
* You can also cross out Osama 11. Fifty-seven percent of Iraqis with an opinion have an unfavorable view
of Osama bin Laden- — with 41 percent of them saying it is a VERY unfavorable view. (Women are
especially down on him.) Except in the Surmi triangle (where the limited support that exists for bin Laden
is heavily concentrated), negative views of the al-Qaeda boss are actually quite lopsided in all parts of the
country. And those opinions were coDected before Iraqi police announced it was al-Qaeda members who
killed scores of worshippers with a truck bomb in Najaf There will be no safehouses for bin Laden in Iraq
in the future.
* And, finally, you can write off the possibility of a Baath revival. We asked "Should Baath Party leaders
who committed crimes in the past be punished, or should past actions be put behind us?" A thoroughly
disgusted and unforgiving Iraqi public stated by 74% to 18% that Saddam's henchmen should be punished.
* » »
This new evidence on Iraqi opinion suggests the country is manageable. If the small number of militants
conducting sabotage and murder inside the country can gradually be dispatched to paradise by American
troopers (this is happening as steady progress is made in stage two of the Iraq war), then the mass of
citizens living along the Tigris-Euphrates Valley are likely to make reasonably sensible use of their new
freedom. "We will not forget it was the U.S. soldiers who liberated us ft-om Saddam," said Abid Ali, an
auto repair shop owner in Sadr City last month.
None of this is to suggest that the task ahead for America will be simple. Inchoate anxiety toward the U.S.
showed up when we asked Iraqis whether they thought the U.S. would help or hurt Iraq over a five-year
period. By 50% to 36% they chose hurt over help.
This is fairly understandable; Iraqis have just lived through a war where Americans were (necessarily)
flinging most of the ammunition. These experiences may explain why Iraqi women (who are more anti-
military in all cultures) show up in our data as especially wary of the U.S. right now. War is never pleasant,
though U.S. forces made heroic efforts to spare innocents in this one — as I illustrate with vivid first-hand
examples in my just-published book about the battles.
637
Evidence of the comparative gentleness of this war can be seen in our poll. Less than 30 percent of our
sample of Iraqis knew or heard of anyone killed in the spring fighting. Meanwhile, fully HALF knew some
family member, neighbor, or friend who had been killed by Iraqi security forces during the years Saddam
held p>ower.
Perhaps the ultimate indication of how comfortable Iraqis are with America's aims in their region came
when we asked how long they would like to see American and Bntish forces remain in their country: Six
months? One year? Two years or more? Two thirds of those with an opinion urged that the coalition troops
should stick around for at least another year or more.
We're making headway in a benighted part of the world, America. Hang in there.
Karl Zinsmeister is editor in chief of The American Enterprise, and author o/Boots on the Ground: A
Month with the 82nd Airborne in the Battle for Iraq (St. Martin s Press), the first book published by one of
the war 's embedded Journalists.
APPENDIX 3:
[please append here the four page PDF — a graphical presentation of the The American Enterprise/Zogfti^
poll results—transmitted with this text file]
638
The First Scientific Pell cf
commissioned and written by The American Enterprise
conducted August 3-19, 2003 by Zogby International in four cities in Iraq
for (nore detalleO results and ctoss-taDulotlons go to wwwJAtmag.com/lssues/artlclelD. 1 7694/ai1lcle_detall-asp
WHAT WILL BE HARDER:
rebuilding Iraq economically or politically?
'oriticaBy
iconomically
DEMOCRACY DEMOCRACY is a Western way of
can work well in Iraq doing things and will not work here
26 The American Entehpiuse
639
Current Iraqi Public Opir^ion
IRAQ SHOULD MODEL ITS NEW GOVERNMENT ON:
USA Saudi Arabia Syria Egypt
Note; 37 percent o( respondents said Not sure. None, or Other The raw percentages tot ttie five courUnes named
were; U.S. 23%. Saudi Arabia 17%. Syria 12%. Egypt 7%. Iran 3.
SHOULD IRAQ HAVE AN ISLAMIC GOVERNMENT?
Isiamc govemmenl
Not sure
Let eveiyane pS^oebwn religion
The American E>m]u>ius£ 27
640
SHOULD BAATH PARTY LEADERS WHO
COMMtTTED CRIMES BE PUNISHED?
Or should past actions be put behind us?
No Not sure
No Not sure
28 The Amerjcam Enti3u»tus£
641
SHOULD U.S. AND BRITAIN SET UP GOVERNMENT
or leave this to Iraqis to work out?
U.S. and Britain set up
WILL THEY HELP OR HURT IRAQ
OVER THE NEXT FIVE YEARS?
Note: Other = No influence or Not sure
The AMEJticAN Enttrpiuie 29
642
Statement
Congressman Jeff Miller, R-FL
Full Committee Hearing on Iraq reconstruction and stability operations:
The Way Forward
October 29, 2003
Mr. Chairman. The way forward is vitally important to ascertain. Everyday our
newspapers, morning radio programs and nightly news detail recent bloodshed in Iraq
and rightfully so, our constituents react.
The House and Senate are currently hammering out the differences in a multi-billion
dollar supplemental to further sustain our forces and to continue our operations of putting
Iraq on a path to democracy.
The deaths, and the money, are lumped together as a failed operation in Iraq. Having
been to Iraq, I think failure is the last word I would use to describe an amazing
transformation of what was once un-transformable and a testament to American
endurance.
We speak of the collation authority, and it is a collation, but Mr. Chairman, you, the
American people and 1 know who is baring the brunt of this burden, the United States.
And to hold a hearing on where we go from here, to put comfort in the hearts of mothers,
fathers, and spouses that their service members will return unharmed is our undisputed
duty.
The purpose of a representative government, one we hope to establish in Iraq, is to
represent our constituents. My district is the home of Eglin Air Force Base and Hurlburt
Field. My district has hundreds of National Guard members in theatre. My state of
Florida has thousands. These are my constituents and the questions they ask daily are
when are they coming home, are they safe, and are we doing the right thing. They further
ask, what is the plan? How are we going to stop these attacks and stabilize the theatre?
We know we are fighting the good fight in Iraq. With every school we open and every
drop of water we provide, the life in Iraq is improved exponentially. However, as we
have said before, writing this history is much tougher than reading about it and our
society has little patience for a muhi-volume event.
I think this hearing is an excellent way for us to examine the operation from the outside
looking in. If we take none of the suggestions given or agree with every word that is
said, we are certain to have a better understanding of the feat we face.
643
A RELATIVELY PROMISING COUNTERMSURGENCY WAR:
Assessing Progress in Iraq
Michael O'Hanlon, Brookings Institution, mobanlon@broobnEs edu. 10/27/03'
SUMMARY
Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, Other Members of the Committee, it is an honor to appear
today to discuss the most momentous — and, increasingly, the most politically contentious — U.S.
military operation since Vietnam. We are clearly still at war m Iraq, and the Bush administration
deserves criticism for its words and actions that suggested otherwise — Mr. Bush's May 1
tnumphant landing on the aircraft carrier, Vice President Cheney's rosy pre-war language about
Iraqis greeting GIs with bouquets and dancing. Secretary Rumsfeld's predictions that only a
small postwar occupation force would be needed. Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz's predictions that
Iraqi oil would quickly be able to finance most of the country's reconstruction. That said, in my
judgment the adimnistration is basically correct that the overall effort in Iraq is succeeding. By
the standards of counterinsurgency warfare, most factors, though admittedly not all, appear to be
working to our advantage. While one would be mistaken to assume rapid or easy victory, Mr.
Rumsfeld's leaked memo last week probably had it about right when he described the war as a
"long, hard slog" that we are nonetheless quite likely to win.
From my personal perspective, one way of assessing the overall success of the campaign in Iraq
is to compare it to what I predi. ted in an article in the journal Orbis last winter before the
conflict began. In that essay, using various tools of mihtary modeling and combat simulation, I
estimated that total U.S. losses could plausibly range from 100 to 5,000. At present, our losses
are less than 350; even if we tragically continue to lose soldiers at the rate of the last six months
for another one to two years, we will remain on the lower end of that range. By the standards of
warfare, that would still be a rather good outcome, assuming of course that we are able to
achieve our fundamental goal of a stable and non-aggressive Iraq in the end.
TEXT
How can we tell if we are making progress in Iraq or not? If you already know what answer you
want, it is easy to find someone to provide it — a prominent Democrat if you oppose the war and
President Bush, a Bush administration official if you prefer good news and the ruling party Ime.
And in fact, you are likely to hear accurate data, but alas highly selective and incomplete data,
from both factions in the debate. The character of the public discussion reaffirms the old adage
about how easy it is to lie with statistics as much as it casts light on what is really happening in
Iraq. How do we move beyond the war of the competing factoids to assess progress? This is
important not only for knowing how well the Iraq mission has gone to date, but even more
importantly for monitoring progress — and adjusting policy where necessary, as well as having
the verve to sustain it in the face of inevitable difficulties — in the crucial months ahead.
' This testimony draws significantly on the work done by Adriana Albuquerque of Brookings. We will update many
of the facts and figures provided here at www.brookines.edu in coining weeks and months.
644
This essay, while only a prebminary and incomplete analysis, attempts to do two things. First, it
briefly reviews the commonly cited data in the Iraq debate to underscore just how much both
sides have it right — since they both cite real and probably reasonably accurate data — to establish
the plausibility of their argument that thmgs are going either well or badly. Second, it then
provides a broader set of data, and not just snapshots of the present but trends over time, to
suggest a means of monitoring future progress. Finally, in conclusion it suggests a general
analytical framework for assessing progress in guerrilla operations that can be applied to Iraq.
To be sure, using quantifiable data to measure progress in a counterinsurgency campaign has its
limitations, and they are stark ones. The Vietnam experience should remind us that assessing
progress in any counterinsurgency through use of statistical measures is dangerous — the data can
be incomplete, wrong, or simply unrepresentative of actual progress m the broader political
struggle that any counterinsurgency operation must include. Body counts and estimates of
"crossover points" at which one is killing the enemy faster than it can regenerate its ranks are
particularly problematic.^ But by estabhshmg as broad a portfolio of data as possible,
scrutinizing it for accuracy, and remembering caveats about how it should be interpreted, one can
still do better with data than without it.
THE WAR OF THE FACTOIDS
Is the counterinsurgency and nation building mission in Iraq going well or badly? There is
substantial evidence on both sides of this question. Th it fact, plus the high political stakes in
play as a presidential campaign approaches, as well as past controversy about whether we should
go to war in the first place, explain why there is such discord in the national debate.
Clearly the Iraq mission today is encountering difficulties. Four terribly tragic bombings
dominated the August news, killing the U.N.'s top administrator in Iraq and one of the country's
most important moderate political leaders. A Governing Council member, Akila al-Hashimi,
was assassinated in September. Rocket and truck bomb attacks the past few days in Baghdad
have killed Amencans, come uncomfortably close to harming a top Amencan official visiting
Iraq at the time, and displayed a capabiUty for coordinate action that had not been frequently
witnessed before.
In addition, oil outflows have been slow to resume in quantity and remained below pre-war
levels six months after the fall of Saddam. Economic opportunity in Iraq remains mediocre for
most; street violence and vigilante justice remain serious problems with little sign of
improvement since April. If current trends continue, it will soon be the case that twice as many
Americans will have died since May 1, when President Bush landed on the aircraft carrier to
declare major combat operations over, than during the overthrow of Saddam. Attacks on U.S.
forces have also increased in number of late. Increasing ambushes of supply convoys and
greater use of improvised explosive devices by Iraqi insurgents were among the more disturbing
For a good critique of how these kinds of metrics were misused in Vietnam, see Andrew Krepinevich, The Army
and Vietnnm.
645
trends of the late summer and early fall period.^ And according to comments in early October by
Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez, head of U.S. ground forces, in Iraq, "The enemy has evolved. It is a
little bit more lethal, little bit more complex, little bit more sophisticated and, in some cases, a
little bit more tenacious."'*
It seems hard to believe that, could he have known in advance how difficult the postwar period
would be, Mr. Bush would have made his famous celebratory landing on a U.S. aircraft carrier
on May 1 and triumphantly declared the end of major combat operations — an attempt at careful
phraseology that could not hide the fact that the president seemed to be taking a victory lap and
calling the war over, when it clearly was not.
That said, on the prognosis for Iraq's future, the Bush administration is at least partly and
perhaps even mostly right. Negative headlines need to be quickly countered with good news, of
which there is an abundance. This is not to whitewash the situation. Rather, it is to paint a
balanced picture and establish a proper benchmark for measuring future progress.
Most of Iraq is now generally stable, and the curfew in Baghdad has been lifted in time for
Ramadan. By October's six-month anniversary of the fall of Saddam, national electricity levels
had reached pre-war levels and were approaching that objective in Baghdad. Several thousand
small businesses had ref>ortedly opened by September, a modest number in a country of Iraq's
size, to be sure, but a very healthy step in the right direction. Iraq also had an independent
central bank and new currency by October.^
Most Iraqi towns had their own indigenous ruling councils; the national Governing Council had
been named and in turn chosen a cabinet. Nearly all of Iraq's 400 courts were functioning; all 65
institutes of higher learning and all 240 hospitals, as well as almost all primary and secondary
schools and 1 ,200 health clinics, had also opened.'
Attacks on American forces remain numerous, and October has been a tough month for U.S.
troops. But overall trends in American casualties are not worsening with time. Many hundreds
of Iraqi resistance fighters, and almost three-fourths of the leaders on the famous deck of cards,
are now dead or captured. Iraqi security forces numbered 60,000 personnel by early October,
including police and army and border guards and a civil defense corps-with steady progress
underway towards achieving a total near 200,000 within a couple years.
GAINING A MORE COMPLETE PICTURE OF POST-SADDAM IRAQ
Both the positive spin and the negative spin of what is happening in Iraq are largely anecdoctal —
compilations of convenient facts with little analytic framework for putting them together. How
do we know which news, the good or the bad, is more important? How do we detect u-ends? And
how can we assess the importance of being so exposed internationally, with little help from key
' See for example, Jessica Mathews, "Iraqis Can Do More," Washington Post. September 29, 2003, p. 19.
* Theola Labbe, "Enemy Is 'More Lethal," U.S. General Says, Washington Post. October 3. 2003, p. 15.
' Donald H. Rumsfeld, "Help Iraq to Help Itself," Wall Street Journal. September 29, 2003.
See for example. Ambassador L. Paul Bremer, "Iraq Six Months Progress Report: Talking Points," October 9,
2003, available at www.cpa-iraq .org and www.defenselink.mil.
646
friends and allies, in the mission in Iraq?
There are no definitive answers to these questions, of course, but a few rules of thumb can
increase the odds of seeing things clearly. First, track all data of relevance regardless of whether
one is selling optimism or pessimism. Two, track it over time, so that trends can be detected.
And third, with as much information in hand as possible, attempt to place it in perspective — to
use some kind of broader argument about how to succeed in counterinsurgency operations that
can help make the disparate data more than the sum of the confusing and contradictory parts.
This latter effort will require subjective judgment and lead to disagreement, of course. But it is
better to debate using serious arguments about how counterinsurgency campaigns are won and
lost than selective factoids.
The attached tables, which will be updated and expanded on the Brookings website in coming
weeks and months, are a first cut at compiling and presenting key data more systematically. It
organizes data into two broad categories, both critical in a successful counterinsurgency —
secunty and economics. We attempt to display information for as broad a set of useful indicators
as data availabiUty allows. In the security sphere, it is necessary to try to assess progress in the
counterinsurgency. progress in reducing crime rates, and progress in building Iraqi security
services. In the economic realm, it is necessary to have information relating both to quahty of
life — availability of water, electricity, cooking gas, and so on — as well as to employment and
economic recovery. Some types of information are now more readily accessible than other
kinds, meaning that our tables are incomplete works in progress.
A third category of effort in counterinsurgency, politics, is harder to track using quantitative
data. That is especially because Iraq now has local governments throughout almost all the
country as well as a Governing council, so future progress will be dependent more on how well
they do their jobs and how quickly they estabUsh legitimacy among the population than on
increases in their ranks. An imperfect proxy for this is polling data showing how the Iraqi
population feels about the foreign presence in its country and about the general direction of
political life within the country. Here the verdict remains mixed. Polls show that a clear
majority of Iraqis want coalition forces to stay and believe that life will gradually improve in the
post-Saddam era. But the majority also feels frustrated and worried about internal political
trends — and a sizeable minority with the potential to do great harm opposes the basic course of
events in Iraq.
Beyond the information already outlined above, where the news is either clearly good or clearly
bad, a few other matters where the news is mixed warrant further elucidation and explanation.
To begin, in the security sphere, crime rates are too high in Iraq, but they are neither worsening
nor appreciably higher than in a number of crime-prone societies in the world. Second, Iraqi
security forces are nowhere near adequate in number, or for that matter in quality, but their ranks
are now quickly increasing.
Within the economic domain, electricity levels are finally recovering but are still not where they
should be, particularly in Baghdad. Employment levels nationwide remain too low. Although a
number of businesses have been created, and market activity is much more lively, available data
do not yet show a substantial increase in employment levels. Nor can they demonstrate that Iraq
647
yet has a notably healthier economic base that will eventually survive the departure of the large
foreign presence and its associated large but artificial economic stimulus.
The way in which many of these trends go in the coming months will say much about Iraq's
prognosis. But how do we evaluate progress in a situation where some data remain promising
and other data troublesome, as is quite likely to prove the case? To get beyond an analysis that
amounts to Uttle more than a ledger of good and bad — that is, to get beyond the debate of the
factoids — a broader analytical framework for understanding counterinsurgency is needed.
PRINCIPLES FOR SUCCESSFUL COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS
In conducting a counterinsurgency, one ultimately needs to defeat dedicated guerrillas while
reducing the proclivity of others to join their ranks. In theory, if the insurgent loss rate exceeds
its pace of recruiting, time should be on the side of the counterinsurgency. In practice, as we
learned in Vietnam, measuring these two respective trends is very hard. Accurate determination
of the Viet Cong "crossover rate" where losses exceeded new recruits was extremely elusive.
But the weight of evidence in Iraq still gives grounds for optimism — and not just because,
viewed over the course of its history, the United States has tended to be fairly good at
counterinsurgency. First, the tragic truck bombings of August did not recur in September, as we
have taken overdue steps to protect high-value targets from such standard terrorist tactics. Even
the synchronized truck bombings of October 27, as terrible as they were, did not collectively
cause a iugher casualty toll than most of the individual bombings of earher months. And the
September assassination of a Governing Council member, Akila Hashimi, has led to better
protection for top Iraqi officials — again, something we should have done sooner but are doing
now. Similarly, even though insurgent tactics have evolved and improved as General Sanchez
noted, U.S. casualty rates have not increased smce their summer highs.
Second, the most numerous element of the insurgency facing U.S. troops is made up of former
Saddam loyalists or Baathists — and they are a hnuted lot. Moreover, they are diminishing with
time as coahtion forces attack and arrest them. For example, in the region north of Baghdad now
run by Gen. Ray Odiemo's 4th Infantry Division, some 600 fighters have been killed and 2,500
arrested in recent months, most of the latter remaining in custody. Not all of these are Baathists,
to be sure, but with such attrition rates, a group of fighters that probably numbered 10,000 to
20,000 at peak strength will decline significantly over time -- especially because it has no
appealing ideology with which to attract more members (unless we so mishandle the operation as
to make anti-Americanism that rallying ideology - a prospect that remains unlikely at present,
given our plans to intensify reconstruction efforts and tum over power to Iraqis quickly.) Around
Tikrit, Hussein's hometown, and other parts of the northern "Sunni triangle," for example, former
regime loyalists have been sufficiently weakened that they need reinforcements from other parts
of Iraq to continue many of their efforts.
Despite a dubious decision by Ambassador Paul Bremer to disband the Iraqi army and ban even
mid-level Baathists from positions of influence, the Bush administration generally has a sound
' See Max Boot, The Savage Wars of Peace (2002).
648
strategy of trying to exonerate most Iraqis who cooperated with the former regime while
punishing only the top leadership. As for the latter, most Baathists from the famous deck of
cards are now off the street. Many second-tier loyalists of the former regime are also being
arrested or killed daily.
Common criminals are numerous, especially since Saddam opened the prisons last year. But
they are unorganized and are increasingly meeting their match in coalition troops and a growing
Iraqi police force. Meanwhile, the growing numbers of Iraqi security forces are already helping
with patrols and protection of fixed infrastructure — making the overall operation more
indigenous and thus presumably more legitimate in Iraqi eyes, while also reducing the number of
missions putting U.S. troops at acute risk.
Jihadists, including members of Ansar al-Islam and possibly al Qaeda, are a serious problem, and
perhaps the greatest reason for long-term worry. But there are means to deal with them. First, we
can improve border security to force the jihadists to enter Iraq in smaller numbers, a policy
already being put into effect. Second, we can train Iraqi border guards to help — again, a policy
that is being implemented, even if the intended total number of Iraqi border agents may now be
too small (less than 10,000, numbers more appropriate for patrolling intra-European borders than
Iraq's much rougher and longer frontiers). Third, to the extent that the Baathist resistance can be
contained and stability and a decent quality of life restored to the country, coalition forces will be
more likely to benefit from human intelligence — that is, from Iraqis providing information about
the identities, locations, and plans of terrorist elements. This last piece is of course a tall order,
and is another way of saying that success will develop its own momentum — if we can get to the
point where we are widely perci ived as succeeding.
There is no nationalist ideology likely to appeal to most Iraqis of the type western powers faced
in Algeria, Vietnam, and elsewhere. Most Iraqis do not feel openly hostile to the U.S. -led foreign
presence according to polls; indeed, some 70 percent are optimistic about the country's future
prospects.
In addition, in these counterinsurgency operations, American troops are following much better
practices than they did in Vietnam. Firepower is generally being used quite carefully, even if
mistakes such as the accidental killing of some 10 Iraqi policemen in September are sometimes
made, and even if the coalition's initial raiding tactics were sometimes culturally insensitive.
Regional commanders are hiring Iraqis to help with recovery and reconstruction, a key kind of
foreign assistance effort that Congress must continue to support. Moreover, while insurgents
have displayed the full range of standard terrorist tactics - truck bombings, assassinations, use of
remotely detonated explosives, mortar and rocket attacks — they are neither very sophisticated
nor organized at the national level.
Much can obviously still go wrong. A few more key assassinations or devastating truck
bombings of the type witnessed in August and a sense of pessimism about the prospects of the
U.S. -led effort could snowball, making it easier for extremist Iraqis to incite the public to
violence. A few stretches like that of the last few days would not be helpful, especially if
bunched together closely in time. More delay in the economic recovery could have similar
political effects. Many Shia may tilt in fundamentalist directions. More likely, Sunni Arabs, less
649
than 20 percent of the population but accustomed to having their own kind run the countrj', could
resist a democratic form of government in which their mfluence (or at least their access to the
spoils of power) may appear less than it was under Saddam.
But, once one accepts we are still at war, and attempting something that is among the most
complex missions ever undertaken by the United States, the state of affairs in Iraq and recent
trends in that country do not look so disconcerting. Things are getting gradually better even as
we progress towards an exit strategy that should further defuse extremist sentiment. We have
gotten fairly good at countennsurgency and nation building. Ironically, that is a legacy the
Clinton administration bequeathed the Bush administration that is helping the latter enormously
right now. And the Iraqi insurgency is unlikely to have the broad appeal that makes certain
guerrilla movements succeed in history. But all of these conclusions are subject to revision as
funher events and information roll in — and we would all do well to view the latter with open
minds regardless of where our views on Iraq stand at present. This mission is too important to
allow to fail, and if it does show signs of failure we must react and adjust promptly.
650
55 MOST WANTED IRAQIS STILL AT LARGE
Month
Iraqi 55 most
wanted:
Individuals still at
large
April
40
May
28
June
23
July
19
August
16
September
IS
October
tbrougli
Oct 27
IS
Total
as of Oct 27
IS
651
ATTACKS ON U.S. TROOPS
CIVILIAN DEATHS IN BAGHDAD
Month
Typical number of daily
attacks on U.S. troops
Baghdad civilians dead in
questionable circumstances
by V.S. troops'
May
610 SO"
11
June
10 to 25'
24
July
MtoZS*
20'
August
15to20*
27'
September
N/A
12"
October
201035'
N/A
N/A= Not available.
' Human Rights Watch, "Heam and Minds: Post-War Civihan Deaths in Baghdad Closed by U.S. Forces." Report Ociober 2003 Vol. IS No 9,
Appendix I- Reported Civihan Deaths in Baghdad, May 1 "September 30". p. 49
' Jim Gaiajnone, "T^iunber of Attacks in Iraq Constanl, Enemy Tactics Change." Amtncan Forces Information Service News Article. October 6.
2003
' Dana Miltaolt.. "Bush Acknowledges Troops Face Danger. Assessment o( Iraq Mission Tooed Do>vn." Washington Post. July 1 1 . 2003
' Dana Priest, "Rumsfeld Touts US Success', Defense Chief Says Attacks WiU Not Deter Forces in Iraq," Washington Post. September 06.
2003
' Two of the deaths included in July are based on complaints filed with the poUce during that month
* Dana Priest, "Rumsfeld Touts US Success'; Defense Chief Says Atucks Win Not Deter Forces in Iraq," Washington Post. September 06.
2003.
' One death included in August is based on a complaint filed with the pohce during that month
' One death included in September is based on i complaini filed with the pohce diuing that month Two undated deaths have been inchided in this
month's casually toll
' R^iv Cbandrasekatan, "Atucks on Troops on Rise. Commander Says." Washington Post, October 23. 2003.
652
NON-U.S. TROOP CONTRIBUTIONS
Monlh
Non-U.S. troop
coDtributions in place
May
40,000'
June
12.000'
July
13;i73'
August
16,000*
September
22,000'
October
24,000'
N/A= Not available.
' Peter Slevui and Venion Loeb, "Plan lo Secure Post war haq Faulted. Pentagon Ignored Lessons From Decade of Peacekeeping. Critics Say."
Washington Post.. May 19. 2003.
' Ann Scon Tyson. Troop Morale in Iraq Hits "Rock Bottom." Christian Science Monitor, July 7. 2003
* "Intemanonai Participatioa in Iraq. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs July 23. 2003." Coalition Provisional
Authority, Bnefing material given to author by CPA/DoD during viat to Iraq September 22-25. 2003.
'"Iraq Status Update: 1 8 September 03: Stability Contributors. U.S. Department of Defense . Bnefmg material made available by CPA/DoD to
author during visit to Iraq September 22-25 2003.
'Dana Milbank and Colum Lynch, "Bush Fails to Gain Pledges on Troops Or Funds for Iraq National Guard. Reserve May Plug
HoXks ."Washington Post, September 25, 2003.
' Jonathan S. Landay "U.S. Makes New U.N. Bid for Iraq Help" Philadelphia Inquiier. October 14, 2003.
653
TRAINING OF IRAQI SECURITY FORCES
Mootb
Iraqi security forces on duty 1
Police
Iraqi Civil Defense
Corps
Army
(400,000
under
Saddam')
Border patrol
May
7,0OO-»,00O'
N/A
0
N/A
June
^^/A
N/A
0
N/A
July
30,000^
N/A
0
N/A
August
34.000'
N/A
e
2300'
September
37,000'
2400'
0
N/A
October
40,000*
6,000'
2400""
4,700"
N/A= Not available
' /Vlex Berensoo, "The Stniggle for Iraq Security Force. Iraqi's New Army Gets Slow Start," Nov York Times September 2 1 . 2003
^ Scott Wilson. "Bremer Shifts Focus to New Iraqi Ecooomy. US (Dccupatioo Chief Cites Progress oo Restonog Order." Washmgion Post. May
27. 2003
' Coalition Fimisional Authority., CPA Daily; Key Facts Security. 17 July 2003 ( www.cpa-iraq org )
' Coalition Provisional Security: Results in Iraq: 100 days Toward Secunty and Freedom." Highlights of the Renewal of Iraq and the End of
Saddam's Regime." August 8. 2003.
' CoaliDoo Provisional Authority, Paul L Bremer IH, U.S. Presidential Special Envoy to Iraq Briefiog Baghdad, Iraq August 23. 2003.
' Alex Bereoson, " The Struggle for Iraq: Secunty Force; Iraqis' New Army Gets Slow Stan." New York Times, September 21 . 2003
Lieutenant General Ricardo SaiKhez. Commander. Coahtioo Ground Forces, Baghdad, Iraq Bnefing. September 4. 2003.
' "The Struggle for Iraq: Six Months. Iraq Math: Visible Gains Minus Losses." New York Times. October 10. 2003
' Thomas E Ricks "Reduction in US Troops Eyed for 'O*: Gradual Exit Strategy Tied to Iraq's Subihly," Washington Post. October 19.2003.
" Ibid
"'Transcript of President Bush's Radio Address to die Narion for October 4, 2003, " White House Office of the Press Secretary .
654
U.S. TROOP LOSSES
Month
U.S. trooD losses since Mav 1. 2003'
April
Fatalities'
(all lands)
Fatalities in
hostile incidents
Fatalities in non hostile
incident:
May
40
9
31
June
29
15
14
July
47
35
12
August
36
14
22
September
27
14
13
Through
Oct 27
34
25
9
Total
as of Oct 27
213'
112'
101'
' Monthly esdmaics based oa casualty reports made available in CAW Special Rtport "Forces: U.S 4 Coalition/Casualties"
(http;//edition.cnn.coin/SPECIALS/2003/iiaq/fOTces/casualties/.) Up until May 1. 2003, Operatioo Iraqi Freedom caused 138 tioop casualties. Of
those, 114 were the result of hostile actioo. and 24 the result of oon-hostile action. Depanmtnt of Defense,: "Operation Iraqi Freedom U.S.
Casualty Suius" (bttp //www defenseUnkmiUnews/)
'Ibid
' Depanment of Defease: "Operatioo Iraqi Freedom U.S. Casualty Status" http7/www defenselinkmil/oews/
•ibid.
'nriii.
655
POLLING BAGDHAD PUBLIC OPINION'
Question
Findings
Will Iraq be in a better
condition five years from
now than it was before the
U.S.-led invasion?^
Better off; 67%
Worse off; 8%
Is Iraq better off now than it
was before the invasion?'
Better off; 33%
Worse off; 47%
Was ousling Saddam worth
the hardships endured since
the invasion?*
Yes: 62%
No; N/A
Would you like to see U.S.
troops stay longer than a
few more months?
Stay longer; 71%
Not suy longer: 26%
Are there circumstances in
which attacks against U.S.
troops can be justified?
Yes: 19%
No; N/A
Sometimes justified; 17%
Have you been afraid at
times to go outside your
home during the day within
the past four weeks?
Yes: 60%
No: N/A
N/A= Not available.
' The Gallop polls ciied ait of 1. 178 adults and were cooducled between Aug 8 and Sept 4 2003 They both have a margin of errai of plus or
nuaus 3 percentage points " Will Lester "Poll Rnds Bagdad Residents Glad to Be Rid of Saddam," Aisoaaud Press. September 24, 2003 Will
Lester. " Poll Suggests Most in Baghdad Don't Want Troops to Leave too CJuickly," ^socmitd Press, October 1 3, 2003
' Will Lester Toll Rnds Baghdad Residents Glad to Be Rid of Saddam." Associaud Press. September 24, 2003
'Ibid
'Ibid.
656
CRIME RELATED DEATHS IN BADGHAD
MoDtb
Homidde in
Baghdad'
Annualized liomicide rate
per 100,000 citizens'
(For comparison
Washington DC rate: 45^2')
May
4«2
145.92
June
626
197.64
July
751'
237.12
August
872
274.48
September
6«7»
210.6
October
N/A
N/A
N/A= Not available.
' Neil MacFarquar. "The Smiggk for baq: Life ill Baghdad. Open War Over. Iraqis Focus on Crime aod a Hunl for Jobs. " New York Times,
September 16. 2003 Number of deaths that ocanred under suspicious circumstances and therefore is bebeved to have been 3 result of crime as
stated by Baghdad Central Morgue
' Based on an estimated population of 3.8 million people. (Source. United Sutes Slate Department, "Background Note Iraq")
' The Baghdad murder rate can be compared to that of Washington DC. FBI Uniform Crime Report estimates that the capital has an annual
homicide rate of 45.82/100.000 residents
* Neil MacFarquar. "The Struggle for Iraq: Ufe in Baghdad; Open War Over. Iraqis Focus on Cnmc and a Hunt for Jobs," New York Times..
September 16, 2003 The number for the previous July, one of that year's most fatal months, was 237 deaths.
' "Unspeakable Savagery on the Streets of Baghdad." Irish Times. October 10, 2003.
657
NATIONWIDE UNEMPLOYMENT RATE
Month
Unemployment
rate
nation wide
May
N/A
June
N/A
July
N/A
August
>50%'
September
60%'
October
50-70%'
N/A= Not available
' Ann Scon Tyson. "Iraqis Sample Free Eoierprise, " Chrisnofi Science Momwr August 19.2003
"•'Who'll Help US'" We Ourselves. Mostly - Rebuilding baq. " Special Report Financial Times. U S Edition. Septeml>er 13. 2(X)3
' Direcior of Employment. Fatin Al-Sieda, Iraqi Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs US Department of Defense BrieHng October 23. 2003
M2 Press Wire 'The number referred to in the matiu is a rough approiumabon of the employmcoi situation As noted by Ms AJ-Saeda 'There
are no employmeni siaiisiics for Iraq "
658
ELECTRICITY AND FUEL
Electricity
Oil
production
natioomde
Fuel supplies available to population |
Time
Nation
wide
Baghdad
Crude OB '
Diesel'
Kerosene^
Total
GasoUne
(Prod. 4
Imp.*)
Total LPG
(Prod.i
Imp')
Estimated
pre-war
level
4000M
2500M'
21
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
May
N/A
300MW'
0.3
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
June
N/A
707 MW"
0.675
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
July
N/A
1082
0.925
65"
475"
13.5
1875
Aug.
N/A
1283
1.445
10.25
6.2
14.0
2525
SepL
N/A
1229
MW"
1.55"
10.5'"
4.95
16"
3025
Oct.
4417"
N/A
l'"
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
Sia(«d Coal:
N/A
2500MW
October*
3.1"
14.9^
77"
15»
4,100 "
N/A= Not avajlable
' Millions of barrels per day ("Iraq Status Update: .8 September 03 Progress on Prionlies: Fuel Status Update." US Deparmuni of Defense.
Briefing matcnal made available by CPA/DoD to author during visit to Iraq September 22-2S 2003.
^ Millions of liters/week Ibid.
' MjUions of liters/week. Ibid.
' MilLons of bters/week. Ibid.
^ Millions of bters/week. Ibid.
'CTA Daily 8 July 2003, " Coalition Provisional Authority, (www qja-iraq.org)
"Iraq Status Update 18 September 03 Progress on Priorities: National Power Update; Power/Baghdad," US. Departmtni of Defense Briefing
materia) made available by CPA/DoD to author during visit to Iraq September 22-25 2003
' "Talking Points - Iraq Six Month Progress Report - Oct 9, 2003 VS. Dep of Defense
' "Iraq Stams Update: 18 Septeitiber 03 Progress on Prionties National Power Update, Power/Bagbdad." US Department of Defense. Briefing
material made available by CPA/DoD to author during visit to Iraq September 22-25 2003
'" Ibid
" Based on two week estimate "Iraq Status Update: 18 September 03: Progress on Priorities: Fuel Status Update," VS. Department of Defense
Briefing material made available by CPA/DoD to author during visit to Iraq September 22-25 2003.
" Based on two week csbmate Ibid
" "Iraq Status Update: 18 September 03: Progress on Priorities; National Power Update, Power/Baghdad," V S Department of Defense.
Briefing material niade available by CPA/DoD to author during visit to Iraq September 22-25 2003
'* Based on two week esomaic. "Iraq Slants Update: 18 September 03: Progress on Priorities; Fuel Status Update." US Department of Defenst.
Briefing matenal trade available by CPA/DoD to author dunng visit to Iraq September 22-25 2003.
'^ Based on two week estimate. Ibid.
" Based on two week estimate. Ibid
" Based on two week estunate Ibid
" Thorn Shanker, "Wolfowitz's Hotel Is Attacked in Baghdad," New York Titnes. October 26. 2003
Associated Press, "Oil Flow fiom N Iraq Stops After Brief Start." Washington Post. October 19, 2003.
*'"lraq Stams Update: 18 September 03; Progress on Priorities: National Power Update; Power/Baghdad." VS. Department of Defense Briefing
material made available by CPA/DoD to author during visit to Iraq September 22-25 2003
Millions of liters/week. "Iraq Status Update; 18 September 03: Progress on Priorities: Fuel Status Update," VS Department of Defense.
Briefing material made available by CPA/DoD to author during visit to Iraq September 22-25 2003
Millions of liters/week Ibid
Millions of Uters/week. Ibid.
Milhoos of liters/week. Ibid.
Millions of bters/week. Ibid.
659
Marina Ottaway
Senior Associate Democracy and Rule of Law Project
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Testimony Prepared for the Hearings on "Iraqi Reconstruction and Stability
Operations: The Way Forward,"
U.S. House of Representatives, Armed Services Committee,
October 29, 2003
The stabilization of Iraq depends not only on progress in re-establishing security,
but also on the formation of an Iraqi government enjoying domestic and international
legitimacy. The installation of such government would reduce opposition to the American
presence among Iraqis, prove to the world that the United States will not stay in Iraq as
an occupying power longer than absolutely necessary, and facilitate the introduction of
political and economic reforms that can only be undertaken by a sovereign Iraqi
government. In helping set up an elected, fully sovereign Iraqi government, however, the
United States is caught between the need for speed and the need to allow sufficient time
for the Iraqis to negotiate extensively and reach an agreement on the many controversial
issues involved in designing a new political system. As the United States' own historical
experience shows, crafting a political system that reconciles the demands and allays the
fears of different groups is a demanding and time consuming task.
The administration still hopes that an Iraqi constitution can be written and
approved in six months and elections held in about a year. This quick process also
responds to growing Iraqi and international pressure for a speedy transfer of sovereignty
from the Coalition Provisional Authority to an Iraqi government, as well as to domestic
pressure to limit the mounting financial and human costs of the occupation. While the
desire for moving so quickly is understandable, encouraging such an accelerated process
would be highly dangerous. The experience of many other countries emerging from civil
conflict or forcible regime change shows that hurriedly organized elections often create
more problems than they solve. Much more thorough political preparation is needed for
elections to produce meaningful and lasting results.
Undoubtedly Paul Bremer and the Coalition Provisional Authority have the
technical resources to rush a constitution into place and race through the logistical
challenges involved in setting up elections. But short-circuiting the process of domestic
discussion, negotiation, and consensus-building that should accompany the crafting of a
new Iraqi political system would be unwise. It would likely result in political institutions
and processes that many Iraqis feel little connection to and that do not command the
loyalty or respect of some key political actors. Worse still, early elections might provoke
precisely the sort of civil conflict that the United Stataes hopes so much to avoid.
Despite these dangers, delaying the elections is not a viable option. The U.S.
government decided early on after ousting Saddam Hussein that a transfer of sovereignty
back to an Iraqi govemnient would take place only once elections are held. As a result.
660
the election timetable is hostage to the inexorably growing pressure for sovereignty. It
did not have to be that way. Other countries emerging from conflict and regime change
under some kind of external occupying or administering force have regained domestic
sovereignty before having elections. Afghanistan is just one example. After the defeat of
the Taliban in October 2001, Afghanistan quickly gained its own interim administration,
led by President Karzai, and a detailed transition roadmap, finalized in Bonn in
December 2001 . With sovereignty and a roadmap for transition already in hand, Afghans
have been willing to wait for elections. The planned elections of next year will take place
close to three years after the end of the war. In Iraq, however, the United States made a
different choice, and it would be both difficult and unwise to go back on the commitment
to transfer full sovereignty only to an elected Iraqi government.
With elections the gate to sovereignty in Iraq, there is only one way to reconcile
the imperative of holding early elections with the need for a lengthy process of political
consensus building and institutional creation. This is to limit the first phase of
constitution writing to an interim constitution and hold elections under that interim
constitution for a constituent assembly and an interim government of national unity. This
would produce an elected government to which the United States could hand over
sovereignty and create an institutional framework to carry out a longer-term, less hurried
effort to write a permanent constitution and create permanent democratic institutions.
Even with more time Iraqis may not reach the compromises necessary to make a
democratic system work. The history of Iraq is one of political strife kept in check only
by authoritarian governments capable of strong-arming all existing political forces into
submission. This is not a particularly good starting point for building democracy, but it is
the reality on the ground, one that makes it all the more important not to rush the process.
The Danger of Premature Elections
Rushing to elections in countries emerging from conflict or sudden regime
collapse often prevents the necessary process of negotiation over the basic political rules
and bargains for a new democratic system. Holding elections without a solid underlying
political consensus on the rules and substance of a new political system presents at least
two major dangers.
First, some of the major political forces may lack confidence that if they do
poorly in the elections their basic interests will still be protected by the system. They may
refuse to accept the results unless they win. Several examples of such rejection of results
occurred in the 1990s, with different but equally undesirable outcomes. After a long civil
war in Angola and then an uncertain peace agreement, the two rival armed movements,
disguised as political parties but still armed, agreed to participate in elections in 1992.
Each side assumed it would win; neither was seriously committed to a democratic
process. International technocrats under UN supervision performed logistical miracles in
pulling off the elections, for naught. The losing party launched another military offensive
within days of the elections and ten more years of civil war followed.
In Cambodia, opposition parties emerged victorious from UN-sponsored elections
held two years after the 1991 peace agreement that brought the long-ruruiing civil war to
661
3
an end. But the incumbent leader, Hun Sen, refused to accept the results. Still in control
of the bureaucracy and the military, he forced the parliament to accept the formation of a
government headed by two prime ministers — himself and the head of the winning party.
Before long, however, he grew discontented with sharing power and seized fiill power
militarily.
And in Liberia, elections imposed by the international community in 1997
reconfirmed the dominant position of Charles Taylor, the victorious leader of the armed
group that had devastated the country in years of war. Liberians gave Taylor a majority
vote not because they liked him but because they realized he would not allow himself to
be sidelined by an electoral loss and would plunge the country back into war in response
to an unfavorable showing. Elections that promised at least stability and perhaps the start
of a political liberalization process brought neither. Taylor ruled repressively and
opposition forces returned to fighting. The country lapsed again into disastrous civil war,
prompting recently another round of international intervention, led by West African
peace keepers, with minor U.S. support.
The second danger of early elections is that they can increase the power of
radical, uncompromising groups. Such political forces tend to be the first to organize in
post-conflict situations and do well in hurried elections. Citizens divided along ethnic or
religious lines are often wary of the ability of a fragile new political system to protect
their core identity-based interests and vote for radicals who promise to defend such
interests by any means.
Bosnia is a telling example in this regard. At the insistence of the international
powers occupying the country after the 1995 Dayton Accords, Bosnia held elections just
nine months after the peace agreement was reached. In those elections, which are now
widely viewed by political analysts as a setback for reconciliation and democratization,
radical nationalist forces on all three sides of the ethnic divide defeated more moderate
groups. New, more moderate parties had insufficient time to organize. Voters, still
unsure whether the new system would really protect them, rewarded the radicals.
The dangers of rejection and of radicalization are present in Iraq. The most
visible groups on the emergent political scene are those with clear ethnic or regional
identities. In a hurried political campaign the more radicalized groups and the sharper
messages are likely to stand out. Other groups, such as the new moderate, secular
organizations and the formerly exiled organizations that the United States has hoped
would become major domestic forces, are only just beginning to develop their base.
Moreover, the major groups that have already emerged may not easily abide by elections
results if those results thwart their ambitions or exacerbate their grievances. The Kurdish
parties have governed a virtually independent region of Iraq for a decade and would
likely be loath to submit to any elected government that attempted to curb their
autonomy. The Shi'ia clerics already have a wide political base and a surging sense of
political destiny, one they might be unwilling to abandon if electoral results did not give
them what they want. The Sunnis elite, struggling with the calamitous loss of their
dominant position, are unlikely to be very happy with what elections will bring them.
662
Crafting a Political System in Iraq
In building a new political system, Iraqis will have to reach agreement on an
almost overwhelming number of difficult, divisive political issues. The most important
and divisive, but by no means the only, issues that will arise in writing a constitution
include the following:
• In devising a federal system for Iraq, which many groups favor, critical
decisions will be necessary about the boundaries of the new internal states and
the degree of autonomy they possess. The Kurds have already drafted a
constitutional proposal calling for a federation composed of one Kurdish and
one Arab state, with significant autonomy for the states. Other Iraqis want to
see states with less autonomy and with boundaries set in accordance with
population size and geography, disregarding ethnic and religious lines. Still
others would be interested in boundaries that maximize Shi'ia power, or
enhance Sunni influence, or protect minorities.
• A fundamental choice will need to be made whether to have a presidential or a
parliamentary system. The presidential system would be in keeping with the
strong executive tradition of Iraq and other Arab countries but would raise the
specter of a return to strongman rule. A parliamentary system would be less
threatening but more alien, and could be more easily paralyzed by dissension
and instability.
• Equally hard and contentious will be the decision whether to incorporate, and
if so, how to incorporate into Iraq's new constitution and legal institutions the
principles derived from the vast body of Islamic laws and interpretation
knows as the sharia.
In addition to constitutional issues, Iraq will also face major choices in
establishing the core laws and procedures necessary for the construction of a democratic
electoral process, including the following:
• In adopting a new electoral system, should Iraq opt for a system of
proportional representation, for single member districts, or for a mixed
system? Proportional representation is favorable to small parties and can
potentially allow better representation of national minorities. It also can lead
to unstable legislatures. With their winner-take-all quality, single member
constituencies tend to eliminate small parties and render it more difficult to
achieve representation for minorities. But they are often relatively stable and
create stronger ties between elected representatives and their constituents.
• In writing a law on political parties there will arise critical issues about their
registration. For example, should the registration of parties with a religious
identity be allowed, creating the possibility of an Islamist victory or at least a
strong Islamist voice in government? Or should such parties be outlawed as
incompatible with liberal democracy, leading a part of the population to feel
disenfranchised?
663
5
• Establishing a voter registration system will be more than a technical
challenge; it will require choices with important pohtical implications.
Ideally, the registration of voters should be preceded by a national census and
the issuance of identity cards and voter registration cards to all Iraqis. But a
census before next summer is out of the question, partly because of time,
partly because census taking in countries with a heterogeneous population and
poor record keeping is a politically charged exercise that can upset carefully
constructed balances. Though countries facing transitional elections often do
register voters without a prior census, the result is frequently controversial.
Minorities complain they are under represented and opposition groups blame
their poor performance on inaccurate voter lists.
These myriad constitutional, legal, and procedural issues will inevitably arise in
crafting a new political system in Iraq. They would be contentious in any context. They
will be particularly difficult to solve in Iraq given its ethnic and religious divisions, its
history of conflict and repression, and its lack of experience with even partial efforts to
democratize. This does not mean that reaching consensus is impossible and that Iraq can
never be democratic. It only means that these issues need to be thoroughly aired and
compromises must be negotiated at length. Thus expectations for a rapid process are not
realistic. Fundamental issues cannot all be settled within the next nine months or even
the next year no matter how hard both Iraqis and the CPA work. Indeed the projected
timetable is extremely short even by the standards of the typical hurried post-conflict
election, which usually takes about two years to organize.
The Value of the Provisional
Under these circumstances, there are only two ways to ready Iraq for elections by
the second half of 2004. One way is to treat the process of political construction and
preparation as a technical rather than a political challenge, keeping most decisions in the
hands of very limited circle of Iraqi elites and CPA officials and minimizing wider
political negotiations and public participation in the process. Paul Bremer promised that
"the constitution will be widely circulated, discussed and debated among the Iraqi
people" and ratified in a referendum. Yet, it is impossible that the constitution could be
written, widely debated within Iraq, and voted on in the six months of the timetable for
the constitution Secretary of State Colin Powell still hopes can be met. Given its near
complete authority over political and legal matters, the CPA could give U.S.-supported
aid technocrats leeway to race the country through the logistical preparations for
elections. Constitutions, electoral systems, rules for the registration of parties, voter
registration mechanisms and all the rest can be pulled ready-made off the shelf But no
matter what miracles of organization and efficiency outside experts manage to
accomplish, Iraq will not be politically ready to adopt a permanent constitution and hold
elections leading to the formation of a government in which only the winners participate.
There are no technical shortcuts to the necessarily lengthy processes of political
compromise, consensus building, and civic education. Overlooking this fact could lead to
outcomes similar to those witnessed in Cambodia, Angola, Liberia or Bosnia.
664
6
The CPA should therefore pursue a different course. The constitution writing
beginning now should be limited to producing an interim constitution or basic law. The
document would contain a broad commitment to democratic principles and respect for
human rights; institutionally, however, it would only provide a minimalist and temporary
framework needed to elect an interim government of national unity that would rule the
country for three years, and a constituent assembly that would oversee the writing of a
permanent constitution in the same period. Under this approach the United States would
fulfill its commitment to transfer sovereignty to an elected government in the second half
of 2004, but avoid many of the risks of early elections. The elections would be for
significantly lower stakes than those currently being discussed. Yet the process would
create nascent democratic institutions that would have the legitimacy and the time
necessary to take the Iraqi political class and the society through the inevitably difficult
process of settling the many choices and dilemmas that arise in constructing a permanent
democratic system.
The interim constitution should be kept as simple as possible. It should establish
for the three-year period of interim government rule a unitary rather than a federal
system. This is not because a unitary system is the best for a democratic Iraq but because
the contentious issues of federalism cannot be quickly solved. Preferably, the interim
constitution should provide for a parliamentary system rather than a presidential one,
with proportional representation. This would avoid the dangerous winner-take-all quality
of an early election for a strong presidential post and would make the constituent
assembly as inclusive as possible. The registration of political parties should be kept
quite open to encourage new organizations to form and to dispel fears that registration
mles are being used to exclude some groups. Voter registration should proceed using a
very simple method, such as election day finger marking, to encourage a large turnout
and make as many Iraqis as possible feel they are part of the process.
Establishing an interim constitution and an interim government before moving to
a permanent constitution and permanent political insUtutions would mean deliberately
postponing many of the most difficult political choices facing Iraq. It would not mean
sweeping them under the rug, as would happen if a permanent constitution were quickly
put into place and aid technocrats took responsibility for solving the major issues of an
electoral process.
An objection that has been raised against the idea of putting the writing of the
constitution in the hands of an elected assembly is that this body would be dominated by
shi'ias, who constitute 60 percent of the population, and that this would lead to the
transformation of Iraq into a Iran-style theocracy. But not all Shi'ias support radical
Islamists — a poll conducted in August by Zogby International in four cities indicated that
only 27 percent of Shi'ias polled favored an Islamic government. Furthermore, a
constitution is never approved by a simple majority, but by a qualified majority, and this
would make it even more difficult for radicals to have their way.
The approach suggested here does not guarantee that when Iraqis eventually
confront and try to solve the challenges of building democratic institutions they will
665
reach happy compromises that all major political actors can accept. But it does increase
the probability that this will happen. In the end, some groups will lose out, as some
always do in a democratic process. The losers are more likely to accept such an outcome,
however, if the issues have been the subject of real negotiations and handled within the
framework of institutions - such as a constituent assembly — that were chosen by Iraqis
rather than the CPA.
The Bush administration is understandably anxious to have an elected government
in Baghdad, both so it can claim success in establishing democracy and begin to
implement an exit strategy. But as has been painfully learned in many countries around
the world, holding elections does not a democracy make. In some cases, elections are not
even the beginning of democracy. Elections are a necessary part of the process of
building new democratic institutions. But if elections are rushed and held without
adequate political preparation, they can provoke political conflict, distort emergent
processes of political representation, and aggravate rather than heal societal di\'isions.
The idea of a slower transition with interim steps and provisional institutions may not
seems as satisfying or decisive as a democratic big bang. And it may well be resisted by
those Iraqi political actors who stand to benefit from a rapid process that rewards those
already in a favored political position. But a more gradual process, rooted in extended
negotiation and consensus-building on the part of major domestic political actors, as well
as broader public debate and participation, corresponds to lessons from other countries
and the real needs of Iraq.
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE
RECORD
October 29, 2003
!
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN
Mr. Langvtn. What are your views about the appropriate role in reconstructed
Iraqi society for former soldiers in Saddam Hussein's army? What steps should the
CPA and Iraq Governing Council make to ensure that they do not become leaders
or actors in resistance efforts, while still not permitting them to assume visible or
influential roles in police, security, or political organizations?
Dr. O'Hanlox. I believe that all former soldiers below a specific rank (perhaps
colonel) should be eligible to apply to the new Iraqi security forces. They should be
vetted for competence, political ties, and any histor>' of violent behavior. They
should not be reconstituted into original units, but instead be eligible to join as
individusls — with the possible proviso that they may have to accept a lower rank
initially, depending on how many people of each rank apply.
Mr. Langvix. The Administration has made efforts to gain international coopera-
tion for reconstruction efforts, but has expressed concern about yielding control of
certain responsibilities. Since we need substantial international cooperation in Iraq
to reduce the stresses on our forces and the burden on our taxpayers, we must
therefore be willing to share responsibihty for Iraqi reconstruction. What, in your
opinion, are the duties to which U.S. forces are best suited, and what responsibil-
ities should be transferred to other authorities or nations?
Dr. O'Hanlon. I beheve the United Nations would do a better job than CPA of
organizing elections and rebuilding institutions like the judiciary in Iraq. I believe
most NATO forces are up to all tough security tasks even in the Sunni triangle.
Other countries' forces may sometimes have to be given more specific and somewhat
less challenging jobs such as patrolling less tense regions or guarding fixed sites
such as ammunition depots.
Dr. Ottaway. Wealthy European and Asian countries are anxious to become in-
volved in the reconstruction of Iraq, one of the most important countries in the Mid-
dle East both economically and politically.
Present US policy is an obstacle to this involvement. The United States want
other countries to provide economic and military support, but insists on maintaining
full control. Until recently, the solution to the problem would have been allowing
the United Nations to take primary responsibility for supervising the political tran-
sition, with the United States maintaining control over the military operations.
It is now too late to discuss such solution. Iraqis have become impatient with the
US occupation and nothing short of the recognition of a sovereign Iraqi government
is going to satisfy them. A period of UN tutelage has become unacceptable. The rec-
ognition of Iraqi sovereignty, however, will increase the financial commitment of
many countries that have been reluctant to engage with Iraq under the present con-
ditions. It is less likely to encourage other countries to send troops.
Mr. Langemn. In your testimony, you noted that the average Iraqi has unfavor-
able opinions of those insurgents tied with either Saddam Hussein loyalists or out-
side fringe groups. In your opinion, if the average Iraqi becomes increasingly frus-
trated with reconstruction efforts, around which groups or leaders would the opposi-
tion likely coalesce?
Mr. ZiNSMEiSTER. [The witness did not respond in a timely manner.]
Mr. Langemn. What are your views about the appropriate role in reconstructed
Iraqi society for former soldiers in Saddam Hussein's army? What steps should the
CPA and Iraq Governing Council make to ensure that they do not become leaders
or actors in resistance efforts, while still not permitting them to assume visible or
influential roles in police, security, or political organizations?
Mr. Zinsmeister. [The witness did not respond in a timely manner.]
(669)
670
Mr. Langevin. The Administration has made efforts to gain international coopera-
tion for reconstruction efforts, but has expressed concern about yielding control of
certain responsibilities. Since we need substantial international cooperation in Iraq
to reduce the stresses on our forces and the burden on our taxpayers, we must
therefore be willing to share responsibility for Iraqi reconstruction. What, in your
opinion, are the duties to which U.S. forces are best suited, and what responsibil-
ities should be transferred to other authorities or nations?
Mr. ZiNSMElSTER. [The witness did not respond in a timely manner.]
o
BOSTON PURi m
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